From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 05671C678D4 for ; Mon, 6 Mar 2023 12:04:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230081AbjCFMEJ (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Mar 2023 07:04:09 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54948 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229995AbjCFMED (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Mar 2023 07:04:03 -0500 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com (frasgout.his.huawei.com [185.176.79.56]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D3BC01E5CD; Mon, 6 Mar 2023 04:03:53 -0800 (PST) Received: from lhrpeml500004.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.200]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4PVccB4HzTz6J9yR; Mon, 6 Mar 2023 20:01:14 +0800 (CST) Received: from [10.123.123.126] (10.123.123.126) by lhrpeml500004.china.huawei.com (7.191.163.9) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2507.21; Mon, 6 Mar 2023 12:03:50 +0000 Message-ID: Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 15:03:49 +0300 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/91.4.1 Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add 10 new test suites dedicated to network Content-Language: ru To: =?UTF-8?Q?Micka=c3=abl_Sala=c3=bcn?= CC: , , , , , , References: <20230116085818.165539-1-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com> <20230116085818.165539-11-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com> From: "Konstantin Meskhidze (A)" In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Originating-IP: [10.123.123.126] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhrpeml500002.china.huawei.com (7.191.160.78) To lhrpeml500004.china.huawei.com (7.191.163.9) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: 2/21/2023 9:05 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет: > > On 16/01/2023 09:58, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote: >> These test suites try to check edge cases for TCP sockets >> bind() and connect() actions. >> >> socket: >> * bind: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked ipv4 and ipv6 sockets. >> * connect: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked ipv4 and ipv6 sockets. >> * bind_afunspec: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked restrictions >> for bind action with AF_UNSPEC socket family. >> * connect_afunspec: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked restrictions >> for connect action with AF_UNSPEC socket family. >> * ruleset_overlap: Tests with overlapping rules for one port. >> * ruleset_expanding: Tests with expanding rulesets in which rules are >> gradually added one by one, restricting sockets' connections. >> * inval: Tests with invalid user space supplied data: >> - out of range ruleset attribute; >> - unhandled allowed access; >> - zero port value; >> - zero access value; >> - legitimate access values; >> * bind_connect_inval_addrlen: Tests with invalid address length >> for ipv4/ipv6 sockets. >> * inval_port_format: Tests with wrong port format for ipv4/ipv6 sockets. >> >> layout1: >> * with_net: Tests with network bind() socket action within >> filesystem directory access test. >> >> Test coverage for security/landlock is 94.1% of 946 lines according >> to gcc/gcov-11. >> >> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze >> --- >> >> Changes since v8: >> * Adds is_sandboxed const for FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket). >> * Refactors AF_UNSPEC tests. >> * Adds address length checking tests. >> * Convert ports in all tests to __be16. >> * Adds invalid port values tests. >> * Minor fixes. >> >> Changes since v7: >> * Squashes all selftest commits. >> * Adds fs test with network bind() socket action. >> * Minor fixes. >> >> --- >> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config | 4 + >> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 65 ++ >> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 1157 +++++++++++++++++++ >> 3 files changed, 1226 insertions(+) >> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c >> >> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config >> index 0f0a65287bac..71f7e9a8a64c 100644 >> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config >> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config >> @@ -1,3 +1,7 @@ >> +CONFIG_INET=y >> +CONFIG_IPV6=y >> +CONFIG_NET=y >> +CONFIG_NET_NS=y >> CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS=y >> CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y >> CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y >> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c >> index b762b5419a89..5de4559c7fbb 100644 >> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c >> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c >> @@ -8,8 +8,10 @@ >> */ >> >> #define _GNU_SOURCE >> +#include >> #include >> #include >> +#include >> #include >> #include >> #include >> @@ -17,6 +19,7 @@ >> #include >> #include >> #include >> +#include >> #include >> #include >> #include >> @@ -4413,4 +4416,66 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout2_overlay, same_content_different_file) >> } >> } >> >> +#define IP_ADDRESS "127.0.0.1" >> + >> +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, with_net) >> +{ >> + int sockfd; >> + int sock_port = 15000; >> + struct sockaddr_in addr4; >> + >> + addr4.sin_family = AF_INET; >> + addr4.sin_port = htons(sock_port); >> + addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS); >> + memset(&addr4.sin_zero, '\0', 8); >> + >> + const struct rule rules[] = { >> + { >> + .path = dir_s1d2, >> + .access = ACCESS_RO, >> + }, >> + {}, >> + }; >> + >> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_net = { >> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | >> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP, >> + }; >> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = { >> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP, >> + >> + .port = htons(sock_port), >> + }; >> + >> + /* Creates ruleset for network access. */ >> + const int ruleset_fd_net = landlock_create_ruleset( >> + &ruleset_attr_net, sizeof(ruleset_attr_net), 0); >> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_net); >> + >> + /* Adds a network rule. */ >> + ASSERT_EQ(0, >> + landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_net, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE, >> + &net_service, 0)); >> + >> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_net); >> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_net)); >> + >> + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules); >> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); >> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); >> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); >> + >> + /* Tests on a directory with the network rule loaded. */ >> + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY)); >> + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY)); >> + >> + sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0); >> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd); >> + /* Binds a socket to port 15000. */ >> + ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd, &addr4, sizeof(addr4))); >> + >> + /* Closes bounded socket. */ >> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd)); >> +} >> + >> TEST_HARNESS_MAIN >> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c >> new file mode 100644 >> index 000000000000..b9543089a4d3 >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c >> @@ -0,0 +1,1157 @@ >> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only >> +/* >> + * Landlock tests - Network >> + * >> + * Copyright (C) 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd. >> + */ >> + >> +#define _GNU_SOURCE >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> + >> +#include "common.h" >> + >> +#define MAX_SOCKET_NUM 10 >> + >> +#define SOCK_PORT_START 3470 >> +#define SOCK_PORT_ADD 10 >> + >> +#define IP_ADDRESS_IPv4 "127.0.0.1" > > Please use a capital "V". Ok. Got it. > >> +#define IP_ADDRESS_IPv6 "::1" > > ditto Ok. > > >> +#define SOCK_PORT 15000 >> + >> +/* Number pending connections queue to be hold. */ >> +#define BACKLOG 10 >> + >> +const struct sockaddr addr_unspec = { .sa_family = AF_UNSPEC }; >> + >> +/* Invalid attribute, out of landlock network access range. */ >> +#define LANDLOCK_INVAL_ATTR 7 >> + >> +FIXTURE(socket) >> +{ >> + uint port[MAX_SOCKET_NUM]; >> + struct sockaddr_in addr4[MAX_SOCKET_NUM]; >> + struct sockaddr_in6 addr6[MAX_SOCKET_NUM]; >> +}; >> + >> +/* struct _fixture_variant_socket */ >> +FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket) >> +{ >> + const bool is_ipv4; >> + const bool is_sandboxed; >> +}; >> + >> +/* clang-format off */ >> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv4) { >> + /* clang-format on */ >> + .is_ipv4 = true, >> + .is_sandboxed = false, >> +}; >> + >> +/* clang-format off */ >> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv4_sandboxed) { >> + /* clang-format on */ >> + .is_ipv4 = true, >> + .is_sandboxed = true, >> +}; >> + >> +/* clang-format off */ >> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv6) { >> + /* clang-format on */ >> + .is_ipv4 = false, >> + .is_sandboxed = false, >> +}; >> + >> +/* clang-format off */ >> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv6_sandboxed) { >> + /* clang-format on */ >> + .is_ipv4 = false, >> + .is_sandboxed = true, >> +}; >> + >> +static int >> +create_socket_variant(const struct _fixture_variant_socket *const variant, > > If all "struct _fixture_variant_socket" can be replaced with > "FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket)" while keeping clang-format and checkpatch.pl > happy, please do it. It seems that some clang-format issues have been > fixed. Same for _test_data and FIXTURE_DATA. Please remove the outdated > comments about these structs (see socket_standalone, and socket variant > definitions). > Ok. Thanks. > >> + const int type) >> +{ >> + if (variant->is_ipv4) >> + return socket(AF_INET, type | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0); >> + else >> + return socket(AF_INET6, type | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0); >> +} >> + >> +static int bind_variant(const struct _fixture_variant_socket *const variant, >> + const int sockfd, >> + const struct _test_data_socket *const self, >> + const size_t index, const bool zero_size) >> + > > Extra new line. Will be deleted. Thanks. > >> +{ >> + if (variant->is_ipv4) >> + return bind(sockfd, &self->addr4[index], >> + (zero_size ? 0 : sizeof(self->addr4[index]))); > > Is the zero_size really useful? Do calling bind and connect with this > argument reaches the Landlock code (check_addrlen) or is it caught by > the network code beforehand? In __sys_bind() syscall security_socket_bind() function goes before sock->ops->bind() method. Selinux and Smacks provide such checks in bind()/connect() hooks, so I think Landlock should do the same. What do you think? > > >> + else >> + return bind(sockfd, &self->addr6[index], >> + (zero_size ? 0 : sizeof(self->addr6[index]))); >> +} >> + >> +static int connect_variant(const struct _fixture_variant_socket *const variant, >> + const int sockfd, >> + const struct _test_data_socket *const self, >> + const size_t index, const bool zero_size) >> +{ >> + if (variant->is_ipv4) >> + return connect(sockfd, &self->addr4[index], >> + (zero_size ? 0 : sizeof(self->addr4[index]))); >> + else >> + return connect(sockfd, &self->addr6[index], >> + (zero_size ? 0 : sizeof(self->addr6[index]))); >> +} > > > [...] > >> + >> +TEST_F_FORK(socket, bind) >> +{ >> + int sockfd; >> + >> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { >> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | >> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP, >> + }; >> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = { >> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | >> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP, >> + .port = htons(self->port[0]), >> + }; >> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = { >> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP, >> + .port = htons(self->port[1]), >> + }; >> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_3 = { >> + .allowed_access = 0, >> + .port = htons(self->port[2]), >> + }; >> + int ruleset_fd, ret; >> + >> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) { >> + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, >> + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0); >> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); >> + >> + /* >> + * Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0] >> + * socket. >> + */ >> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, >> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE, >> + &net_service_1, 0)); >> + /* >> + * Allows connect and deny bind operations to the port[1] >> + * socket. >> + */ >> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, >> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE, >> + &net_service_2, 0)); >> + /* >> + * Empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) are ignored in >> + * network actions for port[2] socket. >> + */ >> + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, >> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE, >> + &net_service_3, 0)); >> + ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno); >> + >> + /* Enforces the ruleset. */ >> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); >> + } >> + >> + sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM); >> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd); >> + /* Binds a socket to port[0]. */ >> + ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0, false); >> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) { >> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret); >> + } else { >> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret); >> + > The condition is useless here. Same on multiple other locations. > Ok. Will be fixed. > >> + >> + /* Closes bounded socket. */ >> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd)); >> + >> + sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM); >> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd); >> + /* Binds a socket to port[1]. */ >> + ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 1, false); >> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) { >> + ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret); >> + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); >> + } else { >> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret); >> + } >> + >> + sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM); >> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd); >> + /* Binds a socket to port[2]. */ >> + ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 2, false); >> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) { >> + ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret); >> + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); >> + } else { >> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret); >> + } >> +} > .