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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [GIT PULL] lsm/lsm-pr-20261016
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2026 23:00:10 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bf59b601a40b9955ee8922c5593eeaf0@paul-moore.com> (raw)

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Linus,

Sixteen LSM framework patches for the Linux v7.4 merge window:

- Add LSM hooks, object blobs, and audit records for namespaces

Add the necessary bits to enable LSMs to enforce access controls on the
management of various kernel namespaces.  While this pull request does
not contain any in-tree users of these hooks, the Landlock pull request
for Linux v7.4 will include Landlock support and the next merge window
will likely include SELinux support as well.  Considering the development
behind these hooks, I expect that BPF LSM developers will also be making
use of the namespace hooks, if they haven't already.

- Update the inode LSM hooks to include mount idmaps

This allows LSMs to incorporate the mount ID mapping into their access
control decisions.  While there are no current in-tree users of this,
it was requested by those developing BPF LSM programs and this pull
request includes a BPF LSM selftest.

- Preserve the full 32-bit ioctl command in LSM audit records

Previously only the low 16 bits were logged, ignoring the direction and
size information in the upper 16 bits.  The pull request also includes
a Landlock based selftest to verify the full 32-bit ioctl value.

- Ensure we don't call security_backing_file_free() multiple times

Thankfully we don't have a problem with the current code base, but we
want to fix this behavior now before it becomes a problem.

- Clarify that only the current task may access current->cred

The current code is a bit misleading around safely accessing the cred
field in a task struct.  Through comment and code corrections, this pull
request clarifies that only the task itself may access its cred field.

- Add SLAB_NO_MERGE to the credential object cache

Harden the credential cache by ensuring credential objects live on
dedicated slab pages.

- Make use of safe memory zero'ing in the LSM Rust bindings

- Update the docs for the current behavior of /sys/kernel/security/lsm

- Update the docs for CONFIG_LSM and the "lsm=" command line option

- Remove unnecessary code 

Paul

--
The following changes since commit fd73f4a6659897191fa0d40695fe370925dd3780:

  Linux 7.3-rc3 (2026-09-13 14:38:02 -0700)

are available in the Git repository at:

  https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm.git
    tags/lsm-pr-20261016

for you to fetch changes up to 881f19c2ffbc73f351b257e09c71e6059939b770:

  lsm: remove redundant NULL check in security_init()
    (2026-09-29 21:47:20 -0400)

----------------------------------------------------------------
lsm/stable-7.4 PR 20261016
----------------------------------------------------------------

Benno Lossin (1):
      rust: lsm: replace `core::mem::zeroed` with `pin_init::zeroed`

Cai Xinchen (2):
      lsm: delete duplicate assignment in lsm_prepare()
      lsm: don't call security_backing_file_free() multiple times

Christian Brauner (2):
      ns: Free anonymous mount namespaces via ns_common_free()
      lsm: add LSM blob and hooks for namespaces

Daan De Meyer (2):
      lsm: expose mount idmaps to inode hooks
      selftests/bpf: verify mount idmaps reach inode hooks

Jann Horn (1):
      cred: clarify that task_struct::cred is only for the current task

Lincoln Wallace (2):
      doc: describe CONFIG_LSM and lsm= as the selection mechanism
      doc: fix LSM ordering description for /sys/kernel/security/lsm

Mickaël Salaün (3):
      lsm: add LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NS for namespace audit records
      lsm: Preserve full ioctl commands in audit records
      selftests/landlock: Check full ioctl commands in audit records

Mohammed EL Kadiri (1):
      cred: prevent slab cache merging for cred_jar

Paul Moore (1):
      lsm: update the BUILD_BUG_ON() in audit_log_lsm_data()

Sang-Heon Jeon (1):
      lsm: remove redundant NULL check in security_init()

 Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst           |   20 -
 fs/cachefiles/security.c                          |    4 
 fs/namei.c                                        |   18 -
 fs/namespace.c                                    |    3 
 include/linux/cred.h                              |   17 -
 include/linux/lsm_audit.h                         |    7 
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h                     |   26 -
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h                         |    1 
 include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h                |    3 
 include/linux/sched.h                             |    8 
 include/linux/security.h                          |   78 +++-
 include/uapi/linux/nsfs.h                         |    1 
 init/init_task.c                                  |    2 
 kernel/auditsc.c                                  |    5 
 kernel/cred.c                                     |    5 
 kernel/nscommon.c                                 |   17 -
 kernel/nsproxy.c                                  |    6 
 rust/kernel/security.rs                           |    3 
 security/lsm_audit.c                              |    8 
 security/lsm_init.c                               |    9 
 security/security.c                               |  115 +++++-
 security/selinux/hooks.c                          |   25 -
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c                        |    9 
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/test_lsm.c |  231 ++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c           |   79 ++++
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c        |   10 
 26 files changed, 599 insertions(+), 111 deletions(-)

--
paul-moore.com

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-10-17  3:00 UTC|newest]

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