From: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "Tingmao Wang" <m@maowtm.org>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH 0/6] Implement LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_QUIET
Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2025 01:06:34 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cover.1757376311.git.m@maowtm.org> (raw)
Hi Mickaël,
This RFC patch series implements a first pass patch of the "quiet flag"
feature as proposed in [1]. I've evolved the design beyond the original
discussion to come up with what I believe would be most useful. For this
implementation:
- The user can set the quiet flag for a layer on any part of the fs
hierarchy, and the flag inherits down (no support for "cancelling" the
inheritance of the flag in specific subdirectories).
- The youngest layer that denies a request gets to decide whether the
denial is audited or not. This means that a compromised binary, for
example, cannot "turn off" Landlock auditing when it tries to access
files, unless it denies access to the files itself. There is some
debate to be had on whether, if a parent layer sets the quiet flag, but
the request is denied by a deeper layer, whether Landlock should still
audit anyway (since the rule author of the child layer likely did not
expect the denial, so it would be good diagnostic)
This series does not add any tests yet (and also no support for
suppressing optional access denial audit yet due to complexity). If
you're happy with this design I can write some tests (and add the missing
support). Here is a sandboxer demo:
# LL_FS_RO=/ LL_FS_RW= LL_FORCE_LOG=1 LL_FS_QUIET=/tmp linux/samples/landlock/sandboxer /bin/bash
Executing the sandboxed command...
[ 135.126499][ T60] audit: type=1423 audit(1757374868.281:942): domain=1a435130e blockers=fs.write_file path="/dev/tty" dev="devtmpfs" ino=11
[ 135.133298][ T60] audit: type=1424 audit(1757374868.281:942): domain=1a435130e status=allocated mode=enforcing pid=959 uid=0 exe="/linux/samples/landlock/sandboxer" comm="sandboxer"
[ 135.141869][ T60] audit: type=1300 audit(1757374868.281:942): arch=c000003e syscall=257 success=no exit=-13 a0=ffffffffffffff9c a1=557a9cda83d1 a2=802 a3=0 items=0 ppid=958 pid=959 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" key=(null)
[ 135.156620][ T60] audit: type=1327 audit(1757374868.281:942): proctitle="/bin/bash"
bash: cannot set terminal process group (958): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
# echo quiet > /tmp/aa
bash: /tmp/aa: Permission denied
# echo not quiet > /usr/aa
[ 165.358804][ T60] audit: type=1423 audit(1757374898.513:943): domain=1a435130e blockers=fs.make_reg path="/usr" dev="virtiofs" ino=840
[ 165.363746][ T60] audit: type=1300 audit(1757374898.513:943): arch=c000003e syscall=257 success=no exit=-13 a0=ffffffffffffff9c a1=557a9ce447c0 a2=241 a3=1b6 items=0 ppid=958 pid=959 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" key=(null)
[ 165.375594][ T60] audit: type=1327 audit(1757374898.513:943): proctitle="/bin/bash"
bash: /usr/aa: Permission denied
## (still in sandboxer)
# LL_FS_RO= LL_FS_RW=/ LL_FS_QUIET=/ linux/samples/landlock/sandboxer /bin/bash
Executing the sandboxed command...
[ 203.490417][ T60] audit: type=1423 audit(1757374936.645:944): domain=1a435130e blockers=fs.write_file path="/dev/tty" dev="devtmpfs" ino=11
...
# echo "child can't suppress audit logs" > /usr/a
[ 219.948543][ T60] audit: type=1423 audit(1757374953.101:945): domain=1a435130e blockers=fs.make_reg path="/usr" dev="virtiofs" ino=840
[ 219.953918][ T60] audit: type=1300 audit(1757374953.101:945): arch=c000003e syscall=257 success=no exit=-13 a0=ffffffffffffff9c a1=5651ea7875c0 a2=241 a3=1b6 items=0 ppid=959 pid=960 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" key=(null)
[ 219.969167][ T60] audit: type=1327 audit(1757374953.101:945): proctitle="/bin/bash"
bash: /usr/a: Permission denied
# echo "/tmp is still quiet" > /tmp/a
bash: /tmp/a: Permission denied
# exit
(still in first layer sandboxer)
# LL_FS_RO=/ LL_FS_RW= LL_FS_QUIET= LL_FORCE_LOG=1 linux/samples/landlock/sandboxer /bin/bash
Executing the sandboxed command...
...
root@fced6595bd01:/# echo "not quiet now" > /tmp/a
[ 492.130486][ T60] audit: type=1423 audit(1757375225.285:949): domain=1a435132a blockers=fs.make_reg path="/tmp" dev="tmpfs" ino=1
[ 492.136729][ T60] audit: type=1300 audit(1757375225.285:949): arch=c000003e syscall=257 success=no exit=-13 a0=ffffffffffffff9c a1=55fc4c168450 a2=241 a3=1b6 items=0 ppid=959 pid=964 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" key=(null)
[ 492.151727][ T60] audit: type=1327 audit(1757375225.285:949): proctitle="/bin/bash"
bash: /tmp/a: Permission denied
All existing kselftests pass.
[1]: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/44#issuecomment-2876500918
Kind regards,
Tingmao
Tingmao Wang (6):
landlock: Add a place for flags to layer rules
landlock: Add API support for the quiet flag
landlock/audit: Check for quiet flag in landlock_log_denial
landlock/audit: Fix wrong type usage
landlock/access: Improve explanation on the deny_masks_t
samples/landlock: Add FS quiet flag support to sandboxer
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 25 +++++
samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 20 +++-
security/landlock/access.h | 6 +-
security/landlock/audit.c | 18 +++-
security/landlock/audit.h | 3 +-
security/landlock/fs.c | 99 ++++++++++++--------
security/landlock/fs.h | 2 +-
security/landlock/net.c | 11 ++-
security/landlock/net.h | 3 +-
security/landlock/ruleset.c | 17 +++-
security/landlock/ruleset.h | 29 +++++-
security/landlock/syscalls.c | 28 +++---
security/landlock/task.c | 12 +--
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
14 files changed, 199 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
base-commit: b320789d6883cc00ac78ce83bccbfe7ed58afcf0
--
2.51.0
next reply other threads:[~2025-09-09 0:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-09-09 0:06 Tingmao Wang [this message]
2025-09-09 0:06 ` [RFC PATCH 1/6] landlock: Add a place for flags to layer rules Tingmao Wang
2025-09-19 16:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-09-21 23:52 ` Tingmao Wang
2025-09-24 9:20 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-09-27 15:43 ` Tingmao Wang
2025-09-27 19:00 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-09-27 23:12 ` Tingmao Wang
2025-09-09 0:06 ` [RFC PATCH 2/6] landlock: Add API support for the quiet flag Tingmao Wang
2025-09-19 16:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-09-09 0:06 ` [RFC PATCH 3/6] landlock/audit: Check for quiet flag in landlock_log_denial Tingmao Wang
2025-09-19 16:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-09-09 0:06 ` [RFC PATCH 4/6] landlock/audit: Fix wrong type usage Tingmao Wang
2025-09-19 16:03 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-09-09 0:06 ` [RFC PATCH 5/6] landlock/access: Improve explanation on the deny_masks_t Tingmao Wang
2025-09-19 16:04 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-09-21 23:52 ` Tingmao Wang
2025-09-09 0:06 ` [RFC PATCH 6/6] samples/landlock: Add FS quiet flag support to sandboxer Tingmao Wang
2025-09-19 16:01 ` [RFC PATCH 0/6] Implement LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_QUIET Mickaël Salaün
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