From: bot+bpf-ci@kernel.org
To: utilityemal77@gmail.com,ast@kernel.org,daniel@iogearbox.net,andrii@kernel.org,kpsingh@kernel.org,matt@bobrowski.net,paul@paul-moore.com,mic@digikod.net,viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,brauner@kernel.org,kees@kernel.org
Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com,gnoack@google.com,jack@suse.cz,song@kernel.org,yonghong.song@linux.dev,martin.lau@linux.dev,eddyz87@gmail.com,memxor@gmail.com,jolsa@kernel.org,m@maowtm.org,bpf@vger.kernel.org,linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,utilityemal77@gmail.com,ast@kernel.org,andrii@kernel.org,daniel@iogearbox.net,martin.lau@kernel.org,eddyz87@gmail.com,yonghong.song@linux.dev,mason@kernel.org,ihor.solodrai@linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 13/15] landlock: Implement the LSM policy object hooks
Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2026 20:46:33 +0000 (UTC) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f3f645f8f6c007dde4eea8821037ea535d3ee88cc71538dae13487a9800d0a52@mail.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260909193719.518517-14-utilityemal77@gmail.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 4479 bytes --]
> diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.h b/security/landlock/cred.h
> index 88fa97fc3bd2..9a2971197892 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/cred.h
> +++ b/security/landlock/cred.h
> @@ -59,6 +59,16 @@ struct landlock_cred_security {
> */
> struct landlock_domain *domain;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_LSM
> + /**
> + * @staged: Restriction staged by the bprm_apply_policy_object() hook,
> + * owning its domain reference, applied at bprm_committing_creds().
> + * Only ever set on credentials prepared for an execution; committed
> + * task credentials never carry a staged restriction.
> + */
> + struct landlock_restriction staged;
> +#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_LSM */
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG
Does adding the staged field here grow struct landlock_file_security for
every open file?
struct landlock_cred_security is embedded by value in the file blob:
security/landlock/fs.h:88-90:
struct landlock_cred_security fown_subject;
and security/landlock/setup.c sets .lbs_file = sizeof(struct
landlock_file_security), so that blob is allocated for every struct
file.
struct landlock_restriction is 16 bytes (domain pointer + u32 flags +
tail padding), so adding it grows landlock_cred_security from 11 bytes
(8+2+1) to 27 bytes (8+16+2+1), making struct landlock_file_security
grow from 32 to 48 bytes (+50%) when CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y.
The struct's kernel-doc says "This structure is packed to minimize the
size of struct landlock_file_security," but the new field is documented
as "Only ever set on credentials prepared for an execution; committed
task credentials never carry a staged restriction," so it is always
zero in the file blob.
hook_file_set_fowner() at security/landlock/fs.c copies this blob with
raw struct assignments, so the 16 exec-only bytes are copied on every
fcntl(F_SETOWN) and socket-owner set. hook_file_free_security() only
touches fown_subject.domain, never staged.
CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y is enabled by mainstream distributions alongside
CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK, making this the common configuration. Could
the exec-only staging state live in a separate structure that is not
embedded in the per-file blob?
> diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.h b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
> index 1465f8a5c464..22edb140bb7f 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.h
> +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
[ ... ]
> @@ -146,6 +147,16 @@ struct landlock_rules {
> u32 num_rules;
> };
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_LSM
> +/*
> + * Landlock's lsm_policy_object types. The namespace is private to
> + * Landlock; 0 stays reserved as "unset".
> + */
> +enum landlock_policy_type {
> + LANDLOCK_POLICY_TYPE_RULESET = 1,
> +};
> +#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_LSM */
> +
> /**
> * struct landlock_ruleset - Landlock ruleset
> *
> @@ -157,6 +168,17 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
> * @rules: Red-black tree storage for rules.
> */
> struct landlock_rules rules;
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_LSM
> + /**
> + * @policy_object: Identity under which the ruleset is handed out
> + * to BPF programs as a referenced kptr: the LSM policy kfuncs
> + * dispatch back to Landlock through its lsmid. Kept outside the
> + * union with @work_free: RCU readers may read its lsmid while a
> + * queued free waits out the grace period.
> + */
> + struct lsm_policy_object policy_object;
> +#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_LSM */
> /**
> * @usage: Number of file descriptors referencing this ruleset. Kept
> * outside the union with @work_free: RCU readers may still call
Should the @usage documentation be updated?
The comment says "Number of file descriptors referencing this ruleset,"
but after this patch a reference can be held with no file descriptor
involved at all.
hook_policy_object_from_fd() calls landlock_get_ruleset_from_fd() to
increment @usage, then the BPF program parks that owned reference in a
map kptr field with bpf_kptr_xchg(). Userspace can close the ruleset fd
afterwards, leaving @usage at 1 with zero file descriptors referencing
the ruleset. hook_policy_object_get() also increments the refcount for
an RCU reader holding no fd.
The rest of this struct's documentation is maintained precisely (three
members carry "Kept outside the union with @work_free" rationales), so
the stale enumeration stands out.
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/34398515657
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-09 20:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-09 19:37 [PATCH bpf-next v3 00/15] BPF interface for applying Landlock rulesets Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 01/15] lsm: Add the LSM policy object lifetime hooks Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 02/15] lsm: Add the bprm_apply_policy_object LSM hook Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 03/15] lsm: Move the lsm_for_each_hook() macro to security/lsm.h Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 04/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_release kfunc and policy object destructor Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:29 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 21:34 ` Paul Moore
2026-09-09 22:20 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-09 23:08 ` Paul Moore
2026-09-12 3:37 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2026-09-12 5:26 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-12 19:33 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2026-09-13 19:41 ` Paul Moore
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 05/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_from_fd kfunc Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:46 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 06/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_acquire kfunc Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:30 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 07/15] lsm: Add the bpf_lsm_policy_apply_bprm kfunc Justin Suess
[not found] ` <20260909195500.DA3E31F000FF@smtp.kernel.org>
2026-09-09 20:20 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-12 3:38 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2026-09-12 5:39 ` Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 08/15] lsm: Document the LSM policy object interface Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 09/15] selftests/bpf: Add tests for the LSM policy object kfuncs Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:30 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 10/15] landlock: Expose the ruleset fd lookup to the rest of Landlock Justin Suess
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 11/15] landlock: Factor the credential restriction out of landlock_restrict_self() Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:29 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 12/15] landlock: Free rulesets after an RCU grace period Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:46 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 13/15] landlock: Implement the LSM policy object hooks Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:46 ` bot+bpf-ci [this message]
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 14/15] selftests/bpf: Test the LSM policy object kfuncs with Landlock Justin Suess
2026-09-09 20:46 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-09 19:37 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 15/15] landlock: Document the BPF policy interface Justin Suess
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=f3f645f8f6c007dde4eea8821037ea535d3ee88cc71538dae13487a9800d0a52@mail.kernel.org \
--to=bot+bpf-ci@kernel.org \
--cc=andrii@kernel.org \
--cc=ast@kernel.org \
--cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=brauner@kernel.org \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=daniel@iogearbox.net \
--cc=eddyz87@gmail.com \
--cc=gnoack@google.com \
--cc=ihor.solodrai@linux.dev \
--cc=jack@suse.cz \
--cc=jolsa@kernel.org \
--cc=kees@kernel.org \
--cc=kpsingh@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=m@maowtm.org \
--cc=martin.lau@kernel.org \
--cc=martin.lau@linux.dev \
--cc=mason@kernel.org \
--cc=matt@bobrowski.net \
--cc=memxor@gmail.com \
--cc=mic@digikod.net \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=song@kernel.org \
--cc=utilityemal77@gmail.com \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
--cc=yonghong.song@linux.dev \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox