From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
To: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>, KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
"corbet@lwn.net" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"ast@kernel.org" <ast@kernel.org>,
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"andrii@kernel.org" <andrii@kernel.org>,
"shuah@kernel.org" <shuah@kernel.org>,
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"zohar@linux.ibm.com" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
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<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
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<linux-stm32@st-md-mailman.stormreply.com>,
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<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
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Subject: RE: [PATCH 00/18] bpf: Secure and authenticated preloading of eBPF programs
Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 17:20:59 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c2e57f10b62940eba3cfcae996e20e3c@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEiveUcx1KHoJ421Cv+52t=0U+Uy2VF51VC_zfTSftQ4wVYOPw@mail.gmail.com>
> From: Djalal Harouni [mailto:tixxdz@gmail.com]
> Sent: Monday, April 4, 2022 9:45 AM
> On Sun, Apr 3, 2022 at 5:42 PM KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Sat, Apr 2, 2022 at 1:55 AM Alexei Starovoitov
> > <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> wrote:
> ...
> > >
> > > > Pinning
> > > > them to unreachable inodes intuitively looked the
> > > > way to go for achieving the stated goal.
> > >
> > > We can consider inodes in bpffs that are not unlinkable by root
> > > in the future, but certainly not for this use case.
> >
> > Can this not be already done by adding a BPF_LSM program to the
> > inode_unlink LSM hook?
> >
>
> Also, beside of the inode_unlink... and out of curiosity: making sysfs/bpffs/
> readonly after pinning, then using bpf LSM hooks
> sb_mount|remount|unmount...
> family combining bpf() LSM hook... isn't this enough to:
> 1. Restrict who can pin to bpffs without using a full MAC
> 2. Restrict who can delete or unmount bpf filesystem
>
> ?
I'm thinking to implement something like this.
First, I add a new program flag called
BPF_F_STOP_ONCONFIRM, which causes the ref count
of the link to increase twice at creation time. In this way,
user space cannot make the link disappear, unless a
confirmation is explicitly sent via the bpf() system call.
Another advantage is that other LSMs can decide
whether or not they allow a program with this flag
(in the bpf security hook).
This would work regardless of the method used to
load the eBPF program (user space or kernel space).
Second, I extend the bpf() system call with a new
subcommand, BPF_LINK_CONFIRM_STOP, which
decreases the ref count for the link of the programs
with the BPF_F_STOP_ONCONFIRM flag. I will also
introduce a new security hook (something like
security_link_confirm_stop), so that an LSM has the
opportunity to deny the stop (the bpf security hook
would not be sufficient to determine exactly for
which link the confirmation is given, an LSM should
be able to deny the stop for its own programs).
What do you think?
Thanks
Roberto
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
Managing Director: Li Peng, Zhong Ronghua
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-04-04 21:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-28 17:50 [PATCH 00/18] bpf: Secure and authenticated preloading of eBPF programs Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 01/18] bpf: Export bpf_link_inc() Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 02/18] bpf-preload: Move bpf_preload.h to include/linux Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 03/18] bpf-preload: Generalize object pinning from the kernel Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 04/18] bpf-preload: Export and call bpf_obj_do_pin_kernel() Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 05/18] bpf-preload: Generate static variables Roberto Sassu
2022-03-29 23:51 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2022-03-30 7:44 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-04-04 0:22 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2022-03-30 15:12 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 06/18] bpf-preload: Generate free_objs_and_skel() Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 07/18] bpf-preload: Generate preload() Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 08/18] bpf-preload: Generate load_skel() Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 09/18] bpf-preload: Generate code to pin non-internal maps Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 10/18] bpf-preload: Generate bpf_preload_ops Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 11/18] bpf-preload: Store multiple bpf_preload_ops structures in a linked list Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 12/18] bpf-preload: Implement new registration method for preloading eBPF programs Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 13/18] bpf-preload: Move pinned links and maps to a dedicated directory in bpffs Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 14/18] bpf-preload: Switch to new preload registration method Roberto Sassu
2022-03-29 2:35 ` kernel test robot
2022-03-29 3:27 ` kernel test robot
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 15/18] bpf-preload: Generate code of kernel module to preload Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 16/18] bpf-preload: Do kernel mount to ensure that pinned objects don't disappear Roberto Sassu
2022-03-29 2:15 ` kernel test robot
2022-03-29 4:08 ` kernel test robot
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 17/18] bpf-preload/selftests: Add test for automatic generation of preload methods Roberto Sassu
2022-03-28 17:50 ` [PATCH 18/18] bpf-preload/selftests: Preload a test eBPF program and check pinned objects Roberto Sassu
2022-03-29 23:51 ` [PATCH 00/18] bpf: Secure and authenticated preloading of eBPF programs Andrii Nakryiko
2022-03-30 7:21 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-03-31 2:27 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-03-31 8:25 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-04-01 23:55 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-04-02 1:03 ` KP Singh
2022-04-04 7:44 ` Djalal Harouni
2022-04-04 17:20 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2022-04-04 22:49 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-04-05 0:00 ` KP Singh
2022-04-05 13:11 ` [POC][USER SPACE][PATCH] Introduce LSM to protect pinned objects Roberto Sassu
2022-04-05 22:47 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-06 6:55 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-04-05 14:49 ` [PATCH 00/18] bpf: Secure and authenticated preloading of eBPF programs Casey Schaufler
2022-04-05 15:29 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-04-05 16:21 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-04-05 16:37 ` KP Singh
2022-04-04 17:41 ` Roberto Sassu
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