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AJvYcCUJq5t6NO6OBovChW5YYQrLNElM44jfnRKgeUP72uS04UaTg2j0NC1EqOxWTvZQdFZb0WZoZujPPq4EwmK55zYDR6w74f0UNJuGeeGzdTydGFMorZBO X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YxsN1kWA4I0VqLCtWwxO52iXkrtWGWgny58ZCRWGDd4q/3ExiTI c9pJ3yrcfVueHvRx/yFGG4t2nFi1vh2nAUGoRiusD9g6QPjwf1SBDySC/tqfYg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IHzQEvbTybFxdOOiTqUl7ym4mHT4Zq9uXRmXAzKRWe5gmEcs6zFJSlc05jkl1alZKpFPU/CEg== X-Received: by 2002:a05:620a:5cca:b0:789:ebd1:445a with SMTP id xr10-20020a05620a5cca00b00789ebd1445amr11360295qkn.42.1710889239710; Tue, 19 Mar 2024 16:00:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost ([70.22.175.108]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id bp10-20020a05620a458a00b00789e8860ef7sm4208014qkb.121.2024.03.19.16.00.39 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 19 Mar 2024 16:00:39 -0700 (PDT) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2024 19:00:38 -0400 Message-ID: Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Paul Moore To: Fan Wu , corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, fsverity@lists.linux.dev, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev, audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Fan Wu Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v15 16/21] security: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook References: <1710560151-28904-17-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> In-Reply-To: <1710560151-28904-17-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com> On Mar 15, 2024 Fan Wu wrote: > > This patch introduces a new hook to save inode's integrity > data. For example, for fsverity enabled files, LSMs can use this hook to save > the verified fsverity builtin signature into the inode's security blob, > and LSMs can make access decisions based on the data inside the signature, > like the signer certificate. > > Signed-off-by: Fan Wu > > -- > v1-v14: > + Not present > > v15: > + Introduced > > --- > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 +++ > include/linux/security.h | 10 ++++++++++ > security/security.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > index 6808ae763913..c88587fc3691 100644 > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > @@ -177,6 +177,9 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_listsecurity, struct inode *inode, char *buffer, > LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_getsecid, struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_copy_up, struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) > LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode_copy_up_xattr, const char *name) > +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setintegrity, struct inode *inode, > + enum lsm_intgr_type type, const void *value, size_t size) > + > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernfs_init_security, struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, > struct kernfs_node *kn) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_permission, struct file *file, int mask) > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 60b40b523d57..0885866b261e 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -405,6 +405,9 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer > void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid); > int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new); > int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name); > +int security_inode_setintegrity(struct inode *inode, > + enum lsm_intgr_type type, const void *value, > + size_t size); > int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, > struct kernfs_node *kn); > int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask); > @@ -1021,6 +1024,13 @@ static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) > return 0; > } > > +static inline int security_inode_setintegrity(struct inode *inode, > + enum lsm_intgr_type, type, > + const void *value, size_t size) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > + > static inline int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, > struct kernfs_node *kn) > { > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 8d88529ac904..c5d426d084ab 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -2681,6 +2681,34 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr); > > +/** > + * security_inode_setintegrity() - Set the inode's integrity data > + * @inode: inode > + * @type: type of integrity, e.g. hash digest, signature, etc > + * @value: the integrity value > + * @size: size of the integrity value > + * > + * Register a verified integrity measurement of a inode with the LSM. > + * > + * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. > + */ > +int security_inode_setintegrity(struct inode *inode, > + enum lsm_intgr_type type, const void *value, > + size_t size) > +{ > + int rc = 0; > + struct security_hook_list *p; > + > + hlist_for_each_entry(p, &security_hook_heads.inode_setintegrity, list) { > + rc = p->hook.inode_setintegrity(inode, type, value, size); > + if (rc) > + return rc; > + } > + > + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setintegrity); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setintegrity); Same as the block device variant of this hook, we should convert this to use the call_int_hook() macro unless there is a strong reason to leave it open coded. > /** > * security_kernfs_init_security() - Init LSM context for a kernfs node > * @kn_dir: parent kernfs node > -- > 2.44.0 -- paul-moore.com