From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Bradley Morgan <bradley.morgan@linux.dev>
Cc: "Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Josef Bacik" <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] userns: security: Inform LSMs of capability check during userns creation
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2026 15:39:33 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aveDlb6PlPSVoLD9@hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261111205814.3282968-1-bradley.morgan@linux.dev>
On Wed, Nov 11, 2026 at 08:58:14PM +0000, Bradley Morgan wrote:
> Right now security_capable() gets called in create_user_ns() to snapshot
> whether the parent could setfcap, but the LSM gets zero context on where
> the check actually came from. It is the same story as setid: without a
> dedicated flag, security modules cannot tell this apart from regular
> capability checks.
>
> Add CAP_OPT_USERNS_CREATE and pass it along from create_user_ns().
This should be patch 1/N in a set that introduces a user of it
in some lsm.
> Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261111-kommt-gischt-ohnedies-469998d2f219@brauner/
> Signed-off-by: Bradley Morgan <bradley.morgan@linux.dev>
> ---
> Thanks Christian for the suggestion :).
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 2 ++
> kernel/user_namespace.c | 3 ++-
> 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 40831fab54709..d24666a0b4833 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ struct nsset;
> #define CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT BIT(1)
> /* If capable is being called by a setid function */
> #define CAP_OPT_INSETID BIT(2)
> +/* Is capable being called from the user namespace creation path? */
> +#define CAP_OPT_USERNS_CREATE BIT(3)
>
> /* LSM Agnostic defines for security_sb_set_mnt_opts() flags */
> #define SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS 1
> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> index 57b7f10be74e1..37480f6d8369f 100644
> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> @@ -134,7 +134,8 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
> * audit: the creator may never map uid 0.
> */
> ns->parent_could_setfcap =
> - !security_capable(new, parent_ns, CAP_SETFCAP, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT);
> + !security_capable(new, parent_ns, CAP_SETFCAP,
> + CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT | CAP_OPT_USERNS_CREATE);
>
> ret = ns_common_init(ns);
> if (ret)
> --
> 2.53.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-13 21:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-11 20:58 [PATCH] userns: security: Inform LSMs of capability check during userns creation Bradley Morgan
2026-11-13 21:39 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2026-11-13 21:54 ` Bradley Morgan
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