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([2001:6b0:1:1041:f9b4:5409:8dcc:9750]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 38308e7fff4ca-2fcb451a6afsm11778001fa.43.2024.10.28.04.45.46 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 28 Oct 2024 04:45:47 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2024 12:45:41 +0100 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 06/19] crypto: rsassa-pkcs1 - Migrate to sig_alg backend To: Lukas Wunner Cc: Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Eric Biggers , Stefan Berger , Vitaly Chikunov , Tadeusz Struk , David Howells , Andrew Zaborowski , Saulo Alessandre , Jonathan Cameron , Ignat Korchagin , Marek Behun , Varad Gautam , Stephan Mueller , Denis Kenzior , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , Roberto Sassu , Dmitry Kasatkin , Eric Snowberg , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, klara@kasm.eu References: <743afd4f298a3fad03e42ab46f913d1f51cb8b7c.1725972335.git.lukas@wunner.de> <2ed09a22-86c0-4cf0-8bda-ef804ccb3413@gmail.com> <9c33d208-168c-4af7-a155-9571872ede4d@gmail.com> Content-Language: en-US, sv-SE From: Klara Modin In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 2024-10-25 09:17, Lukas Wunner wrote: > On Wed, Oct 23, 2024 at 12:19:45PM +0200, Klara Modin wrote: >> On 2024-10-21 21:02, Lukas Wunner wrote: >>> On Mon, Oct 21, 2024 at 06:08:03PM +0200, Klara Modin wrote: >>>> This commit (1e562deacecca1f1bec7d23da526904a1e87525e in next-20241021) >>>> seems to break connecting to wpa2-enterprise with iwd. > [...] >>> There is a *second* issue I discovered last week. I cooked up >>> a fix this morning, but haven't written a commit message yet. >>> The patch is included below and it could indeed solve the >>> problem because it fixes an issue introduced by the commit you >>> identified as culprit. > [...] >> Tested on top of yesterday's next-20241022. >> >> With the first patch only there is no change, same behavior as previously. >> >> With the second patch only I get an oops, similar as the one you mentioned >> in the first fix >> >> With both patches everything seems to work as expected. Thanks! > > Thanks a lot for your testing efforts, this helps greatly! > > I've dug into the source code of iwd (Intel Wireless Daemon) and > the ell library it uses (Embedded Linux Library). > > It turns out that the patch I sent you is sufficient when using > TLS 1.2 or newer for EAP (which I assume is true in your case). > But the patch is *not* sufficient for TLS 1.1 or earlier. > > Normally RSA PKCS#1 encoding requires that the hash is prepended > by a Full Hash Prefix (an ASN.1 sequence which identifies the > hash algorithm used). But it turns out there are legacy protocols > such as TLS 1.1 or earlier as well as IKEv1 which omit the > Full Hash Prefix. > > The kernel supported this prior to 1e562deacecc. Although TLS 1.1 > was deprecated in 2021 by RFC 8996, I think we cannot just remove > support without advance notice. > > So below is a new patch which reinstates support for these legacy > protocols. It should also fix the issue you're seeing with TLS 1.2 > or newer (which is caused by invoking KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY without > specifying a hash algorithm). > > The patch below replaces the one I sent on Monday. You'll still > need the other pending fix: > > https://lore.kernel.org/r/ff7a28cddfc28e7a3fb8292c680510f35ec54391.1728898147.git.lukas@wunner.de/ > > Would you mind testing this combination? It did work in my own > testing, but if you could test it as well that would raise the > confidence. > > I've looked at the source code of wpa_supplicant as well as > various IKEv1 daemons (strongswan, libreswan, isakmpd, raccoon) > and none of them seems to use the kernel's Key Retention Service, > so iwd is the only known user space application affected so far. > > Thanks, > > Lukas This patch also fixes the issue for me (on top of next-20241028). Thanks, Tested-by: Klara Modin > > -- >8 -- > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > index c98c158..bbd07a9 100644 > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static void public_key_destroy(void *payload0, void *payload3) > pkey->pkey_algo); > } else { > if (!hash_algo) > - return -EINVAL; > + hash_algo = "none"; > n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, > "pkcs1(%s,%s)", > pkey->pkey_algo, hash_algo); > diff --git a/crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c b/crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c > index 9c28f1c..4d077fc9 100644 > --- a/crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c > +++ b/crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c > @@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ > * https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9580#table-24 > */ > > +static const u8 hash_prefix_none[] = { }; > + > static const u8 hash_prefix_md5[] = { > 0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, /* SEQUENCE (SEQUENCE (OID */ > 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, /* , */ > @@ -93,6 +95,7 @@ > size_t size; > } hash_prefixes[] = { > #define _(X) { #X, hash_prefix_##X, sizeof(hash_prefix_##X) } > + _(none), > _(md5), > _(sha1), > _(rmd160), > @@ -119,9 +122,18 @@ static const struct hash_prefix *rsassa_pkcs1_find_hash_prefix(const char *name) > return NULL; > } > > -static unsigned int rsassa_pkcs1_hash_len(const struct hash_prefix *p) > +static bool rsassa_pkcs1_invalid_hash_len(unsigned int len, > + const struct hash_prefix *p) > { > /* > + * Legacy protocols such as TLS 1.1 or earlier and IKE version 1 > + * do not prepend a Full Hash Prefix to the hash. In that case, > + * the size of the Full Hash Prefix is zero. > + */ > + if (p->data == hash_prefix_none) > + return false; > + > + /* > * The final byte of the Full Hash Prefix encodes the hash length. > * > * This needs to be revisited should hash algorithms with more than > @@ -130,7 +142,7 @@ static unsigned int rsassa_pkcs1_hash_len(const struct hash_prefix *p) > */ > static_assert(HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE <= 127); > > - return p->data[p->size - 1]; > + return len != p->data[p->size - 1]; > } > > struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx { > @@ -167,7 +179,7 @@ static int rsassa_pkcs1_sign(struct crypto_sig *tfm, > if (dlen < ctx->key_size) > return -EOVERFLOW; > > - if (slen != rsassa_pkcs1_hash_len(hash_prefix)) > + if (rsassa_pkcs1_invalid_hash_len(slen, hash_prefix)) > return -EINVAL; > > if (slen + hash_prefix->size > ctx->key_size - 11) > @@ -237,7 +249,7 @@ static int rsassa_pkcs1_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm, > /* RFC 8017 sec 8.2.2 step 1 - length checking */ > if (!ctx->key_size || > slen != ctx->key_size || > - dlen != rsassa_pkcs1_hash_len(hash_prefix)) > + rsassa_pkcs1_invalid_hash_len(dlen, hash_prefix)) > return -EINVAL; > > /* RFC 8017 sec 8.2.2 step 2 - RSA verification */ > diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c > index 7d768f0..86126be 100644 > --- a/crypto/testmgr.c > +++ b/crypto/testmgr.c > @@ -5540,6 +5540,12 @@ static int alg_test_null(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, > .cipher = __VECS(fcrypt_pcbc_tv_template) > } > }, { > + .alg = "pkcs1(rsa,none)", > + .test = alg_test_sig, > + .suite = { > + .sig = __VECS(pkcs1_rsa_none_tv_template) > + } > + }, { > .alg = "pkcs1(rsa,sha224)", > .test = alg_test_null, > .fips_allowed = 1, > diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h > index 55aae18..d4c232a 100644 > --- a/crypto/testmgr.h > +++ b/crypto/testmgr.h > @@ -1983,6 +1983,61 @@ struct kpp_testvec { > }; > > /* > + * PKCS#1 RSA test vectors for hash algorithm "none" > + * (i.e. the hash in "m" is not prepended by a Full Hash Prefix) > + * > + * Obtained from: > + * https://vcsjones.dev/sometimes-valid-rsa-dotnet/ > + * https://gist.github.com/vcsjones/ab4c2327b53ed018eada76b75ef4fd99 > + */ > +static const struct sig_testvec pkcs1_rsa_none_tv_template[] = { > + { > + .key = > + "\x30\x82\x01\x0a\x02\x82\x01\x01\x00\xa2\x63\x0b\x39\x44\xb8\xbb" > + "\x23\xa7\x44\x49\xbb\x0e\xff\xa1\xf0\x61\x0a\x53\x93\xb0\x98\xdb" > + "\xad\x2c\x0f\x4a\xc5\x6e\xff\x86\x3c\x53\x55\x0f\x15\xce\x04\x3f" > + "\x2b\xfd\xa9\x96\x96\xd9\xbe\x61\x79\x0b\x5b\xc9\x4c\x86\x76\xe5" > + "\xe0\x43\x4b\x22\x95\xee\xc2\x2b\x43\xc1\x9f\xd8\x68\xb4\x8e\x40" > + "\x4f\xee\x85\x38\xb9\x11\xc5\x23\xf2\x64\x58\xf0\x15\x32\x6f\x4e" > + "\x57\xa1\xae\x88\xa4\x02\xd7\x2a\x1e\xcd\x4b\xe1\xdd\x63\xd5\x17" > + "\x89\x32\x5b\xb0\x5e\x99\x5a\xa8\x9d\x28\x50\x0e\x17\xee\x96\xdb" > + "\x61\x3b\x45\x51\x1d\xcf\x12\x56\x0b\x92\x47\xfc\xab\xae\xf6\x66" > + "\x3d\x47\xac\x70\x72\xe7\x92\xe7\x5f\xcd\x10\xb9\xc4\x83\x64\x94" > + "\x19\xbd\x25\x80\xe1\xe8\xd2\x22\xa5\xd0\xba\x02\x7a\xa1\x77\x93" > + "\x5b\x65\xc3\xee\x17\x74\xbc\x41\x86\x2a\xdc\x08\x4c\x8c\x92\x8c" > + "\x91\x2d\x9e\x77\x44\x1f\x68\xd6\xa8\x74\x77\xdb\x0e\x5b\x32\x8b" > + "\x56\x8b\x33\xbd\xd9\x63\xc8\x49\x9d\x3a\xc5\xc5\xea\x33\x0b\xd2" > + "\xf1\xa3\x1b\xf4\x8b\xbe\xd9\xb3\x57\x8b\x3b\xde\x04\xa7\x7a\x22" > + "\xb2\x24\xae\x2e\xc7\x70\xc5\xbe\x4e\x83\x26\x08\xfb\x0b\xbd\xa9" > + "\x4f\x99\x08\xe1\x10\x28\x72\xaa\xcd\x02\x03\x01\x00\x01", > + .key_len = 294, > + .m = > + "\x68\xb4\xf9\x26\x34\x31\x25\xdd\x26\x50\x13\x68\xc1\x99\x26\x71" > + "\x19\xa2\xde\x81", > + .m_size = 20, > + .c = > + "\x6a\xdb\x39\xe5\x63\xb3\x25\xde\x58\xca\xc3\xf1\x36\x9c\x0b\x36" > + "\xb7\xd6\x69\xf9\xba\xa6\x68\x14\x8c\x24\x52\xd3\x25\xa5\xf3\xad" > + "\xc9\x47\x44\xde\x06\xd8\x0f\x56\xca\x2d\xfb\x0f\xe9\x99\xe2\x9d" > + "\x8a\xe8\x7f\xfb\x9a\x99\x96\xf1\x2c\x4a\xe4\xc0\xae\x4d\x29\x47" > + "\x38\x96\x51\x2f\x6d\x8e\xb8\x88\xbd\x1a\x0a\x70\xbc\x23\x38\x67" > + "\x62\x22\x01\x23\x71\xe5\xbb\x95\xea\x6b\x8d\x31\x62\xbf\xf0\xc4" > + "\xb9\x46\xd6\x67\xfc\x4c\xe6\x1f\xd6\x5d\xf7\xa9\xad\x3a\xf1\xbf" > + "\xa2\xf9\x66\xde\xb6\x8e\xec\x8f\x81\x8d\x1e\x3a\x12\x27\x6a\xfc" > + "\xae\x92\x9f\xc3\x87\xc3\xba\x8d\x04\xb8\x8f\x0f\x61\x68\x9a\x96" > + "\x2c\x80\x2c\x32\x40\xde\x9d\xb9\x9b\xe2\xe4\x45\x2e\x91\x47\x5c" > + "\x47\xa4\x9d\x02\x57\x59\xf7\x75\x5d\x5f\x32\x82\x75\x5d\xe5\x78" > + "\xc9\x19\x61\x46\x06\x9d\xa5\x1d\xd6\x32\x48\x9a\xdb\x09\x29\x81" > + "\x14\x2e\xf0\x27\xe9\x37\x13\x74\xec\xa5\xcd\x67\x6b\x19\xf6\x88" > + "\xf0\xc2\x8b\xa8\x7f\x2f\x76\x5a\x3e\x0c\x47\x5d\xe8\x82\x50\x27" > + "\x40\xce\x27\x41\x45\xa0\xcf\xaa\x2f\xd3\xad\x3c\xbf\x73\xff\x93" > + "\xe3\x78\x49\xd9\xa9\x78\x22\x81\x9a\xe5\xe2\x94\xe9\x40\xab\xf1", > + .c_size = 256, > + .public_key_vec = true, > + }, > +}; > + > +/* > * PKCS#1 RSA test vectors. Obtained from CAVS testing. > */ > static const struct sig_testvec pkcs1_rsa_tv_template[] = { >