From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, eparis@redhat.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, keescook@chromium.org,
john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 5/15] LSM: Single calls in secid hooks
Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2025 19:12:46 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ee015074a9019ef4725f7e613fd76f86@paul-moore.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250621171851.5869-6-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
On Jun 21, 2025 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> security_socket_getpeersec_stream(), security_socket_getpeersec_dgram()
> and security_secctx_to_secid() can only provide a single security context
> or secid to their callers. Open code these hooks to return the first
> hook provided. Because only one "major" LSM is allowed there will only
> be one hook in the list, with the excepton being BPF. BPF is not expected
> to be using these interfaces.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> security/security.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index db85006d2fd5..2286285f8aea 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -3806,8 +3806,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_lsmprop_to_secctx);
> */
> int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
> {
> + struct lsm_static_call *scall;
> +
> *secid = 0;
> - return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, secdata, seclen, secid);
> + lsm_for_each_hook(scall, secctx_to_secid) {
> + return scall->hl->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen, secid);
> + }
> + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secctx_to_secid);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
Two thoughts come to mind:
If we are relying on BPF not using these hooks we should remove the BPF
callback. It looks like the secctx_to_secid and socket_getpeersec_stream
callbacks are already absent from the BPF LSM, so it's just a matter of
working with the BPF folks to see if socket_getpeersec_dgram can be
removed. If it can't be removed, you'll need to find another solution.
Instead of opening up the call_int_hook() wrapper here, what would it
look like if we enforced the single callback rule at LSM registration
time?
> @@ -4268,8 +4273,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
> int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval,
> sockptr_t optlen, unsigned int len)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, sock, optval, optlen,
> - len);
> + struct lsm_static_call *scall;
> +
> + lsm_for_each_hook(scall, socket_getpeersec_stream) {
> + return scall->hl->hook.socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval,
> + optlen, len);
> + }
> + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(socket_getpeersec_stream);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -4289,7 +4299,13 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval,
> int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
> struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, sock, skb, secid);
> + struct lsm_static_call *scall;
> +
> + lsm_for_each_hook(scall, socket_getpeersec_dgram) {
> + return scall->hl->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb,
> + secid);
> + }
> + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(socket_getpeersec_dgram);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
>
> --
> 2.47.0
--
paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-10-14 23:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20250621171851.5869-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 00/15] LSM: No exclusive LSMs Casey Schaufler
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 01/15] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC 1/15] " Paul Moore
2025-10-15 5:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2025-10-15 15:01 ` Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 02/15] LSM: security_lsmblob_to_secctx module selection Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC 2/15] " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 03/15] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC 3/15] " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 04/15] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC 4/15] " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 05/15] LSM: Single calls in secid hooks Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2025-11-04 16:00 ` [PATCH RFC 5/15] " Casey Schaufler
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 06/15] LSM: Exclusive secmark usage Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC 6/15] " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 07/15] Audit: Call only the first of the audit rule hooks Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC 7/15] " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 08/15] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 09/15] LSM: Add mount opts blob size tracking Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC 9/15] " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 10/15] LSM: allocate mnt_opts blobs instead of module specific data Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 11/15] LSM: Infrastructure management of the mnt_opts security blob Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 12/15] LSM: Allow reservation of netlabel Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 13/15] LSM: restrict security_cred_getsecid() to a single LSM Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:13 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 14/15] Smack: Remove LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE Casey Schaufler
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 15/15] LSM: Remove exclusive LSM flag Casey Schaufler
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