From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>,
Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>,
Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>,
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Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>, Neal Gompa <neal@gompa.dev>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>,
Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 07/13] rootns: Add rootns_enter() system call
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 22:03:34 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <avyzFnKQrNOid25y@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrWtbUFQGDOCHkxAN9O4i29ixfL5KKF1Cqw2-CjxKwC6gQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 09:42:26AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 9:09 PM Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > Multithreaded userspace daemons cannot call setns(CLONE_NEWUSER) or
> > safely mutate process-wide filesystem state in place before spawning a
> > child into a target namespace set.
> >
> > Add the rootns_enter() system call to fork a child process directly into
> > a rootns whose root mount has been installed. Transition the rootns from
> > ROOTNS_READY through ROOTNS_FORKING to ROOTNS_RUNNING for the first
> > process so it becomes PID 1, serialize concurrent entrants on waitq
> > until bootstrap resolves, and admit subsequent callers into the running
> > PID namespace until teardown begins.
> >
> > Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the target user namespace, forbid credential or
> > PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS privilege escalation
>
> Why are you disallowing this if no_new_privs?
For no any good reason at all apparently: no_new_privs is inherited by
the child and only restricts privilege gain across execve(), whereas
user_namespace transitions are allowed under it.
So yeah, it's a spurious check, and thus I'll drop it.
> This isn't necessarily a showstopper, but fork() is really quite slow
> in many cases. It would be nice to have a more spawn-like API
> available. I assume it's possible to open a file in the target's
> mountns by some sane API even without entering that mountns, as a side
> effect of how the fsopen / move_mount mechanism works.
If the caller retains the O_PATH fd returned by fsmount() for "/", it is
able to open files inside the target mount tree via openat2(...,
RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) w/o entering the mount namespace, and pass the
resulting fd to execveat().
For avoiding full fork(), there are (at least) two options:
1. A rootns flag in clone3() (e.g., CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS) and a rootns fd
in struct clone_args (disallowing incompatible CLONE_NEW*, CLONE_FS,
CLONE_THREAD, ...), and callers can pair it with CLONE_VM | CLONE_VFORK.
2. A flags parameter in rootns_enter() (e.g., ROOTNS_ENTER_VFORK), which
would map directly to CLONE_VM | CLONE_VFORK.
>
> --Andy
Br, Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-17 20:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-17 5:08 [RFC PATCH 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 01/13] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 02/13] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 03/13] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 04/13] rootns: Add rootns_create() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 05/13] rootns: Add rootns_wait() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 06/13] rootns: Add rootns_kill() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 07/13] rootns: Add rootns_enter() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 17:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-17 20:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2026-11-17 20:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 08/13] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 09/13] fs: Support installing rootns mount trees via move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 10/13] arch: Wire up rootns system calls Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 11/13] docs: Document root namespace uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 12/13] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 13/13] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 11:10 ` [RFC PATCH 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 17:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-17 18:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 19:10 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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