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Wed, 18 Nov 2026 20:08:20 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [9.47.158.153] (unknown [9.47.158.153]) by smtpav05.wdc07v.mail.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 20:08:20 +0000 (GMT) Message-ID: Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:08:19 -0500 X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: fix signature length passed to KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY To: florian.bauckholt@cispa.de, David Howells , Jarkko Sakkinen , Lukas Wunner , Ignat Korchagin , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" Cc: Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Hui Peng , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org References: <20261111-keyctl-pkey-fixes-v1-0-934ebaa267a7@cispa.de> <20261111-keyctl-pkey-fixes-v1-1-934ebaa267a7@cispa.de> Content-Language: en-US From: Stefan Berger In-Reply-To: <20261111-keyctl-pkey-fixes-v1-1-934ebaa267a7@cispa.de> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-Reinject: loops=2 maxloops=12 X-Proofpoint-GUID: HKXXmG-UC4fI07WkkUIKC_mzZd1qDZ8L X-Authority-Analysis: v=2.4 cv=Z8x5j3RA c=1 sm=1 tr=0 ts=6afe05b7 cx=c_pps a=AfN7/Ok6k8XGzOShvHwTGQ==:117 a=AfN7/Ok6k8XGzOShvHwTGQ==:17 a=IkcTkHD0fZMA:10 a=zJRp6_cAMcgA:10 a=VkNPw1HP01LnGYTKEx00:22 a=RnoormkPH1_aCDwRdu11:22 a=V8glGbnc2Ofi9Qvn3v5h:22 a=VwQbUJbxAAAA:8 a=pGLkceISAAAA:8 a=VnNF1IyMAAAA:8 a=fjpi1DcuFi9e4zuLaT0A:9 a=QEXdDO2ut3YA:10 X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: tqJB5qfQ6hOs4knfl_yxa9eK_24yXY4i X-Proofpoint-Spam-Info: AW1haW4tMjYxMTE4MDA3NyBTYWx0ZWRfXzX4OhltihA4R UjGEpAfYLdZIsa4xf1+UXd1ahOexugaiV5mO99pHy2W4TiwIPCp2DOYNENk8CDKrF/LCaB9IzYW cHXHofYmbkjF6QtfAEFlf6+qbc8C8vA= X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details-Enc: AW1haW4tMjYxMTE4MDA3NyBTYWx0ZWRfXwCwSUwf0dsZa 1nFeFGeo7vv/dnyEuuRVK6u4Hpuw3TtvSCtaN4wjakjj82yChlWHzk0xR9+K9vQQF0f02iWF21i WqnUQXWsFwkTMuueCwCzOxqsW2vJTUpfaALf1O1CHw92uxXRc5nXCMcCIFPYoARtKaOw1xzP/0Q eNcRThOMpS59MOPl6v7OVbjaDnnLuvj9lli/RArQy/EfsbeOqoKzuKmJ6gw4A+vDrPPYWD39nb5 2xE/+0+wz2DKrBWT8OGat/lJT4pR6RupSbmaueYIuUIkU+QuA05RndKt3bWm/pvuO6eFMRmun0b 9Sv9oQH2zrBXOyUWYTnIF5HOLfxvBx0niMlD4TNaBplrGzi7eL0EyAPCqWWkVki5l7cTEyWx9Sl dX8GoqGH7sT5zFageKRgRQyvwwQBXFMpTQ955Qrto9viPavPscL7Ty7jNrlYDgf5XagQcqw412D r4IuG8dt35wtodx5kSA== X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.293,Aquarius:18.0.1176,Hydra:6.1.138,FMLib:17.12.100.49 definitions=2026-11-18_06,2026-11-16_01,2025-10-01_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 spamscore=0 malwarescore=0 adultscore=0 bulkscore=0 clxscore=1011 impostorscore=0 priorityscore=1501 classifier=typeunknown authscore=0 authtc= authcc= route=outbound adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.22.0-2611040001 definitions=main-2611180077 On 11/11/26 10:56 AM, Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay wrote: > From: Florian Bauckholt > > Commit cb481e59ea6c ("KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()") > made keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() set params->out_len to the maximum > output size of the operation instead of the size provided by the caller. > It does so for KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY as well, but verify has no output > buffer: out_len shares a union with in2_len, the length of the > signature. > > As a result keyctl_pkey_verify() ignores the signature length passed by > the caller. It copies max_sig_size bytes from the signature pointer and > passes max_sig_size as the signature size to the verification. > > This makes no difference for signatures that are always max_sig_size > bytes long, such as RSA. A shorter signature, e.g. a DER-encoded ECDSA > signature, is followed by whatever is behind it in the caller's memory, > or the call fails with -EFAULT if that memory is not readable. The > x962 ECDSA template currently ignores data following the signature, > which hides the problem. > > Use the length provided by the caller, which has already been checked > against max_sig_size. > > Fixes: cb481e59ea6c ("KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()") > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260919221742.3709658-1-benquike@gmail.com/ > Signed-off-by: Florian Bauckholt Tested-by: Stefan Berger > --- > security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c > index 15b6bf6399b5..794fa3d01911 100644 > --- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c > +++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c > @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par > uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size) > return -EINVAL; > > - params->out_len = info.max_sig_size; > + params->in2_len = uparams.in2_len; > break; > default: > return -EOPNOTSUPP; >