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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Sinan Turunc <enscrpt@pm.me>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] keys: serialise key instantiation against keyctl_chown_key()
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2026 15:28:28 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <awGcfFldbGuXWBJL@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261121111246.3478-1-enscrpt@pm.me>

On Sat, Nov 21, 2026 at 11:13:07AM +0000, Sinan Turunc wrote:
> keyctl_chown_key() looks up the target key by calling lookup_user_key()
> with the KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL flag. That flag lets a caller with
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN change the UID of an uninstantiated key during construction.
> When the UID changes, keyctl_chown_key() replaces key->user under key->sem
> and drops the old reference with key_user_put().
> 
> __key_instantiate_and_link() and key_reject_and_link() hold
> key_construction_mutex during instantiation, but neither function takes
> key->sem. Both functions increment key->user->nikeys, and
> __key_instantiate_and_link() also calls key->type->instantiate() without
> holding key->sem. When a key is in quota and its size changes,
> key_payload_reserve() reads key->user seven times without key->sem. Those
> reads include spin_lock_irqsave(&key->user->lock, flags) at the start and
> spin_unlock_irqrestore(&key->user->lock, flags) at the end.
> 
> If keyctl_chown_key() swaps key->user between those two calls,
> key_payload_reserve() unlocks the new owner's spinlock and leaves the old
> spinlock held. By source inspection, key_user_put() can also kfree() the
> old struct key_user while instantiation still dereferences it. That struct
> key_user use-after-free was found by reading the code and did not trigger
> during our KASAN runs.
> 
>   =====================================
>   WARNING: bad unlock balance detected!
>   7.4.0-rc2-g23c62304dde2 #3 Not tainted
>   -------------------------------------
>   request-key/163 is trying to release lock (&candidate->lock) at:
>   [<ffffffff82698fff>] key_payload_reserve+0x29f/0x370
>   but there are no more locks to release!
> 
>   other info that might help us debug this:
>   locks held by request-key/163: 2, on CPU#3:
>    #0: ffffffff871c10a0 (key_construction_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __key_instantiate_and_link+0x38/0x370
>    #1: ffff88800de4a8b8 (&candidate->lock){..-.}-{3:3}, at: key_payload_reserve+0x160/0x370
> 
>   Call Trace:
>    lock_release+0x286/0x2e0
>    _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1a/0x50
>    key_payload_reserve+0x29f/0x370
>    generic_key_instantiate+0x42/0x230
>    __key_instantiate_and_link+0xd7/0x370
>    key_instantiate_and_link+0x40d/0x4b0
>    keyctl_instantiate_key_common+0x2d2/0x450
>    keyctl_instantiate_key+0x167/0x180
>    __do_sys_keyctl+0x391/0x550
> 
> Take key->sem for write with down_write_nested(&key->sem, 2) inside
> key_construction_mutex in __key_instantiate_and_link() and
> key_reject_and_link().
> 
> Fixes: 5801649d8b83 ("[PATCH] keys: let keyctl_chown() change a key's owner")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Sinan Turunc <enscrpt@pm.me>
> ---
> In v3 I removed the tool paragraph and the two lockdep subclass sentences.
> 
>  security/keys/key.c | 4 ++++
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
> index 3f1f0fc..df31d10 100644
> --- a/security/keys/key.c
> +++ b/security/keys/key.c
> @@ -441,6 +441,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
>  	ret = -EBUSY;
>  
>  	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
> +	down_write_nested(&key->sem, 2);
>  
>  	/* can't instantiate twice */
>  	if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) {
> @@ -473,6 +474,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
>  		}
>  	}
>  
> +	up_write(&key->sem);
>  	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
>  
>  	/* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */
> @@ -609,6 +611,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
>  	}
>  
>  	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
> +	down_write_nested(&key->sem, 2);
>  
>  	/* can't instantiate twice */
>  	if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) {
> @@ -632,6 +635,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
>  			key_invalidate(authkey);
>  	}
>  
> +	up_write(&key->sem);
>  	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
>  
>  	if (keyring && link_ret == 0)
> -- 
> 2.56.0
> 

Thank you looks good to me.

Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

Br, Jarkko

      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-21 13:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-21 11:13 [PATCH v3] keys: serialise key instantiation against keyctl_chown_key() Sinan Turunc
2026-11-21 11:26 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-21 13:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]

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