From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>, mjg59@google.com
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/11] evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when the HMAC key is loaded
Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2020 13:45:00 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d4c9d5333256b17acdbe41729dd680f534266130.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2b204e31d21e93c0167d154c2397cd5d11be6e7f.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Hi Roberto,
On Fri, 2020-08-21 at 14:30 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Sorry for the delay in reviewing these patches. Missing from this
> patch set is a cover letter with an explanation for grouping these
> patches into a patch set, other than for convenience. In this case, it
> would be along the lines that the original use case for EVM portable
> and immutable keys support was for a few critical files, not combined
> with an EVM encrypted key type. This patch set more fully integrates
> the initial EVM portable and immutable signature support.
Thank you for more fully integrating the EVM portable signatures into
IMA.
" [PATCH 08/11] ima: Allow imasig requirement to be satisfied by EVM
portable signatures" equates an IMA signature to having a portable and
immutable EVM signature. That is true in terms of signature
verification, but from an attestation perspective the "ima-sig"
template will not contain a signature. If not the EVM signature, then
at least some other indication should be included in the measurement
list.
Are you planning on posting the associated IMA/EVM regression tests?
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-24 17:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-18 16:01 [PATCH 01/11] evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when the HMAC key is loaded Roberto Sassu
2020-06-18 16:01 ` [PATCH 02/11] evm: Load EVM key in ima_load_x509() to avoid appraisal Roberto Sassu
2020-08-21 18:45 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-08-31 9:44 ` Roberto Sassu
2020-08-31 19:26 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-06-18 16:01 ` [PATCH 03/11] evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if the HMAC key is loaded Roberto Sassu
2020-08-21 20:14 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-08-31 8:24 ` Roberto Sassu
2020-08-31 21:31 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-06-18 16:01 ` [PATCH 04/11] evm: Check size of security.evm before using it Roberto Sassu
2020-08-24 12:14 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-06-18 16:01 ` [PATCH 05/11] evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures if check fails Roberto Sassu
2020-08-24 12:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-08-21 18:30 ` [PATCH 01/11] evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when the HMAC key is loaded Mimi Zohar
2020-08-24 17:45 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2020-09-02 11:42 ` Roberto Sassu
2020-09-02 13:40 ` Mimi Zohar
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