From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795110716; b=hbf+HfHvm5q7yFBw+/hn16PovdsQ3Q4Slm/CSZsZXCoO4I5HGrFj5NHc1KJOaFe3M5KI WO/hI1YDQlLE1e7zwQfzYSz0kRWIWm97pr4ezr9VROLSnk/2xfcMHs7kaYHH1qx8drmzS xlSihMpu86ol9e9p23RX8VV/0Fl1aTPZGG/yZV8oGpj+VFnxcro/Dve+TNUz+sSJue252 VGB8BQtE7P9UUVCcjWLVX67y5PWj4nxn7BxdqbOql2Ubp6r7Idhn8JDTSDiYtH2z4ZDEI fPhPe/WDPjro4aZKr4Ww/5jWiIBKUlSRqrg5lJj6FzhRJIEdAJkRF3LqnRK37A9+Krg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795110716; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID: References:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; bh=+gNl9zSZClKVdpkaHWachxujrl0GYW/4jdpRJHBtw2I=; b=rUUv3XTeJrVuTAjgFitoHTtRqaJ3F6+BuVbyoUUoynxX2glJ39eHfmSULDr74ldo0Syo yd0kIY4Td7yBPrI68JJg5bnE+TyAifgdu8L9dj0XrW6Ri3udgBBZq8fsD+v4FAIsdHV3H X89GTdguxO1g/xHzdF7aVeuVfbK0eA0EKtkni2O3r2Oj7SzXar4H/RvbjEDZuQzYCAHP+ 6x/dkP7eo0VWm7oIL+MvglRy6Pv+wiEm1fP7mHnRuteSPw5c0ysbxsLpY5FP8cztfD3s8 Ew5FfGR1t7ndCejp0iWwlsjQjfcdlwrIdb5CqzLDb3oguzfmC1qGVF5GpFo4CbqLeUQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=Aiqyiiz6; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPS id C32AE606A335; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 17:51:56 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=Aiqyiiz6 Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPSA id C9C0D1F0282A; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 17:51:55 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795110716; bh=+gNl9zSZClKVdpkaHWachxujrl0GYW/4jdpRJHBtw2I=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To; b=Aiqyiiz6bl8XYtDgoUqfWd2e3ncbmubamZrPonR3TanM5FN8nXs1TLGUZGhlkVuuT Z/Ue4EeQ3x4yQzeJeyfG85WqvRWtqsNH4lYEdpAu3A+C2bZk9YHB5QkrPGQWkvmgjv hCfvjDcsGNDPETyHcrbPP8OG7SumINSK57wvUw5uBMfxWJRn4VYu9c1RffQdGSwWDa oshe3N4O6E/JQBgtV4ap/wmiPbF73n6b2qownpkX1nZJB0UFgpRI2XfhtWXgvJfVWY K2mhqgFnAygHmzLqyWV0tcVwpTtlWVMqT0DEOC9YY7Ho5PlUDa9yJqXTsF7LsR34UI UZLMuf9e92xQg== Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 19:51:52 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Josef Bacik Cc: Andy Lutomirski , Christian Brauner , Alexander Viro , David Howells , Jan Kara , Serge Hallyn , Kees Cook , Paul Moore , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Message-ID: References: <20261117231352.3816603-1-jarkko@kernel.org> <9463a969d35a7d5ec5a56aeb67644b94.josef@toxicpanda.com> X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: On Thu, Nov 19, 2026 at 07:43:11PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Thu, Nov 19, 2026 at 05:30:55PM +0000, Josef Bacik wrote: > > On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 9:46 AM Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > > cells: The dance where I create an anonymous mountns, mount stuff into > > > it, and then attach it to the cell is cute. But I think the userns > > > interaction is wrong: you are making me assemble all the mounts in > > > *my* userns and then clone the entire tree into a fresh, non-anonymous > > > mountns bound to the current userns. And that clone operation is not > > > free and serves no actual practical purpose. > > > > The copy buys us nothing, agreed. That's just what the mount API gives > > me to work with today, it's not something cells wants. If I could make > > an empty mount namespace and fill it by fd I'd use that, the "root" slot > > takes a mount namespace fd already. Extending the API for that makes > > sense to me on its own. > > > > The mount namespace staying with the builder's userns is on purpose > > though, that's what keeps the cell from mounting anything no matter what > > capabilities it was given. The builder sets the tree up and hands it > > over, so the cell only ever has what it was given, and the mount code > > isn't something it can attack from the inside. > > > > > cells: I find it *incredibly annoying* that one generally cannot put > > > new mounts into an existing container using most existing container > > > managers. I hit this on a surprisingly regular basis. You seem to be > > > baking this into the whole cells design. Why? > > > > By design. Allowing changes to a running container is what causes the > > problems. If you need another mount, tear it down and build it again. > > > > > both of you: Can we please make it possible to do the parts of this > > > that oughtn't require privilege without privilege? > > > > Agreed, we need to come up with a design for this. > > To clear things up I'm not pushing "my stuff" over "your stuff", and > I get if that is the impression I might have given :-) Apologies for > that. > > I think it is better to look where things balance. It can even lead > to something else than anyone considered (something better). I'm > all for right solution :-) Distruption is painful but useful > > E.g., MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTS is completely independent patch regardless > of patch set for what it is worth [1]. E.g., if it'd turned out that some parts of this work is useful and derivable to Cells, I'm good. Just want to make clear where I stand on this topic. I know how opionated area of kernel namespaces are, so it was not exactly an eager action from my side. Br, Jarkko Br, Jarkko