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From: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk,
	agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, mpatocka@redhat.com,
	eparis@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, fsverity@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev,
	audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v20 02/20] ipe: add policy parser
Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2024 10:54:29 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e1dd4dcf-8e2e-4e7b-9d40-533efd123103@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240810155000.GA35219@mail.hallyn.com>



On 8/10/2024 8:50 AM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 02, 2024 at 11:08:16PM -0700, Fan Wu wrote:
>> From: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
>>
>> IPE's interpretation of the what the user trusts is accomplished through
> 
> nit: "of what the user trusts" (drop the extra 'the')
> 
>> its policy. IPE's design is to not provide support for a single trust
>> provider, but to support multiple providers to enable the end-user to
>> choose the best one to seek their needs.
>>
>> This requires the policy to be rather flexible and modular so that
>> integrity providers, like fs-verity, dm-verity, or some other system,
>> can plug into the policy with minimal code changes.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
> 
> This all looks fine.  Just one comment below.
> 
Thank you for reviewing this!

> 
>> +/**
>> + * parse_rule() - parse a policy rule line.
>> + * @line: Supplies rule line to be parsed.
>> + * @p: Supplies the partial parsed policy.
>> + *
>> + * Return:
>> + * * 0		- Success
>> + * * %-ENOMEM	- Out of memory (OOM)
>> + * * %-EBADMSG	- Policy syntax error
>> + */
>> +static int parse_rule(char *line, struct ipe_parsed_policy *p)
>> +{
>> +	enum ipe_action_type action = IPE_ACTION_INVALID;
>> +	enum ipe_op_type op = IPE_OP_INVALID;
>> +	bool is_default_rule = false;
>> +	struct ipe_rule *r = NULL;
>> +	bool first_token = true;
>> +	bool op_parsed = false;
>> +	int rc = 0;
>> +	char *t;
>> +
>> +	r = kzalloc(sizeof(*r), GFP_KERNEL);
>> +	if (!r)
>> +		return -ENOMEM;
>> +
>> +	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&r->next);
>> +	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&r->props);
>> +
>> +	while (t = strsep(&line, IPE_POLICY_DELIM), line) {
> 
> If line is passed in as NULL, t will be NULL on the first test.  Then
> you'll break out and call parse_action(NULL), which calls
> match_token(NULL, ...), which I do not think is safe.
> 
> I realize the current caller won't pass in NULL, but it seems worth
> checking for here in case some future caller is added by someone
> who's unaware.
> 
> Or, maybe add 'line must not be null' to the function description.
> 

Yes, I agree that adding a NULL check would be better. I will include it 
in the next version.

-Fan

  reply	other threads:[~2024-08-13 17:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-08-03  6:08 [PATCH v20 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 01/20] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 02/20] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2024-08-10 15:50   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-08-13 17:54     ` Fan Wu [this message]
2024-08-14  1:53       ` Paul Moore
2024-08-14 18:23         ` Fan Wu
2024-08-15 19:11           ` Paul Moore
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 03/20] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2024-08-10 20:05   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 04/20] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 05/20] initramfs|security: Add a security hook to do_populate_rootfs() Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 06/20] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 07/20] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 08/20] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 09/20] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 10/20] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 11/20] block|lsm: Add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block devices Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs Fan Wu
2024-08-08 22:38   ` Fan Wu
2024-08-15 19:19     ` Paul Moore
2024-08-16 13:35       ` Mikulas Patocka
2024-08-16 19:11         ` Fan Wu
2024-08-18 17:22           ` Paul Moore
2024-08-19 17:47             ` Fan Wu
2024-08-19 19:40               ` Paul Moore
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 13/20] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 14/20] security: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs Fan Wu
2024-08-05 18:51   ` Eric Biggers
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 16/20] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 17/20] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 18/20] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 19/20] Documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
2024-08-03  6:08 ` [PATCH v20 20/20] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information Fan Wu
2024-08-03  8:14   ` Paul Menzel
2024-08-06 20:54     ` Paul Moore
2024-08-07  4:48       ` Paul Menzel
2024-08-07 18:01         ` Fan Wu
2024-08-07 19:42           ` Paul Moore
2024-08-06 20:59 ` [PATCH v20 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Paul Moore
2024-08-20  2:51   ` Paul Moore

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