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Hallyn" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, joeyli , Eric Snowberg , Nayna Jain , linuxppc-dev Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2023 15:56:52 -0400 In-Reply-To: References: <20230907165224.32256-1-msuchanek@suse.de> <20230907173232.GD8826@kitsune.suse.cz> <92e23f29-1a16-54da-48d1-59186158e923@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20230912074116.GL8826@kitsune.suse.cz> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-15" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.28.5 (3.28.5-22.el8) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: E3ajPj7DuwbxoSFWxRgrwOFdKkY5sMzQ X-Proofpoint-GUID: JgKj7eWT6P6o28yIE9BTYJDkdKpjp4DP X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.267,Aquarius:18.0.957,Hydra:6.0.601,FMLib:17.11.176.26 definitions=2023-09-12_19,2023-09-05_01,2023-05-22_02 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 clxscore=1015 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 priorityscore=1501 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 mlxscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2308100000 definitions=main-2309120165 Precedence: bulk List-ID: On Tue, 2023-09-12 at 22:32 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Tue Sep 12, 2023 at 10:22 PM EEST, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Tue, 2023-09-12 at 12:49 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > On Tue Sep 12, 2023 at 10:41 AM EEST, Michal Suchánek wrote: > > > > On Mon, Sep 11, 2023 at 11:39:38PM -0400, Nayna wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On 9/7/23 13:32, Michal Suchánek wrote: > > > > > > Adding more CC's from the original patch, looks like get_maintainers is > > > > > > not that great for this file. > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Sep 07, 2023 at 06:52:19PM +0200, Michal Suchanek wrote: > > > > > > > No other platform needs CA_MACHINE_KEYRING, either. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This is policy that should be decided by the administrator, not Kconfig > > > > > > > dependencies. > > > > > > > > > > We certainly agree that flexibility is important. However, in this case, > > > > > this also implies that we are expecting system admins to be security > > > > > experts. As per our understanding, CA based infrastructure(PKI) is the > > > > > standard to be followed and not the policy decision. And we can only speak > > > > > for Power. > > > > > > > > > > INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING ensures that we always have CA signed leaf > > > > > certs. > > > > > > > > And that's the problem. > > > > > > > > From a distribution point of view there are two types of leaf certs: > > > > > > > > - leaf certs signed by the distribution CA which need not be imported > > > > because the distribution CA cert is enrolled one way or another > > > > - user generated ad-hoc certificates that are not signed in any way, > > > > and enrolled by the user > > > > > > > > The latter are vouched for by the user by enrolling the certificate, and > > > > confirming that they really want to trust this certificate. Enrolling > > > > user certificates is vital for usability or secure boot. Adding extra > > > > step of creating a CA certificate stored on the same system only > > > > complicates things with no added benefit. > > > > > > This all comes down to the generic fact that kernel should not > > > proactively define what it *expects* sysadmins. > > > > > > CA based infrastructure like anything is a policy decision not > > > a decision to be enforced by kernel. > > > > Secure boot requires a signature chain of trust. IMA extends the > > secure and trusted boot concepts to the kernel. Missing from that > > signature chain of trust is the ability of allowing the end > > machine/system owner to load other certificates without recompiling the > > kernel. The introduction of the machine keyring was to address this. > > > > I'm not questioning the end user's intent on loading local or third > > party keys via the normal mechanisms. If the existing mechanism(s) for > > loading local or third party keys were full-proof, then loading a > > single certificate, self-signed or not, would be fine. However, that > > isn't the reality. The security of the two-stage approach is simply > > not equivalent to loading a single certificate. Documentation could > > help the end user/system owner to safely create (and manage) separate > > certificate signing and code signing certs. > > > > Unlike UEFI based systems, PowerVM defines two variables trustedcadb > > and moduledb, for storing certificate signing and code signing > > certificates respectively. First the certs on the trustedcadb are > > loaded and then the ones on moduledb are loaded. > > There's pragmatic reasons to make things more open than they should be > in production. As a hardware example I still possess Raspberry Pi 3B for > test workloads because it has a broken TZ implementation. The world is > really bigger than production workloads. > > It would be better to document what you said rather than enforce the > right choice IMHO (e.g. extend Kconfig documentation). PowerVM LPARs are more about production workloads than a Raspberry Pi. :) -- thanks, Mimi