* Re: [PATCH] efi: Only print errors about failing to get certs if EFI vars are found
From: Hans de Goede @ 2019-11-19 10:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Javier Martinez Canillas, linux-kernel
Cc: Peter Jones, David Howells, James Morris, Josh Boyer, Mimi Zohar,
Nayna Jain, Serge E. Hallyn, linux-security-module
In-Reply-To: <20191119091822.276265-1-javierm@redhat.com>
Hi,
On 19-11-2019 10:18, Javier Martinez Canillas wrote:
> If CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS is enabled, the kernel attempts to load the certs
> from the db, dbx and MokListRT EFI variables into the appropriate keyrings.
>
> But it just assumes that the variables will be present and prints an error
> if the certs can't be loaded, even when is possible that the variables may
> not exist. For example the MokListRT variable will only be present if shim
> is used.
>
> So only print an error message about failing to get the certs list from an
> EFI variable if this is found. Otherwise these printed errors just pollute
> the kernel ring buffer with confusing messages like the following:
>
> [ 5.427251] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
> [ 5.427261] MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
> [ 5.428012] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
> [ 5.428023] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT
>
> Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Thanks for this, I just noticed a potential issue which I missed
when you send this to me for testing:
>
> ---
>
> security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 31 ++++++++++---------
> 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
> index 81b19c52832..336fa528359 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
> @@ -39,16 +39,18 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void)
> * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable.
> */
> static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
> - unsigned long *size)
> + unsigned long *size, efi_status_t *status)
> {
> - efi_status_t status;
> unsigned long lsize = 4;
> unsigned long tmpdb[4];
> void *db;
>
> - status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
> - if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
> - pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", status);
> + *status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
> + if (*status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + if (*status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
> + pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", *status);
> return NULL;
> }
>
> @@ -56,10 +58,10 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
> if (!db)
> return NULL;
>
> - status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
> - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> + *status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
> + if (*status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> kfree(db);
> - pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", status);
> + pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", *status);
> return NULL;
> }
>
> @@ -144,6 +146,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
> efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
> void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL;
> unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0;
> + efi_status_t status;
> int rc = 0;
>
> if (!efi.get_variable)
> @@ -153,8 +156,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
> * an error if we can't get them.
> */
> if (!uefi_check_ignore_db()) {
> - db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize);
> - if (!db) {
> + db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize, &status);
> + if (!db && status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
> pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
> } else {
> rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db",
> @@ -166,8 +169,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
> }
> }
>
> - mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize);
> - if (!mok) {
> + mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status);
> + if (!mok && status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
> pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
> } else {
> rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
This means that if status == EFI_NOT_FOUND we end up still
trying to parse the signature list, I guess that moksize == 0
or some such is saving us here, but I believe that
this should really be:
if (!mok) {
if (status != EFI_NOT_FOUND)
pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
} else {
rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
> @@ -177,8 +180,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
> kfree(mok);
> }
>
> - dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize);
> - if (!dbx) {
> + dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize, &status);
> + if (!dbx && status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
> pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n");
> } else {
> rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:dbx",
Idem.
Regards,
Hans
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] efi: Only print errors about failing to get certs if EFI vars are found
From: Javier Martinez Canillas @ 2019-11-19 11:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Hans de Goede, linux-kernel
Cc: Peter Jones, David Howells, James Morris, Josh Boyer, Mimi Zohar,
Nayna Jain, Serge E. Hallyn, linux-security-module
In-Reply-To: <71e319d0-5fa9-f464-8546-b51629ae4ab3@redhat.com>
Hello Hans,
Thanks a lot for your feedback.
On 11/19/19 11:59 AM, Hans de Goede wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 19-11-2019 10:18, Javier Martinez Canillas wrote:
>> If CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS is enabled, the kernel attempts to load the certs
>> from the db, dbx and MokListRT EFI variables into the appropriate keyrings.
>>
>> But it just assumes that the variables will be present and prints an error
>> if the certs can't be loaded, even when is possible that the variables may
>> not exist. For example the MokListRT variable will only be present if shim
>> is used.
>>
>> So only print an error message about failing to get the certs list from an
>> EFI variable if this is found. Otherwise these printed errors just pollute
>> the kernel ring buffer with confusing messages like the following:
>>
>> [ 5.427251] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
>> [ 5.427261] MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
>> [ 5.428012] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
>> [ 5.428023] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT
>>
>> Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
>
> Thanks for this, I just noticed a potential issue which I missed
> when you send this to me for testing:
>
[snip]
>>
>> if (!efi.get_variable)
>> @@ -153,8 +156,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
>> * an error if we can't get them.
>> */
>> if (!uefi_check_ignore_db()) {
>> - db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize);
>> - if (!db) {
>> + db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize, &status);
>> + if (!db && status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
>> pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
>> } else {
>> rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db",
You are correct, this is another instance of the same issue that you mentioned.
>> @@ -166,8 +169,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
>> }
>> }
>>
>> - mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize);
>> - if (!mok) {
>> + mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status);
>> + if (!mok && status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
>> pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
>> } else {
>> rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
>
> This means that if status == EFI_NOT_FOUND we end up still
> trying to parse the signature list, I guess that moksize == 0
> or some such is saving us here, but I believe that
> this should really be:
>
> if (!mok) {
> if (status != EFI_NOT_FOUND)
> pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
> } else {
> rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
>
Agreed. I'll fix the issues and post a v2. Since we are adding these statements,
I could also print debug messages for the case that status == EFI_NOT_FOUND.
Best regards,
--
Javier Martinez Canillas
Software Engineer - Desktop Hardware Enablement
Red Hat
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v2] efi: Only print errors about failing to get certs if EFI vars are found
From: Javier Martinez Canillas @ 2019-11-19 11:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Peter Jones, Hans de Goede, Javier Martinez Canillas,
David Howells, James Morris, Josh Boyer, Mimi Zohar, Nayna Jain,
Serge E. Hallyn, linux-security-module
If CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS is enabled, the kernel attempts to load the certs
from the db, dbx and MokListRT EFI variables into the appropriate keyrings.
But it just assumes that the variables will be present and prints an error
if the certs can't be loaded, even when is possible that the variables may
not exist. For example the MokListRT variable will only be present if shim
is used.
So only print an error message about failing to get the certs list from an
EFI variable if this is found. Otherwise these printed errors just pollute
the kernel ring buffer with confusing messages like the following:
[ 5.427251] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
[ 5.427261] MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
[ 5.428012] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
[ 5.428023] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT
Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
---
Hans,
I'll really appreciate if you can test this patch. I just built tested it
because I don't have access to a machine to reproduce the issue right now.
Best regards,
Javier
Changes in v2:
- Fix flaws in the logic, that caused the signature list was parsed if
the return code was EFI_NOT_FOUND that pointed out Hans de Goede.
- Print debug messages if the variables are not found.
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 40 ++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
index 81b19c52832..020fc7a11ef 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
@@ -39,16 +39,18 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void)
* Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable.
*/
static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
- unsigned long *size)
+ unsigned long *size, efi_status_t *status)
{
- efi_status_t status;
unsigned long lsize = 4;
unsigned long tmpdb[4];
void *db;
- status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
- if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", status);
+ *status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
+ if (*status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (*status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", *status);
return NULL;
}
@@ -56,10 +58,10 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
if (!db)
return NULL;
- status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ *status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
+ if (*status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
kfree(db);
- pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", status);
+ pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", *status);
return NULL;
}
@@ -144,6 +146,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL;
unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0;
+ efi_status_t status;
int rc = 0;
if (!efi.get_variable)
@@ -153,9 +156,12 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
* an error if we can't get them.
*/
if (!uefi_check_ignore_db()) {
- db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize);
+ db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize, &status);
if (!db) {
- pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
+ if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ pr_debug("MODSIGN: db variable wasn't found\n");
+ else
+ pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
} else {
rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db",
db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);
@@ -166,9 +172,12 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
}
}
- mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize);
+ mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status);
if (!mok) {
- pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
+ if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ pr_debug("MokListRT variable wasn't found\n");
+ else
+ pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
} else {
rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);
@@ -177,9 +186,12 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
kfree(mok);
}
- dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize);
+ dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize, &status);
if (!dbx) {
- pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n");
+ if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ pr_debug("dbx variable wasn't found\n");
+ else
+ pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n");
} else {
rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:dbx",
dbx, dbxsize,
--
2.23.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Only print errors about failing to get certs if EFI vars are found
From: Hans de Goede @ 2019-11-19 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Javier Martinez Canillas, linux-kernel
Cc: Peter Jones, David Howells, James Morris, Josh Boyer, Mimi Zohar,
Nayna Jain, Serge E. Hallyn, linux-security-module
In-Reply-To: <20191119115043.21585-1-javierm@redhat.com>
Hi,
On 19-11-2019 12:50, Javier Martinez Canillas wrote:
> If CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS is enabled, the kernel attempts to load the certs
> from the db, dbx and MokListRT EFI variables into the appropriate keyrings.
>
> But it just assumes that the variables will be present and prints an error
> if the certs can't be loaded, even when is possible that the variables may
> not exist. For example the MokListRT variable will only be present if shim
> is used.
>
> So only print an error message about failing to get the certs list from an
> EFI variable if this is found. Otherwise these printed errors just pollute
> the kernel ring buffer with confusing messages like the following:
>
> [ 5.427251] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
> [ 5.427261] MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
> [ 5.428012] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
> [ 5.428023] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT
>
> Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
>
> ---
> Hans,
>
> I'll really appreciate if you can test this patch. I just built tested it
> because I don't have access to a machine to reproduce the issue right now.
Ok, I've given this a test-run just now, works as advertised for me:
Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Regards,
Hans
> Changes in v2:
> - Fix flaws in the logic, that caused the signature list was parsed if
> the return code was EFI_NOT_FOUND that pointed out Hans de Goede.
> - Print debug messages if the variables are not found.
>
> security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 40 ++++++++++++-------
> 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
> index 81b19c52832..020fc7a11ef 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
> @@ -39,16 +39,18 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void)
> * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable.
> */
> static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
> - unsigned long *size)
> + unsigned long *size, efi_status_t *status)
> {
> - efi_status_t status;
> unsigned long lsize = 4;
> unsigned long tmpdb[4];
> void *db;
>
> - status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
> - if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
> - pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", status);
> + *status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
> + if (*status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + if (*status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
> + pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", *status);
> return NULL;
> }
>
> @@ -56,10 +58,10 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
> if (!db)
> return NULL;
>
> - status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
> - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> + *status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
> + if (*status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> kfree(db);
> - pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", status);
> + pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", *status);
> return NULL;
> }
>
> @@ -144,6 +146,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
> efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
> void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL;
> unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0;
> + efi_status_t status;
> int rc = 0;
>
> if (!efi.get_variable)
> @@ -153,9 +156,12 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
> * an error if we can't get them.
> */
> if (!uefi_check_ignore_db()) {
> - db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize);
> + db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize, &status);
> if (!db) {
> - pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
> + if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
> + pr_debug("MODSIGN: db variable wasn't found\n");
> + else
> + pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n");
> } else {
> rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db",
> db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db);
> @@ -166,9 +172,12 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
> }
> }
>
> - mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize);
> + mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status);
> if (!mok) {
> - pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
> + if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
> + pr_debug("MokListRT variable wasn't found\n");
> + else
> + pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n");
> } else {
> rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
> mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);
> @@ -177,9 +186,12 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
> kfree(mok);
> }
>
> - dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize);
> + dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize, &status);
> if (!dbx) {
> - pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n");
> + if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
> + pr_debug("dbx variable wasn't found\n");
> + else
> + pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n");
> } else {
> rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:dbx",
> dbx, dbxsize,
>
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH] security: Fix Kconfig indentation
From: Krzysztof Kozlowski @ 2019-11-20 13:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski, John Johansen, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
Mimi Zohar, Dmitry Kasatkin, Micah Morton, linux-security-module,
linux-integrity
Adjust indentation from spaces to tab (+optional two spaces) as in
coding style with command like:
$ sed -e 's/^ /\t/' -i */Kconfig
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
---
security/apparmor/Kconfig | 2 +-
security/integrity/Kconfig | 24 ++++++++++++------------
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 12 ++++++------
security/safesetid/Kconfig | 24 ++++++++++++------------
4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
index a422a349f926..1f0e712c5e50 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig
+++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT
depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
default y
help
- This option selects whether sha1 hashing of loaded policy
+ This option selects whether sha1 hashing of loaded policy
is enabled by default. The generation of sha1 hashes for
loaded policy provide system administrators a quick way
to verify that policy in the kernel matches what is expected,
diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 71f0177e8716..c92339445087 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
bool "Enable asymmetric keys support"
depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
default n
- select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
- select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
- select CRYPTO_RSA
- select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+ select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
+ select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
+ select CRYPTO_RSA
+ select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
help
This option enables digital signature verification using
asymmetric keys.
@@ -53,14 +53,14 @@ config INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
keyring.
config INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
- bool "Provide keyring for platform/firmware trusted keys"
- depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
- depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
- help
- Provide a separate, distinct keyring for platform trusted keys, which
- the kernel automatically populates during initialization from values
- provided by the platform for verifying the kexec'ed kerned image
- and, possibly, the initramfs signature.
+ bool "Provide keyring for platform/firmware trusted keys"
+ depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+ help
+ Provide a separate, distinct keyring for platform trusted keys, which
+ the kernel automatically populates during initialization from values
+ provided by the platform for verifying the kexec'ed kerned image
+ and, possibly, the initramfs signature.
config LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 838476d780e5..ec9259bd8115 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -159,13 +159,13 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE
If unsure, say N.
config IMA_ARCH_POLICY
- bool "Enable loading an IMA architecture specific policy"
- depends on (KEXEC_SIG && IMA) || IMA_APPRAISE \
+ bool "Enable loading an IMA architecture specific policy"
+ depends on (KEXEC_SIG && IMA) || IMA_APPRAISE \
&& INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
- default n
- help
- This option enables loading an IMA architecture specific policy
- based on run time secure boot flags.
+ default n
+ help
+ This option enables loading an IMA architecture specific policy
+ based on run time secure boot flags.
config IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY
bool "IMA build time configured policy rules"
diff --git a/security/safesetid/Kconfig b/security/safesetid/Kconfig
index 18b5fb90417b..ab1a2c69b0b8 100644
--- a/security/safesetid/Kconfig
+++ b/security/safesetid/Kconfig
@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
config SECURITY_SAFESETID
- bool "Gate setid transitions to limit CAP_SET{U/G}ID capabilities"
- depends on SECURITY
- select SECURITYFS
- default n
- help
- SafeSetID is an LSM module that gates the setid family of syscalls to
- restrict UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those
- approved by a system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit
- the given UIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated
- with CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace
- UID mappings.
+ bool "Gate setid transitions to limit CAP_SET{U/G}ID capabilities"
+ depends on SECURITY
+ select SECURITYFS
+ default n
+ help
+ SafeSetID is an LSM module that gates the setid family of syscalls to
+ restrict UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those
+ approved by a system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit
+ the given UIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated
+ with CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace
+ UID mappings.
- If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH] Smack: check length in smk_set_cipso()
From: Denis Efremov @ 2019-11-20 14:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
Cc: Denis Efremov, linux-security-module, linux-kernel,
Casey Schaufler, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, stable
It's possible to trigger out-of-bounds read in smk_set_cipso().
For example (from root):
$ echo "test 1" > /sys/fs/smackfs/cipso2
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in vsscanf+0x2203/0x2990
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888061b023c9 by task bash/5578
The patch adds length checks for SMK_LONG_FMT format.
The bug was found by syzkaller.
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>
---
security/smack/smackfs.c | 13 ++++++++++---
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index e3e05c04dbd1..fad50a5a807b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -878,6 +878,9 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
else
rule += strlen(skp->smk_known) + 1;
+ if (rule - data + 2 * SMK_DIGITLEN - 1 >= count)
+ goto out;
+
ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &maplevel);
if (ret != 1 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL)
goto out;
@@ -887,15 +890,19 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (ret != 1 || catlen > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM)
goto out;
- if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT &&
- count != (SMK_CIPSOMIN + catlen * SMK_DIGITLEN))
+ rule += SMK_DIGITLEN;
+
+ if ((format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT &&
+ count != (SMK_CIPSOMIN + catlen * SMK_DIGITLEN)) ||
+ (format == SMK_LONG_FMT &&
+ count != (rule - data + catlen * SMK_DIGITLEN)))
goto out;
memset(mapcatset, 0, sizeof(mapcatset));
for (i = 0; i < catlen; i++) {
- rule += SMK_DIGITLEN;
ret = sscanf(rule, "%u", &cat);
+ rule += SMK_DIGITLEN;
if (ret != 1 || cat > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM)
goto out;
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH] x86/mtrr: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for all access
From: James Morris @ 2019-11-20 20:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Kees Cook, Thomas Gleixner, Zhang Xiaoxu, linux-kernel, x86,
tyhicks, colin.king, linux-security-module, Matthew Garrett
In-Reply-To: <20191119100753.GA27787@zn.tnic>
On Tue, 19 Nov 2019, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/if.c | 21 ++-------------------
> > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>
> Yap, LGTM, thanks!
>
> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v2] security: Fix Kconfig indentation
From: Krzysztof Kozlowski @ 2019-11-21 3:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski, John Johansen, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
Mimi Zohar, Dmitry Kasatkin, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen,
Micah Morton, linux-security-module, linux-integrity, keyrings
Adjust indentation from spaces to tab (+optional two spaces) as in
coding style with command like:
$ sed -e 's/^ /\t/' -i */Kconfig
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
---
Changes since v1:
1. Fix also 7-space and tab+1 space indentation issues.
---
security/apparmor/Kconfig | 22 +++++++++++-----------
security/integrity/Kconfig | 36 ++++++++++++++++++------------------
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 12 ++++++------
security/keys/Kconfig | 22 +++++++++++-----------
security/safesetid/Kconfig | 24 ++++++++++++------------
5 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
index a422a349f926..81d85acff580 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig
+++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
@@ -28,17 +28,17 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
is available to userspace via the apparmor filesystem.
config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT
- bool "Enable policy hash introspection by default"
- depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
- default y
- help
- This option selects whether sha1 hashing of loaded policy
- is enabled by default. The generation of sha1 hashes for
- loaded policy provide system administrators a quick way
- to verify that policy in the kernel matches what is expected,
- however it can slow down policy load on some devices. In
- these cases policy hashing can be disabled by default and
- enabled only if needed.
+ bool "Enable policy hash introspection by default"
+ depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
+ default y
+ help
+ This option selects whether sha1 hashing of loaded policy
+ is enabled by default. The generation of sha1 hashes for
+ loaded policy provide system administrators a quick way
+ to verify that policy in the kernel matches what is expected,
+ however it can slow down policy load on some devices. In
+ these cases policy hashing can be disabled by default and
+ enabled only if needed.
config SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG
bool "Build AppArmor with debug code"
diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 71f0177e8716..41d565f9c2c3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
bool "Enable asymmetric keys support"
depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
default n
- select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
- select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
- select CRYPTO_RSA
- select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+ select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
+ select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
+ select CRYPTO_RSA
+ select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
help
This option enables digital signature verification using
asymmetric keys.
@@ -53,24 +53,24 @@ config INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
keyring.
config INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
- bool "Provide keyring for platform/firmware trusted keys"
- depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
- depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
- help
- Provide a separate, distinct keyring for platform trusted keys, which
- the kernel automatically populates during initialization from values
- provided by the platform for verifying the kexec'ed kerned image
- and, possibly, the initramfs signature.
+ bool "Provide keyring for platform/firmware trusted keys"
+ depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+ help
+ Provide a separate, distinct keyring for platform trusted keys, which
+ the kernel automatically populates during initialization from values
+ provided by the platform for verifying the kexec'ed kerned image
+ and, possibly, the initramfs signature.
config LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
- depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
- depends on EFI
- def_bool y
+ depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+ depends on EFI
+ def_bool y
config LOAD_IPL_KEYS
- depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
- depends on S390
- def_bool y
+ depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+ depends on S390
+ def_bool y
config LOAD_PPC_KEYS
bool "Enable loading of platform and blacklisted keys for POWER"
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 838476d780e5..ec9259bd8115 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -159,13 +159,13 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE
If unsure, say N.
config IMA_ARCH_POLICY
- bool "Enable loading an IMA architecture specific policy"
- depends on (KEXEC_SIG && IMA) || IMA_APPRAISE \
+ bool "Enable loading an IMA architecture specific policy"
+ depends on (KEXEC_SIG && IMA) || IMA_APPRAISE \
&& INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
- default n
- help
- This option enables loading an IMA architecture specific policy
- based on run time secure boot flags.
+ default n
+ help
+ This option enables loading an IMA architecture specific policy
+ based on run time secure boot flags.
config IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY
bool "IMA build time configured policy rules"
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index 20791a556b58..7d7fc251b38a 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -109,17 +109,17 @@ config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
config KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
- bool "Diffie-Hellman operations on retained keys"
- depends on KEYS
- select CRYPTO
- select CRYPTO_HASH
- select CRYPTO_DH
- help
- This option provides support for calculating Diffie-Hellman
- public keys and shared secrets using values stored as keys
- in the kernel.
-
- If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+ bool "Diffie-Hellman operations on retained keys"
+ depends on KEYS
+ select CRYPTO
+ select CRYPTO_HASH
+ select CRYPTO_DH
+ help
+ This option provides support for calculating Diffie-Hellman
+ public keys and shared secrets using values stored as keys
+ in the kernel.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
config KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
bool "Provide key/keyring change notifications"
diff --git a/security/safesetid/Kconfig b/security/safesetid/Kconfig
index 18b5fb90417b..ab1a2c69b0b8 100644
--- a/security/safesetid/Kconfig
+++ b/security/safesetid/Kconfig
@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
config SECURITY_SAFESETID
- bool "Gate setid transitions to limit CAP_SET{U/G}ID capabilities"
- depends on SECURITY
- select SECURITYFS
- default n
- help
- SafeSetID is an LSM module that gates the setid family of syscalls to
- restrict UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those
- approved by a system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit
- the given UIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated
- with CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace
- UID mappings.
+ bool "Gate setid transitions to limit CAP_SET{U/G}ID capabilities"
+ depends on SECURITY
+ select SECURITYFS
+ default n
+ help
+ SafeSetID is an LSM module that gates the setid family of syscalls to
+ restrict UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those
+ approved by a system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit
+ the given UIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated
+ with CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace
+ UID mappings.
- If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH v11 02/25] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
From: James Morris @ 2019-11-21 5:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, linux-security-module, selinux, keescook,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20191113175721.2317-3-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
On Wed, 13 Nov 2019, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
> of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
> is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
> and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Hi Casey,
Note that LSM infrastructure changes will need signoffs from the
maintainers of all major LSMs.
See
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/alpine.LRH.2.21.1909060644570.1710@namei.org/
I've set aside some time at the end of this week to take a close look.
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v11 03/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
From: James Morris @ 2019-11-21 5:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, linux-security-module, selinux, Kees Cook,
John Johansen, Tetsuo Handa, Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley,
Mimi Zohar
In-Reply-To: <20191113175721.2317-4-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
On Wed, 13 Nov 2019, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
> to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
> lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
>
> Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
> lsmblob instead of a u32. In some cases this requires a
> temporary conversion using lsmblob_init() that will go
> away when other interfaces get converted.
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
> kernel/auditfilter.c | 7 +++++--
> kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++----
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++--
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++--
> security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
> 6 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
IMA changes will also need review from Mimi.
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v11 17/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
From: James Morris @ 2019-11-21 5:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, linux-security-module, selinux, keescook,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20191113175721.2317-18-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
On Wed, 13 Nov 2019, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill
> a lsmcontext structure instead of data and length pointers.
> This provides the information about which LSM created the
> context so that security_release_secctx() can use the
> correct hook.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 23 +++++++++--------------
> include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
> security/security.c | 13 +++++++++++--
> 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
Please ensure all relevant maintainers are cc'd:
$ scripts/get_maintainer.pl fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v5 15/27] nfs: get rid of ->set_security()
From: James Morris @ 2019-11-21 5:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Scott Mayhew
Cc: anna.schumaker, trond.myklebust, David Howells, viro, linux-nfs,
linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel, linux-security-module
In-Reply-To: <20191120152750.6880-16-smayhew@redhat.com>
On Wed, 20 Nov 2019, Scott Mayhew wrote:
> From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
>
> it's always either nfs_set_sb_security() or nfs_clone_sb_security(),
> the choice being controlled by mount_info->cloned != NULL. No need
> to add methods, especially when both instances live right next to
> the caller and are never accessed anywhere else.
>
> Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Please ensure that any changes relating to the LSM API are cc'd to the
linux-security-module list.
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] tomoyo: Don't check open/getattr permission on sockets.
From: James Morris @ 2019-11-21 7:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tetsuo Handa
Cc: Andrew Morton, Stephen Rothwell, linux-security-module,
Linus Torvalds
In-Reply-To: <d5cbd24b-531d-e9d0-f784-e6447129741d@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
On Wed, 13 Nov 2019, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> Hello, Andrew and James.
>
> I have difficulty setting up environments for sending pull request to linux.git
> (nobody around me knows Linux kernel maintainer's workflow at the command line level).
> Can you pick up the following commit via mmotm or linux-security.git tree?
Not sure if your fix is complete.
Are there other potential paths to trigger this via tomoyo_path_perm() ?
e.g. call unlink(2) on /proc/pid/fd/sockfd
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] tomoyo: Don't check open/getattr permission on sockets.
From: Tetsuo Handa @ 2019-11-21 10:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: James Morris
Cc: Andrew Morton, Stephen Rothwell, linux-security-module,
Linus Torvalds
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1911211818320.3625@namei.org>
On 2019/11/21 16:21, James Morris wrote:
> On Wed, 13 Nov 2019, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
>
>> Hello, Andrew and James.
>>
>> I have difficulty setting up environments for sending pull request to linux.git
>> (nobody around me knows Linux kernel maintainer's workflow at the command line level).
>> Can you pick up the following commit via mmotm or linux-security.git tree?
>
> Not sure if your fix is complete.
>
> Are there other potential paths to trigger this via tomoyo_path_perm() ?
>
> e.g. call unlink(2) on /proc/pid/fd/sockfd
I think they are safe. For example, unlink(2) checks that
inode is valid before calling security_path_unlink().
dentry = __lookup_hash(&last, path.dentry, lookup_flags);
error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
/* Why not before? Because we want correct error value */
if (last.name[last.len])
goto slashes;
inode = dentry->d_inode;
if (d_is_negative(dentry))
goto slashes;
ihold(inode);
error = security_path_unlink(&path, dentry);
if (error)
goto exit2;
error = vfs_unlink(path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, &delegated_inode);
exit2:
dput(dentry);
}
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] tomoyo: Don't check open/getattr permission on sockets.
From: Tetsuo Handa @ 2019-11-21 13:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: James Morris
Cc: Andrew Morton, Stephen Rothwell, linux-security-module,
Linus Torvalds
In-Reply-To: <cba33548-91dc-42b4-ef96-43642ebc3427@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
On 2019/11/21 19:18, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> On 2019/11/21 16:21, James Morris wrote:
>> On Wed, 13 Nov 2019, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
>>
>>> Hello, Andrew and James.
>>>
>>> I have difficulty setting up environments for sending pull request to linux.git
>>> (nobody around me knows Linux kernel maintainer's workflow at the command line level).
>>> Can you pick up the following commit via mmotm or linux-security.git tree?
>>
>> Not sure if your fix is complete.
>>
>> Are there other potential paths to trigger this via tomoyo_path_perm() ?
>>
>> e.g. call unlink(2) on /proc/pid/fd/sockfd
>
> I think they are safe. For example, unlink(2) checks that
> inode is valid before calling security_path_unlink().
Hmm, since unlink(2) locks parent's inode instead of inode to be removed itself,
there is indeed possibility that tomoyo_path_perm() races with __sock_release().
We need another patch...
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v11 01/25] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
From: John Johansen @ 2019-11-21 18:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20191113181925.2437-2-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
On 11/13/19 10:19 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
> of the individual security modules and into the security
> infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
> the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
> space is required, and the space is allocated there.
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
you can replace the reviewed by with
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
> security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 ++-
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 ++++-----------
> security/security.c | 36 +++++++++++++-
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 78 +++++++++++++++----------------
> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++
> security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++-----
> security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 64 ++++++++++++-------------
> security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 ++--
> 10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index a3763247547c..13a67fd1a767 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -2080,6 +2080,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
> int lbs_cred;
> int lbs_file;
> int lbs_inode;
> + int lbs_sock;
> int lbs_ipc;
> int lbs_msg_msg;
> int lbs_task;
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
> index 2431c011800d..5b6f52c62058 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
> +++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
> @@ -51,7 +51,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
> struct aa_label *peer;
> };
>
> -#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
> +static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk)
> +{
> + return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
> +}
> +
> #define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
> #define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \
> struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index ec3a928af829..4093fa231671 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -753,33 +753,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo
> return error;
> }
>
> -/**
> - * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
> - */
> -static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
> -{
> - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
> -
> - ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
> - if (!ctx)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> -
> - SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
> -
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> /**
> * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
> */
> static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
> {
> - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
> + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
>
> - SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
> aa_put_label(ctx->label);
> aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
> - kfree(ctx);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -788,8 +770,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
> static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
> struct sock *newsk)
> {
> - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
> - struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
> + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
> + struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk);
>
> new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
> new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
> @@ -840,7 +822,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
> label = aa_get_current_label();
>
> if (sock->sk) {
> - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
> + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);
>
> aa_put_label(ctx->label);
> ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
> @@ -1025,7 +1007,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
> */
> static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
> + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
>
> if (!skb->secmark)
> return 0;
> @@ -1038,7 +1020,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
>
> static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
> {
> - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
> + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
>
> if (ctx->peer)
> return ctx->peer;
> @@ -1122,7 +1104,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
> */
> static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
> {
> - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
> + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
>
> if (!ctx->label)
> ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
> @@ -1132,7 +1114,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
> static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> struct request_sock *req)
> {
> - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
> + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
>
> if (!skb->secmark)
> return 0;
> @@ -1149,6 +1131,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
> .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
> .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
> + .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
> };
>
> static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> @@ -1185,7 +1168,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
>
> - LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
>
> @@ -1624,7 +1606,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
> if (sk == NULL)
> return NF_ACCEPT;
>
> - ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
> + ctx = aa_sock(sk);
> if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
> skb->secmark, sk))
> return NF_ACCEPT;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 1bc000f834e2..5e43d3f64c1f 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
> #include <linux/string.h>
> #include <linux/msg.h>
> #include <net/flow.h>
> +#include <net/sock.h>
>
> #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
>
> @@ -169,6 +170,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
> lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
> lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
> lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
> + lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
> lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
> }
>
> @@ -304,6 +306,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
> init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
> init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
> init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
> + init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
> init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
>
> /*
> @@ -622,6 +625,28 @@ static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +/**
> + * lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob
> + * @sock: the sock that needs a blob
> + * @priority: allocation mode
> + *
> + * Allocate the sock blob for all the modules
> + *
> + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
> + */
> +static int lsm_sock_alloc(struct sock *sock, gfp_t priority)
> +{
> + if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock == 0) {
> + sock->sk_security = NULL;
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + sock->sk_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority);
> + if (sock->sk_security == NULL)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /**
> * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob
> * @task: the task that needs a blob
> @@ -2066,12 +2091,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
>
> int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
> + int rc = lsm_sock_alloc(sk, priority);
> +
> + if (unlikely(rc))
> + return rc;
> + rc = call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
> + if (unlikely(rc))
> + security_sk_free(sk);
> + return rc;
> }
>
> void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
> {
> call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
> + kfree(sk->sk_security);
> + sk->sk_security = NULL;
> }
>
> void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 9625b99e677f..3feb971068e2 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -4467,7 +4467,7 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
>
> static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> struct common_audit_data ad;
> struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
>
> @@ -4524,7 +4524,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
> isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
>
> if (sock->sk) {
> - sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
> sksec->sclass = sclass;
> sksec->sid = sid;
> /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
> @@ -4540,8 +4540,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
> static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
> struct socket *sockb)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = selinux_sock(socka->sk);
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = selinux_sock(sockb->sk);
>
> sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
> sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
> @@ -4556,7 +4556,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
> static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
> {
> struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> u16 family;
> int err;
>
> @@ -4691,7 +4691,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
> struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
> {
> struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> int err;
>
> err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
> @@ -4870,9 +4870,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
> struct sock *other,
> struct sock *newsk)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock);
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other);
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk);
> struct common_audit_data ad;
> struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
> int err;
> @@ -4904,8 +4904,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
> static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
> struct socket *other)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
> - struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
> + struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
> struct common_audit_data ad;
> struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
>
> @@ -4947,7 +4947,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> u16 family)
> {
> int err = 0;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
> struct common_audit_data ad;
> struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
> @@ -4980,7 +4980,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> int err;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> u16 family = sk->sk_family;
> u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
> struct common_audit_data ad;
> @@ -5048,13 +5048,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> return err;
> }
>
> -static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
> - int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
> +static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
> + char __user *optval,
> + int __user *optlen,
> + unsigned int len)
> {
> int err = 0;
> char *scontext;
> u32 scontext_len;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
> u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
>
> if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
> @@ -5114,34 +5116,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
>
> static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
> -
> - sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
> - if (!sksec)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
> sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
> sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
> selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
> - sk->sk_security = sksec;
>
> return 0;
> }
>
> static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> - sk->sk_security = NULL;
> selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
> - kfree(sksec);
> }
>
> static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> - struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> + struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
>
> newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
> newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
> @@ -5155,7 +5150,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
> if (!sk)
> *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
> else {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> *secid = sksec->sid;
> }
> @@ -5165,7 +5160,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
> {
> struct inode_security_struct *isec =
> inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
> sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
> @@ -5180,7 +5175,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
> static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
> struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
> struct common_audit_data ad;
> struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
> u8 peerlbl_active;
> @@ -5331,8 +5326,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
> static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
> struct sock *newsk)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> - struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> + struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
>
> /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
> * the non-sctp clone version.
> @@ -5349,7 +5344,7 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
> static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> struct request_sock *req)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> int err;
> u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
> u32 connsid;
> @@ -5370,7 +5365,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
> const struct request_sock *req)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
>
> newsksec->sid = req->secid;
> newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
> @@ -5387,7 +5382,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
> static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> u16 family = sk->sk_family;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
> if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
> @@ -5471,7 +5466,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
> static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
> {
> struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
> * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
> @@ -5512,7 +5507,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> int err = 0;
> u32 perm;
> struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
> err = -EINVAL;
> @@ -5653,7 +5648,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
> return NF_ACCEPT;
>
> /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
> - sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> sid = sksec->sid;
> } else
> sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
> @@ -5692,7 +5687,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
>
> if (sk == NULL)
> return NF_ACCEPT;
> - sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
> ad.u.net = &net;
> @@ -5784,7 +5779,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
> u32 skb_sid;
> struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
>
> - sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
> return NF_DROP;
> /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
> @@ -5813,7 +5808,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
> } else {
> /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
> * associated socket. */
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> peer_sid = sksec->sid;
> secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
> }
> @@ -6793,6 +6788,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
> .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
> .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
> + .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
> };
>
> static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> index 586b7abd0aa7..3e2bb90dc868 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> @@ -185,4 +185,9 @@ static inline u32 current_sid(void)
> return tsec->sid;
> }
>
> +static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
> +{
> + return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
> +}
> +
> #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
> diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> index abaab7683840..6a94b31b5472 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
> #include <linux/gfp.h>
> #include <linux/ip.h>
> #include <linux/ipv6.h>
> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
> #include <net/sock.h>
> #include <net/netlabel.h>
> #include <net/ip.h>
> @@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
> static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
> {
> int rc;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
>
> if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
> @@ -100,7 +101,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
> const struct sock *sk,
> u32 sid)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
>
> if (secattr == NULL)
> @@ -235,7 +236,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
> * being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
> sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
> if (sk != NULL) {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
> return 0;
> @@ -273,7 +274,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
> {
> int rc;
> struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
> struct sockaddr_in addr4;
> struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
>
> @@ -352,7 +353,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
> */
> void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> if (family == PF_INET)
> sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
> @@ -370,8 +371,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
> */
> void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> - struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> + struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
>
> newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
> }
> @@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
> int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
> {
> int rc;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
>
> if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
> @@ -504,7 +505,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
> {
> int rc = 0;
> struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
>
> if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
> @@ -542,7 +543,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
> struct sockaddr *addr)
> {
> int rc;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
>
> /* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
> @@ -581,7 +582,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
> int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
> struct sockaddr *addr)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
> sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
> index 62529f382942..2836540f9577 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack.h
> +++ b/security/smack/smack.h
> @@ -372,6 +372,11 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
> return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
> }
>
> +static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock(const struct sock *sock)
> +{
> + return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Is the directory transmuting?
> */
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index abeb09c30633..796f78580c17 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
> if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>
> - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
>
> if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
> isp = ssp->smk_in;
> @@ -1838,7 +1838,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
>
> if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
> sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
> - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
> tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
> /*
> * If the receiving process can't write to the
> @@ -2245,11 +2245,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
> static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
> {
> struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
> - struct socket_smack *ssp;
> -
> - ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
> - if (ssp == NULL)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
>
> /*
> * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
> @@ -2263,11 +2259,10 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
> }
> ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
>
> - sk->sk_security = ssp;
> -
> return 0;
> }
>
> +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
> /**
> * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
> * @sk: the socket
> @@ -2276,7 +2271,6 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
> */
> static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
> {
> -#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
> struct smk_port_label *spp;
>
> if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
> @@ -2289,9 +2283,8 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
> }
> rcu_read_unlock();
> }
> -#endif
> - kfree(sk->sk_security);
> }
> +#endif
>
> /**
> * smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
> @@ -2409,7 +2402,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
> static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
> {
> struct smack_known *skp;
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
> int rc = 0;
>
> /*
> @@ -2454,7 +2447,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
> int rc;
> int sk_lbl;
> struct smack_known *hkp;
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
> struct smk_audit_info ad;
>
> rcu_read_lock();
> @@ -2530,7 +2523,7 @@ static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
> {
> struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
> struct smk_port_label *spp;
> unsigned short port = 0;
>
> @@ -2618,7 +2611,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
> int act)
> {
> struct smk_port_label *spp;
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
> struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
> unsigned short port;
> struct smack_known *object;
> @@ -2712,7 +2705,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
> if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>
> - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
>
> if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
> ssp->smk_in = skp;
> @@ -2760,7 +2753,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
> * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
> */
> if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
> - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
> ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
> ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
> }
> @@ -2785,8 +2778,8 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
> static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
> struct socket *sockb)
> {
> - struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
> - struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *asp = smack_sock(socka->sk);
> + struct socket_smack *bsp = smack_sock(sockb->sk);
>
> asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
> bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
> @@ -2844,7 +2837,7 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
> return 0;
>
> #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
> - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
> #endif
>
> switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
> @@ -3586,9 +3579,9 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
> {
> struct smack_known *skp;
> struct smack_known *okp;
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
> - struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
> - struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock);
> + struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other);
> + struct socket_smack *nsp = smack_sock(newsk);
> struct smk_audit_info ad;
> int rc = 0;
> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
> @@ -3634,8 +3627,8 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
> */
> static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
> {
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> - struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
> + struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other->sk);
> struct smk_audit_info ad;
> int rc;
>
> @@ -3672,7 +3665,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
> struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
> #endif
> #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
> struct smack_known *rsp;
> #endif
> int rc = 0;
> @@ -3845,7 +3838,7 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
> static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
> struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
> int rc = 0;
> struct smk_audit_info ad;
> @@ -3966,7 +3959,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
> int slen = 1;
> int rc = 0;
>
> - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
> if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
> rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
> slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
> @@ -4016,7 +4009,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
>
> switch (family) {
> case PF_UNIX:
> - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
> s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
> break;
> case PF_INET:
> @@ -4029,7 +4022,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
> * Translate what netlabel gave us.
> */
> if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
> - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
> netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
> rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
> if (rc == 0) {
> @@ -4067,7 +4060,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
> (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
> return;
>
> - ssp = sk->sk_security;
> + ssp = smack_sock(sk);
> ssp->smk_in = skp;
> ssp->smk_out = skp;
> /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
> @@ -4087,7 +4080,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> {
> u16 family = sk->sk_family;
> struct smack_known *skp;
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
> struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
> struct sockaddr_in addr;
> struct iphdr *hdr;
> @@ -4186,7 +4179,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
> const struct request_sock *req)
> {
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
> struct smack_known *skp;
>
> if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
> @@ -4590,6 +4583,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
> .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
> .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
> + .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
> };
>
> static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> @@ -4699,7 +4693,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
> +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
> +#endif
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
> index fc7399b45373..635e2339579e 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
> @@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,
> struct socket_smack *ssp;
> struct smack_known *skp;
>
> - if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
> - ssp = sk->sk_security;
> + if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
> + ssp = smack_sock(sk);
> skp = ssp->smk_out;
> skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
> }
> @@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,
> struct socket_smack *ssp;
> struct smack_known *skp;
>
> - if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
> - ssp = sk->sk_security;
> + if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
> + ssp = smack_sock(sk);
> skp = ssp->smk_out;
> skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
> }
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v11 02/25] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
From: John Johansen @ 2019-11-21 18:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20191113181925.2437-3-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
On 11/13/19 10:19 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> When more than one security module is exporting data to
> audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
> is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
> structure to be used instead.
>
> The lsmblob structure is currently an array of
> u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the
> security modules built into the system that would
> use secids if active. The system assigns the module
> a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are
> compiled in but not registered there will be unused
> slots.
>
> A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name
> of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There
> is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name
> and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
reviewed and
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 ++++++--
> include/linux/security.h | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++++-
> security/commoncap.c | 7 ++++-
> security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++++-
> security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +++++-
> security/security.c | 28 ++++++++++++++----
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +++++-
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++++-
> security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +++++-
> security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 ++++-
> 11 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 13a67fd1a767..cfe5393840c7 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -2062,6 +2062,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
> struct hlist_head locked_down;
> } __randomize_layout;
>
> +/*
> + * Information that identifies a security module.
> + */
> +struct lsm_id {
> + const char *lsm; /* Name of the LSM */
> + int slot; /* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */
> +};
> +
> /*
> * Security module hook list structure.
> * For use with generic list macros for common operations.
> @@ -2070,7 +2078,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
> struct hlist_node list;
> struct hlist_head *head;
> union security_list_options hook;
> - char *lsm;
> + struct lsm_id *lsmid;
> } __randomize_layout;
>
> /*
> @@ -2099,7 +2107,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
> extern char *lsm_names;
>
> extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> - char *lsm);
> + struct lsm_id *lsmid);
>
> #define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)
> #define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 9df7547afc0c..5eced28fa0c9 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -126,6 +126,64 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
> LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
> };
>
> +/*
> + * Data exported by the security modules
> + *
> + * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
> + */
> +#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
> + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0))
> +
> +struct lsmblob {
> + u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
> +};
> +
> +#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */
> +#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */
> +#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
> + * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize
> + * @secid: The initial secid value
> + *
> + * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
> + */
> +static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
> + blob->secid[i] = secid;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is an value in the lsmblob
> + * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data
> + *
> + * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise
> + */
> +static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob)
> +{
> + struct lsmblob empty = {};
> +
> + return !!memcmp(blob, &empty, sizeof(*blob));
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal
> + * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data
> + * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data
> + *
> + * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise
> + */
> +static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)
> +{
> + return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba));
> +}
> +
> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> int cap, unsigned int opts);
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 4093fa231671..11845348eefb 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -1134,6 +1134,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
> };
>
> +static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "apparmor",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
> @@ -1722,7 +1727,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
> goto buffers_out;
> }
> security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
> - "apparmor");
> + &apparmor_lsmid);
>
> /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
> apparmor_initialized = 1;
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index f4ee0ae106b2..9dcfd2a0e891 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -1339,6 +1339,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>
> +static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "capability",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
> @@ -1363,7 +1368,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> static int __init capability_init(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
> - "capability");
> + &capability_lsmid);
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> index ee5cb944f4ad..86317e78899f 100644
> --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
> @@ -180,6 +180,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
> return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "loadpin",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
> @@ -227,7 +232,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)
> pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
> enforce ? "" : "not ");
> parse_exclude();
> - security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
> + security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks),
> + &loadpin_lsmid);
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> index 7760019ad35d..950dfb7f931e 100644
> --- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
> @@ -149,6 +149,11 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
> return -EACCES;
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "safesetid",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
> @@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
> static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
> {
> security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
> - ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
> + ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks),
> + &safesetid_lsmid);
>
> /* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
> safesetid_initialized = 1;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 5e43d3f64c1f..5f503cadf7f3 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -308,6 +308,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
> init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
> init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
> init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
> + init_debug("lsmblob size = %lu\n", sizeof(struct lsmblob));
>
> /*
> * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
> @@ -435,21 +436,36 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
> + */
> +static int lsm_slot __initdata;
> +
> /**
> * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
> * @hooks: the hooks to add
> * @count: the number of hooks to add
> - * @lsm: the name of the security module
> + * @lsmid: the the identification information for the security module
> *
> * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
> + * If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot
> + * for it in the lsmblob.
> */
> void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> - char *lsm)
> + struct lsm_id *lsmid)
> {
> int i;
>
> + if (lsmid->slot == LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
> + if (lsm_slot >= LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
> + panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
> + lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++;
> + init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n", lsmid->lsm,
> + lsmid->slot);
> + }
> +
> for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
> - hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
> + hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
> hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
> }
>
> @@ -458,7 +474,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
> * and fix this up afterwards.
> */
> if (slab_is_available()) {
> - if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
> + if (lsm_append(lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
> panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
> }
> }
> @@ -1906,7 +1922,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
>
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
> - if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
> + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> continue;
> return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
> }
> @@ -1919,7 +1935,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> struct security_hook_list *hp;
>
> hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
> - if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
> + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
> continue;
> return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
> }
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 3feb971068e2..5570a6ed49d5 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -6791,6 +6791,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
> };
>
> +static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "selinux",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
> @@ -7051,7 +7056,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
>
> hashtab_cache_init();
>
> - security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
> + security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
> + &selinux_lsmid);
>
> if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
> panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 796f78580c17..e42336328446 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -4586,6 +4586,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
> };
>
> +static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "smack",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
> @@ -4784,7 +4789,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
> /*
> * Register with LSM
> */
> - security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
> + security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
> smack_enabled = 1;
>
> pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
> diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> index 716c92ec941a..f1968e80f06d 100644
> --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
> @@ -529,6 +529,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
> }
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "tomoyo",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> /*
> * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
> * registering TOMOYO.
> @@ -581,7 +586,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
> struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);
>
> /* register ourselves with the security framework */
> - security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo");
> + security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks),
> + &tomoyo_lsmid);
> pr_info("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
> s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
> atomic_inc(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
> diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> index 94dc346370b1..0f0cf7136929 100644
> --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
> @@ -421,6 +421,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> return rc;
> }
>
> +static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + .lsm = "yama",
> + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED
> +};
> +
> static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
> @@ -477,7 +482,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
> static int __init yama_init(void)
> {
> pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
> - security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama");
> + security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);
> yama_init_sysctl();
> return 0;
> }
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v11 03/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
From: John Johansen @ 2019-11-21 18:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20191113181925.2437-4-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
On 11/13/19 10:19 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
> to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
> lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
>
> Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
> lsmblob instead of a u32. In some cases this requires a
> temporary conversion using lsmblob_init() that will go
> away when other interfaces get converted.
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
> kernel/auditfilter.c | 7 +++++--
> kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++----
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++--
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++--
> security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
> 6 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 5eced28fa0c9..2df58448f1f2 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1835,7 +1835,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
> int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
> +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
> + void *lsmrule);
> void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
>
> #else
> @@ -1851,8 +1852,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> - void *lsmrule)
> +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
> + u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> {
> return 0;
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index b0126e9c0743..356db1dd276c 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -1325,6 +1325,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
> struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
> pid_t pid;
> u32 sid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> switch (f->type) {
> case AUDIT_PID:
> @@ -1355,8 +1356,10 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
> if (f->lsm_rule) {
> security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
> - f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> + result = security_audit_rule_match(
> + &blob, f->type,
> + f->op, f->lsm_rule);
> }
> break;
> case AUDIT_EXE:
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 4effe01ebbe2..7566e5b1c419 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> const struct cred *cred;
> int i, need_sid = 1;
> u32 sid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> unsigned int sessionid;
>
> cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
> @@ -643,7 +644,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
> need_sid = 0;
> }
> - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> + result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
> + f->type,
> f->op,
> f->lsm_rule);
> }
> @@ -658,15 +661,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> if (f->lsm_rule) {
> /* Find files that match */
> if (name) {
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
> result = security_audit_rule_match(
> - name->osid,
> + &blob,
> f->type,
> f->op,
> f->lsm_rule);
> } else if (ctx) {
> list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> if (security_audit_rule_match(
> - n->osid,
> + &blob,
> f->type,
> f->op,
> f->lsm_rule)) {
> @@ -678,7 +683,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> /* Find ipc objects that match */
> if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
> break;
> - if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
> + if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
> f->type, f->op,
> f->lsm_rule))
> ++result;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index 3689081aaf38..5bcd6011ef8c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -370,8 +370,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> -static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> - void *lsmrule)
> +static inline int security_filter_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
> + u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> {
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 5380aca2b351..7711cc6a3fe3 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -414,6 +414,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
> int rc = 0;
> u32 osid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
> continue;
> @@ -423,7 +424,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
> case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
> security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
> - rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> + rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
> rule->lsm[i].type,
> Audit_equal,
> rule->lsm[i].rule);
> @@ -431,7 +433,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
> case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
> case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
> - rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> + rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
> rule->lsm[i].type,
> Audit_equal,
> rule->lsm[i].rule);
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 5f503cadf7f3..7c386cbe4cf3 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
> /*
> * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
> */
> -static int lsm_slot __initdata;
> +static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;
>
> /**
> * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
> @@ -2412,9 +2412,21 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
> }
>
> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
> + void *lsmrule)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> + field, op, lsmrule);
> + if (rc != 0)
> + return rc;
> + }
> + return 0;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v11 04/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
From: John Johansen @ 2019-11-21 18:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20191113181925.2437-5-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
On 11/13/19 10:19 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_kernel_act_as interface to use a lsmblob
> structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of
> module stacking. Change it's only caller, set_security_override,
> to do the same. Change that one's only caller,
> set_security_override_from_ctx, to call it with the new
> parameter type.
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++-
> include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
> kernel/cred.c | 10 ++++++----
> security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
> 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
> index 18639c069263..03ae0182cba6 100644
> --- a/include/linux/cred.h
> +++ b/include/linux/cred.h
> @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
>
> struct cred;
> struct inode;
> +struct lsmblob;
>
> /*
> * COW Supplementary groups list
> @@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
> extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
> extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *);
> extern int change_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
> -extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, u32);
> +extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, struct lsmblob *);
> extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
> extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
> extern int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 2df58448f1f2..2b0ab47cfb26 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
> int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
> void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
> void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
> -int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
> +int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
> int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
> int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
> int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
> @@ -1041,7 +1041,8 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
> {
> }
>
> -static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
> +static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred,
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> return 0;
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
> index c0a4c12d38b2..846ac4b23c16 100644
> --- a/kernel/cred.c
> +++ b/kernel/cred.c
> @@ -732,14 +732,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
> /**
> * set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
> * @new: The credentials to alter
> - * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
> + * @blob: The LSM security information to set
> *
> * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
> * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
> */
> -int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
> +int set_security_override(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> - return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
> + return security_kernel_act_as(new, blob);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
>
> @@ -755,6 +755,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
> */
> int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
> {
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> u32 secid;
> int ret;
>
> @@ -762,7 +763,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
> if (ret < 0)
> return ret;
>
> - return set_security_override(new, secid);
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> + return set_security_override(new, &blob);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 7c386cbe4cf3..dd6f212e11af 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1615,9 +1615,19 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
>
> -int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
> +int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.kernel_act_as(new, blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (rc != 0)
> + return rc;
> + }
> + return 0;
> }
>
> int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v11 05/25] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
From: John Johansen @ 2019-11-21 18:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20191113181925.2437-6-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
On 11/13/19 10:19 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the data used in UDS SO_PEERSEC processing from a
> secid to a more general struct lsmblob. Update the
> security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() interface to use the
> lsmblob. There is a small amount of scaffolding code
> that will come out when the security_secid_to_secctx()
> code is brought in line with the lsmblob.
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++--
> include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
> include/net/scm.h | 8 +++++---
> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 +++++---
> net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +++---
> security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
> 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 2b0ab47cfb26..d57f400a307e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1354,7 +1354,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);
> int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
> int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
> -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
> +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> + struct lsmblob *blob);
> int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
> void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
> void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
> @@ -1492,7 +1493,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __
> return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> }
>
> -static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
> +static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
> + struct sk_buff *skb,
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> }
> diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
> index 3426d6dacc45..933492c08b8c 100644
> --- a/include/net/af_unix.h
> +++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
> @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {
> kgid_t gid;
> struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> - u32 secid; /* Security ID */
> + struct lsmblob lsmblob; /* Security LSM data */
> #endif
> u32 consumed;
> } __randomize_layout;
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index 1ce365f4c256..e2e71c4bf9d0 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {
> struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
> struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> - u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
> + struct lsmblob lsmblob; /* Passed LSM data */
> #endif
> };
>
> @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> {
> - security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
> + security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->lsmblob);
> }
> #else
> static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> @@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
> int err;
>
> if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
> + /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->lsmblob.secid[0],
> + &secdata, &seclen);
>
> if (!err) {
> put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index aa3fd61818c4..6cf57d5ac899 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -130,15 +130,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
>
> static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> + struct lsmblob lb;
> char *secdata;
> - u32 seclen, secid;
> + u32 seclen;
> int err;
>
> - err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
> + err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &lb);
> if (err)
> return;
>
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
> + /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(lb.secid[0], &secdata, &seclen);
> if (err)
> return;
>
> diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> index 0d8da809bea2..189fd6644e7f 100644
> --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
> +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> @@ -138,17 +138,17 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> - UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid;
> + UNIXCB(skb).lsmblob = scm->lsmblob;
> }
>
> static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> - scm->secid = UNIXCB(skb).secid;
> + scm->lsmblob = UNIXCB(skb).lsmblob;
> }
>
> static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> - return (scm->secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
> + return lsmblob_equal(&scm->lsmblob, &(UNIXCB(skb).lsmblob));
> }
> #else
> static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index dd6f212e11af..55837706e3ef 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2108,10 +2108,22 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
> optval, optlen, len);
> }
>
> -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
> +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
> - skb, secid);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram,
> + list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb,
> + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (rc != 0)
> + break;
> + }
> + return rc;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
>
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v11 06/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
From: John Johansen @ 2019-11-21 18:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20191113181925.2437-7-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
On 11/13/19 10:19 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change security_secctx_to_secid() to fill in a lsmblob instead
> of a u32 secid. Multiple LSMs may be able to interpret the
> string, and this allows for setting whichever secid is
> appropriate. In some cases there is scaffolding where other
> interfaces have yet to be converted.
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
> kernel/cred.c | 4 +---
> net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 13 ++++++-------
> net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 5 ++++-
> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 14 ++++++++------
> security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
> 6 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index d57f400a307e..b69877a13efa 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -494,7 +494,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
> int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
> -int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
> +int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> + struct lsmblob *blob);
> void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
> void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
> int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> @@ -1300,7 +1301,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *secle
>
> static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
> u32 seclen,
> - u32 *secid)
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
> index 846ac4b23c16..7fef90f3f10b 100644
> --- a/kernel/cred.c
> +++ b/kernel/cred.c
> @@ -756,14 +756,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
> int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
> {
> struct lsmblob blob;
> - u32 secid;
> int ret;
>
> - ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
> + ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &blob);
> if (ret < 0)
> return ret;
>
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> return set_security_override(new, &blob);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> index 317e3a9e8c5b..7c49397c33fd 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
> @@ -617,21 +617,20 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {
>
> static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
> {
> - u32 tmp_secid = 0;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> int err;
>
> - err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &tmp_secid);
> + err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &blob);
> if (err)
> return err;
>
> - if (!tmp_secid)
> - return -ENOENT;
> -
> - err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(tmp_secid);
> + /* Using le[0] is scaffolding */
> + err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(blob.secid[0]);
> if (err)
> return err;
>
> - priv->secid = tmp_secid;
> + /* Using le[0] is scaffolding */
> + priv->secid = blob.secid[0];
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> index 2317721f3ecb..2d68416b4552 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
> @@ -45,13 +45,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
>
> static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
> {
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> int err;
>
> info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
> info->secid = 0;
>
> err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
> - &info->secid);
> + &blob);
> if (err) {
> if (err == -EINVAL)
> pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
> @@ -59,6 +60,8 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
> return err;
> }
>
> + /* scaffolding during the transition */
> + info->secid = blob.secid[0];
> if (!info->secid) {
> pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
> info->secctx);
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index d2e4ab8d1cb1..7a5a87f15736 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -881,7 +881,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
> void *addr;
> void *mask;
> u32 addr_len;
> - u32 secid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
>
> /* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
> @@ -905,12 +905,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
> ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
> nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> - &secid);
> + &blob);
> if (ret_val != 0)
> return ret_val;
>
> + /* scaffolding with the [0] */
> return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
> - dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
> + dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0],
> &audit_info);
> }
>
> @@ -932,7 +933,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
> void *addr;
> void *mask;
> u32 addr_len;
> - u32 secid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
>
> /* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
> @@ -954,12 +955,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
> ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
> nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
> - &secid);
> + &blob);
> if (ret_val != 0)
> return ret_val;
>
> + /* scaffolding with the [0] */
> return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
> - NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
> + NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0],
> &audit_info);
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 55837706e3ef..32bb5383de9b 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1970,10 +1970,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
>
> -int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
> +int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> - *secid = 0;
> - return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc;
> +
> + lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen,
> + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + if (rc != 0)
> + return rc;
> + }
> + return 0;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
>
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v11 07/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
From: John Johansen @ 2019-11-21 18:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20191113181925.2437-8-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
On 11/13/19 10:19 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change security_secid_to_secctx() to take a lsmblob as input
> instead of a u32 secid. It will then call the LSM hooks
> using the lsmblob element allocated for that module. The
> callers have been updated as well. This allows for the
> possibility that more than one module may be called upon
> to translate a secid to a string, as can occur in the
> audit code.
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> drivers/android/binder.c | 4 +++-
> include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
> include/net/scm.h | 5 ++---
> kernel/audit.c | 9 +++++++--
> kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++----
> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 3 +--
> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 8 ++++++--
> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 +++-
> net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 8 ++++++--
> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 6 +++---
> security/security.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
> 12 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index 265d9dd46a5e..5f4702b4c507 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -3109,10 +3109,12 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
>
> if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
> u32 secid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> size_t added_size;
>
> security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
> if (ret) {
> return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
> return_error_param = ret;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index b69877a13efa..a3e99bccb1bb 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
> size_t size);
> int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
> int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
> struct lsmblob *blob);
> void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
> @@ -1294,7 +1294,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> +static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob,
> + char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> index e2e71c4bf9d0..31ae605fcc0a 100644
> --- a/include/net/scm.h
> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> @@ -97,9 +97,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
> int err;
>
> if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
> - /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->lsmblob.secid[0],
> - &secdata, &seclen);
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->lsmblob, &secdata,
> + &seclen);
>
> if (!err) {
> put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index da8dc0db5bd3..2f8e89eaf3e5 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -1417,7 +1417,10 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
> len = 0;
> if (audit_sig_sid) {
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> +
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid);
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
> if (err)
> return err;
> }
> @@ -2060,12 +2063,14 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> unsigned len;
> int error;
> u32 sid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> if (!sid)
> return 0;
>
> - error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
> if (error) {
> if (error != -EINVAL)
> goto error_path;
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 7566e5b1c419..04803c3099b2 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -966,6 +966,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> char *ctx = NULL;
> u32 len;
> int rc = 0;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
> if (!ab)
> @@ -975,7 +976,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
> if (sid) {
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
> rc = 1;
> } else {
> @@ -1218,7 +1220,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
> if (osid) {
> char *ctx = NULL;
> u32 len;
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> +
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
> *call_panic = 1;
> } else {
> @@ -1368,9 +1373,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
> if (n->osid != 0) {
> char *ctx = NULL;
> u32 len;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(
> - n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
> if (call_panic)
> *call_panic = 2;
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index 6cf57d5ac899..1ca97d0cb4a9 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -139,8 +139,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (err)
> return;
>
> - /* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */
> - err = security_secid_to_secctx(lb.secid[0], &secdata, &seclen);
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(&lb, &secdata, &seclen);
> if (err)
> return;
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> index e2d13cd18875..0412f6744185 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
> @@ -331,8 +331,10 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
> int len, ret;
> char *secctx;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
> if (ret)
> return 0;
>
> @@ -621,8 +623,10 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
> {
> #ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
> int len, ret;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, NULL, &len);
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, NULL, &len);
> if (ret)
> return 0;
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> index 410809c669e1..183a85412155 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
> @@ -175,8 +175,10 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
> int ret;
> u32 len;
> char *secctx;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> - ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, ct->secmark);
> + ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &len);
> if (ret)
> return;
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> index feabdfb22920..bfa7f12fde99 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
> @@ -305,13 +305,17 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
> {
> u32 seclen = 0;
> #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> +
> if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
> return 0;
>
> read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
>
> - if (skb->secmark)
> - security_secid_to_secctx(skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen);
> + if (skb->secmark) {
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, skb->secmark);
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen);
> + }
>
> read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
> #endif
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 7a5a87f15736..0cda17cb44a0 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -375,6 +375,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
> struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
> char *secctx = NULL;
> u32 secctx_len;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
> addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
> @@ -437,7 +438,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
> unlhsh_add_return:
> rcu_read_unlock();
> if (audit_buf != NULL) {
> - if (security_secid_to_secctx(secid,
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
> &secctx,
> &secctx_len) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> @@ -474,6 +476,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
> struct net_device *dev;
> char *secctx;
> u32 secctx_len;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
> list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
> @@ -493,8 +496,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
> addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
> if (dev != NULL)
> dev_put(dev);
> + if (entry != NULL)
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
> if (entry != NULL &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
> &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
> @@ -536,6 +541,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
> struct net_device *dev;
> char *secctx;
> u32 secctx_len;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
> list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
> @@ -554,8 +560,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
> addr, mask);
> if (dev != NULL)
> dev_put(dev);
> + if (entry != NULL)
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, entry->secid);
> if (entry != NULL &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob,
> &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
> security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
> @@ -1076,6 +1084,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
> u32 secid;
> char *secctx;
> u32 secctx_len;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
> cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
> @@ -1130,7 +1139,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
> secid = addr6->secid;
> }
>
> - ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> + ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);
> if (ret_val != 0)
> goto list_cb_failure;
> ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> index 3ed4fea2a2de..893301ae0131 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
> @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
> struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
> char *secctx;
> u32 secctx_len;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
> return NULL;
> @@ -98,10 +99,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
> audit_info->sessionid);
>
> + lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_info->secid);
> if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
> - security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid,
> - &secctx,
> - &secctx_len) == 0) {
> + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
> audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
> security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
> }
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 32bb5383de9b..0fc75a31a6bb 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1963,10 +1963,20 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
>
> -int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> +int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsmblob *blob, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata,
> - seclen);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> + int rc;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
> + secdata, seclen);
> + if (rc != 0)
> + return rc;
> + }
> + return 0;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
>
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v11 08/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
From: John Johansen @ 2019-11-21 18:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20191113181925.2437-9-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
On 11/13/19 10:19 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data
> for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in
> a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The
> audit data structure containing the secid will be updated
> later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here.
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
> kernel/auditsc.c | 5 ++++-
> security/security.c | 12 +++++++++---
> 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index a3e99bccb1bb..9519b4fb43ae 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
> void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
> int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
> -void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
> +void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob);
> int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
> void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
> int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
> @@ -1172,9 +1172,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
> +static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> - *secid = 0;
> + lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> }
>
> static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 04803c3099b2..ce8bf2d8f8d2 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -2285,11 +2285,14 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
> void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
> {
> struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
> context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
> context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
> context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
> - security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
> + security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob);
> + /* scaffolding on the [0] - change "osid" to a lsmblob */
> + context->ipc.osid = blob.secid[0];
> context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 0fc75a31a6bb..b60c6a51f622 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1783,10 +1783,16 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
> return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
> }
>
> -void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
> +void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> - *secid = 0;
> - call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + hp->hook.ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + }
> }
>
> int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v11 09/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
From: John Johansen @ 2019-11-21 18:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20191113181925.2437-10-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
On 11/13/19 10:19 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_task_getsecid() interface to fill in
> a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of
> LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
> possible secids for possible reporting.
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> drivers/android/binder.c | 4 +--
> include/linux/security.h | 7 ++---
> kernel/audit.c | 11 ++++----
> kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +--
> kernel/auditsc.c | 18 ++++++++-----
> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 +++-
> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 ++++-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 ++-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++-----------
> security/security.c | 12 ++++++---
> 10 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index 5f4702b4c507..3a7fcdc8dbe2 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -3108,12 +3108,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> t->priority = task_nice(current);
>
> if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
> - u32 secid;
> struct lsmblob blob;
> size_t added_size;
>
> - security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
> + security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob);
> ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
> if (ret) {
> return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 9519b4fb43ae..67f95a335b5d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
> int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
> int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
> int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
> -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
> +void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob);
> int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
> int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
> int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
> @@ -1099,9 +1099,10 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p,
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> - *secid = 0;
> + lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> }
>
> static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 2f8e89eaf3e5..fd29186ae977 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -2062,14 +2062,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> char *ctx = NULL;
> unsigned len;
> int error;
> - u32 sid;
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> - security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> - if (!sid)
> + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> + if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob))
> return 0;
>
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len);
> if (error) {
> if (error != -EINVAL)
> @@ -2276,6 +2274,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
> int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
> {
> kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
> (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
> @@ -2286,7 +2285,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
> audit_sig_uid = auid;
> else
> audit_sig_uid = uid;
> - security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid);
> + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> + /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */
> + audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0];
> }
>
> return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index 356db1dd276c..19cfbe716f9d 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -1324,7 +1324,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
> for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
> struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
> pid_t pid;
> - u32 sid;
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> switch (f->type) {
> @@ -1355,8 +1354,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
> case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
> if (f->lsm_rule) {
> - security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> result = security_audit_rule_match(
> &blob, f->type,
> f->op, f->lsm_rule);
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index ce8bf2d8f8d2..cccb681ad081 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> {
> const struct cred *cred;
> int i, need_sid = 1;
> - u32 sid;
> struct lsmblob blob;
> unsigned int sessionid;
>
> @@ -641,10 +640,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
> logged upon error */
> if (f->lsm_rule) {
> if (need_sid) {
> - security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
> + security_task_getsecid(tsk, &blob);
> need_sid = 0;
> }
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
> result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
> f->type,
> f->op,
> @@ -2382,12 +2380,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
> void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
> {
> struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
> context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
> context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
> context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> - security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
> + security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
> + /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */
> + context->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
> memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
> }
>
> @@ -2403,6 +2404,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
> struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
> struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
> kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
> return 0;
> @@ -2414,7 +2416,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
> ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
> ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
> ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> - security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
> + security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
> + /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
> + ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0];
> memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -2435,7 +2439,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
> axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
> axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
> axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> - security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
> + security_task_getsecid(t, &blob);
> + /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */
> + axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0];
> memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
> axp->pid_count++;
>
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> index 0cda17cb44a0..e279b81d9545 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
> @@ -1539,11 +1539,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
> int ret_val;
> struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
> struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> /* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
> * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
> * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
> - security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid);
> + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> + /* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */
> + audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0];
> audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
> audit_info.sessionid = 0;
>
> diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
> index 3c67afce64f1..438b5db6c714 100644
> --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
> +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
> @@ -34,7 +34,11 @@
> static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
> struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
> {
> - security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid);
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> +
> + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> + /* scaffolding until secid is converted */
> + audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0];
> audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
> audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
> }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index 136ae4e0ee92..7288a574459b 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -48,11 +48,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
> int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
> {
> u32 secid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> if (!ima_appraise)
> return 0;
>
> - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> + lsmblob_secid(&blob, &secid);
> return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
> IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL);
> }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 60027c643ecd..cac654c2faaf 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -380,12 +380,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
> */
> int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
> {
> - u32 secid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
> - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
> - 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
> + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> + /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
> + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
> + NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
> }
>
> return 0;
> @@ -408,10 +409,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> {
> int ret;
> u32 secid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> - ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
> - MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
> + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> + /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
> + ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
> + NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
> if (ret)
> return ret;
>
> @@ -432,10 +435,11 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> */
> int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
> {
> - u32 secid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
> + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> + /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
> + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
> mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
> MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
> }
> @@ -544,7 +548,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
> {
> enum ima_hooks func;
> - u32 secid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
> if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
> @@ -566,9 +570,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> }
>
> func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
> - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
> - MAY_READ, func);
> + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> + /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
> + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
> + size, MAY_READ, func);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -687,11 +692,13 @@ static void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
> void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size)
> {
> u32 secid;
> + struct lsmblob blob;
>
> if (buf && size != 0) {
> - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
> + /* scaffolding */
> process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, "kexec-cmdline",
> - current_cred(), secid);
> + current_cred(), blob.secid[0]);
> }
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index b60c6a51f622..e1f216d453bf 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1700,10 +1700,16 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
> return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
> }
>
> -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> +void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> - *secid = 0;
> - call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + hp->hook.task_getsecid(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + }
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
>
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v11 10/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
From: John Johansen @ 2019-11-21 18:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In-Reply-To: <20191113181925.2437-11-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
On 11/13/19 10:19 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Change the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a
> lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its
> callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided
> for IMA and audit.
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
> kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++++-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 +---
> security/security.c | 11 +++++++++--
> 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 67f95a335b5d..a845254fc415 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
> int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
> int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
> int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
> -void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
> +void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob);
> int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
> int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
> int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
> @@ -922,9 +922,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
> +static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode,
> + struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> - *secid = 0;
> + lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> }
>
> static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index cccb681ad081..5752e51883d5 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -1931,13 +1931,17 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
> const struct dentry *dentry,
> struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
> {
> + struct lsmblob blob;
> +
> name->ino = inode->i_ino;
> name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
> name->mode = inode->i_mode;
> name->uid = inode->i_uid;
> name->gid = inode->i_gid;
> name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
> - security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
> + security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
> + /* scaffolding until osid is updated */
> + name->osid = blob.secid[0];
> if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
> name->fcap_ver = -1;
> return;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 7711cc6a3fe3..c5417045e165 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -413,7 +413,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> return false;
> for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
> int rc = 0;
> - u32 osid;
> struct lsmblob blob;
>
> if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
> @@ -423,8 +422,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
> case LSM_OBJ_USER:
> case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
> case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
> - security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
> - lsmblob_init(&blob, osid);
> + security_inode_getsecid(inode, &blob);
> rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
> rule->lsm[i].type,
> Audit_equal,
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index e1f216d453bf..bd279a24adfc 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1386,9 +1386,16 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
>
> -void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
> +void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsmblob *blob)
> {
> - call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> +
> + lsmblob_init(blob, 0);
> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid, list) {
> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> + continue;
> + hp->hook.inode_getsecid(inode, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> + }
> }
>
> int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
>
^ permalink raw reply
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