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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [GIT PULL] selinux/selinux-pr-20250323
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 2025 15:39:46 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d0ade43454dee9c00689f03e8d9bd32a@paul-moore.com> (raw)

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Linus,

Here is the SELinux pull request for the Linux v6.15 merge window, the
highlights are below:

- Add additional SELinux access controls for kernel file reads/loads

  The SELinux kernel file read/load access controls were never updated
  beyond the initial kernel module support, this pull request adds
  support for firmware, kexec, policies, and x.509 certificates.

- Add support for wildcards in network interface names

  There are a number of userspace tools which auto-generate network
  interface names using some pattern of <XXXX>-<NN> where <XXXX> is
  a fixed string, e.g. "podman", and <NN> is a increasing counter.
  Supporting wildcards in the SELinux policy for network interfaces
  simplifies the policy associted with these interfaces.

- Fix a potential problem in the kernel read file SELinux code

  SELinux should always check the file label in the
  security_kernel_read_file() LSM hook, regardless of if the file is
  being read in chunks.  Unfortunately, the existing code only
  considered the file label on the first chunk; this pull request
  fixes this problem.
  
  There is more detail in the individual commit, but thankfully the
  existing code didn't expose a bug due to multi-stage reads only
  taking place in one driver, and that driver loading a file type
  that isn't targeted by the SELinux policy.

- Fix the subshell error handling in the example policy loader

  Minor fix to SELinux example policy loader in scripts/selinux due
  to an undesired interaction with subshells and errexit.

Please merge,
-Paul

--
The following changes since commit 2014c95afecee3e76ca4a56956a936e23283f05b:

  Linux 6.14-rc1 (2025-02-02 15:39:26 -0800)

are available in the Git repository at:

  https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git
    tags/selinux-pr-20250323

for you to fetch changes up to a3d3043ef24ac750f05a164e48f3d0833ebf0252:

  selinux: get netif_wildcard policycap from policy instead of cache
    (2025-03-17 16:22:04 -0400)

----------------------------------------------------------------
selinux/stable-6.15 PR 20250323
----------------------------------------------------------------

"Kipp N. Davis" (1):
      selinux: add permission checks for loading other kinds of kernel
         files

Christian Göttsche (2):
      selinux: support wildcard network interface names
      selinux: get netif_wildcard policycap from policy instead of cache

Paul Moore (1):
      selinux: always check the file label in selinux_kernel_read_file()

Tanya Agarwal (1):
      selinux: fix spelling error

Tim Schumacher (1):
      selinux: Chain up tool resolving errors in install_policy.sh

 scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh          |   15 ++---
 security/selinux/avc.c                     |    2 
 security/selinux/hooks.c                   |   58 +++++++++++++++++----
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h        |    4 +
 security/selinux/include/policycap.h       |    1 
 security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h |    1 
 security/selinux/include/security.h        |    8 ++
 security/selinux/ss/services.c             |   15 ++++-
 8 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

--
paul-moore.com

             reply	other threads:[~2025-03-23 19:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-03-23 19:39 Paul Moore [this message]
2025-03-25 23:02 ` [GIT PULL] selinux/selinux-pr-20250323 Linus Torvalds
2025-03-26 18:36   ` Paul Moore
2025-03-26 19:40     ` Linus Torvalds
2025-03-26 20:48       ` Paul Moore
2025-03-26 21:06         ` Linus Torvalds
2025-03-26 23:02           ` Paul Moore
2025-03-27  0:43             ` Linus Torvalds
2025-03-27  1:06               ` Thiébaud Weksteen
2025-03-27  1:20                 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-03-27  3:27                   ` Thiébaud Weksteen
2025-03-27  4:09                     ` Linus Torvalds
2025-03-27  8:59                       ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2025-03-27 15:49                         ` Linus Torvalds
2025-03-27 16:55                           ` Stephen Smalley
2025-03-27 18:15                             ` Linus Torvalds
2025-03-27 19:03                               ` Linus Torvalds
2025-03-27 19:16                                 ` Stephen Smalley
2025-03-27 19:40                                   ` Linus Torvalds
2025-03-28 13:23                                     ` Stephen Smalley
2025-03-28 15:06                                       ` Paul Moore
2025-04-02 20:38                                         ` Paul Moore
2025-03-28 16:36                                       ` Linus Torvalds
2025-03-28 17:24                                         ` Casey Schaufler
2025-03-27 16:41                         ` Casey Schaufler
2025-03-25 23:17 ` pr-tracker-bot

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