From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ima: defer arch_ima_get_secureboot() call to IMA init time
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2020 17:28:43 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <bafaaab0a1798b1be3f3e52f3340937edb3d84e6.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201012083631.12724-1-ardb@kernel.org>
Hi Ard,
On Mon, 2020-10-12 at 10:36 +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Chester reports that it is necessary to introduce a new way to pass
> the EFI secure boot status between the EFI stub and the core kernel
> on ARM systems. The usual way of obtaining this information is by
> checking the SecureBoot and SetupMode EFI variables, but this can
> only be done after the EFI variable workqueue is created, which
> occurs in a subsys_initcall(), whereas arch_ima_get_secureboot()
> is called much earlier by the IMA framework.
>
> However, the IMA framework itself is started as a late_initcall,
> and the only reason the call to arch_ima_get_secureboot() occurs
> so early is because it happens in the context of a __setup()
> callback that parses the ima_appraise= command line parameter.
>
> So let's refactor this code a little bit, by using a core_param()
> callback to capture the command line argument, and deferring any
> reasoning based on its contents to the IMA init routine.
Other than this patch needing to be on top of commit e4d7e2df3a09
("ima: limit secure boot feedback scope for appraise"), it looks good.
thanks,
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-12 21:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-10-12 8:36 [PATCH] ima: defer arch_ima_get_secureboot() call to IMA init time Ard Biesheuvel
2020-10-12 21:28 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2020-10-13 6:59 ` Ard Biesheuvel
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