* Re: [PATCH] apparmor: Restore Y/N in /sys for apparmor's "enabled"
From: James Morris @ 2019-04-09 20:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: David Rheinsberg, John Johansen, Serge E. Hallyn,
linux-security-module, LKML
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+g8tPrDAYVKv26ci6zvGuvC1TMXto7weVP2QBymMRjhw@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, 9 Apr 2019, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 8, 2019 at 11:21 PM David Rheinsberg
> <david.rheinsberg@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Hi
> >
> > On Mon, Apr 8, 2019 at 6:07 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > Before commit c5459b829b71 ("LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled"
> > > state"), /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled would show "Y" or "N"
> > > since it was using the "bool" handler. After being changed to "int",
> > > this switched to "1" or "0", breaking the userspace AppArmor detection
> > > of dbus-broker. This restores the Y/N output while keeping the LSM
> > > infrastructure happy.
> > >
> > > Before:
> > > $ cat /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled
> > > 1
> > >
> > > After:
> > > $ cat /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled
> > > Y
> > >
> > > Reported-by: David Rheinsberg <david.rheinsberg@gmail.com>
> > > Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CADyDSO6k8vYb1eryT4g6+EHrLCvb68GAbHVWuULkYjcZcYNhhw@mail.gmail.com
> > > Fixes: c5459b829b71 ("LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state")
> > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > > ---
> > > This fix, if John is okay with it, is needed in v5.1 to correct the
> > > userspace regression reported by David.
> > > ---
> > > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > > 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > This looks good to me. Thanks a lot! If this makes v5.1, I will leave
> > the apparmor-detection in dbus-broker as it is, unless someone asks me
> > to parse 0/1 as well?
> >
> > I cannot judge whether the apparmor_initialized check is correct, but
> > for the parameter parsing:
> >
> > Reviewed-by: David Rheinsberg <david.rheinsberg@gmail.com>
>
> Thanks!
>
> James, are you able to take this for v5.1 fixes?
Sure.
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 40/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert SELinux and Smack to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 +++----
security/security.c | 9 ++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +++---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 +++---
4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 8b842fd13fb4..34ed56be82b8 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1401,12 +1401,11 @@
* @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
*
* @inode_getsecctx:
- * On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security
+ * On success, returns 0 and fills out @cp with the security
* context for the given @inode.
*
* @inode we wish to get the security context of.
- * @ctx is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context.
- * @ctxlen points to the place to put the length of @ctx.
+ * @cp is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context.
*
* Security hooks for using the eBPF maps and programs functionalities through
* eBPF syscalls.
@@ -1679,7 +1678,7 @@ union security_list_options {
void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);
int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
- int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+ int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
int (*unix_stream_connect)(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f3788840019a..4625a9b00d1d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2040,7 +2040,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
{
- return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, &lc);
+
+ *ctx = (void *)lc.context;
+ *ctxlen = lc.len;
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a2257ccaee5c..e881f42d3ff8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6355,14 +6355,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
}
-static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
int len = 0;
len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
- ctx, true);
+ (void **)&cp->context, true);
if (len < 0)
return len;
- *ctxlen = len;
+ cp->len = len;
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 78c01ef707eb..46eead699e1d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4484,12 +4484,12 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
}
-static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
- *ctx = skp->smk_known;
- *ctxlen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
+ cp->context = skp->smk_known;
+ cp->len = strlen(skp->smk_known);
return 0;
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 38/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert SELinux, Smack and AppArmor to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++----
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/secid.c | 11 +++++------
security/security.c | 12 ++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 ++---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 +++-----
6 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index af0bcdf8fcfe..566714aa0caf 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1323,9 +1323,8 @@
* length and the next call which actually allocates and returns the
* secdata.
* @l points to the security information.
- * @secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security
+ * @cp contains the pointer that stores the converted security
* context.
- * @seclen pointer which contains the length of the data
* @secctx_to_secid:
* Convert security context to exported lsm data.
* @l contains the pointer to the generated security data.
@@ -1672,8 +1671,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
int (*setprocattr)(const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
- int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
- u32 *seclen);
+ int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsm_export *l);
void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index 5381eff03d4f..964d3dc92635 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ struct aa_label;
#define AA_SECID_WILDCARD 1
struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l);
-int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsm_export *l);
void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 69d98a89db75..4e11434605d6 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static inline void aa_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
l->apparmor = secid;
}
-int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
/* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */
struct aa_label *label;
@@ -89,13 +89,12 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
label = aa_secid_to_label(l);
- AA_BUG(!seclen);
-
if (!label)
return -EINVAL;
- if (secdata)
- len = aa_label_asxprint(secdata, root_ns, label,
+ /* scaffolding check - Casey */
+ if (cp)
+ len = aa_label_asxprint(&cp->context, root_ns, label,
FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED | FLAG_ABS_ROOT,
GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -106,7 +105,7 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
if (len < 0)
return -ENOMEM;
- *seclen = len;
+ cp->len = len;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7bf16c547010..7cf8e268a45c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1989,8 +1989,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- return call_one_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, secdata,
- seclen);
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = call_one_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, &lc);
+ if (secdata)
+ *secdata = lc.context;
+ else
+ security_release_secctx(lc.context, lc.len);
+ *seclen = lc.len;
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7dd333f133db..6a2a82dcd948 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6301,14 +6301,13 @@ static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
}
-static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
- u32 *seclen)
+static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
u32 secid;
selinux_import_secid(l, &secid);
return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
- secdata, seclen);
+ &cp->context, &cp->len);
}
static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index a837af153ed9..10d6c6a1a001 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4434,8 +4434,7 @@ static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
*
* Exists for networking code.
*/
-static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
- u32 *seclen)
+static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
u32 secid;
@@ -4443,9 +4442,8 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
smack_import_secid(l, &secid);
skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
- if (secdata)
- *secdata = skp->smk_known;
- *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
+ cp->context = skp->smk_known;
+ cp->len = strlen(skp->smk_known);
return 0;
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 39/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert SELinux, Smack and AppArmor to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++--
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/secid.c | 7 +++----
security/security.c | 6 +++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++--
6 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 566714aa0caf..8b842fd13fb4 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1327,8 +1327,8 @@
* context.
* @secctx_to_secid:
* Convert security context to exported lsm data.
+ * @cp contains the security context.
* @l contains the pointer to the generated security data.
- * @secdata contains the security context.
*
* @release_secctx:
* Release the security context.
@@ -1672,7 +1672,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*setprocattr)(const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
- int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ int (*secctx_to_secid)(const struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l);
void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index 964d3dc92635..acfcf99bff0e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ struct aa_label;
struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l);
int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
-int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l);
void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 4e11434605d6..35df38592b6e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -110,13 +110,12 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
return 0;
}
-int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
- struct lsm_export *l)
+int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct aa_label *label;
- label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, secdata,
- seclen, GFP_KERNEL, false, false);
+ label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, cp->context,
+ cp->len, GFP_KERNEL, false, false);
if (IS_ERR(label))
return PTR_ERR(label);
aa_export_secid(l, label->secid);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7cf8e268a45c..f3788840019a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2005,8 +2005,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsm_export *l)
{
+ struct lsm_context lc;
+
+ lc.context = secdata;
+ lc.len = seclen;
lsm_export_init(l);
- return call_one_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, l);
+ return call_one_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, &lc, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 6a2a82dcd948..a2257ccaee5c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6310,13 +6310,13 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
&cp->context, &cp->len);
}
-static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l)
{
u32 secid;
int rc;
- rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, cp->context, cp->len,
&secid, GFP_KERNEL);
selinux_export_secid(l, secid);
return rc;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 10d6c6a1a001..78c01ef707eb 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4455,10 +4455,10 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
*
* Exists for audit and networking code.
*/
-static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(cp->context);
if (skp)
smack_export_secid(l, skp->smk_secid);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 37/59] LSM: Create a data structure for a security context
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
A "security context" is the text representation of
the information used by LSMs. This provides a structure
so that the use can be made consistant.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 6c44aca19c65..8dd21133ede8 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -119,6 +119,17 @@ static inline bool lsm_export_equal(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_export *m)
extern struct lsm_export *lsm_export_skb(struct sk_buff *skb);
+/* Text representation of LSM specific security information - a "context" */
+struct lsm_context {
+ char *context;
+ u32 len;
+};
+
+static inline void lsm_context_init(struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 36/59] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
LSM hooks dealing with security context strings should
only be called for one security module. Add call macros
that invoke a single module hook and us in for those cases.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/security.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 015c38c882ba..7bf16c547010 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -713,6 +713,16 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
} while (0)
+#define call_one_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \
+ do { \
+ struct security_hook_list *P; \
+ \
+ hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
+ P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ break; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
#define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \
int RC = IRC; \
do { \
@@ -727,6 +737,19 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
RC; \
})
+#define call_one_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \
+ int RC = IRC; \
+ do { \
+ struct security_hook_list *P; \
+ \
+ hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
+ RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ break; \
+ } \
+ } while (0); \
+ RC; \
+})
+
/* Security operations */
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -1966,7 +1989,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, secdata, seclen);
+ return call_one_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, secdata,
+ seclen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
@@ -1974,13 +1998,13 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsm_export *l)
{
lsm_export_init(l);
- return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, l);
+ return call_one_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
- call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
+ call_one_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
@@ -2105,7 +2129,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
+ return call_one_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
optval, optlen, len);
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 35/59] AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Remove the getpeersec_dgram hook stub. It's unnecessary
and disrupts stacking.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 12 ++----------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 24b638bd4305..76c409737370 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1094,15 +1094,9 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
* @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
*
* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
+ *
+ * The TODO stub interfered with stacking and was removed - Casey
*/
-static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct lsm_export *l)
-
-{
- /* TODO: requires secid support */
- return -ENOPROTOOPT;
-}
/**
* apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
@@ -1202,8 +1196,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
- apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 34/59] Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The secid_to_secctx() hook has to be balanced with a release_secctx
hook for stacking. This hook does nothing.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 +++++---
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 38ea48d22547..a837af153ed9 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4470,10 +4470,11 @@ static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
}
/*
- * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
- * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
- * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
+ * There smack_release_secctx hook does nothing
*/
+static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+{
+}
static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
@@ -4713,6 +4714,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, smack_release_secctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 33/59] IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Fix the prototype on a function stub
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 8b109ad0de2e..7ae41218eb07 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -309,8 +309,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
return -EINVAL;
}
-static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+static inline int security_filter_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field,
+ u32 op, void *lsmrule)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 31/59] Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert to lsm_export structures instead of u32 secids.
Clean out the associated scaffolding. This requires changes
to several internal interfaces, but no change in behavior.
Change the LOC tag type to pass an lsm_export instead of
a single u32. As this tag is only used locally there is
no change to externally exposed interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/net/netlabel.h | 10 ++---
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 ++++---
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 5 +--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 65 ++++++++++++-------------------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 7 ++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 5 +--
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 9 +++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 ++-
security/smack/smackfs.c | 12 ++++--
11 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 72d6435fc16c..546c75f27d05 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ struct calipso_doi;
/* NetLabel audit information */
struct netlbl_audit {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
kuid_t loginuid;
unsigned int sessionid;
};
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap {
* @attr.mls: MLS sensitivity label
* @attr.mls.cat: MLS category bitmap
* @attr.mls.lvl: MLS sensitivity level
- * @attr.secid: LSM specific secid token
+ * @attr.le: LSM specific data
*
* Description:
* This structure is used to pass security attributes between NetLabel and the
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;
u32 lvl;
} mls;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
} attr;
};
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsm_export *l,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsm_export *l,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
return -ENOSYS;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index f0165c5f376b..1defea2488b3 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -122,13 +122,16 @@ int cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid = 1;
*
* 0 8 16 24 32
* +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | 10000000 | 00000110 | 32-bit secid value |
+ * | 10000000 | 00000110 | SELinux secid |
* +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | in (host byte order)|
+ * | Smack secid | AppArmor secid |
+ * +----------+----------+----------+----------+
+ * | LSM export flags |
* +----------+----------+
*
+ * All secid and flag fields are in host byte order.
*/
-#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN 6
+#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN (2 + sizeof(struct lsm_export))
/*
* Helper Functions
@@ -1481,7 +1484,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
buffer[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL;
buffer[1] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
- *(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.secid;
+ memcpy(&buffer[2], &secattr->attr.le, sizeof(secattr->attr.le));
return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
}
@@ -1501,7 +1504,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
const unsigned char *tag,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
- secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
+ memcpy(&secattr->attr.le, &tag[2], sizeof(secattr->attr.le));
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index ee3e5b6471a6..849064422e0b 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsm_export *l,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
u32 addr_len;
@@ -243,8 +243,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
}
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
- secid, audit_info);
+ dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, l, audit_info);
}
/**
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 7f245d593c8f..f79ab91bf25e 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_tbl {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
struct netlbl_af4list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
struct netlbl_af6list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in_addr *addr,
const struct in_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr = addr->s_addr & mask->s_addr;
entry->list.mask = mask->s_addr;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->le = *l;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr4_list);
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in6_addr *addr,
const struct in6_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr.s6_addr32[3] &= mask->s6_addr32[3];
entry->list.mask = *mask;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->le = *l;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af6list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsm_export *l,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
int ret_val;
@@ -389,7 +389,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
- struct lsm_export le;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -422,7 +421,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in_addr *addr4 = addr;
const struct in_addr *mask4 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, l);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -435,7 +434,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *addr6 = addr;
const struct in6_addr *mask6 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, l);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -452,10 +451,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
}
@@ -490,7 +486,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
- struct lsm_export le;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -510,10 +505,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->le,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -555,7 +548,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
- struct lsm_export le;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -574,10 +566,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
addr, mask);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->le,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -903,7 +893,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
@@ -932,9 +921,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
+ dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, &le,
&audit_info);
}
@@ -956,7 +944,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
@@ -983,10 +970,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
- &audit_info);
+ NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, &le, &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -1097,10 +1082,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;
struct net_device *dev;
void *data;
- u32 secid;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
- struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_export *lep;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1138,7 +1122,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr4->secid;
+ lep = (struct lsm_export *)&addr4->le;
} else {
ret_val = nla_put_in6_addr(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR,
@@ -1152,11 +1136,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr6->secid;
+ lep = (struct lsm_export *)&addr6->le;
}
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lep, &secctx, &secctx_len);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
@@ -1501,26 +1484,30 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
case PF_INET: {
struct iphdr *hdr4;
struct netlbl_af4list *addr4;
+ struct lsm_export *lep;
hdr4 = ip_hdr(skb);
addr4 = netlbl_af4list_search(hdr4->saddr,
&iface->addr4_list);
if (addr4 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->secid;
+ lep = &netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->le;
+ secattr->attr.le = *lep;
break;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case PF_INET6: {
struct ipv6hdr *hdr6;
struct netlbl_af6list *addr6;
+ struct lsm_export *lep;
hdr6 = ipv6_hdr(skb);
addr6 = netlbl_af6list_search(&hdr6->saddr,
&iface->addr6_list);
if (addr6 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->secid;
+ lep = &netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->le;
+ secattr->attr.le = *lep;
break;
}
#endif /* IPv6 */
@@ -1554,13 +1541,11 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
- struct lsm_export le;
/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
* it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
* messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
- security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &audit_info.secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.le);
audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
audit_info.sessionid = 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
index 3a9e5dc9511b..0803f1e6e3c1 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsm_export *l,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 1079cdea872c..2cc96305c841 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
- struct lsm_export le;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return NULL;
@@ -113,9 +112,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
audit_info->sessionid);
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, audit_info->secid);
- if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
+ if (lsm_export_any(&audit_info->le) &&
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_info->le, &secctx,
+ &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index 2dbc4276bdcc..ee73711e0756 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -48,10 +48,7 @@
static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
- struct lsm_export le;
-
- security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &audit_info->secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->le);
audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index c40914a157b7..4bbd50237a8a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
return NULL;
if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
- (secattr->attr.secid == sid))
+ (secattr->attr.le.selinux == sid))
return secattr;
return NULL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 626b877363fb..8a197b387056 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3596,8 +3596,9 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
- else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
- *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+ else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID &&
+ (secattr->attr.le.flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX))
+ *sid = secattr->attr.le.selinux;
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
rc = -EIDRM;
ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
@@ -3670,7 +3671,9 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->domain == NULL)
goto out;
- secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+ lsm_export_init(&secattr->attr.le);
+ secattr->attr.le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
+ secattr->attr.le.selinux = sid;
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index ecd636e5c75c..38ea48d22547 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3756,11 +3756,12 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
return &smack_known_web;
return &smack_known_star;
}
- if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0)
+ if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0 &&
+ (sap->attr.le.flags & LSM_EXPORT_SMACK))
/*
* Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
*/
- return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+ return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.le.smack);
/*
* Without guidance regarding the smack value
* for the packet fall back on the network
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index faf2ea3968b3..28c567465f6c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -197,7 +197,8 @@ static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
- nap->secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ nap->le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ nap->le.smack = skp->smk_secid;
}
/*
@@ -1150,6 +1151,7 @@ static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)
static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
struct smk_net4addr *snp;
struct sockaddr_in newname;
char *smack;
@@ -1281,10 +1283,14 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
* but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
*/
- if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL)
+ if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL) {
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
+ le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ le.smack = snp->smk_label->smk_secid;
rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
&snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
- snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
+ &le, &audit_info);
+ }
if (rc == 0)
rc = count;
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 32/59] LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The scaffolding functions lsm_export_secid and lsm_export_to_all
are no longer required. Remove them.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 43 ----------------------------------------
1 file changed, 43 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index c413dcc1905a..6c44aca19c65 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -117,49 +117,6 @@ static inline bool lsm_export_equal(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_export *m)
return true;
}
-/**
- * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
- * @data: the containing data structure
- * @secid: where to put the one that matters.
- *
- * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done.
- */
-static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
-{
- switch (data->flags) {
- case LSM_EXPORT_NONE:
- *secid = 0;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX:
- *secid = data->selinux;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK:
- *secid = data->smack;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
- *secid = data->apparmor;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK | LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
- /* For scaffolding only */
- *secid = data->selinux;
- break;
- default:
- pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
- data->flags);
- *secid = 0;
- break;
- }
-}
-
-static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
-{
- data->selinux = secid;
- data->smack = secid;
- data->apparmor = secid;
- data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |
- LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
-}
-
extern struct lsm_export *lsm_export_skb(struct sk_buff *skb);
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 27/59] NET: Store LSM access information in the socket blob for UDS
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
UNIX domain socket connections don't have sufficient
space in the socket buffer (skb) secmark for more than
one Linux security module (LSM) to pass data. Expanding
the secmark has been ruled out as an option. Store the
necessary data in the socket security blob pointed to
by the skb socket.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
net/unix/af_unix.c | 14 ++++++++------
security/security.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index e76d7a9dbe50..c413dcc1905a 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ struct ctl_table;
struct audit_krule;
struct user_namespace;
struct timezone;
+struct sk_buff;
enum lsm_event {
LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
@@ -100,6 +101,22 @@ static inline bool lsm_export_any(struct lsm_export *l)
((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR) && l->apparmor));
}
+static inline bool lsm_export_equal(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_export *m)
+{
+ if (l->flags != m->flags || l->flags == LSM_EXPORT_NONE)
+ return false;
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX &&
+ (l->selinux != m->selinux || l->selinux == 0))
+ return false;
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SMACK &&
+ (l->smack != m->smack || l->smack == 0))
+ return false;
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR &&
+ (l->apparmor != m->apparmor || l->apparmor == 0))
+ return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
/**
* lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
* @data: the containing data structure
@@ -143,6 +160,8 @@ static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
}
+extern struct lsm_export *lsm_export_skb(struct sk_buff *skb);
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -174,7 +193,6 @@ extern int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
extern int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
struct msghdr;
-struct sk_buff;
struct sock;
struct sockaddr;
struct socket;
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 4d4107927ba2..afe9c9f1adeb 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -143,21 +143,23 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &(UNIXCB(skb).secid));
+ struct lsm_export *ble = lsm_export_skb(skb);
+
+ *ble = scm->le;
}
static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- lsm_export_to_all(&scm->le, UNIXCB(skb).secid);
+ struct lsm_export *ble = lsm_export_skb(skb);
+
+ scm->le = *ble;
}
static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- u32 best_secid;
-
- lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &best_secid);
- return (best_secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
+ return lsm_export_equal(&scm->le, lsm_export_skb(skb));
}
+
#else
static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{ }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 69983ad68233..015c38c882ba 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -46,7 +46,22 @@ static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
char *lsm_names;
-static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
+/* Socket blobs include infrastructure managed data */
+static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct lsm_export),
+};
+
+/**
+ * lsm_export_skb - pointer to the lsm_export associated with the skb
+ * @skb: the socket buffer
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the LSM managed data.
+ */
+struct lsm_export *lsm_export_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ return skb->sk->sk_security;
+}
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 29/59] NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Replace the lsm_export scaffolding in nft_meta.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
index 598bea8e4799..a1d3dab5bc25 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
@@ -580,11 +580,17 @@ static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
u32 tmp_secid = 0;
int err;
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &le);
if (err)
return err;
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &tmp_secid);
+ /* Use the "best" secid */
+ if (le.selinux)
+ tmp_secid = le.selinux;
+ else
+ tmp_secid = le.smack;
+
if (!tmp_secid)
return -ENOENT;
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 30/59] NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Remove scaffolding functions from the netfilter code.
Replace with direct access to lsm_export fields so as
to be explicit about how the secmarks are being
handled.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 12 ++++++++++--
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 7 ++++++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 6 +++++-
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index b069277450c5..d10cc1924e46 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -332,7 +332,11 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
char *secctx;
struct lsm_export le;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
+ le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ le.selinux = ct->secmark;
+ le.smack = ct->secmark;
+
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -619,7 +623,11 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
int len, ret;
struct lsm_export le;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
+ le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ le.selinux = ct->secmark;
+ le.smack = ct->secmark;
+
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, NULL, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 12318026d8d4..d353f3efc5a5 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -177,7 +177,12 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
char *secctx;
struct lsm_export le;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
+ /* Whichever LSM may be using the secmark */
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
+ le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ le.selinux = ct->secmark;
+ le.smack = ct->secmark;
+
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 4c74c383e26b..a0670137477b 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -317,7 +317,11 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
if (skb->secmark) {
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, skb->secmark);
+ /* Whichever LSM may be using the secmark */
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
+ le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ le.selinux = skb->secmark;
+ le.smack = skb->secmark;
security_secid_to_secctx(&le, secdata, &seclen);
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 28/59] NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Replace the lsm_export scaffolding in xt_SECMARK.c
This raises an issue, in that Smack users have been
using SECMARK_MODE_SEL, which is suppoed to be exclusively
for SELinux. This is worked around in the code, but not
fully addressed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index 2def8d8898e6..9a2a97c200a2 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
info->secid = 0;
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx), &le);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL)
@@ -63,7 +64,12 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
return err;
}
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &info->secid);
+ /* Smack is cheating, using SECMARK_MODE_SEL */
+ if (le.selinux)
+ info->secid = le.selinux;
+ else
+ info->secid = le.smack;
+
if (!info->secid) {
pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
info->secctx);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 26/59] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Clean out the scaffolding used in the lsm_export transition.
This requires changing some of the IMA internal interfaces
from u32 to struct lsm_export pointers.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 10 ++++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 +---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 25 ++++++++-----------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 +++++++-------
5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index d213e835c498..8b109ad0de2e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -192,8 +192,9 @@ enum ima_hooks {
};
/* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr);
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsm_export *l, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int *pcr);
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -213,8 +214,9 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
/* IMA policy related functions */
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr);
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsm_export *l, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags, int *pcr);
void ima_init_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c7505fb122d4..7e493af96134 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
* @inode: pointer to inode to measure
* @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
- * @secid: secid of the task being validated
+ * @l: LAM data of the task being validated
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
* MAY_APPEND)
* @func: caller identifier
@@ -175,14 +175,15 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
*
*/
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr)
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsm_export *l, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int *pcr)
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
flags &= ima_policy_flag;
- return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr);
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, l, func, mask, flags, pcr);
}
/*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index be714afc9fd2..ba64b0b61383 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -50,15 +50,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
*/
int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), &le, func, mask,
IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index f5efa9ef270d..22b973e743fe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
}
static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
- u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
- enum ima_hooks func)
+ struct lsm_export *l, char *buf, loff_t size,
+ int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
* bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
* Included is the appraise submask.
*/
- action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr);
+ action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, l, mask, func, &pcr);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
(ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
if (!action && !violation_check)
@@ -335,13 +335,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
*/
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &le, NULL,
0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
@@ -364,19 +362,16 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), &le, NULL, 0,
MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
return ret;
security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &le, NULL, 0,
MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
@@ -392,12 +387,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &le, NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
@@ -506,7 +499,6 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
@@ -530,8 +522,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &le, buf, size,
MAY_READ, func);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 280f2410e551..fae4718d24f9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
* Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
*/
static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_export *l,
enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
{
int i;
@@ -345,8 +345,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le,
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(l,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule);
@@ -394,7 +393,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
* @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
* being made
- * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
+ * @l: LSM data of the task to be validated
* @func: IMA hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @pcr: set the pcr to extend
@@ -406,8 +405,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
* than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
*/
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr)
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsm_export *l, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags, int *pcr)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
if (!(entry->action & actmask))
continue;
- if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask))
+ if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, l, func, mask))
continue;
action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 24/59] Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert target_sid to be an lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. Clean out the associated
scaffolding. Change the name to target_lsm to be
descriptive.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
kernel/audit.h | 3 ++-
kernel/auditsc.c | 30 ++++++++++++------------------
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 64498850c52b..e2e6fa911f9c 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t target_auid;
kuid_t target_uid;
unsigned int target_sessionid;
- u32 target_sid;
+ struct lsm_export target_lsm;
char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 41f540037a93..75d181029d40 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {
kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
- u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ struct lsm_export target_lsm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
int pid_count;
};
@@ -937,14 +937,14 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
}
static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
- kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
- u32 sid, char *comm)
+ kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
+ unsigned int sessionid,
+ struct lsm_export *l, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
- struct lsm_export le;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -953,9 +953,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
- if (sid) {
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (lsm_export_any(l)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1525,7 +1524,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
axs->target_auid[i],
axs->target_uid[i],
axs->target_sessionid[i],
- axs->target_sid[i],
+ &axs->target_lsm[i],
axs->target_comm[i]))
call_panic = 1;
}
@@ -1534,7 +1533,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
context->target_sessionid,
- context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
+ &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm))
call_panic = 1;
if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
@@ -1711,7 +1710,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
context->aux = NULL;
context->aux_pids = NULL;
context->target_pid = 0;
- context->target_sid = 0;
+ lsm_export_init(&context->target_lsm);
context->sockaddr_len = 0;
context->type = 0;
context->fds[0] = -1;
@@ -2363,14 +2362,12 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- struct lsm_export le;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_lsm);
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2387,7 +2384,6 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid, t_uid = task_uid(t);
- struct lsm_export le;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2411,8 +2407,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_lsm);
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2433,8 +2428,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_lsm[axp->pid_count]);
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 25/59] Audit: Convert osid to an lsm_export structure
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert osid to be an lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. Clean out the associated
scaffolding. Change the name to olsm to be
descriptive.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 4 +---
kernel/audit.h | 4 ++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 36 ++++++++++++------------------------
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 5226e2af9498..d83d1f05c95d 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2073,12 +2073,10 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
char *ctx = NULL;
unsigned len;
int error;
- u32 sid;
struct lsm_export le;
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &sid);
- if (!sid)
+ if (!lsm_export_any(&le))
return 0;
error = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index e2e6fa911f9c..7d2fcdf0bc94 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct audit_names {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsm_export olsm;
struct audit_cap_data fcap;
unsigned int fcap_ver;
unsigned char type; /* record type */
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
umode_t mode;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsm_export olsm;
int has_perm;
uid_t perm_uid;
gid_t perm_gid;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 75d181029d40..d64775f4bb1b 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -645,17 +645,15 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_rule) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- &le,
+ &name->olsm,
f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, n->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- &le,
+ &n->olsm,
f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule)) {
@@ -667,8 +665,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, ctx->ipc.osid);
- if (security_audit_rule_match(&le,
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.olsm,
f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rule))
++result;
@@ -1187,19 +1184,17 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
context->socketcall.args[i]);
break; }
case AUDIT_IPC: {
- u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
+ struct lsm_export *l = &context->ipc.olsm;
audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
- if (osid) {
+ if (lsm_export_any(l)) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- struct lsm_export le;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=(unknown)");
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
@@ -1346,14 +1341,12 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
- if (n->osid != 0) {
+ if (lsm_export_any(&n->olsm)) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- struct lsm_export le;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->olsm, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=(unknown)");
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
@@ -1907,16 +1900,13 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
- struct lsm_export le;
-
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &name->osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->olsm);
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
@@ -2266,13 +2256,11 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- struct lsm_export le;
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
- security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &context->ipc.osid);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.olsm);
context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 15/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert security_kernel_act_as to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/cred.c | 10 ++++++----
security/security.c | 8 ++------
4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index ddd45bb74887..023f422eefd6 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
struct cred;
struct inode;
+struct lsm_export;
/*
* COW Supplementary groups list
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *);
extern int change_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
-extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, u32);
+extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, struct lsm_export *);
extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
extern int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ea2c6c4e88db..7369cdc3a681 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
@@ -961,7 +961,8 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
{
}
-static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
+static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 45d77284aed0..40a3fde22667 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -701,14 +701,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
/**
* set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
* @new: The credentials to alter
- * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
+ * @l: The LSM security information to set
*
* Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
* security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
*/
-int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int set_security_override(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
+ return security_kernel_act_as(new, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
@@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
*/
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
u32 secid;
int ret;
@@ -731,7 +732,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- return set_security_override(new, secid);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ return set_security_override(new, &le);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1e819ecf26ff..edaaaef54239 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1615,13 +1615,9 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- lsm_export_to_all(&data, secid);
-
- return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, &data);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, l);
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 16/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert security_socket_getpeersec_dgram to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
In particular, the le entry in scm_cookie includes the secid
data. The secid will go away.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++--
include/net/scm.h | 4 +++-
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 +++-
security/security.c | 13 ++++---------
4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 7369cdc3a681..e3f5c61b9b2c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1270,7 +1270,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);
int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1408,7 +1409,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
-static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 1ce365f4c256..13b8a369fd89 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {
struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
+ struct lsm_export le; /* Passed LSM data */
#endif
};
@@ -46,7 +47,8 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
- security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
+ security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &scm->secid);
}
#else
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 82f341e84fae..b8ef7677a7e5 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,14 +130,16 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen, secid;
int err;
- err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
+ err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &le);
if (err)
return;
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index edaaaef54239..d8300a6400c3 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2110,16 +2110,11 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
}
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
- u32 *secid)
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
- int rc;
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- rc = call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, skb,
- &data);
-
- lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
- return rc;
+ lsm_export_init(l);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, skb,
+ l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 21/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert security_inode_getsecid to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 5 ++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 +---
security/security.c | 8 +++-----
4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ae4c058abc5e..2d04687c3fa9 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_export *l);
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
@@ -852,9 +852,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsm_export_init(l);
}
static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index b06ffcf9bb9f..71daead619e5 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1908,13 +1908,16 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
+
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &name->osid);
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 090ef8ceb116..280f2410e551 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -326,7 +326,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
- u32 osid;
struct lsm_export le;
int retried = 0;
@@ -337,8 +336,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_OBJ_USER:
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &le);
rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 22ea709593f3..e12ce930dfd9 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1387,12 +1387,10 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, &data);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
+ lsm_export_init(l);
+ call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, l);
}
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 19/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert security_ipc_getsecid to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 4 +++-
security/security.c | 8 +++-----
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 5cea6260bbd9..6ac48c7c4a41 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsm_export *l);
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
@@ -1096,9 +1096,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsm_export_init(l);
}
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 83aba0336eac..eabbf78fee96 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2266,11 +2266,13 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsm_export le;
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
- security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &context->ipc.osid);
context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b6a096be95ac..6ba1187c9655 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1775,12 +1775,10 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
}
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, &data);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
+ lsm_export_init(l);
+ call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, l);
}
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 23/59] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Remove lsm_export scaffolding around audit_sig_sid by
changing the u32 secid into an lsm_export structure named
audit_sig_lsm.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++
kernel/audit.c | 18 ++++++++----------
kernel/audit.h | 2 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 3 +--
4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 40aa7b9f3c83..e76d7a9dbe50 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -93,6 +93,13 @@ static inline void lsm_export_init(struct lsm_export *l)
memset(l, 0, sizeof(*l));
}
+static inline bool lsm_export_any(struct lsm_export *l)
+{
+ return (((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX) && l->selinux) ||
+ ((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SMACK) && l->smack) ||
+ ((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR) && l->apparmor));
+}
+
/**
* lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
* @data: the containing data structure
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index fa4c5544eb37..5226e2af9498 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -135,9 +135,9 @@ static u32 audit_backlog_limit = 64;
static u32 audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME;
/* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */
-kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
-pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1;
-u32 audit_sig_sid = 0;
+kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
+pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1;
+struct lsm_export audit_sig_lsm;
/* Records can be lost in several ways:
0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1429,23 +1429,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
- struct lsm_export le;
-
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, audit_sig_sid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len);
+ if (lsm_export_any(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
+ &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (audit_sig_sid)
+ if (lsm_export_any(&audit_sig_lsm))
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
+ if (lsm_export_any(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 958d5b8fc1b3..64498850c52b 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);
extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid;
-extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
+extern struct lsm_export audit_sig_lsm;
extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 71daead619e5..41f540037a93 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2398,8 +2398,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &audit_sig_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_lsm);
}
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 20/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert security_task_getsecid to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 4 +---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/audit.c | 4 ++--
kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +---
kernel/auditsc.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 4 +++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 5 ++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 +++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
security/security.c | 8 +++-----
10 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 9119333f794b..0eeb5b75da5b 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3119,11 +3119,9 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->priority = task_nice(current);
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
- security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &le);
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 6ac48c7c4a41..ae4c058abc5e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
-void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_export *l);
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1023,9 +1023,10 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsm_export_init(l);
}
static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index b5d96a0320fb..fa4c5544eb37 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2078,11 +2078,11 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
u32 sid;
struct lsm_export le;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &sid);
if (!sid)
return 0;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
error = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 15771102919d..468dac2bdce5 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1323,7 +1323,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
pid_t pid;
- u32 sid;
struct lsm_export le;
switch (f->type) {
@@ -1354,8 +1353,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_rule) {
- security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&le,
f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index eabbf78fee96..b06ffcf9bb9f 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
- u32 sid;
struct lsm_export le;
unsigned int sessionid;
@@ -628,10 +627,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
logged upon error */
if (f->lsm_rule) {
if (need_sid) {
- security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(tsk, &le);
need_sid = 0;
}
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&le, f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule);
@@ -2362,12 +2360,14 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsm_export le;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &context->target_sid);
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2384,6 +2384,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid, t_uid = task_uid(t);
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2394,7 +2395,8 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &audit_sig_sid);
}
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
@@ -2407,7 +2409,8 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &ctx->target_sid);
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2428,7 +2431,8 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 00922f55dd9e..7f245d593c8f 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -1554,11 +1554,13 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+ struct lsm_export le;
/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
* it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
* messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &audit_info.secid);
audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
audit_info.sessionid = 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index 4a397cde1a48..2dbc4276bdcc 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -48,7 +48,10 @@
static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid);
+ struct lsm_export le;
+
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &audit_info->secid);
audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 5fb7127bbe68..be714afc9fd2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -51,11 +51,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 357edd140c09..1e3cfaf0ee5c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -336,9 +336,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
@@ -363,8 +365,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
@@ -388,8 +392,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
@@ -500,6 +506,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
{
enum ima_hooks func;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
@@ -521,7 +528,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
}
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
MAY_READ, func);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 6ba1187c9655..22ea709593f3 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1690,12 +1690,10 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
}
-void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, &data);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
+ lsm_export_init(l);
+ call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 22/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-04-09 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert security_cred_getsecid to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 3 ++-
security/security.c | 8 +++-----
3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 2d04687c3fa9..40aa7b9f3c83 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 1e3cfaf0ee5c..f5efa9ef270d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -374,7 +374,8 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (ret)
return ret;
- security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
+ security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e12ce930dfd9..69983ad68233 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1604,12 +1604,10 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
}
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, &data);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
+ lsm_export_init(l);
+ call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related
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