From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
To: jejb@linux.ibm.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, serge@hallyn.com,
christian.brauner@ubuntu.com, containers@lists.linux.dev,
dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, lsturman@redhat.com,
puiterwi@redhat.com, jamjoom@us.ibm.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
rgb@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
jmorris@namei.org
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 19/19] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2021 14:11:35 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cd05433a-3630-e7f5-e144-ff766d7792fa@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <11b557b58de74828b1c16334a5fb52c4d3f6ad0f.camel@linux.ibm.com>
On 12/3/21 13:50, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Fri, 2021-12-03 at 13:06 -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
>> On 12/3/21 12:03, James Bottomley wrote:
>>> On Thu, 2021-12-02 at 21:31 -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
>>> [...]
>>>> static int securityfs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
>>>> {
>>>> + int rc;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (fc->user_ns->ima_ns->late_fs_init) {
>>>> + rc = fc->user_ns->ima_ns->late_fs_init(fc->user_ns);
>>>> + if (rc)
>>>> + return rc;
>>>> + }
>>>> fc->ops = &securityfs_context_ops;
>>>> return 0;
>>>> }
>>> I know I suggested this, but to get this to work in general, it's
>>> going to have to not be specific to IMA, so it's going to have to
>>> become something generic like a notifier chain. The other problem
>>> is it's only working still by accident:
>> I had thought about this also but the rationale was:
>>
>> securityfs is compiled due to CONFIG_IMA_NS and the user namespace
>> exists there and that has a pointer now to ima_namespace, which can
>> have that callback. I assumed that other namespaced subsystems could
>> also be reached then via such a callback, but I don't know.
> Well securityfs is supposed to exist for LSMs. At some point each of
> those is going to need to be namespaced, which may eventually be quite
> a pile of callbacks, which is why I thought of a notifier.
>
>> I suppose any late filesystem init callchain would have to be
>> connected to the user_namespace somehow?
> I don't think so; I think just moving some securityfs entries into the
> user_namespace and managing the notifier chain from within securityfs
> will do for now. [although I'd have to spec this out in code before I
> knew for sure].
It doesn't have to be right in the user_namespace. The IMA namespace is
connected to the user namespace and holds the dentries now...
Please spec it out...
>
>>>> +int ima_fs_ns_init(struct ima_namespace *ns)
>>>> +{
>>>> + ns->mount = securityfs_ns_create_mount(ns->user_ns);
>>> This actually triggers on the call to securityfs_init_fs_context,
>>> but nothing happens because the callback is null. Every subsequent
>>> use of fscontext will trigger this. The point of a keyed supeblock
>>> is that fill_super is only called once per key, that's the place we
>>> should be doing this. It should also probably be a blocking
>>> notifier so anyconsumer of securityfs can be namespaced by
>>> registering for this notifier.
>> What I don't like about the fill_super is that it gets called too
>> early:
>>
>> [ 67.058611] securityfs_ns_create_mount @ 102 target user_ns:
>> ffff95c010698c80; nr_extents: 0
>> [ 67.059836] securityfs_fill_super @ 47 user_ns:
>> ffff95c010698c80;
>> nr_extents: 0
> Right, it's being activated by securityfs_ns_create_mount which is
> called as soon as the user_ns is created.
Well, that doesn't help us then...
>> We are switching to the target user namespace in
>> securityfs_ns_create_mount. The expected nr_extents at this point is
>> 0, since user_ns hasn't been configured, yet. But then
>> security_fill_super is also called with nr_extents 0. We cannot use
>> that, it's too early!
> Exactly, so I was thinking of not having a securityfs_ns_create_mount
> at all. All the securityfs_ns_create.. calls would be in the notifier
But we need to somehow have a call to get_tree_keyed() and have that
user namespace switched out. I don't know how else to do this other than
having some function that does that and that is now called
securityfs_ns_create_mount().
get_tree_keyed() will also call the fill_super() which is called when
securityfs_ns_create_mount() is called.
[ 196.739071] ima_fs_ns_init @ 639 before securityfs_ns_create_mount()
[ 196.740426] securityfs_init_fs_context @ 72 user_ns:
ffffffff98a3cc60; nr_extents: 1
[ 196.741519] securityfs_ns_create_mount @ 105 target user_ns:
ffff9e239753eb80; nr_extents: 0
[ 196.742657] securityfs_get_tree @ 60 before get_tree_keyed()
[ 196.743418] securityfs_fill_super @ 47 user_ns: ffff9e239753eb80;
nr_extents: 0
[ 196.744467] ima_fs_ns_init @ 641 after securityfs_ns_create_mount()
[ 196.745304] ima: Allocated hash algorithm: sha256
[ 196.757650] securityfs_init_fs_context @ 72 user_ns:
ffff9e239753eb80; nr_extents: 1
[ 196.758759] securityfs_get_tree @ 60 before get_tree_keyed()
You said it works by 'accident'. I know it works because the function
securityfs_init_fs_context() that now populates the filesystem via the
late_fs_init() is getting called twice. Does 'accident' here mean the
call sequence could change?
>
>> Where would the vfsmount pointer reside? For now it's in
>> ima_namespace, but it sounds like it should be in a more centralized
>> place? Should it also be connected to the user_namespace so we can
>> pick it up using get_user_ns()?
> exactly. I think struct user_namespace should have two elements gated
> by a #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS which are the vfsmount and the
> mount_count for passing into simple_pin_fs.
Also that we can do for as long as it flies beyond the conversation
here... :-) Anyone else have an opinion ?
Stefan
>
> James
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-12-03 19:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-12-03 2:30 [RFC v2 00/19] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 01/19] ima: Add IMA namespace support Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 02/19] ima: Define ns_status for storing namespaced iint data Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 03/19] ima: Namespace audit status flags Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 04/19] ima: Move delayed work queue and variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 05/19] ima: Move IMA's keys queue related " Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 06/19] ima: Move policy " Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 07/19] ima: Move ima_htable " Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 08/19] ima: Move measurement list related variables " Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 09/19] ima: Only accept AUDIT rules for IMA non-init_ima_ns namespaces for now Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 10/19] ima: Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 11/19] securityfs: Prefix global variables with securityfs_ Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 12/19] securityfs: Pass static variables as parameters from top level functions Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 13/19] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 14/19] ima: Move some IMA policy and filesystem related variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 15/19] capabilities: Introduce CAP_INTEGRITY_ADMIN Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 16:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-12-03 17:39 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 16/19] ima: Use integrity_admin_ns_capable() to check corresponding capability Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 17/19] userns: Introduce a refcount variable for calling early teardown function Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 18/19] ima/userns: Define early teardown function for IMA namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 19/19] ima: Setup securityfs " Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 15:07 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 17:03 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-03 18:06 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 18:50 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-03 19:11 ` Stefan Berger [this message]
2021-12-04 0:33 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 11:52 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 4:27 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-06 14:03 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 14:11 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-06 17:22 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 19:37 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-12-06 12:08 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 13:38 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-06 14:13 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 15:44 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 16:25 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-06 14:11 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 14:21 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-06 14:42 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 14:51 ` James Bottomley
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