From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>,
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"dwmw2@infradead.org" <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
"herbert@gondor.apana.org.au" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"davem@davemloft.net" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"jmorris@namei.org" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"serge@hallyn.com" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"nayna@linux.ibm.com" <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
"mic@linux.microsoft.com" <mic@linux.microsoft.com>,
Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] KEYS: CA link restriction
Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2022 07:45:03 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e10f2161aaa69a9d301b3a16a37cbab266318aee.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <22860730-d615-5683-6af0-05b6f4f3e71d@linux.ibm.com>
On Mon, 2022-03-07 at 21:31 -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
>
> On 3/7/22 18:38, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> >
> >
> >> On Mar 7, 2022, at 4:01 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> On Mon, 2022-03-07 at 18:06 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> >>>
> >>>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> >>>>> index 6b1ac5f5896a..49bb2ea7f609 100644
> >>>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> >>>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> >>>>> @@ -108,6 +108,49 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
> >>>>> return ret;
> >>>>> }
> >>>>> +/**
> >>>>> + * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys
> >>>>> + * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to.
> >>>>> + * @type: The type of key being added.
> >>>>> + * @payload: The payload of the new key.
> >>>>> + * @trust_keyring: Unused.
> >>>>> + *
> >>>>> + * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new
> >>>>> + * certificate as being ok to link.
> >>>>
> >>>> CA = root CA here, right?
> >>>
> >>> Yes, I’ll update the comment
> >>
> >> Updating the comment is not enough. There's an existing function named
> >> "x509_check_for_self_signed()" which determines whether the certificate
> >> is self-signed.
> >
> > Originally I tried using that function. However when the restrict link code is called,
> > all the necessary x509 information is no longer available. The code in
> > restrict_link_by_ca is basically doing the equivalent to x509_check_for_self_signed.
> > After verifying the cert has the CA flag set, the call to public_key_verify_signature
> > validates the cert is self signed.
> >
> Isn't x509_cert_parse() being called as part of parsing the certificate?
> If so, it seems to check for a self-signed certificate every time. You
> could add something like the following to x509_check_for_self_signed(cert):
> pub->x509_self_signed = cert->self_signed = true;
>
> This could then reduce the function in 3/4 to something like:
>
> return payload->data[asym_crypto]->x509_self_signed;
Agreed, as long as the other two criteria are also met: CA and keyUsage
should be required and limited to keyCertSign.
thanks,
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-08 12:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-01 17:36 [PATCH 0/4] Add CA enforcement in the machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2022-03-01 17:36 ` [PATCH 1/4] KEYS: Create static version of public_key_verify_signature Eric Snowberg
2022-03-01 17:36 ` [PATCH 2/4] X.509: Parse Basic Constraints for CA Eric Snowberg
2022-03-04 15:10 ` Stefan Berger
2022-03-07 18:02 ` Eric Snowberg
2022-03-01 17:36 ` [PATCH 3/4] KEYS: CA link restriction Eric Snowberg
2022-03-04 15:28 ` Stefan Berger
2022-03-07 18:06 ` Eric Snowberg
2022-03-07 23:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-03-07 23:38 ` Eric Snowberg
2022-03-08 2:31 ` Stefan Berger
2022-03-08 12:45 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2022-03-08 13:56 ` Stefan Berger
2022-03-08 18:02 ` Eric Snowberg
2022-03-09 17:12 ` Stefan Berger
2022-03-09 17:17 ` Stefan Berger
2022-03-09 18:13 ` Eric Snowberg
2022-03-09 19:02 ` Stefan Berger
2022-03-11 18:44 ` Eric Snowberg
2022-03-11 20:23 ` Stefan Berger
2022-03-14 12:00 ` Stefan Berger
2022-03-09 17:33 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-03-01 17:36 ` [PATCH 4/4] integrity: CA enforcement in machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2022-03-04 23:19 ` Stefan Berger
2022-03-07 18:13 ` Eric Snowberg
2022-03-07 18:36 ` Stefan Berger
2022-03-07 18:48 ` Eric Snowberg
2022-03-06 23:33 ` [PATCH 0/4] Add CA enforcement in the " Mimi Zohar
2022-03-07 18:55 ` Eric Snowberg
2022-03-09 18:43 ` Mimi Zohar
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