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From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	elena.reshetova@intel.com,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v1 3/3] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_SYS_PERFMON support
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 19:22:22 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bbb40b80-be40-335a-c7b7-61fb4bce20d2@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <283f09a5-33bd-eac3-bdfd-83d775045bf9@linux.intel.com>


Extend error messages to mention CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability as an option
to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials where applicable. 

Make perf_event_paranoid_check() to be aware of CAP_SYS_PERFMON in case
perf_event_paranoid value >= 0.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 tools/perf/design.txt   |  3 ++-
 tools/perf/util/cap.h   |  4 ++++
 tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 +++++-----
 tools/perf/util/util.c  | 15 +++++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/perf/design.txt b/tools/perf/design.txt
index 0453ba26cdbd..71755b3e1303 100644
--- a/tools/perf/design.txt
+++ b/tools/perf/design.txt
@@ -258,7 +258,8 @@ gets schedule to. Per task counters can be created by any user, for
 their own tasks.
 
 A 'pid == -1' and 'cpu == x' counter is a per CPU counter that counts
-all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege.
+all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_PERFMON or
+CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege.
 
 The 'flags' parameter is currently unused and must be zero.
 
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cap.h b/tools/perf/util/cap.h
index 051dc590ceee..0f79fbf6638b 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/cap.h
+++ b/tools/perf/util/cap.h
@@ -29,4 +29,8 @@ static inline bool perf_cap__capable(int cap __maybe_unused)
 #define CAP_SYSLOG	34
 #endif
 
+#ifndef CAP_SYS_PERFMON
+#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38
+#endif
+
 #endif /* __PERF_CAP_H */
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
index f4dea055b080..3a46325e3702 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
@@ -2468,14 +2468,14 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target,
 		 "You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n"
 		 "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n"
 		 "which controls use of the performance events system by\n"
-		 "unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n"
+		 "unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n"
 		 "The current value is %d:\n\n"
 		 "  -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n"
 		 "      Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n"
-		 ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-		 "      Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-		 ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-		 ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n"
+		 ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
+		 "      Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
+		 ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
+		 ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n"
 		 "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n"
 		 "	kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" ,
 				 target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "",
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/util.c b/tools/perf/util/util.c
index 969ae560dad9..d8334fa97c85 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/util.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/util.c
@@ -271,8 +271,19 @@ int perf_event_paranoid(void)
 
 bool perf_event_paranoid_check(int max_level)
 {
-	return perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
-			perf_event_paranoid() <= max_level;
+	bool res = false;
+
+	res = perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+
+	if (!res) {
+		if (max_level >= 0)
+			res = perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON);
+	}
+
+	if (!res)
+		res = perf_event_paranoid() <= max_level;
+
+	return res;
 }
 
 static int
-- 
2.20.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-12-05 16:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-12-05 16:15 [PATCH v1 0/3] Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability for secure Perf users groups Alexey Budankov
2019-12-05 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 1/3] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov
2019-12-05 16:21 ` [PATCH v1 2/3] perf/core: apply CAP_SYS_PERFMON to CPUs and kernel monitoring Alexey Budankov
2019-12-05 16:22 ` Alexey Budankov [this message]
2019-12-05 16:49 ` [PATCH v1 0/3] Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability for secure Perf users groups Casey Schaufler
2019-12-05 17:05   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-05 17:33     ` Casey Schaufler
2019-12-05 18:11       ` Andi Kleen
2019-12-05 18:37       ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-11 10:52       ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-11 15:24         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-12-11 17:00           ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-11 18:09         ` Casey Schaufler
2019-12-11 20:36           ` Andi Kleen
2019-12-11 21:25             ` Casey Schaufler
2019-12-12 14:24             ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-15 11:53               ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-11 19:04       ` Stephane Eranian

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