From: elfring@users.sourceforge.net (SF Markus Elfring)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable bug in range_read()
Date: Sat, 1 Apr 2017 08:40:59 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fb1cb81c-4b03-5b21-f933-ea3e58491a13@users.sourceforge.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhT7njoVyHgyiTQhCcvZEYrTE_XZRLxT4+JJPiH3W88AUw@mail.gmail.com>
>>> We removed this initialization as a cleanup but it is probably
>>> required.
>>>
>>> The concern is that "nel" can be zero. I'm not an expert on SELinux
>>> code but I think it looks possible to write an SELinux policy which
>>> triggers this bug. GCC doesn't catch this, but my static checker
>>> does.
>>>
>>> Fixes: 9c312e79d6af ("selinux: Delete an unnecessary variable
>>> initialisation in range_read()")
>>> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
>>
>> Nice catch, thanks!
>>
>> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
>
> Yes, indeed. Thanks Dan, I should have caught this when merging Markus' patch.
How do you think about the possibility to call the function ?range_read? only with
a system configuration where the interface ?le32_to_cpu? will be resolved to
a positive value so that statements in the corresponding for loop will be executed
at least once?
Regards,
Markus
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-04-01 6:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-03-31 15:21 [PATCH] selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable bug Dan Carpenter
2017-03-31 15:52 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-03-31 19:18 ` Paul Moore
2017-04-01 6:40 ` SF Markus Elfring [this message]
2017-04-01 14:52 ` selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable bug in range_read() Paul Moore
2017-04-03 1:10 ` [PATCH] selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable bug James Morris
2017-04-03 21:45 ` Paul Moore
2017-04-04 0:03 ` James Morris
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