From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795034535; b=x3oWyPi4dKun21ql5tRl9e+d6mrRDuU7itxLCcazVLTzIGKpVQ2KNA48dhQ+9Wte/mdj jU3TCB1zIv9y3H1g00dEnDQ2YgBeRa4ncwrFBa+Bk5/1Y7w8xro7FDu39tRzhgx1SCScY dM+uKY2YYxqGzwr6tefPuw5UNzx9voJ4PD8XeClDjQMxQI5dfkWCAip7AMWwOI9LPQ945 twmAdo6wmyXOE5zhMr9yRsyu4JG2H95PWB9AfEULvVWcaaIDYoI3HQqRP61DXBUZi/MLu TnBnCmi7Xn5YexYYNg1G7L5YL8WbBYjDIDcL8hzCYwZNuiRF4zKyoLw0zJIAL/gRUyQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795034535; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID: References:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; bh=yGYFAZyPSCRNjDclcP1I3y+zEfg7NXEfs5NTufJGWEA=; b=PwuLNJgYgfeDam+z4T14vCQJcUSIQ5fRaycpLzoWWCtrf5icsBZff/ah6UkUMCN6VO2O 0kjVY2CfBscBx0vwezcNmxUfvTNcO/ve7Pj3wAUEUtoRn1rloLYgPmvxDlM4t2ymcqEe7 2th4abS+Pi6RIt0tJa9Cn7PRvqkCwaLskGg+MsFK3mcunQISiYyaDc7SuwPzedgYmhI8s sJbSYp2mOk9sXWnqbXsemiKpgNE/Mlap/rUf/f0g5A68EgNZ7N3i0s8k9kFIr9AZjWMSO iGFJvzDNrvWZaYyNvT9s0V4M9LiKixYzGjZvhtSHaKdSYYoRirvOZKPV/+xODOPJi6g== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=HOD98SOo; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPS id 0869F606A32C; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 20:42:14 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=HOD98SOo Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPSA id 04AA41F000C5; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 20:42:14 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795034534; bh=yGYFAZyPSCRNjDclcP1I3y+zEfg7NXEfs5NTufJGWEA=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To; b=HOD98SOo2y7LisIyear+vmT71uL7GcKw4TOcb4yz+HJhLShq9FVnXgPGBj0IeH7nB NkHXUPLZ6DRpt4YwIsK/2RvI8yv0k+FRz+5enF8Ej27HdLMrk4C6B2ytR0+pLqQK/z oMprkQ42FVzf6Xihen6u2RRCEMBBDP6MuBmjUaMjT1cdjCXVhnN+aewx89/JyIs4Gi z3B+N334YoohR8XLQNcnWbDUIliIcKGMIxLBPHjkMAQHHjbscX63CQ3tBhM7+cFll9 GoLv7GUXN2rPT8+o/rRkgW8EvF037oveTAIM4TQRC1KdjuJH1V1Z49qgse9IJGO+tp XSe3e2bfxSr/A== Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 22:42:10 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: David Howells Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Alexander Viro , Andrew Morton , Andy Lutomirski , Anna-Maria Behnsen , Ben Segall , Christian Brauner , David Hildenbrand , Davidlohr Bueso , Dietmar Eggemann , Frederic Weisbecker , Ingo Molnar , Jan Kara , John Johansen , Jonathan Corbet , Juri Lelli , Kees Cook , K Prateek Nayak , "Liam R. Howlett" , Lorenzo Stoakes , Manfred Spraul , Mel Gorman , Michal Hocko , Mike Rapoport , Neal Gompa , Paul Moore , Pavel Tikhomirov , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , Serge Hallyn , Shuah Khan , Steven Rostedt , Suren Baghdasaryan , Thomas Gleixner , Valentin Schneider , Vincent Guittot , Vincenzo Frascino , Vlastimil Babka , Zygmunt Krynicki Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Message-ID: References: <20261118193539.240065-1-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 09:54:32PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 09:35:26PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > OVERVIEW > > ======== > > > > A root namespace (rootns) is a kernel object backed by a file descriptor > > that binds together: > > > > 1. A full set of detached namespaces owned by a fresh user namespace. > > 2. A dedicated PID namespace for spawning processes into, signaling > > members, and polling or waiting on PID 1 exit. > > 3. An initially empty mount namespace (CLONE_EMPTY_MNTNS) populated > > directly in its target user namespace before going live, without > > inheriting host mounts or cloning staged trees, while still allowing > > new mounts to be attached at runtime. > > > > Work on this feature started in 2025 from David Howells' container object > > patch set [1], which I turned into a namespace for namespace roots and > > rebuilt around that premise. > > > > While the patch set is manually written, the original motivation came > > from isolating LLM agents. Running untrusted agent workloads made it > > clear that OCI runtimes need to minimize their live configuration > > surface. > > > > Assembling mounts, credentials, and namespaces inside helper processes > > with a half-configured container is what I see as the main challenge, > > and the existential debate around namespaces and container objects is an > > unfocused discussion topic. > > > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/155059610368.17079.2220554006494174417.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ > > > > IMPLEMENTATION > > ============== > > > > rootns_create() allocates a rootns instance backed by a pollable > > anonymous inode fd, creating a fresh owning user namespace and a full set > > of detached namespaces: empty mount (CLONE_EMPTY_MNTNS), PID, UTS, IPC, > > network, cgroup, and time. ioctl(rootnsfd, ROOTNS_GET_NSFD, nstype) > > returns nsfs file descriptors for individual member namespaces when > > standalone namespace operations are needed. > > > > Superblocks are configured directly in the target user namespace via > > fsopen(), FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS, and fsmount(), allowing unprivileged > > callers to assemble FS_USERNS_MOUNT filesystems without holding > > CAP_SYS_ADMIN in their own user namespace or entering the target user > > namespace first. move_mount(..., MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS) operates on any > > non-anonymous mount namespace fd: on an empty mount namespace it installs > > "/" onto the nullfs root once, and it attaches relative submounts both > > before entry and into live mount namespaces. > > > > Once "/" is installed, processes are spawned into the rootns via clone3() > > with CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS and struct clone_args.rootns, without mutating the > > caller in place. Pairing CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS with CLONE_VM | CLONE_VFORK > > and opening the target binary via openat2(..., RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) on the > > retained "/" mount fd allows spawning with execveat() without copying > > page tables. > > > > The first entrant becomes PID 1; once it exits and > > zap_pid_ns_processes() reaps all members, poll() reports EPOLLHUP and > > rootns_wait() returns init's exit status and rusage. rootns_kill() walks > > pid_ns->idr under tasklist_lock to signal member thread groups. > > > > CHANGES > > ======= > > > > v3: > > - The patch set size increased predominantly because the coverage of > > kselftest had to widened to cover the introduced changes. > > - Replace MOVE_MOUNT_T_ROOTNS_ROOT with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS targeting > > mnt_ns nsfs fds, and add ioctl(ROOTNS_GET_NSFD) to open member > > namespace fds (Andy Lutomirski). > > - Allow unprivileged fsopen(), FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS, and fsmount() to > > configure and mount FS_USERNS_MOUNT filesystems directly in the target > > user namespace without entering it first (Andy Lutomirski). > > - Fix locking, refcounting, credential/dumpability/timens setup, > > pivot_root() lookup, and cross-userns mount checks across copy_rootns(), > > CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS, rootns_kill(), FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS, and move_mount() > > (Sashiko). > > - Mark PowerPC rootns syscalls nospu (Sashiko). > > - Update documentation and kselftests. > > I.e. before PID 1 and /proc//ns/* existss, nsfd for namespace other > than root nsfd can be acquired as follows: > > int mnts_fd = ioctl(root_fd, ROOTNS_GET_NSFD, CLONE_NEWNS); Unprivileged caller becomes the owner of rootns->user_ns. Each mount syscall then just checks CAP_SYS_ADMIN against rootns->user_ns. The user space wiring goes along the lines of: int root_fd = rootns_create(ROOTNS_KILL_ON_CLOSE | ROOTNS_CLOSE_ON_EXEC); int mntns_fd = ioctl(root_fd, ROOTNS_GET_NSFD, CLONE_NEWNS); int tmpfs_fd = fsopen("tmpfs", 0); fsconfig(tmpfs_fd, FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS, NULL, NULL, root_fd); fsconfig(tmpfs_fd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 0); int rootfs_fd = fsmount(tmpfs_fd, 0, 0); move_mount(rootfs_fd, "", mntns_fd, "/", MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH | MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS); struct clone_args args = { .flags = CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS, .rootns = root_fd, }; pid_t pid = clone3(&args, sizeof(args)); Note that example is uncompiled :-) This example makes me feel that perhaps RootNS is not the best possible name for this but this rather should be e.g., NullNS? Br, Jarkko