* [PATCH V6 4/4] efi: Attempt to get the TCG2 event log in the boot stub
From: Matthew Garrett @ 2019-05-17 21:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: peterhuewe, jarkko.sakkinen, jgg, roberto.sassu, linux-efi,
linux-security-module, linux-kernel, tweek, bsz, Matthew Garrett
In-Reply-To: <20190517213918.26045-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Right now we only attempt to obtain the SHA1-only event log. The
protocol also supports a crypto agile log format, which contains digests
for all algorithms in use. Attempt to obtain this first, and fall back
to obtaining the older format if the system doesn't support it. This is
lightly complicated by the event sizes being variable (as we don't know
in advance which algorithms are in use), and the interface giving us
back a pointer to the start of the final entry rather than a pointer to
the end of the log - as a result, we need to parse the final entry to
figure out its length in order to know how much data to copy up to the
OS.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
index 5bd04f75d8d6..b3f30448e454 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
@@ -8,8 +8,13 @@
* Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
*/
#include <linux/efi.h>
-#include <linux/tpm_eventlog.h>
#include <asm/efi.h>
+/*
+ * KASAN redefines memcpy() in a way that isn't available in the EFI stub.
+ * We need to include asm/efi.h before linux/tpm_eventlog.h in order to avoid
+ * the wrong memcpy() being referenced.
+ */
+#include <linux/tpm_eventlog.h>
#include "efistub.h"
@@ -57,7 +62,7 @@ void efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
#endif
-static void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
+void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
{
efi_guid_t tcg2_guid = EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID;
efi_guid_t linux_eventlog_guid = LINUX_EFI_TPM_EVENT_LOG_GUID;
@@ -67,6 +72,7 @@ static void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
unsigned long first_entry_addr, last_entry_addr;
size_t log_size, last_entry_size;
efi_bool_t truncated;
+ int version = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2;
void *tcg2_protocol = NULL;
status = efi_call_early(locate_protocol, &tcg2_guid, NULL,
@@ -74,14 +80,20 @@ static void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
return;
- status = efi_call_proto(efi_tcg2_protocol, get_event_log, tcg2_protocol,
- EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2,
- &log_location, &log_last_entry, &truncated);
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- return;
+ status = efi_call_proto(efi_tcg2_protocol, get_event_log,
+ tcg2_protocol, version, &log_location,
+ &log_last_entry, &truncated);
+
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS || !log_location) {
+ version = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2;
+ status = efi_call_proto(efi_tcg2_protocol, get_event_log,
+ tcg2_protocol, version, &log_location,
+ &log_last_entry, &truncated);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS || !log_location)
+ return;
+
+ }
- if (!log_location)
- return;
first_entry_addr = (unsigned long) log_location;
/*
@@ -96,8 +108,23 @@ static void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
* We need to calculate its size to deduce the full size of
* the logs.
*/
- last_entry_size = sizeof(struct tcpa_event) +
- ((struct tcpa_event *) last_entry_addr)->event_size;
+ if (version == EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2) {
+ /*
+ * The TCG2 log format has variable length entries,
+ * and the information to decode the hash algorithms
+ * back into a size is contained in the first entry -
+ * pass a pointer to the final entry (to calculate its
+ * size) and the first entry (so we know how long each
+ * digest is)
+ */
+ last_entry_size =
+ __calc_tpm2_event_size((void *)last_entry_addr,
+ (void *)(long)log_location,
+ false);
+ } else {
+ last_entry_size = sizeof(struct tcpa_event) +
+ ((struct tcpa_event *) last_entry_addr)->event_size;
+ }
log_size = log_last_entry - log_location + last_entry_size;
}
@@ -114,7 +141,7 @@ static void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
memset(log_tbl, 0, sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_size);
log_tbl->size = log_size;
- log_tbl->version = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2;
+ log_tbl->version = version;
memcpy(log_tbl->log, (void *) first_entry_addr, log_size);
status = efi_call_early(install_configuration_table,
@@ -126,9 +153,3 @@ static void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
err_free:
efi_call_early(free_pool, log_tbl);
}
-
-void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
-{
- /* Only try to retrieve the logs in 1.2 format. */
- efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(sys_table_arg);
-}
--
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] initramfs: introduce do_readxattrs()
From: H. Peter Anvin @ 2019-05-17 21:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Roberto Sassu, viro
Cc: linux-security-module, linux-integrity, initramfs, linux-api,
linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, zohar, silviu.vlasceanu,
dmitry.kasatkin, takondra, kamensky, arnd, rob, james.w.mcmechan,
niveditas98
In-Reply-To: <CD9A4F89-7CA5-4329-A06A-F8DEB87905A5@zytor.com>
On 5/17/19 1:18 PM, hpa@zytor.com wrote:
>
> Ok... I just realized this does not work for a modular initramfs, composed at load time from multiple files, which is a very real problem. Should be easy enough to deal with: instead of one large file, use one companion file per source file, perhaps something like filename..xattrs (suggesting double dots to make it less likely to conflict with a "real" file.) No leading dot, as it makes it more likely that archivers will sort them before the file proper.
>
> A side benefit is that the format can be simpler as there is no need to encode the filename.
>
> A technically cleaner solution still, but which would need archiver modifications, would be to encode the xattrs as an optionally nameless file (just an empty string) with a new file mode value, immediately following the original file. The advantage there is that the archiver itself could support xattrs and other extended metadata (which has been requested elsewhere); the disadvantage obviously is that that it requires new support in the archiver. However, at least it ought to be simpler since it is still a higher protocol level than the cpio archive itself.
>
> There's already one special case in cpio, which is the "!!!TRAILER!!!" filename; although I don't think it is part of the formal spec, to the extent there is one, I would expect that in practice it is always encoded with a mode of 0, which incidentally could be used to unbreak the case where such a filename actually exists. So one way to support such extended metadata would be to set mode to 0 and use the filename to encode the type of metadata. I wonder how existing GNU or BSD cpio (the BSD one is better maintained these days) would deal with reading such a file; it would at least not be a regression if it just read it still, possibly with warnings. It could also be possible to use bits 17:16 in the mode, which are traditionally always zero (mode_t being 16 bits), but I believe are present in most or all of the cpio formats for historical reasons. It might be accepted better by existing implementations to use one of these high bits combined with S_IFREG, I dont know.
>
Correction: it's just !!!TRAILER!!!.
I tested with GNU cpio, BSD cpio, scpio and pax.
With a mode of 0:
- GNU cpio errors, but extracts all the other files.
- BSD cpio extracts them as regular files.
- scpio and pax abort.
With a mode of 0x18000 (bit 16 + S_IFREG), all of them happily extracted
the data as regular files.
-hpa
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] initramfs: introduce do_readxattrs()
From: H. Peter Anvin @ 2019-05-17 21:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arvind Sankar
Cc: Roberto Sassu, viro, linux-security-module, linux-integrity,
initramfs, linux-api, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, zohar,
silviu.vlasceanu, dmitry.kasatkin, takondra, kamensky, arnd, rob,
james.w.mcmechan, niveditas98
In-Reply-To: <20190517210219.GA5998@rani.riverdale.lan>
On 5/17/19 2:02 PM, Arvind Sankar wrote:
> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 01:18:11PM -0700, hpa@zytor.com wrote:
>>
>> Ok... I just realized this does not work for a modular initramfs, composed at load time from multiple files, which is a very real problem. Should be easy enough to deal with: instead of one large file, use one companion file per source file, perhaps something like filename..xattrs (suggesting double dots to make it less likely to conflict with a "real" file.) No leading dot, as it makes it more likely that archivers will sort them before the file proper.
> This version of the patch was changed from the previous one exactly to deal with this case --
> it allows for the bootloader to load multiple initramfs archives, each
> with its own .xattr-list file, and to have that work properly.
> Could you elaborate on the issue that you see?
>
Well, for one thing, how do you define "cpio archive", each with its own
.xattr-list file? Second, that would seem to depend on the ordering, no,
in which case you depend critically on .xattr-list file following the
files, which most archivers won't do.
Either way it seems cleaner to have this per file; especially if/as it
can be done without actually mucking up the format.
I need to run, but I'll post a more detailed explanation of what I did
in a little bit.
-hpa
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] initramfs: introduce do_readxattrs()
From: Arvind Sankar @ 2019-05-17 22:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: H. Peter Anvin
Cc: Arvind Sankar, Roberto Sassu, viro, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity, initramfs, linux-api, linux-fsdevel,
linux-kernel, zohar, silviu.vlasceanu, dmitry.kasatkin, takondra,
kamensky, arnd, rob, james.w.mcmechan, niveditas98
In-Reply-To: <d48f35a1-aab1-2f20-2e91-5e81a84b107f@zytor.com>
On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 02:47:31PM -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 5/17/19 2:02 PM, Arvind Sankar wrote:
> > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 01:18:11PM -0700, hpa@zytor.com wrote:
> >>
> >> Ok... I just realized this does not work for a modular initramfs, composed at load time from multiple files, which is a very real problem. Should be easy enough to deal with: instead of one large file, use one companion file per source file, perhaps something like filename..xattrs (suggesting double dots to make it less likely to conflict with a "real" file.) No leading dot, as it makes it more likely that archivers will sort them before the file proper.
> > This version of the patch was changed from the previous one exactly to deal with this case --
> > it allows for the bootloader to load multiple initramfs archives, each
> > with its own .xattr-list file, and to have that work properly.
> > Could you elaborate on the issue that you see?
> >
>
> Well, for one thing, how do you define "cpio archive", each with its own
> .xattr-list file? Second, that would seem to depend on the ordering, no,
> in which case you depend critically on .xattr-list file following the
> files, which most archivers won't do.
>
> Either way it seems cleaner to have this per file; especially if/as it
> can be done without actually mucking up the format.
>
> I need to run, but I'll post a more detailed explanation of what I did
> in a little bit.
>
> -hpa
>
Not sure what you mean by how do I define it? Each cpio archive will
contain its own .xattr-list file with signatures for the files within
it, that was the idea.
You need to review the code more closely I think -- it does not depend
on the .xattr-list file following the files to which it applies.
The code first extracts .xattr-list as though it was a regular file. If
a later dupe shows up (presumably from a second archive, although the
patch will actually allow a second one in the same archive), it will
then process the existing .xattr-list file and apply the attributes
listed within it. It then will proceed to read the second one and
overwrite the first one with it (this is the normal behaviour in the
kernel cpio parser). At the end once all the archives have been
extracted, if there is an .xattr-list file in the rootfs it will be
parsed (it would've been the last one encountered, which hasn't been
parsed yet, just extracted).
Regarding the idea to use the high 16 bits of the mode field in
the header that's another possibility. It would just require additional
support in the program that actually creates the archive though, which
the current patch doesn't.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] initramfs: introduce do_readxattrs()
From: kbuild test robot @ 2019-05-17 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Roberto Sassu
Cc: kbuild-all, viro, linux-security-module, linux-integrity,
initramfs, linux-api, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, zohar,
silviu.vlasceanu, dmitry.kasatkin, takondra, kamensky, hpa, arnd,
rob, james.w.mcmechan, niveditas98, Roberto Sassu
In-Reply-To: <20190517165519.11507-3-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3884 bytes --]
Hi Roberto,
Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on linus/master]
[also build test ERROR on v5.1 next-20190517]
[if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improve the system]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Roberto-Sassu/initramfs-set-extended-attributes/20190518-055846
config: sparc64-allyesconfig (attached as .config)
compiler: sparc64-linux-gnu-gcc (Debian 7.2.0-11) 7.2.0
reproduce:
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
GCC_VERSION=7.2.0 make.cross ARCH=sparc64
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All error/warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
init/initramfs.c: In function 'do_readxattrs':
>> init/initramfs.c:437:10: error: implicit declaration of function 'vmalloc'; did you mean 'kvmalloc'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
path = vmalloc(file_entry_size);
^~~~~~~
kvmalloc
>> init/initramfs.c:437:8: warning: assignment makes pointer from integer without a cast [-Wint-conversion]
path = vmalloc(file_entry_size);
^
>> init/initramfs.c:461:3: error: implicit declaration of function 'vfree'; did you mean 'kvfree'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
vfree(path);
^~~~~
kvfree
cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
vim +437 init/initramfs.c
391
392 static int __init do_readxattrs(void)
393 {
394 struct path_hdr hdr;
395 char *path = NULL;
396 char str[sizeof(hdr.p_size) + 1];
397 unsigned long file_entry_size;
398 size_t size, path_size, total_size;
399 struct kstat st;
400 struct file *file;
401 loff_t pos;
402 int ret;
403
404 ret = vfs_lstat(XATTR_LIST_FILENAME, &st);
405 if (ret < 0)
406 return ret;
407
408 total_size = st.size;
409
410 file = filp_open(XATTR_LIST_FILENAME, O_RDONLY, 0);
411 if (IS_ERR(file))
412 return PTR_ERR(file);
413
414 pos = file->f_pos;
415
416 while (total_size) {
417 size = kernel_read(file, (char *)&hdr, sizeof(hdr), &pos);
418 if (size != sizeof(hdr)) {
419 ret = -EIO;
420 goto out;
421 }
422
423 total_size -= size;
424
425 str[sizeof(hdr.p_size)] = 0;
426 memcpy(str, hdr.p_size, sizeof(hdr.p_size));
427 ret = kstrtoul(str, 16, &file_entry_size);
428 if (ret < 0)
429 goto out;
430
431 file_entry_size -= sizeof(sizeof(hdr.p_size));
432 if (file_entry_size > total_size) {
433 ret = -EINVAL;
434 goto out;
435 }
436
> 437 path = vmalloc(file_entry_size);
438 if (!path) {
439 ret = -ENOMEM;
440 goto out;
441 }
442
443 size = kernel_read(file, path, file_entry_size, &pos);
444 if (size != file_entry_size) {
445 ret = -EIO;
446 goto out_free;
447 }
448
449 total_size -= size;
450
451 path_size = strnlen(path, file_entry_size);
452 if (path_size == file_entry_size) {
453 ret = -EINVAL;
454 goto out_free;
455 }
456
457 xattr_buf = path + path_size + 1;
458 xattr_len = file_entry_size - path_size - 1;
459
460 ret = do_setxattrs(path);
> 461 vfree(path);
462 path = NULL;
463
464 if (ret < 0)
465 break;
466 }
467 out_free:
468 vfree(path);
469 out:
470 fput(file);
471
472 if (ret < 0)
473 error("Unable to parse xattrs");
474
475 return ret;
476 }
477
---
0-DAY kernel test infrastructure Open Source Technology Center
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all Intel Corporation
[-- Attachment #2: .config.gz --]
[-- Type: application/gzip, Size: 57391 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] initramfs: introduce do_readxattrs()
From: kbuild test robot @ 2019-05-18 1:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Roberto Sassu
Cc: kbuild-all, viro, linux-security-module, linux-integrity,
initramfs, linux-api, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, zohar,
silviu.vlasceanu, dmitry.kasatkin, takondra, kamensky, hpa, arnd,
rob, james.w.mcmechan, niveditas98, Roberto Sassu
In-Reply-To: <20190517165519.11507-3-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 5380 bytes --]
Hi Roberto,
Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on linus/master]
[also build test ERROR on v5.1 next-20190517]
[if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improve the system]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Roberto-Sassu/initramfs-set-extended-attributes/20190518-055846
config: m68k-allyesconfig (attached as .config)
compiler: m68k-linux-gnu-gcc (Debian 7.2.0-11) 7.2.0
reproduce:
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
GCC_VERSION=7.2.0 make.cross ARCH=m68k
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All error/warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
init/initramfs.c: In function 'do_readxattrs':
init/initramfs.c:437:10: error: implicit declaration of function 'vmalloc'; did you mean 'kvmalloc'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
path = vmalloc(file_entry_size);
^~~~~~~
kvmalloc
init/initramfs.c:437:8: warning: assignment makes pointer from integer without a cast [-Wint-conversion]
path = vmalloc(file_entry_size);
^
init/initramfs.c:461:3: error: implicit declaration of function 'vfree'; did you mean 'kvfree'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
vfree(path);
^~~~~
kvfree
In file included from include/asm-generic/io.h:891:0,
from arch/m68k/include/asm/io.h:11,
from include/linux/kexec.h:19,
from init/initramfs.c:694:
include/linux/vmalloc.h: At top level:
>> include/linux/vmalloc.h:77:14: error: conflicting types for 'vmalloc'
extern void *vmalloc(unsigned long size);
^~~~~~~
init/initramfs.c:437:10: note: previous implicit declaration of 'vmalloc' was here
path = vmalloc(file_entry_size);
^~~~~~~
In file included from include/asm-generic/io.h:891:0,
from arch/m68k/include/asm/io.h:11,
from include/linux/kexec.h:19,
from init/initramfs.c:694:
>> include/linux/vmalloc.h:102:13: warning: conflicting types for 'vfree'
extern void vfree(const void *addr);
^~~~~
init/initramfs.c:461:3: note: previous implicit declaration of 'vfree' was here
vfree(path);
^~~~~
cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
vim +/vmalloc +77 include/linux/vmalloc.h
db64fe02 Nick Piggin 2008-10-18 76
^1da177e Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 @77 extern void *vmalloc(unsigned long size);
e1ca7788 Dave Young 2010-10-26 78 extern void *vzalloc(unsigned long size);
83342314 Nick Piggin 2006-06-23 79 extern void *vmalloc_user(unsigned long size);
930fc45a Christoph Lameter 2005-10-29 80 extern void *vmalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node);
e1ca7788 Dave Young 2010-10-26 81 extern void *vzalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node);
^1da177e Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 82 extern void *vmalloc_exec(unsigned long size);
^1da177e Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 83 extern void *vmalloc_32(unsigned long size);
83342314 Nick Piggin 2006-06-23 84 extern void *vmalloc_32_user(unsigned long size);
dd0fc66f Al Viro 2005-10-07 85 extern void *__vmalloc(unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask, pgprot_t prot);
d0a21265 David Rientjes 2011-01-13 86 extern void *__vmalloc_node_range(unsigned long size, unsigned long align,
d0a21265 David Rientjes 2011-01-13 87 unsigned long start, unsigned long end, gfp_t gfp_mask,
cb9e3c29 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 88 pgprot_t prot, unsigned long vm_flags, int node,
cb9e3c29 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 89 const void *caller);
1f5307b1 Michal Hocko 2017-05-08 90 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
a7c3e901 Michal Hocko 2017-05-08 91 extern void *__vmalloc_node_flags(unsigned long size, int node, gfp_t flags);
8594a21c Michal Hocko 2017-05-12 92 static inline void *__vmalloc_node_flags_caller(unsigned long size, int node,
8594a21c Michal Hocko 2017-05-12 93 gfp_t flags, void *caller)
1f5307b1 Michal Hocko 2017-05-08 94 {
8594a21c Michal Hocko 2017-05-12 95 return __vmalloc_node_flags(size, node, flags);
1f5307b1 Michal Hocko 2017-05-08 96 }
8594a21c Michal Hocko 2017-05-12 97 #else
8594a21c Michal Hocko 2017-05-12 98 extern void *__vmalloc_node_flags_caller(unsigned long size,
8594a21c Michal Hocko 2017-05-12 99 int node, gfp_t flags, void *caller);
1f5307b1 Michal Hocko 2017-05-08 100 #endif
cb9e3c29 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 101
b3bdda02 Christoph Lameter 2008-02-04 @102 extern void vfree(const void *addr);
bf22e37a Andrey Ryabinin 2016-12-12 103 extern void vfree_atomic(const void *addr);
^1da177e Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 104
:::::: The code at line 77 was first introduced by commit
:::::: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 Linux-2.6.12-rc2
:::::: TO: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org>
:::::: CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org>
---
0-DAY kernel test infrastructure Open Source Technology Center
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all Intel Corporation
[-- Attachment #2: .config.gz --]
[-- Type: application/gzip, Size: 49863 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] initramfs: introduce do_readxattrs()
From: Rob Landley @ 2019-05-18 2:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: H. Peter Anvin, Roberto Sassu, viro
Cc: linux-security-module, linux-integrity, initramfs, linux-api,
linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, zohar, silviu.vlasceanu,
dmitry.kasatkin, takondra, kamensky, arnd, james.w.mcmechan,
niveditas98
In-Reply-To: <69ef1f55-9fc1-7ee0-371f-3dbc77551dc0@zytor.com>
On 5/17/19 4:41 PM, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 5/17/19 1:18 PM, hpa@zytor.com wrote:
>>
>> Ok... I just realized this does not work for a modular initramfs, composed at load time from multiple files, which is a very real problem. Should be easy enough to deal with: instead of one large file, use one companion file per source file, perhaps something like filename..xattrs (suggesting double dots to make it less likely to conflict with a "real" file.) No leading dot, as it makes it more likely that archivers will sort them before the file proper.
>>
>> A side benefit is that the format can be simpler as there is no need to encode the filename.
>>
>> A technically cleaner solution still, but which would need archiver modifications, would be to encode the xattrs as an optionally nameless file (just an empty string) with a new file mode value, immediately following the original file. The advantage there is that the archiver itself could support xattrs and other extended metadata (which has been requested elsewhere); the disadvantage obviously is that that it requires new support in the archiver. However, at least it ought to be simpler since it is still a higher protocol level than the cpio archive itself.
>>
>> There's already one special case in cpio, which is the "!!!TRAILER!!!" filename; although I don't think it is part of the formal spec, to the extent there is one, I would expect that in practice it is always encoded with a mode of 0, which incidentally could be used to unbreak the case where such a filename actually exists. So one way to support such extended metadata would be to set mode to 0 and use the filename to encode the type of metadata. I wonder how existing GNU or BSD cpio (the BSD one is better maintained these days) would deal with reading such a file; it would at least not be a regression if it just read it still, possibly with warnings. It could also be possible to use bits 17:16 in the mode, which are traditionally always zero (mode_t being 16 bits), but I believe are present in most or all of the cpio formats for historical reasons. It might be accepted better by existing implementations to use one of these high bits combined with S_IFREG, I dont know.
>
>
> Correction: it's just !!!TRAILER!!!.
We documented it as "TRAILER!!!" without leading !!!, and that its purpose is to
flush hardlinks:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/early-userspace/buffer-format.txt
That's what toybox cpio has been producing. Kernel consumes it just fine. Just
checked busybox cpio and that's what they're producing as well...
Rob
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] initramfs: introduce do_readxattrs()
From: kbuild test robot @ 2019-05-18 5:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Roberto Sassu
Cc: kbuild-all, viro, linux-security-module, linux-integrity,
initramfs, linux-api, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, zohar,
silviu.vlasceanu, dmitry.kasatkin, takondra, kamensky, hpa, arnd,
rob, james.w.mcmechan, niveditas98, Roberto Sassu
In-Reply-To: <20190517165519.11507-3-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Hi Roberto,
Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on linus/master]
[also build test WARNING on v5.1 next-20190517]
[if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improve the system]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Roberto-Sassu/initramfs-set-extended-attributes/20190518-055846
reproduce:
# apt-get install sparse
make ARCH=x86_64 allmodconfig
make C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__'
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
init/initramfs.c:24:45: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *buf @@ got f] <asn:1> *buf @@
init/initramfs.c:24:45: sparse: expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *buf
init/initramfs.c:24:45: sparse: got char const *p
init/initramfs.c:115:36: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename @@ got n:1> *filename @@
init/initramfs.c:115:36: sparse: expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename
init/initramfs.c:115:36: sparse: got char *filename
init/initramfs.c:303:24: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *name @@ got n:1> *name @@
init/initramfs.c:303:24: sparse: expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *name
init/initramfs.c:303:24: sparse: got char *path
init/initramfs.c:305:36: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *pathname @@ got n:1> *pathname @@
init/initramfs.c:305:36: sparse: expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *pathname
init/initramfs.c:305:36: sparse: got char *path
init/initramfs.c:307:37: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *pathname @@ got n:1> *pathname @@
init/initramfs.c:307:37: sparse: expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *pathname
init/initramfs.c:307:37: sparse: got char *path
init/initramfs.c:317:43: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *oldname @@ got n:1> *oldname @@
init/initramfs.c:317:43: sparse: expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *oldname
init/initramfs.c:317:43: sparse: got char *old
init/initramfs.c:317:48: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *newname @@ got char char const [noderef] <asn:1> *newname @@
init/initramfs.c:317:48: sparse: expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *newname
init/initramfs.c:317:48: sparse: got char *static [toplevel] [assigned] collected
init/initramfs.c:404:25: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *name @@ got n:1> *name @@
init/initramfs.c:404:25: sparse: expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *name
init/initramfs.c:404:25: sparse: got char *
>> init/initramfs.c:490:32: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *name @@ got char char const [noderef] <asn:1> *name @@
init/initramfs.c:490:32: sparse: expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *name
init/initramfs.c:490:32: sparse: got char *static [toplevel] [assigned] collected
init/initramfs.c:500:41: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename @@ got char char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename @@
init/initramfs.c:500:41: sparse: expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename
init/initramfs.c:500:41: sparse: got char *static [toplevel] [assigned] collected
init/initramfs.c:512:28: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *pathname @@ got char char const [noderef] <asn:1> *pathname @@
init/initramfs.c:512:28: sparse: expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *pathname
init/initramfs.c:512:28: sparse: got char *static [toplevel] [assigned] collected
init/initramfs.c:513:28: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename @@ got char char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename @@
init/initramfs.c:513:28: sparse: expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename
init/initramfs.c:513:28: sparse: got char *static [toplevel] [assigned] collected
init/initramfs.c:514:28: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename @@ got char char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename @@
init/initramfs.c:514:28: sparse: expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename
init/initramfs.c:514:28: sparse: got char *static [toplevel] [assigned] collected
init/initramfs.c:519:36: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename @@ got char char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename @@
init/initramfs.c:519:36: sparse: expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename
init/initramfs.c:519:36: sparse: got char *static [toplevel] [assigned] collected
init/initramfs.c:520:36: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename @@ got char char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename @@
init/initramfs.c:520:36: sparse: expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename
init/initramfs.c:520:36: sparse: got char *static [toplevel] [assigned] collected
init/initramfs.c:521:36: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename @@ got char char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename @@
init/initramfs.c:521:36: sparse: expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename
init/initramfs.c:521:36: sparse: got char *static [toplevel] [assigned] collected
init/initramfs.c:552:32: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *oldname @@ got n:1> *oldname @@
init/initramfs.c:552:32: sparse: expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *oldname
init/initramfs.c:552:32: sparse: got char *
init/initramfs.c:552:53: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *newname @@ got char char const [noderef] <asn:1> *newname @@
init/initramfs.c:552:53: sparse: expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *newname
init/initramfs.c:552:53: sparse: got char *static [toplevel] [assigned] collected
init/initramfs.c:553:21: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename @@ got char char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename @@
init/initramfs.c:553:21: sparse: expected char const [noderef] <asn:1> *filename
init/initramfs.c:553:21: sparse: got char *static [toplevel] [assigned] collected
vim +490 init/initramfs.c
310
311 static int __init maybe_link(void)
312 {
313 if (nlink >= 2) {
314 char *old = find_link(major, minor, ino, mode, collected);
315 if (old) {
316 clean_path(collected, 0);
> 317 return (ksys_link(old, collected) < 0) ? -1 : 1;
318 }
319 }
320 return 0;
321 }
322
323 struct xattr_hdr {
324 char c_size[8]; /* total size including c_size field */
325 char c_data[]; /* <name>\0<value> */
326 };
327
328 static int __init __maybe_unused do_setxattrs(char *pathname)
329 {
330 char *buf = xattr_buf;
331 char *bufend = buf + xattr_len;
332 struct xattr_hdr *hdr;
333 char str[sizeof(hdr->c_size) + 1];
334 struct path path;
335
336 if (!xattr_len)
337 return 0;
338
339 str[sizeof(hdr->c_size)] = 0;
340
341 while (buf < bufend) {
342 char *xattr_name, *xattr_value;
343 unsigned long xattr_entry_size;
344 unsigned long xattr_name_size, xattr_value_size;
345 int ret;
346
347 if (buf + sizeof(hdr->c_size) > bufend) {
348 error("malformed xattrs");
349 break;
350 }
351
352 hdr = (struct xattr_hdr *)buf;
353 memcpy(str, hdr->c_size, sizeof(hdr->c_size));
354 ret = kstrtoul(str, 16, &xattr_entry_size);
355 buf += xattr_entry_size;
356 if (ret || buf > bufend || !xattr_entry_size) {
357 error("malformed xattrs");
358 break;
359 }
360
361 xattr_name = hdr->c_data;
362 xattr_name_size = strnlen(xattr_name,
363 xattr_entry_size - sizeof(hdr->c_size));
364 if (xattr_name_size == xattr_entry_size - sizeof(hdr->c_size)) {
365 error("malformed xattrs");
366 break;
367 }
368
369 xattr_value = xattr_name + xattr_name_size + 1;
370 xattr_value_size = buf - xattr_value;
371
372 ret = kern_path(pathname, 0, &path);
373 if (!ret) {
374 ret = vfs_setxattr(path.dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
375 xattr_value_size, 0);
376
377 path_put(&path);
378 }
379
380 pr_debug("%s: %s size: %lu val: %s (ret: %d)\n", pathname,
381 xattr_name, xattr_value_size, xattr_value, ret);
382 }
383
384 return 0;
385 }
386
387 struct path_hdr {
388 char p_size[10]; /* total size including p_size field */
389 char p_data[]; /* <path>\0<xattrs> */
390 };
391
392 static int __init do_readxattrs(void)
393 {
394 struct path_hdr hdr;
395 char *path = NULL;
396 char str[sizeof(hdr.p_size) + 1];
397 unsigned long file_entry_size;
398 size_t size, path_size, total_size;
399 struct kstat st;
400 struct file *file;
401 loff_t pos;
402 int ret;
403
404 ret = vfs_lstat(XATTR_LIST_FILENAME, &st);
405 if (ret < 0)
406 return ret;
407
408 total_size = st.size;
409
410 file = filp_open(XATTR_LIST_FILENAME, O_RDONLY, 0);
411 if (IS_ERR(file))
412 return PTR_ERR(file);
413
414 pos = file->f_pos;
415
416 while (total_size) {
417 size = kernel_read(file, (char *)&hdr, sizeof(hdr), &pos);
418 if (size != sizeof(hdr)) {
419 ret = -EIO;
420 goto out;
421 }
422
423 total_size -= size;
424
425 str[sizeof(hdr.p_size)] = 0;
426 memcpy(str, hdr.p_size, sizeof(hdr.p_size));
427 ret = kstrtoul(str, 16, &file_entry_size);
428 if (ret < 0)
429 goto out;
430
431 file_entry_size -= sizeof(sizeof(hdr.p_size));
432 if (file_entry_size > total_size) {
433 ret = -EINVAL;
434 goto out;
435 }
436
437 path = vmalloc(file_entry_size);
438 if (!path) {
439 ret = -ENOMEM;
440 goto out;
441 }
442
443 size = kernel_read(file, path, file_entry_size, &pos);
444 if (size != file_entry_size) {
445 ret = -EIO;
446 goto out_free;
447 }
448
449 total_size -= size;
450
451 path_size = strnlen(path, file_entry_size);
452 if (path_size == file_entry_size) {
453 ret = -EINVAL;
454 goto out_free;
455 }
456
457 xattr_buf = path + path_size + 1;
458 xattr_len = file_entry_size - path_size - 1;
459
460 ret = do_setxattrs(path);
461 vfree(path);
462 path = NULL;
463
464 if (ret < 0)
465 break;
466 }
467 out_free:
468 vfree(path);
469 out:
470 fput(file);
471
472 if (ret < 0)
473 error("Unable to parse xattrs");
474
475 return ret;
476 }
477
478 static __initdata int wfd;
479
480 static int __init do_name(void)
481 {
482 state = SkipIt;
483 next_state = Reset;
484 if (strcmp(collected, "TRAILER!!!") == 0) {
485 free_hash();
486 return 0;
487 } else if (strcmp(collected, XATTR_LIST_FILENAME) == 0) {
488 struct kstat st;
489
> 490 if (!vfs_lstat(collected, &st))
491 do_readxattrs();
492 }
493 clean_path(collected, mode);
494 if (S_ISREG(mode)) {
495 int ml = maybe_link();
496 if (ml >= 0) {
497 int openflags = O_WRONLY|O_CREAT;
498 if (ml != 1)
499 openflags |= O_TRUNC;
500 wfd = ksys_open(collected, openflags, mode);
501
502 if (wfd >= 0) {
503 ksys_fchown(wfd, uid, gid);
504 ksys_fchmod(wfd, mode);
505 if (body_len)
506 ksys_ftruncate(wfd, body_len);
507 vcollected = kstrdup(collected, GFP_KERNEL);
508 state = CopyFile;
509 }
510 }
511 } else if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
512 ksys_mkdir(collected, mode);
513 ksys_chown(collected, uid, gid);
514 ksys_chmod(collected, mode);
515 dir_add(collected, mtime);
516 } else if (S_ISBLK(mode) || S_ISCHR(mode) ||
517 S_ISFIFO(mode) || S_ISSOCK(mode)) {
518 if (maybe_link() == 0) {
519 ksys_mknod(collected, mode, rdev);
520 ksys_chown(collected, uid, gid);
521 ksys_chmod(collected, mode);
522 do_utime(collected, mtime);
523 }
524 }
525 return 0;
526 }
527
---
0-DAY kernel test infrastructure Open Source Technology Center
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all Intel Corporation
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH V6 4/4] efi: Attempt to get the TCG2 event log in the boot stub
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-05-18 16:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Matthew Garrett
Cc: linux-integrity, Peter Hüwe, Jarkko Sakkinen,
Jason Gunthorpe, Roberto Sassu, linux-efi, linux-security-module,
Linux Kernel Mailing List, Thiebaud Weksteen, Bartosz Szczepanek,
Matthew Garrett
In-Reply-To: <20190517213918.26045-5-matthewgarrett@google.com>
On Fri, 17 May 2019 at 23:39, Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> wrote:
>
> From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
>
> Right now we only attempt to obtain the SHA1-only event log. The
> protocol also supports a crypto agile log format, which contains digests
> for all algorithms in use. Attempt to obtain this first, and fall back
> to obtaining the older format if the system doesn't support it. This is
> lightly complicated by the event sizes being variable (as we don't know
> in advance which algorithms are in use), and the interface giving us
> back a pointer to the start of the final entry rather than a pointer to
> the end of the log - as a result, we need to parse the final entry to
> figure out its length in order to know how much data to copy up to the
> OS.
>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
This signoff doesn't belong here I think?
> ---
> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++----------
> 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
> index 5bd04f75d8d6..b3f30448e454 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
> @@ -8,8 +8,13 @@
> * Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
> */
> #include <linux/efi.h>
> -#include <linux/tpm_eventlog.h>
> #include <asm/efi.h>
> +/*
> + * KASAN redefines memcpy() in a way that isn't available in the EFI stub.
> + * We need to include asm/efi.h before linux/tpm_eventlog.h in order to avoid
> + * the wrong memcpy() being referenced.
> + */
> +#include <linux/tpm_eventlog.h>
>
Please drop this hunk. I just sent out a patch to fix this properly.
> #include "efistub.h"
>
> @@ -57,7 +62,7 @@ void efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
>
> #endif
>
> -static void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
> +void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
> {
> efi_guid_t tcg2_guid = EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID;
> efi_guid_t linux_eventlog_guid = LINUX_EFI_TPM_EVENT_LOG_GUID;
> @@ -67,6 +72,7 @@ static void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
> unsigned long first_entry_addr, last_entry_addr;
> size_t log_size, last_entry_size;
> efi_bool_t truncated;
> + int version = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2;
> void *tcg2_protocol = NULL;
>
> status = efi_call_early(locate_protocol, &tcg2_guid, NULL,
> @@ -74,14 +80,20 @@ static void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
> if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
> return;
>
> - status = efi_call_proto(efi_tcg2_protocol, get_event_log, tcg2_protocol,
> - EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2,
> - &log_location, &log_last_entry, &truncated);
> - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
> - return;
> + status = efi_call_proto(efi_tcg2_protocol, get_event_log,
> + tcg2_protocol, version, &log_location,
> + &log_last_entry, &truncated);
> +
> + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS || !log_location) {
> + version = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2;
> + status = efi_call_proto(efi_tcg2_protocol, get_event_log,
> + tcg2_protocol, version, &log_location,
> + &log_last_entry, &truncated);
> + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS || !log_location)
> + return;
> +
> + }
>
> - if (!log_location)
> - return;
> first_entry_addr = (unsigned long) log_location;
>
> /*
> @@ -96,8 +108,23 @@ static void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
> * We need to calculate its size to deduce the full size of
> * the logs.
> */
> - last_entry_size = sizeof(struct tcpa_event) +
> - ((struct tcpa_event *) last_entry_addr)->event_size;
> + if (version == EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2) {
> + /*
> + * The TCG2 log format has variable length entries,
> + * and the information to decode the hash algorithms
> + * back into a size is contained in the first entry -
> + * pass a pointer to the final entry (to calculate its
> + * size) and the first entry (so we know how long each
> + * digest is)
> + */
> + last_entry_size =
> + __calc_tpm2_event_size((void *)last_entry_addr,
> + (void *)(long)log_location,
> + false);
> + } else {
> + last_entry_size = sizeof(struct tcpa_event) +
> + ((struct tcpa_event *) last_entry_addr)->event_size;
> + }
> log_size = log_last_entry - log_location + last_entry_size;
> }
>
> @@ -114,7 +141,7 @@ static void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
>
> memset(log_tbl, 0, sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_size);
> log_tbl->size = log_size;
> - log_tbl->version = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2;
> + log_tbl->version = version;
> memcpy(log_tbl->log, (void *) first_entry_addr, log_size);
>
> status = efi_call_early(install_configuration_table,
> @@ -126,9 +153,3 @@ static void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
> err_free:
> efi_call_early(free_pool, log_tbl);
> }
> -
> -void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
> -{
> - /* Only try to retrieve the logs in 1.2 format. */
> - efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(sys_table_arg);
> -}
> --
> 2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 5/4] mm: Introduce SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT and mark excluded caches
From: Mathias Krause @ 2019-05-20 6:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: Alexander Potapenko, Andrew Morton, Christoph Lameter,
kernel-hardening, Masahiro Yamada, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
Nick Desaulniers, Kostya Serebryany, Dmitry Vyukov, Sandeep Patil,
Laura Abbott, Randy Dunlap, Jann Horn, Mark Rutland, linux-mm,
linux-security-module
In-Reply-To: <201905161746.16E885F@keescook>
Hi Kees,
On Fri, 17 May 2019 at 02:50, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> In order to improve the init_on_free performance, some frequently
> freed caches with less sensitive contents can be excluded from the
> init_on_free behavior.
>
> This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the
> last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the
> code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't
> reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
you might want to give secunet credit for this one, as can be seen here:
https://github.com/minipli/linux-grsec/commit/309d494e7a3f6533ca68fc8b3bd89fa76fd2c2df
However, please keep the "Changes or omissions from the original
code..." part as your version slightly differs.
Thanks,
Mathias
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
> fs/buffer.c | 2 +-
> fs/dcache.c | 3 ++-
> include/linux/slab.h | 3 +++
> kernel/fork.c | 6 ++++--
> mm/rmap.c | 5 +++--
> mm/slab.h | 5 +++--
> net/core/skbuff.c | 6 ++++--
> 7 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/buffer.c b/fs/buffer.c
> index 0faa41fb4c88..04a85bd4cf2e 100644
> --- a/fs/buffer.c
> +++ b/fs/buffer.c
> @@ -3457,7 +3457,7 @@ void __init buffer_init(void)
> bh_cachep = kmem_cache_create("buffer_head",
> sizeof(struct buffer_head), 0,
> (SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|SLAB_PANIC|
> - SLAB_MEM_SPREAD),
> + SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT),
> NULL);
>
> /*
> diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c
> index 8136bda27a1f..323b039accba 100644
> --- a/fs/dcache.c
> +++ b/fs/dcache.c
> @@ -3139,7 +3139,8 @@ void __init vfs_caches_init_early(void)
> void __init vfs_caches_init(void)
> {
> names_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("names_cache", PATH_MAX, 0,
> - SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, 0, PATH_MAX, NULL);
> + SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT, 0,
> + PATH_MAX, NULL);
>
> dcache_init();
> inode_init();
> diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
> index 9449b19c5f10..7eba9ad8830d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/slab.h
> +++ b/include/linux/slab.h
> @@ -92,6 +92,9 @@
> /* Avoid kmemleak tracing */
> #define SLAB_NOLEAKTRACE ((slab_flags_t __force)0x00800000U)
>
> +/* Exclude slab from zero-on-free when init_on_free is enabled */
> +#define SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT ((slab_flags_t __force)0x01000000U)
> +
> /* Fault injection mark */
> #ifdef CONFIG_FAILSLAB
> # define SLAB_FAILSLAB ((slab_flags_t __force)0x02000000U)
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index b4cba953040a..9868585f5520 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> @@ -2550,11 +2550,13 @@ void __init proc_caches_init(void)
>
> mm_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("mm_struct",
> mm_size, ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN,
> - SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT,
> + SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT|
> + SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT,
> offsetof(struct mm_struct, saved_auxv),
> sizeof_field(struct mm_struct, saved_auxv),
> NULL);
> - vm_area_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(vm_area_struct, SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT);
> + vm_area_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(vm_area_struct, SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT|
> + SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT);
> mmap_init();
> nsproxy_cache_init();
> }
> diff --git a/mm/rmap.c b/mm/rmap.c
> index e5dfe2ae6b0d..b7b8013eeb0a 100644
> --- a/mm/rmap.c
> +++ b/mm/rmap.c
> @@ -432,10 +432,11 @@ static void anon_vma_ctor(void *data)
> void __init anon_vma_init(void)
> {
> anon_vma_cachep = kmem_cache_create("anon_vma", sizeof(struct anon_vma),
> - 0, SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT,
> + 0, SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT|
> + SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT,
> anon_vma_ctor);
> anon_vma_chain_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(anon_vma_chain,
> - SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT);
> + SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT|SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT);
> }
>
> /*
> diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
> index 24ae887359b8..f95b4f03c57b 100644
> --- a/mm/slab.h
> +++ b/mm/slab.h
> @@ -129,7 +129,8 @@ static inline slab_flags_t kmem_cache_flags(unsigned int object_size,
> /* Legal flag mask for kmem_cache_create(), for various configurations */
> #define SLAB_CORE_FLAGS (SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_CACHE_DMA | \
> SLAB_CACHE_DMA32 | SLAB_PANIC | \
> - SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS )
> + SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS | \
> + SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT)
>
> #if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB)
> #define SLAB_DEBUG_FLAGS (SLAB_RED_ZONE | SLAB_POISON | SLAB_STORE_USER)
> @@ -535,7 +536,7 @@ static inline bool slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfp_t flags, struct kmem_cache *c)
> static inline bool slab_want_init_on_free(struct kmem_cache *c)
> {
> if (static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_free))
> - return !(c->ctor);
> + return !(c->ctor) && ((c->flags & SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT) == 0);
> else
> return false;
> }
> diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
> index e89be6282693..b65902d2c042 100644
> --- a/net/core/skbuff.c
> +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
> @@ -3981,14 +3981,16 @@ void __init skb_init(void)
> skbuff_head_cache = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("skbuff_head_cache",
> sizeof(struct sk_buff),
> 0,
> - SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC,
> + SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|
> + SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT,
> offsetof(struct sk_buff, cb),
> sizeof_field(struct sk_buff, cb),
> NULL);
> skbuff_fclone_cache = kmem_cache_create("skbuff_fclone_cache",
> sizeof(struct sk_buff_fclones),
> 0,
> - SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC,
> + SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|
> + SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT,
> NULL);
> skb_extensions_init();
> }
> --
> 2.17.1
>
>
> --
> Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] initramfs: introduce do_readxattrs()
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2019-05-20 8:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arvind Sankar
Cc: hpa, viro, linux-security-module, linux-integrity, initramfs,
linux-api, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, zohar, silviu.vlasceanu,
dmitry.kasatkin, takondra, kamensky, arnd, rob, james.w.mcmechan,
niveditas98
In-Reply-To: <20190517211014.GA9198@rani.riverdale.lan>
On 5/17/2019 11:10 PM, Arvind Sankar wrote:
> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 05:02:20PM -0400, Arvind Sankar wrote:
>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 01:18:11PM -0700, hpa@zytor.com wrote:
>>>
>>> Ok... I just realized this does not work for a modular initramfs, composed at load time from multiple files, which is a very real problem. Should be easy enough to deal with: instead of one large file, use one companion file per source file, perhaps something like filename..xattrs (suggesting double dots to make it less likely to conflict with a "real" file.) No leading dot, as it makes it more likely that archivers will sort them before the file proper.
>> This version of the patch was changed from the previous one exactly to deal with this case --
>> it allows for the bootloader to load multiple initramfs archives, each
>> with its own .xattr-list file, and to have that work properly.
>> Could you elaborate on the issue that you see?
> Roberto, are you missing a changelog entry for v2->v3 change?
The changelog for v1->v2 is missing.
Thanks
Roberto
--
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
Managing Director: Bo PENG, Jian LI, Yanli SHI
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] initramfs: introduce do_readxattrs()
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2019-05-20 8:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: hpa, viro
Cc: linux-security-module, linux-integrity, initramfs, linux-api,
linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, zohar, silviu.vlasceanu,
dmitry.kasatkin, takondra, kamensky, arnd, rob, james.w.mcmechan,
niveditas98
In-Reply-To: <CD9A4F89-7CA5-4329-A06A-F8DEB87905A5@zytor.com>
On 5/17/2019 10:18 PM, hpa@zytor.com wrote:
> On May 17, 2019 9:55:19 AM PDT, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> wrote:
>> This patch adds support for an alternative method to add xattrs to
>> files in
>> the rootfs filesystem. Instead of extracting them directly from the ram
>> disk image, they are extracted from a regular file called .xattr-list,
>> that
>> can be added by any ram disk generator available today. The file format
>> is:
>>
>> <file #N data len (ASCII, 10 chars)><file #N path>\0
>> <xattr #N data len (ASCII, 8 chars)><xattr #N name>\0<xattr #N value>
>>
>> .xattr-list can be generated by executing:
>>
>> $ getfattr --absolute-names -d -h -R -e hex -m - \
>> <file list> | xattr.awk -b > ${initdir}/.xattr-list
>>
>> where the content of the xattr.awk script is:
>>
>> #! /usr/bin/awk -f
>> {
>> if (!length($0)) {
>> printf("%.10x%s\0", len, file);
>> for (x in xattr) {
>> printf("%.8x%s\0", xattr_len[x], x);
>> for (i = 0; i < length(xattr[x]) / 2; i++) {
>> printf("%c", strtonum("0x"substr(xattr[x], i * 2 + 1, 2)));
>> }
>> }
>> i = 0;
>> delete xattr;
>> delete xattr_len;
>> next;
>> };
>> if (i == 0) {
>> file=$3;
>> len=length(file) + 8 + 1;
>> }
>> if (i > 0) {
>> split($0, a, "=");
>> xattr[a[1]]=substr(a[2], 3);
>> xattr_len[a[1]]=length(a[1]) + 1 + 8 + length(xattr[a[1]]) / 2;
>> len+=xattr_len[a[1]];
>> };
>> i++;
>> }
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>> ---
>> init/initramfs.c | 99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 1 file changed, 99 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/init/initramfs.c b/init/initramfs.c
>> index 0c6dd1d5d3f6..6ec018c6279a 100644
>> --- a/init/initramfs.c
>> +++ b/init/initramfs.c
>> @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
>> #include <linux/namei.h>
>> #include <linux/xattr.h>
>>
>> +#define XATTR_LIST_FILENAME ".xattr-list"
>> +
>> static ssize_t __init xwrite(int fd, const char *p, size_t count)
>> {
>> ssize_t out = 0;
>> @@ -382,6 +384,97 @@ static int __init __maybe_unused do_setxattrs(char
>> *pathname)
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> +struct path_hdr {
>> + char p_size[10]; /* total size including p_size field */
>> + char p_data[]; /* <path>\0<xattrs> */
>> +};
>> +
>> +static int __init do_readxattrs(void)
>> +{
>> + struct path_hdr hdr;
>> + char *path = NULL;
>> + char str[sizeof(hdr.p_size) + 1];
>> + unsigned long file_entry_size;
>> + size_t size, path_size, total_size;
>> + struct kstat st;
>> + struct file *file;
>> + loff_t pos;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + ret = vfs_lstat(XATTR_LIST_FILENAME, &st);
>> + if (ret < 0)
>> + return ret;
>> +
>> + total_size = st.size;
>> +
>> + file = filp_open(XATTR_LIST_FILENAME, O_RDONLY, 0);
>> + if (IS_ERR(file))
>> + return PTR_ERR(file);
>> +
>> + pos = file->f_pos;
>> +
>> + while (total_size) {
>> + size = kernel_read(file, (char *)&hdr, sizeof(hdr), &pos);
>> + if (size != sizeof(hdr)) {
>> + ret = -EIO;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> +
>> + total_size -= size;
>> +
>> + str[sizeof(hdr.p_size)] = 0;
>> + memcpy(str, hdr.p_size, sizeof(hdr.p_size));
>> + ret = kstrtoul(str, 16, &file_entry_size);
>> + if (ret < 0)
>> + goto out;
>> +
>> + file_entry_size -= sizeof(sizeof(hdr.p_size));
>> + if (file_entry_size > total_size) {
>> + ret = -EINVAL;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> +
>> + path = vmalloc(file_entry_size);
>> + if (!path) {
>> + ret = -ENOMEM;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> +
>> + size = kernel_read(file, path, file_entry_size, &pos);
>> + if (size != file_entry_size) {
>> + ret = -EIO;
>> + goto out_free;
>> + }
>> +
>> + total_size -= size;
>> +
>> + path_size = strnlen(path, file_entry_size);
>> + if (path_size == file_entry_size) {
>> + ret = -EINVAL;
>> + goto out_free;
>> + }
>> +
>> + xattr_buf = path + path_size + 1;
>> + xattr_len = file_entry_size - path_size - 1;
>> +
>> + ret = do_setxattrs(path);
>> + vfree(path);
>> + path = NULL;
>> +
>> + if (ret < 0)
>> + break;
>> + }
>> +out_free:
>> + vfree(path);
>> +out:
>> + fput(file);
>> +
>> + if (ret < 0)
>> + error("Unable to parse xattrs");
>> +
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> static __initdata int wfd;
>>
>> static int __init do_name(void)
>> @@ -391,6 +484,11 @@ static int __init do_name(void)
>> if (strcmp(collected, "TRAILER!!!") == 0) {
>> free_hash();
>> return 0;
>> + } else if (strcmp(collected, XATTR_LIST_FILENAME) == 0) {
>> + struct kstat st;
>> +
>> + if (!vfs_lstat(collected, &st))
>> + do_readxattrs();
>> }
>> clean_path(collected, mode);
>> if (S_ISREG(mode)) {
>> @@ -562,6 +660,7 @@ static char * __init unpack_to_rootfs(char *buf,
>> unsigned long len)
>> buf += my_inptr;
>> len -= my_inptr;
>> }
>> + do_readxattrs();
>> dir_utime();
>> kfree(name_buf);
>> kfree(symlink_buf);
>
> Ok... I just realized this does not work for a modular initramfs, composed at load time from multiple files, which is a very real problem. Should be easy enough to deal with: instead of one large file, use one companion file per source file, perhaps something like filename..xattrs (suggesting double dots to make it less likely to conflict with a "real" file.) No leading dot, as it makes it more likely that archivers will sort them before the file proper.
Version 1 of the patch set worked exactly in this way. However, Rob
pointed out that this would be a problem if file names plus the suffix
exceed 255 characters.
Roberto
--
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
Managing Director: Bo PENG, Jian LI, Yanli SHI
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] initramfs: introduce do_readxattrs()
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2019-05-20 9:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arvind Sankar, H. Peter Anvin
Cc: viro, linux-security-module, linux-integrity, initramfs,
linux-api, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, zohar, silviu.vlasceanu,
dmitry.kasatkin, takondra, kamensky, arnd, rob, james.w.mcmechan,
niveditas98
In-Reply-To: <20190517221731.GA11358@rani.riverdale.lan>
On 5/18/2019 12:17 AM, Arvind Sankar wrote:
> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 02:47:31PM -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
>> On 5/17/19 2:02 PM, Arvind Sankar wrote:
>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 01:18:11PM -0700, hpa@zytor.com wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Ok... I just realized this does not work for a modular initramfs, composed at load time from multiple files, which is a very real problem. Should be easy enough to deal with: instead of one large file, use one companion file per source file, perhaps something like filename..xattrs (suggesting double dots to make it less likely to conflict with a "real" file.) No leading dot, as it makes it more likely that archivers will sort them before the file proper.
>>> This version of the patch was changed from the previous one exactly to deal with this case --
>>> it allows for the bootloader to load multiple initramfs archives, each
>>> with its own .xattr-list file, and to have that work properly.
>>> Could you elaborate on the issue that you see?
>>>
>>
>> Well, for one thing, how do you define "cpio archive", each with its own
>> .xattr-list file? Second, that would seem to depend on the ordering, no,
>> in which case you depend critically on .xattr-list file following the
>> files, which most archivers won't do.
>>
>> Either way it seems cleaner to have this per file; especially if/as it
>> can be done without actually mucking up the format.
>>
>> I need to run, but I'll post a more detailed explanation of what I did
>> in a little bit.
>>
>> -hpa
>>
> Not sure what you mean by how do I define it? Each cpio archive will
> contain its own .xattr-list file with signatures for the files within
> it, that was the idea.
>
> You need to review the code more closely I think -- it does not depend
> on the .xattr-list file following the files to which it applies.
>
> The code first extracts .xattr-list as though it was a regular file. If
> a later dupe shows up (presumably from a second archive, although the
> patch will actually allow a second one in the same archive), it will
> then process the existing .xattr-list file and apply the attributes
> listed within it. It then will proceed to read the second one and
> overwrite the first one with it (this is the normal behaviour in the
> kernel cpio parser). At the end once all the archives have been
> extracted, if there is an .xattr-list file in the rootfs it will be
> parsed (it would've been the last one encountered, which hasn't been
> parsed yet, just extracted).
>
> Regarding the idea to use the high 16 bits of the mode field in
> the header that's another possibility. It would just require additional
> support in the program that actually creates the archive though, which
> the current patch doesn't.
Yes, for adding signatures for a subset of files, no changes to the ram
disk generator are necessary. Everything is done by a custom module. To
support a generic use case, it would be necessary to modify the
generator to execute getfattr and the awk script after files have been
placed in the temporary directory.
If I understood the new proposal correctly, it would be task for cpio to
read file metadata after the content and create a new record for each
file with mode 0x18000, type of metadata encoded in the file name and
metadata as file content. I don't know how easy it would be to modify
cpio. Probably the amount of changes would be reasonable.
The kernel will behave in a similar way. It will call do_readxattrs() in
do_copy() for each file. Since the only difference between the current
and the new proposal would be two additional calls to do_readxattrs() in
do_name() and unpack_to_rootfs(), maybe we could support both.
Roberto
--
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
Managing Director: Bo PENG, Jian LI, Yanli SHI
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
From: Dr. Greg @ 2019-05-20 9:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: James Morris
Cc: Andy Lutomirski, Sean Christopherson, Serge E. Hallyn, LSM List,
Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley, Eric Paris, selinux, Jarkko Sakkinen,
Jethro Beekman, Xing, Cedric, Hansen, Dave, Thomas Gleixner,
Dr. Greg, Linus Torvalds, LKML, X86 ML, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com,
Ayoun, Serge, Katz-zamir, Shay, Huang, Haitao, Andy Shevchenko,
Svahn, Kai, Borislav Petkov, Josh Triplett, Huang, Kai,
David Rientjes
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1905161716460.23647@namei.org>
On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 05:24:33PM +1000, James Morris wrote:
Good morning, I hope everyone had a pleasant weekend.
James, I believe the last time our paths crossed was at the Linux
Security Summit in Seattle, I trust you have been well since then.
> On Wed, 15 May 2019, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> > On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 3:46 PM James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > You could try user.sigstruct, which does not require any privs.
> > >
> >
> > I don't think I understand your proposal. What file would this
> > attribute be on? What would consume it?
> It would be on the enclave file, so you keep the sigstruct bound to
> it, rather than needing a separate file to manage. It would
> simplify any LSM policy check.
>
> It would be consumed by (I guess) the SGX_INIT_THE_ENCLAVE ioctl in your
> example, instead of having a 2nd fd.
I've watched this discussion regarding LSM, sigstructs and file
descriptors with some fascination, since all of this infrastructure
already exists and should be well understood by anyone who has been
active in SGX runtime development. There would thus seem to be a
disconnect between SGX driver developers and the consumers of the
services of the driver.
The existing enclave format, codified by the silo within Intel that is
responsible for the existing SDK/PSW, implements a notes section
stored inside a standard ELF shared library image. The notes section
contains a significant amount of metadata that is used to direct the
instantiation of what will be the initialized enclave image. Said
metadata includes a copy of the sigstruct that was generated when the
enclave was signed, which is the event that triggers metadata
generation.
All of this means that any enclave that gets loaded effectively
triggers both LSM and IMA checks.
James, if you remember, the paper that we presented in Seattle
described the initial implementation of an extension to the Linux IMA
infrastructure that tracks whether or not processes can be 'trusted'.
That work has gone on to include running the trust modeling and
disciplining engine inside of a namespace specific SGX enclave. We
would be happy to make available execution trajectory logs that
clearly document IMA and LSM checks being conducted on enclaves.
There is a strong probability that we will be maintaining and
supporting a modified version of whatever driver that goes upstream.
In support of this we are putting together a white paper discussing
security architecture concerns inherent in an SGX driver. With the
intent of avoiding LKML verbosity we will post a URL to the paper when
it is available if there is interest.
The issue of EDMM has already come up, suffice it to say that EDMM
makes LSM inspection of enclave content, while desirable, largely
irrelevant from a security perspective.
> James Morris
Best wishes for a productive week.
Dr. Greg
As always,
Dr. G.W. Wettstein, Ph.D. Enjellic Systems Development, LLC.
4206 N. 19th Ave. Specializing in information infra-structure
Fargo, ND 58102 development.
PH: 701-281-1686 EMAIL: greg@enjellic.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"If you plugged up your nose and mouth right before you sneezed, would
the sneeze go out your ears or would your head explode? Either way I'm
afraid to try."
-- Nick Kean
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2019-05-20 11:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson
Cc: Andy Lutomirski, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, LSM List,
Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley, Eric Paris, selinux, Jethro Beekman,
Xing, Cedric, Hansen, Dave, Thomas Gleixner, Dr. Greg,
Linus Torvalds, LKML, X86 ML, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com,
Ayoun, Serge, Katz-zamir, Shay, Huang, Haitao, Andy Shevchenko,
Svahn, Kai, Borislav Petkov, Josh Triplett, Huang, Kai,
David Rientjes
In-Reply-To: <20190516224550.GC11204@linux.intel.com>
On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 03:45:50PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 02:02:58PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > On May 15, 2019, at 10:16 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> > > There is a problem here though. Usually the enclave itself is just a
> > > loader that then loads the application from outside source and creates
> > > the executable pages from the content.
> > >
> > > A great example of this is Graphene that bootstraps unmodified Linux
> > > applications to an enclave:
> > >
> > > https://github.com/oscarlab/graphene
> > >
> >
> > ISTM you should need EXECMEM or similar to run Graphene, then.
>
> Agreed, Graphene is effectively running arbitrary enclave code. I'm
> guessing there is nothing that prevents extending/reworking Graphene to
> allow generating the enclave ahead of time so as to avoid populating the
> guts of the enclave at runtime, i.e. it's likely possible to run an
> unmodified application in an enclave without EXECMEM if that's something
> Graphene or its users really care about.
I'd guess that also people adding SGX support to containers want
somewhat similar framework to work on so that you can just wrap a
container with an enclave.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2019-05-20 11:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Lutomirski
Cc: Sean Christopherson, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, LSM List,
Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley, Eric Paris, selinux, Jethro Beekman,
Xing, Cedric, Hansen, Dave, Thomas Gleixner, Dr. Greg,
Linus Torvalds, LKML, X86 ML, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com,
Ayoun, Serge, Katz-zamir, Shay, Huang, Haitao, Andy Shevchenko,
Svahn, Kai, Borislav Petkov, Josh Triplett, Huang, Kai,
David Rientjes
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrVx1hgY67mP+73w5rT+eY+APcfS0YJ+XwtTLNz3CbVNMA@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 02:02:58PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> That certainly *could* be done, and I guess the decision could be left
> to the LSMs, but I'm not convinced this adds value. What security use
> case does this cover that isn't already covered by requiring EXECUTE
> (e.g. lib_t) on the enclave file and some new SIGSTRUCT right on the
> .sigstruct?
I guess you are right as SIGSTRUCT completely shields the memory layout
and contents of an enclave.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2019-05-20 11:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson
Cc: Andy Lutomirski, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, LSM List,
Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley, Eric Paris, selinux, Jethro Beekman,
Xing, Cedric, Hansen, Dave, Thomas Gleixner, Dr. Greg,
Linus Torvalds, LKML, X86 ML, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com,
Ayoun, Serge, Katz-zamir, Shay, Huang, Haitao, Andy Shevchenko,
Svahn, Kai, Borislav Petkov, Josh Triplett, Huang, Kai,
David Rientjes
In-Reply-To: <20190517000331.GD11204@linux.intel.com>
On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 05:03:31PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> The SGX ioctl() would need to take mmap_sem for write, but we can mitigate
> that issue by changing the ioctl() to take a range of memory instead of a
> single page. That'd also provide "EADD batching" that folks have
> requested.
This should be easy enough to add as the EADD operations are already
batched internally to a worker thread.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2019-05-20 11:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Lutomirski
Cc: Sean Christopherson, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, LSM List,
Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley, Eric Paris, selinux, Jethro Beekman,
Xing, Cedric, Hansen, Dave, Thomas Gleixner, Dr. Greg,
Linus Torvalds, LKML, X86 ML, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com,
Ayoun, Serge, Katz-zamir, Shay, Huang, Haitao, Andy Shevchenko,
Svahn, Kai, Borislav Petkov, Josh Triplett, Huang, Kai,
David Rientjes
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrWxw7xALE0kmiYBzomaSMAeXEVq-7rX7xeqPtDPeDQiCA@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 05:26:15PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> Is userspace actually requred to mmap() the enclave prior to EADDing things?
Nope, not since v20. Here is what I wrote about API to the kernel
documentation:
"The enclave life-cycle starts by opening `/dev/sgx/enclave`. After this
there is already a data structure inside kernel tracking the enclave
that is initially uncreated. After this a set of ioctl's can be used to
create, populate and initialize the enclave.
You can close (if you want) the fd after you've mmap()'d. As long as the
file is open the enclave stays alive so you might want to do that after
you don't need it anymore. Even munmap() won't destruct the enclave if
the file is open. Neither will closing the fd as long as you have
mmap() done over the fd (even if it does not across the range defined in
SECS)."
Enclave can be created and initialized without doing a single mmap()
call.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2019-05-20 11:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson
Cc: Andy Lutomirski, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, LSM List,
Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley, Eric Paris, selinux, Jethro Beekman,
Xing, Cedric, Hansen, Dave, Thomas Gleixner, Dr. Greg,
Linus Torvalds, LKML, X86 ML, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com,
Ayoun, Serge, Katz-zamir, Shay, Huang, Haitao, Andy Shevchenko,
Svahn, Kai, Borislav Petkov, Josh Triplett, Huang, Kai,
David Rientjes
In-Reply-To: <20190517154128.GA15006@linux.intel.com>
On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 08:41:28AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> It was a requirement prior to the API rework in v20, i.e. unless someone
> was really quick on the draw after the v20 update all existing userspace
> implementations mmap() the enclave before ECREATE. Requiring a valid
> enclave VMA for EADD shoudn't be too onerous.
Still underlining: it is not required.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 10/10] docs: fix broken documentation links
From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab @ 2019-05-20 14:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linux Doc Mailing List
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab, Mauro Carvalho Chehab, linux-kernel,
Jonathan Corbet, x86, linux-acpi, linux-edac, netdev, devicetree,
linux-pci, linux-arm-kernel, linux-amlogic, linux-arm-msm,
linux-gpio, linux-i2c, linuxppc-dev, xen-devel,
platform-driver-x86, devel, kvm, virtualization, devel, linux-mm,
linux-security-module, linux-kselftest
In-Reply-To: <cover.1558362030.git.mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Mostly due to x86 and acpi conversion, several documentation
links are still pointing to the old file. Fix them.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
---
Documentation/acpi/dsd/leds.txt | 2 +-
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst | 6 +++---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 16 ++++++++--------
Documentation/admin-guide/ras.rst | 2 +-
.../devicetree/bindings/net/fsl-enetc.txt | 7 +++----
.../bindings/pci/amlogic,meson-pcie.txt | 2 +-
.../bindings/regulator/qcom,rpmh-regulator.txt | 2 +-
Documentation/devicetree/booting-without-of.txt | 2 +-
Documentation/driver-api/gpio/board.rst | 2 +-
Documentation/driver-api/gpio/consumer.rst | 2 +-
.../firmware-guide/acpi/enumeration.rst | 2 +-
.../firmware-guide/acpi/method-tracing.rst | 2 +-
Documentation/i2c/instantiating-devices | 2 +-
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 4 ++--
.../translations/it_IT/process/4.Coding.rst | 2 +-
.../translations/it_IT/process/howto.rst | 2 +-
.../it_IT/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst | 4 ++--
.../translations/zh_CN/process/4.Coding.rst | 2 +-
Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.rst | 2 +-
Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst | 4 ++--
.../x86/x86_64/fake-numa-for-cpusets.rst | 2 +-
MAINTAINERS | 6 +++---
arch/arm/Kconfig | 2 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 2 +-
arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 2 +-
arch/x86/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++--------
arch/x86/Kconfig.debug | 2 +-
| 2 +-
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/platform/pvh/enlighten.c | 2 +-
drivers/acpi/Kconfig | 10 +++++-----
drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c | 2 +-
.../fieldbus/Documentation/fieldbus_dev.txt | 4 ++--
drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 2 +-
include/acpi/acpi_drivers.h | 2 +-
include/linux/fs_context.h | 2 +-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 +-
mm/Kconfig | 2 +-
security/Kconfig | 2 +-
tools/include/linux/err.h | 2 +-
tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt | 4 ++--
tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c | 2 +-
49 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/acpi/dsd/leds.txt b/Documentation/acpi/dsd/leds.txt
index 81a63af42ed2..cc58b1a574c5 100644
--- a/Documentation/acpi/dsd/leds.txt
+++ b/Documentation/acpi/dsd/leds.txt
@@ -96,4 +96,4 @@ where
<URL:http://www.uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/_DSD-hierarchical-data-extension-UUID-v1.1.pdf>,
referenced 2019-02-21.
-[7] Documentation/acpi/dsd/data-node-reference.txt
+[7] Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/dsd/data-node-references.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst
index 0124980dca2d..8d3273e32eb1 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ parameter is applicable::
X86-32 X86-32, aka i386 architecture is enabled.
X86-64 X86-64 architecture is enabled.
More X86-64 boot options can be found in
- Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.txt .
+ Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst.
X86 Either 32-bit or 64-bit x86 (same as X86-32+X86-64)
X86_UV SGI UV support is enabled.
XEN Xen support is enabled
@@ -181,10 +181,10 @@ In addition, the following text indicates that the option::
Parameters denoted with BOOT are actually interpreted by the boot
loader, and have no meaning to the kernel directly.
Do not modify the syntax of boot loader parameters without extreme
-need or coordination with <Documentation/x86/boot.txt>.
+need or coordination with <Documentation/x86/boot.rst>.
There are also arch-specific kernel-parameters not documented here.
-See for example <Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.txt>.
+See for example <Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst>.
Note that ALL kernel parameters listed below are CASE SENSITIVE, and that
a trailing = on the name of any parameter states that that parameter will
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 138f6664b2e2..bc5f202d42ec 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT statements, e.g.,
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT((ACPI_DB_INFO, ...
The debug_level mask defaults to "info". See
- Documentation/acpi/debug.txt for more information about
+ Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/debug.rst for more information about
debug layers and levels.
Enable processor driver info messages:
@@ -963,7 +963,7 @@
for details.
nompx [X86] Disables Intel Memory Protection Extensions.
- See Documentation/x86/intel_mpx.txt for more
+ See Documentation/x86/intel_mpx.rst for more
information about the feature.
nopku [X86] Disable Memory Protection Keys CPU feature found
@@ -1189,7 +1189,7 @@
that is to be dynamically loaded by Linux. If there are
multiple variables with the same name but with different
vendor GUIDs, all of them will be loaded. See
- Documentation/acpi/ssdt-overlays.txt for details.
+ Documentation/admin-guide/acpi/ssdt-overlays.rst for details.
eisa_irq_edge= [PARISC,HW]
@@ -2383,7 +2383,7 @@
mce [X86-32] Machine Check Exception
- mce=option [X86-64] See Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.txt
+ mce=option [X86-64] See Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst
md= [HW] RAID subsystems devices and level
See Documentation/admin-guide/md.rst.
@@ -2439,7 +2439,7 @@
set according to the
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG_DEFAULT_ONLINE kernel config
option.
- See Documentation/memory-hotplug.txt.
+ See Documentation/admin-guide/mm/memory-hotplug.rst.
memmap=exactmap [KNL,X86] Enable setting of an exact
E820 memory map, as specified by the user.
@@ -2528,7 +2528,7 @@
mem_encrypt=on: Activate SME
mem_encrypt=off: Do not activate SME
- Refer to Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
+ Refer to Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
for details on when memory encryption can be activated.
mem_sleep_default= [SUSPEND] Default system suspend mode:
@@ -3528,7 +3528,7 @@
See Documentation/blockdev/paride.txt.
pirq= [SMP,APIC] Manual mp-table setup
- See Documentation/x86/i386/IO-APIC.txt.
+ See Documentation/x86/i386/IO-APIC.rst.
plip= [PPT,NET] Parallel port network link
Format: { parport<nr> | timid | 0 }
@@ -5054,7 +5054,7 @@
Can be used multiple times for multiple devices.
vga= [BOOT,X86-32] Select a particular video mode
- See Documentation/x86/boot.txt and
+ See Documentation/x86/boot.rst and
Documentation/svga.txt.
Use vga=ask for menu.
This is actually a boot loader parameter; the value is
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/ras.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/ras.rst
index c7495e42e6f4..2b20f5f7380d 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/ras.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/ras.rst
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ Architecture (MCA)\ [#f3]_.
mode).
.. [#f3] For more details about the Machine Check Architecture (MCA),
- please read Documentation/x86/x86_64/machinecheck at the Kernel tree.
+ please read Documentation/x86/x86_64/machinecheck.rst at the Kernel tree.
EDAC - Error Detection And Correction
*************************************
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/fsl-enetc.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/fsl-enetc.txt
index c812e25ae90f..25fc687419db 100644
--- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/fsl-enetc.txt
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/fsl-enetc.txt
@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ Required properties:
In this case, the ENETC node should include a "mdio" sub-node
that in turn should contain the "ethernet-phy" node describing the
external phy. Below properties are required, their bindings
-already defined in ethernet.txt or phy.txt, under
-Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/*.
+already defined in Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/ethernet.txt or
+Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/phy.txt.
Required:
@@ -51,8 +51,7 @@ Example:
connection:
In this case, the ENETC port node defines a fixed link connection,
-as specified by "fixed-link.txt", under
-Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/*.
+as specified by Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/fixed-link.txt.
Required:
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/amlogic,meson-pcie.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/amlogic,meson-pcie.txt
index 12b18f82d441..efa2c8b9b85a 100644
--- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/amlogic,meson-pcie.txt
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/amlogic,meson-pcie.txt
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Amlogic Meson AXG DWC PCIE SoC controller
Amlogic Meson PCIe host controller is based on the Synopsys DesignWare PCI core.
It shares common functions with the PCIe DesignWare core driver and
inherits common properties defined in
-Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/designware-pci.txt.
+Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/designware-pcie.txt.
Additional properties are described here:
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/qcom,rpmh-regulator.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/qcom,rpmh-regulator.txt
index 7ef2dbe48e8a..14d2eee96b3d 100644
--- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/qcom,rpmh-regulator.txt
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/qcom,rpmh-regulator.txt
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ Second Level Nodes - Regulators
sent for this regulator including those which are for a
strictly lower power state.
-Other properties defined in Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator.txt
+Other properties defined in Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/regulator.txt
may also be used. regulator-initial-mode and regulator-allowed-modes may be
specified for VRM regulators using mode values from
include/dt-bindings/regulator/qcom,rpmh-regulator.h. regulator-allow-bypass
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/booting-without-of.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/booting-without-of.txt
index e86bd2f64117..60f8640f2b2f 100644
--- a/Documentation/devicetree/booting-without-of.txt
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/booting-without-of.txt
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ it with special cases.
the decompressor (the real mode entry point goes to the same 32bit
entry point once it switched into protected mode). That entry point
supports one calling convention which is documented in
- Documentation/x86/boot.txt
+ Documentation/x86/boot.rst
The physical pointer to the device-tree block (defined in chapter II)
is passed via setup_data which requires at least boot protocol 2.09.
The type filed is defined as
diff --git a/Documentation/driver-api/gpio/board.rst b/Documentation/driver-api/gpio/board.rst
index b37f3f7b8926..ce91518bf9f4 100644
--- a/Documentation/driver-api/gpio/board.rst
+++ b/Documentation/driver-api/gpio/board.rst
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ with the help of _DSD (Device Specific Data), introduced in ACPI 5.1::
}
For more information about the ACPI GPIO bindings see
-Documentation/acpi/gpio-properties.txt.
+Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/gpio-properties.rst.
Platform Data
-------------
diff --git a/Documentation/driver-api/gpio/consumer.rst b/Documentation/driver-api/gpio/consumer.rst
index 5e4d8aa68913..fdecb6d711db 100644
--- a/Documentation/driver-api/gpio/consumer.rst
+++ b/Documentation/driver-api/gpio/consumer.rst
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ case, it will be handled by the GPIO subsystem automatically. However, if the
_DSD is not present, the mappings between GpioIo()/GpioInt() resources and GPIO
connection IDs need to be provided by device drivers.
-For details refer to Documentation/acpi/gpio-properties.txt
+For details refer to Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/gpio-properties.rst
Interacting With the Legacy GPIO Subsystem
diff --git a/Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/enumeration.rst b/Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/enumeration.rst
index 6b32b7be8c85..65f5bb5725ac 100644
--- a/Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/enumeration.rst
+++ b/Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/enumeration.rst
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ a code like this::
There are also devm_* versions of these functions which release the
descriptors once the device is released.
-See Documentation/acpi/gpio-properties.txt for more information about the
+See Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/gpio-properties.rst for more information about the
_DSD binding related to GPIOs.
MFD devices
diff --git a/Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/method-tracing.rst b/Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/method-tracing.rst
index d0b077b73f5f..0aa7e2c5d32a 100644
--- a/Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/method-tracing.rst
+++ b/Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/method-tracing.rst
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ c. Filter out the debug layer/level matched logs when the specified
Where:
0xXXXXXXXX/0xYYYYYYYY
- Refer to Documentation/acpi/debug.txt for possible debug layer/level
+ Refer to Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/debug.rst for possible debug layer/level
masking values.
\PPPP.AAAA.TTTT.HHHH
Full path of a control method that can be found in the ACPI namespace.
diff --git a/Documentation/i2c/instantiating-devices b/Documentation/i2c/instantiating-devices
index 0d85ac1935b7..5a3e2f331e8c 100644
--- a/Documentation/i2c/instantiating-devices
+++ b/Documentation/i2c/instantiating-devices
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Method 1c: Declare the I2C devices via ACPI
-------------------------------------------
ACPI can also describe I2C devices. There is special documentation for this
-which is currently located at Documentation/acpi/enumeration.txt.
+which is currently located at Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/enumeration.rst.
Method 2: Instantiate the devices explicitly
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index f0c86fbb3b48..92f7f34b021a 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ is 0x15 and the full version number is 0x234, this file will contain
the value 340 = 0x154.
See the type_of_loader and ext_loader_type fields in
-Documentation/x86/boot.txt for additional information.
+Documentation/x86/boot.rst for additional information.
==============================================================
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ The complete bootloader version number. In the example above, this
file will contain the value 564 = 0x234.
See the type_of_loader and ext_loader_ver fields in
-Documentation/x86/boot.txt for additional information.
+Documentation/x86/boot.rst for additional information.
==============================================================
diff --git a/Documentation/translations/it_IT/process/4.Coding.rst b/Documentation/translations/it_IT/process/4.Coding.rst
index c05b89e616dd..1d23e951491f 100644
--- a/Documentation/translations/it_IT/process/4.Coding.rst
+++ b/Documentation/translations/it_IT/process/4.Coding.rst
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ con cosa stanno lavorando. Consultate: Documentation/ABI/README per avere una
descrizione di come questi documenti devono essere impostati e quali
informazioni devono essere fornite.
-Il file :ref:`Documentation/translations/it_IT/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst <kernelparameters>`
+Il file :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst <kernelparameters>`
descrive tutti i parametri di avvio del kernel. Ogni patch che aggiunga
nuovi parametri dovrebbe aggiungere nuove voci a questo file.
diff --git a/Documentation/translations/it_IT/process/howto.rst b/Documentation/translations/it_IT/process/howto.rst
index 9903ac7c566b..44e6077730e8 100644
--- a/Documentation/translations/it_IT/process/howto.rst
+++ b/Documentation/translations/it_IT/process/howto.rst
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ Di seguito una lista di file che sono presenti nei sorgente del kernel e che
"Linux kernel patch submission format"
http://linux.yyz.us/patch-format.html
- :ref:`Documentation/process/translations/it_IT/stable-api-nonsense.rst <it_stable_api_nonsense>`
+ :ref:`Documentation/translations/it_IT/process/stable-api-nonsense.rst <it_stable_api_nonsense>`
Questo file descrive la motivazioni sottostanti la conscia decisione di
non avere un API stabile all'interno del kernel, incluso cose come:
diff --git a/Documentation/translations/it_IT/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst b/Documentation/translations/it_IT/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst
index 48e88e5ad2c5..4f206cee31a7 100644
--- a/Documentation/translations/it_IT/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst
+++ b/Documentation/translations/it_IT/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Regole sul tipo di patch che vengono o non vengono accettate nei sorgenti
- Non deve includere alcuna correzione "banale" (correzioni grammaticali,
pulizia dagli spazi bianchi, eccetera).
- Deve rispettare le regole scritte in
- :ref:`Documentation/translation/it_IT/process/submitting-patches.rst <it_submittingpatches>`
+ :ref:`Documentation/translations/it_IT/process/submitting-patches.rst <it_submittingpatches>`
- Questa patch o una equivalente deve esistere già nei sorgenti principali di
Linux
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Procedura per sottomettere patch per i sorgenti -stable
- Se la patch contiene modifiche a dei file nelle cartelle net/ o drivers/net,
allora seguite le linee guida descritte in
- :ref:`Documentation/translation/it_IT/networking/netdev-FAQ.rst <it_netdev-FAQ>`;
+ :ref:`Documentation/translations/it_IT/networking/netdev-FAQ.rst <it_netdev-FAQ>`;
ma solo dopo aver verificato al seguente indirizzo che la patch non sia
già in coda:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/bundle/davem/stable/?series=&submitter=&state=*&q=&archive=
diff --git a/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/process/4.Coding.rst b/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/process/4.Coding.rst
index 5301e9d55255..8bb777941394 100644
--- a/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/process/4.Coding.rst
+++ b/Documentation/translations/zh_CN/process/4.Coding.rst
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ scripts/coccinelle目录下已经打包了相当多的内核“语义补丁”
任何添加新用户空间界面的代码（包括新的sysfs或/proc文件）都应该包含该界面的
文档，该文档使用户空间开发人员能够知道他们在使用什么。请参阅
-Documentation/abi/readme，了解如何格式化此文档以及需要提供哪些信息。
+Documentation/ABI/README，了解如何格式化此文档以及需要提供哪些信息。
文件 :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst <kernelparameters>`
描述了内核的所有引导时间参数。任何添加新参数的补丁都应该向该文件添加适当的
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.rst b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.rst
index ab88a4514163..44856417e6a5 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.rst
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ physical address space. This "ought to be enough for anybody" ©.
QEMU 2.9 and later support 5-level paging.
Virtual memory layout for 5-level paging is described in
-Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
+Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.rst
Enabling 5-level paging
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst
index 2f69836b8445..6a4285a3c7a4 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ only the AMD64 specific ones are listed here.
Machine check
=============
-Please see Documentation/x86/x86_64/machinecheck for sysfs runtime tunables.
+Please see Documentation/x86/x86_64/machinecheck.rst for sysfs runtime tunables.
mce=off
Disable machine check
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ APICs
Don't use the local APIC (alias for i386 compatibility)
pirq=...
- See Documentation/x86/i386/IO-APIC.txt
+ See Documentation/x86/i386/IO-APIC.rst
noapictimer
Don't set up the APIC timer
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/x86_64/fake-numa-for-cpusets.rst b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/fake-numa-for-cpusets.rst
index 74fbb78b3c67..04df57b9aa3f 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/x86_64/fake-numa-for-cpusets.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/fake-numa-for-cpusets.rst
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ For more information on the features of cpusets, see
Documentation/cgroup-v1/cpusets.txt.
There are a number of different configurations you can use for your needs. For
more information on the numa=fake command line option and its various ways of
-configuring fake nodes, see Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.txt.
+configuring fake nodes, see Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst.
For the purposes of this introduction, we'll assume a very primitive NUMA
emulation setup of "numa=fake=4*512,". This will split our system memory into
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 0c84bf76d165..47aa4f6defb9 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -3874,7 +3874,7 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/hwmon/cirrus,lochnagar.txt
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pinctrl/cirrus,lochnagar.txt
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/cirrus,lochnagar.txt
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/cirrus,lochnagar.txt
-F: Documentation/hwmon/lochnagar
+F: Documentation/hwmon/lochnagar.rst
CISCO FCOE HBA DRIVER
M: Satish Kharat <satishkh@cisco.com>
@@ -11272,7 +11272,7 @@ NXP FXAS21002C DRIVER
M: Rui Miguel Silva <rmfrfs@gmail.com>
L: linux-iio@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
-F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/gyroscope/fxas21002c.txt
+F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/gyroscope/nxp,fxas21002c.txt
F: drivers/iio/gyro/fxas21002c_core.c
F: drivers/iio/gyro/fxas21002c.h
F: drivers/iio/gyro/fxas21002c_i2c.c
@@ -13043,7 +13043,7 @@ M: Niklas Cassel <niklas.cassel@linaro.org>
L: netdev@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
F: drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-qcom-ethqos.c
-F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/qcom,dwmac.txt
+F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/qcom,ethqos.txt
QUALCOMM GENERIC INTERFACE I2C DRIVER
M: Alok Chauhan <alokc@codeaurora.org>
diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index 8869742a85df..0f220264cc23 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@ config SMP
uniprocessor machines. On a uniprocessor machine, the kernel
will run faster if you say N here.
- See also <file:Documentation/x86/i386/IO-APIC.txt>,
+ See also <file:Documentation/x86/i386/IO-APIC.rst>,
<file:Documentation/lockup-watchdogs.txt> and the SMP-HOWTO available at
<http://tldp.org/HOWTO/SMP-HOWTO.html>.
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
index 07bf740bea91..31cc2f423aa8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
/*
* We require a kernel with an unambiguous Image header. Per
- * Documentation/booting.txt, this is the case when image_size
+ * Documentation/arm64/booting.txt, this is the case when image_size
* is non-zero (practically speaking, since v3.17).
*/
h = (struct arm64_image_header *)kernel;
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index 8c1c636308c8..e868d2bd48b8 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ config PPC_MEM_KEYS
page-based protections, but without requiring modification of the
page tables when an application changes protection domains.
- For details, see Documentation/vm/protection-keys.rst
+ For details, see Documentation/x86/protection-keys.rst
If unsure, say y.
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 2bbbd4d1ba31..78fdf2dd71d1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ config SMP
Y to "Enhanced Real Time Clock Support", below. The "Advanced Power
Management" code will be disabled if you say Y here.
- See also <file:Documentation/x86/i386/IO-APIC.txt>,
+ See also <file:Documentation/x86/i386/IO-APIC.rst>,
<file:Documentation/lockup-watchdogs.txt> and the SMP-HOWTO available at
<http://www.tldp.org/docs.html#howto>.
@@ -1290,7 +1290,7 @@ config MICROCODE
the Linux kernel.
The preferred method to load microcode from a detached initrd is described
- in Documentation/x86/microcode.txt. For that you need to enable
+ in Documentation/x86/microcode.rst. For that you need to enable
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD in order for the loader to be able to scan the
initrd for microcode blobs.
@@ -1329,7 +1329,7 @@ config MICROCODE_OLD_INTERFACE
It is inadequate because it runs too late to be able to properly
load microcode on a machine and it needs special tools. Instead, you
should've switched to the early loading method with the initrd or
- builtin microcode by now: Documentation/x86/microcode.txt
+ builtin microcode by now: Documentation/x86/microcode.rst
config X86_MSR
tristate "/dev/cpu/*/msr - Model-specific register support"
@@ -1478,7 +1478,7 @@ config X86_5LEVEL
A kernel with the option enabled can be booted on machines that
support 4- or 5-level paging.
- See Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.txt for more
+ See Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.rst for more
information.
Say N if unsure.
@@ -1626,7 +1626,7 @@ config ARCH_MEMORY_PROBE
depends on X86_64 && MEMORY_HOTPLUG
help
This option enables a sysfs memory/probe interface for testing.
- See Documentation/memory-hotplug.txt for more information.
+ See Documentation/admin-guide/mm/memory-hotplug.rst for more information.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config ARCH_PROC_KCORE_TEXT
@@ -1783,7 +1783,7 @@ config MTRR
You can safely say Y even if your machine doesn't have MTRRs, you'll
just add about 9 KB to your kernel.
- See <file:Documentation/x86/mtrr.txt> for more information.
+ See <file:Documentation/x86/mtrr.rst> for more information.
config MTRR_SANITIZER
def_bool y
@@ -1895,7 +1895,7 @@ config X86_INTEL_MPX
process and adds some branches to paths used during
exec() and munmap().
- For details, see Documentation/x86/intel_mpx.txt
+ For details, see Documentation/x86/intel_mpx.rst
If unsure, say N.
@@ -1911,7 +1911,7 @@ config X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
page-based protections, but without requiring modification of the
page tables when an application changes protection domains.
- For details, see Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt
+ For details, see Documentation/x86/protection-keys.rst
If unsure, say y.
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
index f730680dc818..59f598543203 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ config IOMMU_DEBUG
code. When you use it make sure you have a big enough
IOMMU/AGP aperture. Most of the options enabled by this can
be set more finegrained using the iommu= command line
- options. See Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.txt for more
+ options. See Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst for more
details.
config IOMMU_LEAK
--git a/arch/x86/boot/header.S b/arch/x86/boot/header.S
index 850b8762e889..90d791ca1a95 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/header.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/header.S
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ start_sys_seg: .word SYSSEG # obsolete and meaningless, but just
type_of_loader: .byte 0 # 0 means ancient bootloader, newer
# bootloaders know to change this.
- # See Documentation/x86/boot.txt for
+ # See Documentation/x86/boot.rst for
# assigned ids
# flags, unused bits must be zero (RFU) bit within loadflags
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 11aa3b2afa4d..33f9fc38d014 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
*
* entry.S contains the system-call and fault low-level handling routines.
*
- * Some of this is documented in Documentation/x86/entry_64.txt
+ * Some of this is documented in Documentation/x86/entry_64.rst
*
* A note on terminology:
* - iret frame: Architecture defined interrupt frame from SS to RIP
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h
index f6f6ef436599..101eb944f13c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ static void sanitize_boot_params(struct boot_params *boot_params)
* IMPORTANT NOTE TO BOOTLOADER AUTHORS: do not simply clear
* this field. The purpose of this field is to guarantee
* compliance with the x86 boot spec located in
- * Documentation/x86/boot.txt . That spec says that the
+ * Documentation/x86/boot.rst . That spec says that the
* *whole* structure should be cleared, after which only the
* portion defined by struct setup_header (boot_params->hdr)
* should be copied in.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
index 793c14c372cb..288b065955b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
#define __START_KERNEL_map _AC(0xffffffff80000000, UL)
-/* See Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt for a description of the memory map. */
+/* See Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.rst for a description of the memory map. */
#define __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT 52
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
index 88bca456da99..52e5f5f2240d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ extern unsigned int ptrs_per_p4d;
#define PGDIR_MASK (~(PGDIR_SIZE - 1))
/*
- * See Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt for a description of the memory map.
+ * See Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.rst for a description of the memory map.
*
* Be very careful vs. KASLR when changing anything here. The KASLR address
* range must not overlap with anything except the KASAN shadow area, which
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c
index e1f3ba19ba54..06d4e67f31ab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static u8 amd_ucode_patch[PATCH_MAX_SIZE];
/*
* Microcode patch container file is prepended to the initrd in cpio
- * format. See Documentation/x86/microcode.txt
+ * format. See Documentation/x86/microcode.rst
*/
static const char
ucode_path[] __maybe_unused = "kernel/x86/microcode/AuthenticAMD.bin";
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index 22f60dd26460..b07e7069b09e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel,
efi_map_offset = params_cmdline_sz;
efi_setup_data_offset = efi_map_offset + ALIGN(efi_map_sz, 16);
- /* Copy setup header onto bootparams. Documentation/x86/boot.txt */
+ /* Copy setup header onto bootparams. Documentation/x86/boot.rst */
setup_header_size = 0x0202 + kernel[0x0201] - setup_hdr_offset;
/* Is there a limit on setup header size? */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
index dcd272dbd0a9..f62b498b18fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ void __init pci_iommu_alloc(void)
}
/*
- * See <Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.txt> for the iommu kernel
+ * See <Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.rst> for the iommu kernel
* parameter documentation.
*/
static __init int iommu_setup(char *p)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index 7f61431c75fb..400c1ba033aa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ void native_flush_tlb_others(const struct cpumask *cpumask,
}
/*
- * See Documentation/x86/tlb.txt for details. We choose 33
+ * See Documentation/x86/tlb.rst for details. We choose 33
* because it is large enough to cover the vast majority (at
* least 95%) of allocations, and is small enough that we are
* confident it will not cause too much overhead. Each single
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/pvh/enlighten.c b/arch/x86/platform/pvh/enlighten.c
index 1861a2ba0f2b..c0a502f7e3a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/pvh/enlighten.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/pvh/enlighten.c
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static void __init init_pvh_bootparams(bool xen_guest)
}
/*
- * See Documentation/x86/boot.txt.
+ * See Documentation/x86/boot.rst.
*
* Version 2.12 supports Xen entry point but we will use default x86/PC
* environment (i.e. hardware_subarch 0).
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/Kconfig b/drivers/acpi/Kconfig
index 283ee94224c6..2438f37f2ca1 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/acpi/Kconfig
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ config ACPI_CUSTOM_DSDT_FILE
depends on !STANDALONE
help
This option supports a custom DSDT by linking it into the kernel.
- See Documentation/acpi/dsdt-override.txt
+ See Documentation/admin-guide/acpi/dsdt-override.rst
Enter the full path name to the file which includes the AmlCode
or dsdt_aml_code declaration.
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ config ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE
This option provides functionality to upgrade arbitrary ACPI tables
via initrd. No functional change if no ACPI tables are passed via
initrd, therefore it's safe to say Y.
- See Documentation/acpi/initrd_table_override.txt for details
+ See Documentation/admin-guide/acpi/initrd_table_override.rst for details
config ACPI_TABLE_OVERRIDE_VIA_BUILTIN_INITRD
bool "Override ACPI tables from built-in initrd"
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ config ACPI_TABLE_OVERRIDE_VIA_BUILTIN_INITRD
This option provides functionality to override arbitrary ACPI tables
from built-in uncompressed initrd.
- See Documentation/acpi/initrd_table_override.txt for details
+ See Documentation/admin-guide/acpi/initrd_table_override.rst for details
config ACPI_DEBUG
bool "Debug Statements"
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ config ACPI_DEBUG
output and increases the kernel size by around 50K.
Use the acpi.debug_layer and acpi.debug_level kernel command-line
- parameters documented in Documentation/acpi/debug.txt and
+ parameters documented in Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/debug.rst and
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst to control the type and
amount of debug output.
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ config ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD
help
This debug facility allows ACPI AML methods to be inserted and/or
replaced without rebooting the system. For details refer to:
- Documentation/acpi/method-customizing.txt.
+ Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/method-customizing.rst.
NOTE: This option is security sensitive, because it allows arbitrary
kernel memory to be written to by root (uid=0) users, allowing them
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c
index b17b79e612a3..ac6280ad43a1 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c
@@ -1075,7 +1075,7 @@ static int ftgmac100_mii_probe(struct ftgmac100 *priv, phy_interface_t intf)
}
/* Indicate that we support PAUSE frames (see comment in
- * Documentation/networking/phy.txt)
+ * Documentation/networking/phy.rst)
*/
phy_support_asym_pause(phydev);
diff --git a/drivers/staging/fieldbus/Documentation/fieldbus_dev.txt b/drivers/staging/fieldbus/Documentation/fieldbus_dev.txt
index 56af3f650fa3..89fb8e14676f 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/fieldbus/Documentation/fieldbus_dev.txt
+++ b/drivers/staging/fieldbus/Documentation/fieldbus_dev.txt
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ a limited few common behaviours and properties. This allows us to define
a simple interface consisting of a character device and a set of sysfs files:
See:
-Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-fieldbus-dev
-Documentation/ABI/testing/fieldbus-dev-cdev
+drivers/staging/fieldbus/Documentation/ABI/sysfs-class-fieldbus-dev
+drivers/staging/fieldbus/Documentation/ABI/fieldbus-dev-cdev
Note that this simple interface does not provide a way to modify adapter
configuration settings. It is therefore useful only for adapters that get their
diff --git a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
index 1e3ed41ae1f3..69938dbae2d0 100644
--- a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
@@ -1694,7 +1694,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vhost_dev_ioctl);
/* TODO: This is really inefficient. We need something like get_user()
* (instruction directly accesses the data, with an exception table entry
- * returning -EFAULT). See Documentation/x86/exception-tables.txt.
+ * returning -EFAULT). See Documentation/x86/exception-tables.rst.
*/
static int set_bit_to_user(int nr, void __user *addr)
{
diff --git a/include/acpi/acpi_drivers.h b/include/acpi/acpi_drivers.h
index de1804aeaf69..98e3db7a89cd 100644
--- a/include/acpi/acpi_drivers.h
+++ b/include/acpi/acpi_drivers.h
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
#define ACPI_MAX_STRING 80
/*
- * Please update drivers/acpi/debug.c and Documentation/acpi/debug.txt
+ * Please update drivers/acpi/debug.c and Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/debug.rst
* if you add to this list.
*/
#define ACPI_BUS_COMPONENT 0x00010000
diff --git a/include/linux/fs_context.h b/include/linux/fs_context.h
index 1f966670c8dc..623eb58560b9 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs_context.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs_context.h
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ struct fs_parameter {
* Superblock creation fills in ->root whereas reconfiguration begins with this
* already set.
*
- * See Documentation/filesystems/mounting.txt
+ * See Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt
*/
struct fs_context {
const struct fs_context_operations *ops;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 47f58cfb6a19..df1318d85f7d 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@
* state. This is called immediately after commit_creds().
*
* Security hooks for mount using fs_context.
- * [See also Documentation/filesystems/mounting.txt]
+ * [See also Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt]
*
* @fs_context_dup:
* Allocate and attach a security structure to sc->security. This pointer
diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
index ee8d1f311858..6e5fb81bde4b 100644
--- a/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/mm/Kconfig
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ config MEMORY_HOTPLUG_DEFAULT_ONLINE
onlining policy (/sys/devices/system/memory/auto_online_blocks) which
determines what happens to newly added memory regions. Policy setting
can always be changed at runtime.
- See Documentation/memory-hotplug.txt for more information.
+ See Documentation/admin-guide/mm/memory-hotplug.rst for more information.
Say Y here if you want all hot-plugged memory blocks to appear in
'online' state by default.
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index aeac3676dd4d..6d75ed71970c 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
into userspace.
- See Documentation/x86/pti.txt for more details.
+ See Documentation/x86/pti.rst for more details.
config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
diff --git a/tools/include/linux/err.h b/tools/include/linux/err.h
index 2f5a12b88a86..25f2bb3a991d 100644
--- a/tools/include/linux/err.h
+++ b/tools/include/linux/err.h
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
* Userspace note:
* The same principle works for userspace, because 'error' pointers
* fall down to the unused hole far from user space, as described
- * in Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt for x86_64 arch:
+ * in Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.rst for x86_64 arch:
*
* 0000000000000000 - 00007fffffffffff (=47 bits) user space, different per mm hole caused by [48:63] sign extension
* ffffffffffe00000 - ffffffffffffffff (=2 MB) unused hole
diff --git a/tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt b/tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt
index 4dd11a554b9b..de094670050b 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt
+++ b/tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements, for
which gcc sometimes uses jump tables.
(Objtool also has an 'orc generate' subcommand which generates debuginfo
-for the ORC unwinder. See Documentation/x86/orc-unwinder.txt in the
+for the ORC unwinder. See Documentation/x86/orc-unwinder.rst in the
kernel tree for more details.)
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ b) ORC (Oops Rewind Capability) unwind table generation
band. So it doesn't affect runtime performance and it can be
reliable even when interrupts or exceptions are involved.
- For more details, see Documentation/x86/orc-unwinder.txt.
+ For more details, see Documentation/x86/orc-unwinder.rst.
c) Higher live patching compatibility rate
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
index 5d546dcdbc80..798a5ddeee55 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
- * Tests x86 Memory Protection Keys (see Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt)
+ * Tests x86 Memory Protection Keys (see Documentation/x86/protection-keys.rst)
*
* There are examples in here of:
* * how to set protection keys on memory
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH 10/10] docs: fix broken documentation links
From: Wolfram Sang @ 2019-05-20 15:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mauro Carvalho Chehab
Cc: Linux Doc Mailing List, Mauro Carvalho Chehab, linux-kernel,
Jonathan Corbet, x86, linux-acpi, linux-edac, netdev, devicetree,
linux-pci, linux-arm-kernel, linux-amlogic, linux-arm-msm,
linux-gpio, linux-i2c, linuxppc-dev, xen-devel,
platform-driver-x86, devel, kvm, virtualization, devel, linux-mm,
linux-security-module, linux-kselftest
In-Reply-To: <4fd1182b4a41feb2447c7ccde4d7f0a6b3c92686.1558362030.git.mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1091 bytes --]
On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 11:47:39AM -0300, Mauro Carvalho Chehab wrote:
> Mostly due to x86 and acpi conversion, several documentation
> links are still pointing to the old file. Fix them.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Thanks, didn't notice that.
> Documentation/i2c/instantiating-devices | 2 +-
...
> diff --git a/Documentation/i2c/instantiating-devices b/Documentation/i2c/instantiating-devices
> index 0d85ac1935b7..5a3e2f331e8c 100644
> --- a/Documentation/i2c/instantiating-devices
> +++ b/Documentation/i2c/instantiating-devices
> @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Method 1c: Declare the I2C devices via ACPI
> -------------------------------------------
>
> ACPI can also describe I2C devices. There is special documentation for this
> -which is currently located at Documentation/acpi/enumeration.txt.
> +which is currently located at Documentation/firmware-guide/acpi/enumeration.rst.
>
>
> Method 2: Instantiate the devices explicitly
For this I2C part:
Reviewed-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
[-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 833 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 5/4] mm: Introduce SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT and mark excluded caches
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-05-20 16:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mathias Krause
Cc: Alexander Potapenko, Andrew Morton, Christoph Lameter,
kernel-hardening, Masahiro Yamada, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
Nick Desaulniers, Kostya Serebryany, Dmitry Vyukov, Sandeep Patil,
Laura Abbott, Randy Dunlap, Jann Horn, Mark Rutland, linux-mm,
linux-security-module
In-Reply-To: <CA+rthh9bLiohU78PBMonji_LPjj756rhTy22v9nL8LpL0cTb5g@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 08:10:19AM +0200, Mathias Krause wrote:
> Hi Kees,
>
> On Fri, 17 May 2019 at 02:50, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > In order to improve the init_on_free performance, some frequently
> > freed caches with less sensitive contents can be excluded from the
> > init_on_free behavior.
> >
> > This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the
> > last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the
> > code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't
> > reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
>
> you might want to give secunet credit for this one, as can be seen here:
>
> https://github.com/minipli/linux-grsec/commit/309d494e7a3f6533ca68fc8b3bd89fa76fd2c2df
>
> However, please keep the "Changes or omissions from the original
> code..." part as your version slightly differs.
Ah-ha! Thanks for finding the specific commit; I'll adjust
attribution. Are you able to describe how you chose the various excluded
kmem caches? (I assume it wasn't just "highest numbers in the stats
reporting".) And why run the ctor after wipe? Doesn't that means you're
just running the ctor again at the next allocation time?
Thanks!
-Kees
>
> Thanks,
> Mathias
>
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > ---
> > fs/buffer.c | 2 +-
> > fs/dcache.c | 3 ++-
> > include/linux/slab.h | 3 +++
> > kernel/fork.c | 6 ++++--
> > mm/rmap.c | 5 +++--
> > mm/slab.h | 5 +++--
> > net/core/skbuff.c | 6 ++++--
> > 7 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/buffer.c b/fs/buffer.c
> > index 0faa41fb4c88..04a85bd4cf2e 100644
> > --- a/fs/buffer.c
> > +++ b/fs/buffer.c
> > @@ -3457,7 +3457,7 @@ void __init buffer_init(void)
> > bh_cachep = kmem_cache_create("buffer_head",
> > sizeof(struct buffer_head), 0,
> > (SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|SLAB_PANIC|
> > - SLAB_MEM_SPREAD),
> > + SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT),
> > NULL);
> >
> > /*
> > diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c
> > index 8136bda27a1f..323b039accba 100644
> > --- a/fs/dcache.c
> > +++ b/fs/dcache.c
> > @@ -3139,7 +3139,8 @@ void __init vfs_caches_init_early(void)
> > void __init vfs_caches_init(void)
> > {
> > names_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("names_cache", PATH_MAX, 0,
> > - SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, 0, PATH_MAX, NULL);
> > + SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT, 0,
> > + PATH_MAX, NULL);
> >
> > dcache_init();
> > inode_init();
> > diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
> > index 9449b19c5f10..7eba9ad8830d 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/slab.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/slab.h
> > @@ -92,6 +92,9 @@
> > /* Avoid kmemleak tracing */
> > #define SLAB_NOLEAKTRACE ((slab_flags_t __force)0x00800000U)
> >
> > +/* Exclude slab from zero-on-free when init_on_free is enabled */
> > +#define SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT ((slab_flags_t __force)0x01000000U)
> > +
> > /* Fault injection mark */
> > #ifdef CONFIG_FAILSLAB
> > # define SLAB_FAILSLAB ((slab_flags_t __force)0x02000000U)
> > diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> > index b4cba953040a..9868585f5520 100644
> > --- a/kernel/fork.c
> > +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> > @@ -2550,11 +2550,13 @@ void __init proc_caches_init(void)
> >
> > mm_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("mm_struct",
> > mm_size, ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN,
> > - SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT,
> > + SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT|
> > + SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT,
> > offsetof(struct mm_struct, saved_auxv),
> > sizeof_field(struct mm_struct, saved_auxv),
> > NULL);
> > - vm_area_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(vm_area_struct, SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT);
> > + vm_area_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(vm_area_struct, SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT|
> > + SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT);
> > mmap_init();
> > nsproxy_cache_init();
> > }
> > diff --git a/mm/rmap.c b/mm/rmap.c
> > index e5dfe2ae6b0d..b7b8013eeb0a 100644
> > --- a/mm/rmap.c
> > +++ b/mm/rmap.c
> > @@ -432,10 +432,11 @@ static void anon_vma_ctor(void *data)
> > void __init anon_vma_init(void)
> > {
> > anon_vma_cachep = kmem_cache_create("anon_vma", sizeof(struct anon_vma),
> > - 0, SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT,
> > + 0, SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT|
> > + SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT,
> > anon_vma_ctor);
> > anon_vma_chain_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(anon_vma_chain,
> > - SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT);
> > + SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT|SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT);
> > }
> >
> > /*
> > diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
> > index 24ae887359b8..f95b4f03c57b 100644
> > --- a/mm/slab.h
> > +++ b/mm/slab.h
> > @@ -129,7 +129,8 @@ static inline slab_flags_t kmem_cache_flags(unsigned int object_size,
> > /* Legal flag mask for kmem_cache_create(), for various configurations */
> > #define SLAB_CORE_FLAGS (SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_CACHE_DMA | \
> > SLAB_CACHE_DMA32 | SLAB_PANIC | \
> > - SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS )
> > + SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS | \
> > + SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT)
> >
> > #if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB)
> > #define SLAB_DEBUG_FLAGS (SLAB_RED_ZONE | SLAB_POISON | SLAB_STORE_USER)
> > @@ -535,7 +536,7 @@ static inline bool slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfp_t flags, struct kmem_cache *c)
> > static inline bool slab_want_init_on_free(struct kmem_cache *c)
> > {
> > if (static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_free))
> > - return !(c->ctor);
> > + return !(c->ctor) && ((c->flags & SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT) == 0);
> > else
> > return false;
> > }
> > diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
> > index e89be6282693..b65902d2c042 100644
> > --- a/net/core/skbuff.c
> > +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
> > @@ -3981,14 +3981,16 @@ void __init skb_init(void)
> > skbuff_head_cache = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("skbuff_head_cache",
> > sizeof(struct sk_buff),
> > 0,
> > - SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC,
> > + SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|
> > + SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT,
> > offsetof(struct sk_buff, cb),
> > sizeof_field(struct sk_buff, cb),
> > NULL);
> > skbuff_fclone_cache = kmem_cache_create("skbuff_fclone_cache",
> > sizeof(struct sk_buff_fclones),
> > 0,
> > - SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC,
> > + SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|
> > + SLAB_NO_FREE_INIT,
> > NULL);
> > skb_extensions_init();
> > }
> > --
> > 2.17.1
> >
> >
> > --
> > Kees Cook
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH V6 0/4] Add support for crypto agile TPM event logs
From: Bartosz Szczepanek @ 2019-05-20 17:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Matthew Garrett
Cc: linux-integrity, Peter Huewe, Jarkko Sakkinen, Jason Gunthorpe,
Roberto Sassu, linux-efi, LSM List, Linux Kernel Mailing List,
Thiébaud Weksteen
In-Reply-To: <20190517213918.26045-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>
Hi Matthew,
On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 11:39 PM Matthew Garrett
<matthewgarrett@google.com> wrote:
>
> Updated with the fixes from Bartosz and the header fixes folded in.
> Bartosz, my machine still doesn't generate any final event log entries -
> are you able to give this a test and make sure it's good?
Yes, I'll check that and let you know. May be later this week.
Best regards,
Bartosz
^ permalink raw reply
* Printing for your logo
From: Heather @ 2019-05-20 12:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Hi,
I didn’t know if you had received my email from last week?
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Custom USB Account Manager
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH V7 2/4] tpm: Reserve the TPM final events table
From: Matthew Garrett @ 2019-05-20 20:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: peterhuewe, jarkko.sakkinen, jgg, roberto.sassu, linux-efi,
linux-security-module, linux-kernel, tweek, bsz, Matthew Garrett
In-Reply-To: <20190520205501.177637-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
UEFI systems provide a boot services protocol for obtaining the TPM
event log, but this is unusable after ExitBootServices() is called.
Unfortunately ExitBootServices() itself triggers additional TPM events
that then can't be obtained using this protocol. The platform provides a
mechanism for the OS to obtain these events by recording them to a
separate UEFI configuration table which the OS can then map.
Unfortunately this table isn't self describing in terms of providing its
length, so we need to parse the events inside it to figure out how long
it is. Since the table isn't mapped at this point, we need to extend the
length calculation function to be able to map the event as it goes
along.
(Fixes by Bartosz Szczepanek <bsz@semihalf.com>)
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
---
drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/tpm2.c | 2 +-
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 2 +
drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++-
include/linux/efi.h | 9 +++
include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
5 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/tpm2.c b/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/tpm2.c
index 1a977bdd3bd2..de1d9f7e5a92 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/tpm2.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/tpm2.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
static size_t calc_tpm2_event_size(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *event,
struct tcg_pcr_event *event_header)
{
- return __calc_tpm2_event_size(event, event_header);
+ return __calc_tpm2_event_size(event, event_header, false);
}
static void *tpm2_bios_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
index 55b77c576c42..6b11c41e0575 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct efi __read_mostly efi = {
.mem_attr_table = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
.rng_seed = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
.tpm_log = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
+ .tpm_final_log = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
.mem_reserve = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi);
@@ -485,6 +486,7 @@ static __initdata efi_config_table_type_t common_tables[] = {
{EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE_GUID, "MEMATTR", &efi.mem_attr_table},
{LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID, "RNG", &efi.rng_seed},
{LINUX_EFI_TPM_EVENT_LOG_GUID, "TPMEventLog", &efi.tpm_log},
+ {LINUX_EFI_TPM_FINAL_LOG_GUID, "TPMFinalLog", &efi.tpm_final_log},
{LINUX_EFI_MEMRESERVE_TABLE_GUID, "MEMRESERVE", &efi.mem_reserve},
{NULL_GUID, NULL, NULL},
};
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c
index 3a689b40ccc0..2c912ea08166 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c
@@ -4,34 +4,90 @@
* Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
*/
+#define TPM_MEMREMAP(start, size) early_memremap(start, size)
+#define TPM_MEMUNMAP(start, size) early_memunmap(start, size)
+
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/tpm_eventlog.h>
#include <asm/early_ioremap.h>
+int efi_tpm_final_log_size;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi_tpm_final_log_size);
+
+static int tpm2_calc_event_log_size(void *data, int count, void *size_info)
+{
+ struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *header;
+ int event_size, size = 0;
+
+ while (count > 0) {
+ header = data + size;
+ event_size = __calc_tpm2_event_size(header, size_info, true);
+ if (event_size == 0)
+ return -1;
+ size += event_size;
+ count--;
+ }
+
+ return size;
+}
+
/*
* Reserve the memory associated with the TPM Event Log configuration table.
*/
int __init efi_tpm_eventlog_init(void)
{
struct linux_efi_tpm_eventlog *log_tbl;
+ struct efi_tcg2_final_events_table *final_tbl;
unsigned int tbl_size;
+ int ret = 0;
- if (efi.tpm_log == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
+ if (efi.tpm_log == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {
+ /*
+ * We can't calculate the size of the final events without the
+ * first entry in the TPM log, so bail here.
+ */
return 0;
+ }
log_tbl = early_memremap(efi.tpm_log, sizeof(*log_tbl));
if (!log_tbl) {
pr_err("Failed to map TPM Event Log table @ 0x%lx\n",
- efi.tpm_log);
+ efi.tpm_log);
efi.tpm_log = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR;
return -ENOMEM;
}
tbl_size = sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_tbl->size;
memblock_reserve(efi.tpm_log, tbl_size);
+
+ if (efi.tpm_final_log == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
+ goto out;
+
+ final_tbl = early_memremap(efi.tpm_final_log, sizeof(*final_tbl));
+
+ if (!final_tbl) {
+ pr_err("Failed to map TPM Final Event Log table @ 0x%lx\n",
+ efi.tpm_final_log);
+ efi.tpm_final_log = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR;
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tbl_size = tpm2_calc_event_log_size(efi.tpm_final_log
+ + sizeof(final_tbl->version)
+ + sizeof(final_tbl->nr_events),
+ final_tbl->nr_events,
+ log_tbl->log);
+ memblock_reserve((unsigned long)final_tbl,
+ tbl_size + sizeof(*final_tbl));
+ early_memunmap(final_tbl, sizeof(*final_tbl));
+ efi_tpm_final_log_size = tbl_size;
+
+out:
early_memunmap(log_tbl, sizeof(*log_tbl));
- return 0;
+ return ret;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 54357a258b35..e33c70a52a9d 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -689,6 +689,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);
#define LINUX_EFI_LOADER_ENTRY_GUID EFI_GUID(0x4a67b082, 0x0a4c, 0x41cf, 0xb6, 0xc7, 0x44, 0x0b, 0x29, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x4f)
#define LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x1ce1e5bc, 0x7ceb, 0x42f2, 0x81, 0xe5, 0x8a, 0xad, 0xf1, 0x80, 0xf5, 0x7b)
#define LINUX_EFI_TPM_EVENT_LOG_GUID EFI_GUID(0xb7799cb0, 0xeca2, 0x4943, 0x96, 0x67, 0x1f, 0xae, 0x07, 0xb7, 0x47, 0xfa)
+#define LINUX_EFI_TPM_FINAL_LOG_GUID EFI_GUID(0x1e2ed096, 0x30e2, 0x4254, 0xbd, 0x89, 0x86, 0x3b, 0xbe, 0xf8, 0x23, 0x25)
#define LINUX_EFI_MEMRESERVE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x888eb0c6, 0x8ede, 0x4ff5, 0xa8, 0xf0, 0x9a, 0xee, 0x5c, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xc2)
typedef struct {
@@ -996,6 +997,7 @@ extern struct efi {
unsigned long mem_attr_table; /* memory attributes table */
unsigned long rng_seed; /* UEFI firmware random seed */
unsigned long tpm_log; /* TPM2 Event Log table */
+ unsigned long tpm_final_log; /* TPM2 Final Events Log table */
unsigned long mem_reserve; /* Linux EFI memreserve table */
efi_get_time_t *get_time;
efi_set_time_t *set_time;
@@ -1707,6 +1709,13 @@ struct linux_efi_tpm_eventlog {
extern int efi_tpm_eventlog_init(void);
+struct efi_tcg2_final_events_table {
+ u64 version;
+ u64 nr_events;
+ u8 events[];
+};
+extern int efi_tpm_final_log_size;
+
/*
* efi_runtime_service() function identifiers.
* "NONE" is used by efi_recover_from_page_fault() to check if the page
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h b/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h
index 6a86144e13f1..63238c84dc0b 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h
@@ -112,10 +112,35 @@ struct tcg_pcr_event2_head {
struct tpm_digest digests[];
} __packed;
+struct tcg_algorithm_size {
+ u16 algorithm_id;
+ u16 algorithm_size;
+};
+
+struct tcg_algorithm_info {
+ u8 signature[16];
+ u32 platform_class;
+ u8 spec_version_minor;
+ u8 spec_version_major;
+ u8 spec_errata;
+ u8 uintn_size;
+ u32 number_of_algorithms;
+ struct tcg_algorithm_size digest_sizes[];
+};
+
+#ifndef TPM_MEMREMAP
+#define TPM_MEMREMAP(start, size) NULL
+#endif
+
+#ifndef TPM_MEMUNMAP
+#define TPM_MEMUNMAP(start, size) do{} while(0)
+#endif
+
/**
* __calc_tpm2_event_size - calculate the size of a TPM2 event log entry
* @event: Pointer to the event whose size should be calculated
* @event_header: Pointer to the initial event containing the digest lengths
+ * @do_mapping: Whether or not the event needs to be mapped
*
* The TPM2 event log format can contain multiple digests corresponding to
* separate PCR banks, and also contains a variable length of the data that
@@ -131,10 +156,13 @@ struct tcg_pcr_event2_head {
*/
static inline int __calc_tpm2_event_size(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *event,
- struct tcg_pcr_event *event_header)
+ struct tcg_pcr_event *event_header,
+ bool do_mapping)
{
struct tcg_efi_specid_event_head *efispecid;
struct tcg_event_field *event_field;
+ void *mapping = NULL;
+ int mapping_size;
void *marker;
void *marker_start;
u32 halg_size;
@@ -148,16 +176,49 @@ static inline int __calc_tpm2_event_size(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *event,
marker = marker + sizeof(event->pcr_idx) + sizeof(event->event_type)
+ sizeof(event->count);
+ /* Map the event header */
+ if (do_mapping) {
+ mapping_size = marker - marker_start;
+ mapping = TPM_MEMREMAP((unsigned long)marker_start,
+ mapping_size);
+ if (!mapping) {
+ size = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ mapping = marker_start;
+ }
+
+ event = (struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *)mapping;
+
efispecid = (struct tcg_efi_specid_event_head *)event_header->event;
/* Check if event is malformed. */
- if (event->count > efispecid->num_algs)
- return 0;
+ if (event->count > efispecid->num_algs) {
+ size = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < event->count; i++) {
halg_size = sizeof(event->digests[i].alg_id);
- memcpy(&halg, marker, halg_size);
+
+ /* Map the digest's algorithm identifier */
+ if (do_mapping) {
+ TPM_MEMUNMAP(mapping, mapping_size);
+ mapping_size = halg_size;
+ mapping = TPM_MEMREMAP((unsigned long)marker,
+ mapping_size);
+ if (!mapping) {
+ size = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ mapping = marker;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&halg, mapping, halg_size);
marker = marker + halg_size;
+
for (j = 0; j < efispecid->num_algs; j++) {
if (halg == efispecid->digest_sizes[j].alg_id) {
marker +=
@@ -166,18 +227,41 @@ static inline int __calc_tpm2_event_size(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *event,
}
}
/* Algorithm without known length. Such event is unparseable. */
- if (j == efispecid->num_algs)
- return 0;
+ if (j == efispecid->num_algs) {
+ size = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Map the event size - we don't read from the event itself, so
+ * we don't need to map it
+ */
+ if (do_mapping) {
+ TPM_MEMUNMAP(mapping, mapping_size);
+ mapping_size += sizeof(event_field->event_size);
+ mapping = TPM_MEMREMAP((unsigned long)marker,
+ mapping_size);
+ if (!mapping) {
+ size = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ mapping = marker;
}
- event_field = (struct tcg_event_field *)marker;
+ event_field = (struct tcg_event_field *)mapping;
+
marker = marker + sizeof(event_field->event_size)
+ event_field->event_size;
size = marker - marker_start;
if ((event->event_type == 0) && (event_field->event_size == 0))
- return 0;
-
+ size = 0;
+out:
+ if (do_mapping)
+ TPM_MEMUNMAP(mapping, mapping_size);
return size;
}
+
#endif
--
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
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