* Re: [PATCH v2 4/4] nios2: implement architecture-specific portion of sys_clone3
From: Arnd Bergmann @ 2025-09-01 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com, Dinh Nguyen, Christian Brauner,
Andrew Morton, David Hildenbrand, Lorenzo Stoakes,
Liam R. Howlett, Vlastimil Babka, Mike Rapoport,
Suren Baghdasaryan, Michal Hocko, Ingo Molnar, Peter Zijlstra,
Juri Lelli, Vincent Guittot, Dietmar Eggemann, Steven Rostedt,
Benjamin Segall, Mel Gorman, Valentin Schneider, Kees Cook,
Paul Walmsley, Palmer Dabbelt, Albert Ou, Alexandre Ghiti, guoren,
Oleg Nesterov, Jens Axboe, Alexander Viro, Jan Kara, Tejun Heo,
Johannes Weiner, Michal Koutný, Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Anna-Maria Gleixner,
Frederic Weisbecker, Thomas Gleixner, Masami Hiramatsu,
David S . Miller, Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni,
Simon Horman, Mathieu Desnoyers, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo,
Namhyung Kim, Mark Rutland, Alexander Shishkin, Jiri Olsa,
Ian Rogers, Adrian Hunter, John Johansen, Stephen Smalley,
Ondrej Mosnacek, Kentaro Takeda, Tetsuo Handa, Richard Henderson,
Matt Turner, Vineet Gupta, Russell King, Catalin Marinas,
Will Deacon, Brian Cain, Huacai Chen, WANG Xuerui,
Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek, Thomas Bogendoerfer, Jonas Bonn,
Stefan Kristiansson, Stafford Horne, James E . J . Bottomley,
Helge Deller, Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman,
Nicholas Piggin, Christophe Leroy, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
Andreas Larsson, Richard Weinberger, Anton Ivanov, Johannes Berg,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel,
Max Filippov
Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, linux-riscv, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
linux-block, linux-fsdevel, cgroups, linux-security-module,
linux-trace-kernel, Netdev, linux-perf-users, apparmor, selinux,
linux-alpha, linux-snps-arc, linux-arm-kernel, linux-hexagon,
loongarch, linux-m68k, linux-mips, linux-openrisc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-parisc, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh, sparclinux,
linux-um
In-Reply-To: <20250901-nios2-implement-clone3-v2-4-53fcf5577d57@siemens-energy.com>
On Mon, Sep 1, 2025, at 15:09, Simon Schuster via B4 Relay wrote:
> From: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
>
> This commit adds the sys_clone3 entry point for nios2. An
> architecture-specific wrapper (__sys_clone3) is required to save and
> restore additional registers to the kernel stack via SAVE_SWITCH_STACK
> and RESTORE_SWITCH_STACK.
>
> Signed-off-by: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2 2/4] copy_process: pass clone_flags as u64 across calltree
From: Arnd Bergmann @ 2025-09-01 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com, Dinh Nguyen, Christian Brauner,
Andrew Morton, David Hildenbrand, Lorenzo Stoakes,
Liam R. Howlett, Vlastimil Babka, Mike Rapoport,
Suren Baghdasaryan, Michal Hocko, Ingo Molnar, Peter Zijlstra,
Juri Lelli, Vincent Guittot, Dietmar Eggemann, Steven Rostedt,
Benjamin Segall, Mel Gorman, Valentin Schneider, Kees Cook,
Paul Walmsley, Palmer Dabbelt, Albert Ou, Alexandre Ghiti, guoren,
Oleg Nesterov, Jens Axboe, Alexander Viro, Jan Kara, Tejun Heo,
Johannes Weiner, Michal Koutný, Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Anna-Maria Gleixner,
Frederic Weisbecker, Thomas Gleixner, Masami Hiramatsu,
David S . Miller, Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni,
Simon Horman, Mathieu Desnoyers, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo,
Namhyung Kim, Mark Rutland, Alexander Shishkin, Jiri Olsa,
Ian Rogers, Adrian Hunter, John Johansen, Stephen Smalley,
Ondrej Mosnacek, Kentaro Takeda, Tetsuo Handa, Richard Henderson,
Matt Turner, Vineet Gupta, Russell King, Catalin Marinas,
Will Deacon, Brian Cain, Huacai Chen, WANG Xuerui,
Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek, Thomas Bogendoerfer, Jonas Bonn,
Stefan Kristiansson, Stafford Horne, James E . J . Bottomley,
Helge Deller, Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman,
Nicholas Piggin, Christophe Leroy, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
Andreas Larsson, Richard Weinberger, Anton Ivanov, Johannes Berg,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel,
Max Filippov
Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, linux-riscv, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
linux-block, linux-fsdevel, cgroups, linux-security-module,
linux-trace-kernel, Netdev, linux-perf-users, apparmor, selinux,
linux-alpha, linux-snps-arc, linux-arm-kernel, linux-hexagon,
loongarch, linux-m68k, linux-mips, linux-openrisc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-parisc, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh, sparclinux,
linux-um
In-Reply-To: <20250901-nios2-implement-clone3-v2-2-53fcf5577d57@siemens-energy.com>
On Mon, Sep 1, 2025, at 15:09, Simon Schuster via B4 Relay wrote:
> From: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
>
> With the introduction of clone3 in commit 7f192e3cd316 ("fork: add
> clone3") the effective bit width of clone_flags on all architectures was
> increased from 32-bit to 64-bit, with a new type of u64 for the flags.
> However, for most consumers of clone_flags the interface was not
> changed from the previous type of unsigned long.
>
> While this works fine as long as none of the new 64-bit flag bits
> (CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND and CLONE_INTO_CGROUP) are evaluated, this is still
> undesirable in terms of the principle of least surprise.
>
> Thus, this commit fixes all relevant interfaces of callees to
> sys_clone3/copy_process (excluding the architecture-specific
> copy_thread) to consistently pass clone_flags as u64, so that
> no truncation to 32-bit integers occurs on 32-bit architectures.
>
> Signed-off-by: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
> Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] arch: copy_thread: pass clone_flags as u64
From: Arnd Bergmann @ 2025-09-01 13:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com, Dinh Nguyen, Christian Brauner,
Andrew Morton, David Hildenbrand, Lorenzo Stoakes,
Liam R. Howlett, Vlastimil Babka, Mike Rapoport,
Suren Baghdasaryan, Michal Hocko, Ingo Molnar, Peter Zijlstra,
Juri Lelli, Vincent Guittot, Dietmar Eggemann, Steven Rostedt,
Benjamin Segall, Mel Gorman, Valentin Schneider, Kees Cook,
Paul Walmsley, Palmer Dabbelt, Albert Ou, Alexandre Ghiti, guoren,
Oleg Nesterov, Jens Axboe, Alexander Viro, Jan Kara, Tejun Heo,
Johannes Weiner, Michal Koutný, Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Anna-Maria Gleixner,
Frederic Weisbecker, Thomas Gleixner, Masami Hiramatsu,
David S . Miller, Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni,
Simon Horman, Mathieu Desnoyers, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo,
Namhyung Kim, Mark Rutland, Alexander Shishkin, Jiri Olsa,
Ian Rogers, Adrian Hunter, John Johansen, Stephen Smalley,
Ondrej Mosnacek, Kentaro Takeda, Tetsuo Handa, Richard Henderson,
Matt Turner, Vineet Gupta, Russell King, Catalin Marinas,
Will Deacon, Brian Cain, Huacai Chen, WANG Xuerui,
Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek, Thomas Bogendoerfer, Jonas Bonn,
Stefan Kristiansson, Stafford Horne, James E . J . Bottomley,
Helge Deller, Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman,
Nicholas Piggin, Christophe Leroy, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
Andreas Larsson, Richard Weinberger, Anton Ivanov, Johannes Berg,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel,
Max Filippov
Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, linux-riscv, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
linux-block, linux-fsdevel, cgroups, linux-security-module,
linux-trace-kernel, Netdev, linux-perf-users, apparmor, selinux,
linux-alpha, linux-snps-arc, linux-arm-kernel, linux-hexagon,
loongarch, linux-m68k, linux-mips, linux-openrisc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-parisc, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh, sparclinux,
linux-um
In-Reply-To: <20250901-nios2-implement-clone3-v2-3-53fcf5577d57@siemens-energy.com>
On Mon, Sep 1, 2025, at 15:09, Simon Schuster via B4 Relay wrote:
> From: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
>
> With the introduction of clone3 in commit 7f192e3cd316 ("fork: add
> clone3") the effective bit width of clone_flags on all architectures was
> increased from 32-bit to 64-bit, with a new type of u64 for the flags.
> However, for most consumers of clone_flags the interface was not
> changed from the previous type of unsigned long.
>
> While this works fine as long as none of the new 64-bit flag bits
> (CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND and CLONE_INTO_CGROUP) are evaluated, this is still
> undesirable in terms of the principle of least surprise.
>
> Thus, this commit fixes all relevant interfaces of the copy_thread
> function that is called from copy_process to consistently pass
> clone_flags as u64, so that no truncation to 32-bit integers occurs on
> 32-bit architectures.
>
> Signed-off-by: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] copy_sighand: Handle architectures where sizeof(unsigned long) < sizeof(u64)
From: David Hildenbrand @ 2025-09-01 13:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: schuster.simon, Dinh Nguyen, Christian Brauner, Arnd Bergmann,
Andrew Morton, Lorenzo Stoakes, Liam R. Howlett, Vlastimil Babka,
Mike Rapoport
Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, linux-riscv, linux-csky, linux-block,
linux-fsdevel, cgroups, linux-security-module, linux-trace-kernel,
netdev, linux-perf-users, apparmor, selinux, linux-alpha,
linux-snps-arc, linux-arm-kernel, linux-hexagon, loongarch,
linux-m68k, linux-mips, linux-openrisc, linux-parisc,
linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh, sparclinux, linux-um, stable
In-Reply-To: <20250901-nios2-implement-clone3-v2-1-53fcf5577d57@siemens-energy.com>
On 01.09.25 15:09, Simon Schuster via B4 Relay wrote:
> From: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
>
> With the introduction of clone3 in commit 7f192e3cd316 ("fork: add
> clone3") the effective bit width of clone_flags on all architectures was
> increased from 32-bit to 64-bit. However, the signature of the copy_*
> helper functions (e.g., copy_sighand) used by copy_process was not
> adapted.
>
> As such, they truncate the flags on any 32-bit architectures that
> supports clone3 (arc, arm, csky, m68k, microblaze, mips32, openrisc,
> parisc32, powerpc32, riscv32, x86-32 and xtensa).
>
> For copy_sighand with CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND being an actual u64
> constant, this triggers an observable bug in kernel selftest
> clone3_clear_sighand:
>
> if (clone_flags & CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND)
>
> in function copy_sighand within fork.c will always fail given:
>
> unsigned long /* == uint32_t */ clone_flags
> #define CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND 0x100000000ULL
>
> This commit fixes the bug by always passing clone_flags to copy_sighand
> via their declared u64 type, invariant of architecture-dependent integer
> sizes.
>
> Fixes: b612e5df4587 ("clone3: add CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # linux-5.5+
> Signed-off-by: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
> Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
> ---
(stripping To list)
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
--
Cheers
David / dhildenb
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] copy_sighand: Handle architectures where sizeof(unsigned long) < sizeof(u64)
From: Arnd Bergmann @ 2025-09-01 13:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com, Dinh Nguyen, Christian Brauner,
Andrew Morton, David Hildenbrand, Lorenzo Stoakes,
Liam R. Howlett, Vlastimil Babka, Mike Rapoport,
Suren Baghdasaryan, Michal Hocko, Ingo Molnar, Peter Zijlstra,
Juri Lelli, Vincent Guittot, Dietmar Eggemann, Steven Rostedt,
Benjamin Segall, Mel Gorman, Valentin Schneider, Kees Cook,
Paul Walmsley, Palmer Dabbelt, Albert Ou, Alexandre Ghiti, guoren,
Oleg Nesterov, Jens Axboe, Alexander Viro, Jan Kara, Tejun Heo,
Johannes Weiner, Michal Koutný, Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Anna-Maria Gleixner,
Frederic Weisbecker, Thomas Gleixner, Masami Hiramatsu,
David S . Miller, Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni,
Simon Horman, Mathieu Desnoyers, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo,
Namhyung Kim, Mark Rutland, Alexander Shishkin, Jiri Olsa,
Ian Rogers, Adrian Hunter, John Johansen, Stephen Smalley,
Ondrej Mosnacek, Kentaro Takeda, Tetsuo Handa, Richard Henderson,
Matt Turner, Vineet Gupta, Russell King, Catalin Marinas,
Will Deacon, Brian Cain, Huacai Chen, WANG Xuerui,
Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek, Thomas Bogendoerfer, Jonas Bonn,
Stefan Kristiansson, Stafford Horne, James E . J . Bottomley,
Helge Deller, Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman,
Nicholas Piggin, Christophe Leroy, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
Andreas Larsson, Richard Weinberger, Anton Ivanov, Johannes Berg,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel,
Max Filippov
Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, linux-riscv, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
linux-block, linux-fsdevel, cgroups, linux-security-module,
linux-trace-kernel, Netdev, linux-perf-users, apparmor, selinux,
linux-alpha, linux-snps-arc, linux-arm-kernel, linux-hexagon,
loongarch, linux-m68k, linux-mips, linux-openrisc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-parisc, linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh, sparclinux,
linux-um, stable
In-Reply-To: <20250901-nios2-implement-clone3-v2-1-53fcf5577d57@siemens-energy.com>
On Mon, Sep 1, 2025, at 15:09, Simon Schuster via B4 Relay wrote:
> This commit fixes the bug by always passing clone_flags to copy_sighand
> via their declared u64 type, invariant of architecture-dependent integer
> sizes.
>
> Fixes: b612e5df4587 ("clone3: add CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # linux-5.5+
> Signed-off-by: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
> Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/2] Add O_DENY_WRITE (complement AT_EXECVE_CHECK)
From: Serge E. Hallyn @ 2025-09-01 13:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jann Horn
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn, Andy Lutomirski, Aleksa Sarai,
Mickaël Salaün, Christian Brauner, Al Viro, Kees Cook,
Paul Moore, Arnd Bergmann, Christian Heimes, Dmitry Vyukov,
Elliott Hughes, Fan Wu, Florian Weimer, Jeff Xu, Jonathan Corbet,
Jordan R Abrahams, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian, Luca Boccassi,
Matt Bobrowski, Miklos Szeredi, Mimi Zohar, Nicolas Bouchinet,
Robert Waite, Roberto Sassu, Scott Shell, Steve Dower,
Steve Grubb, kernel-hardening, linux-api, linux-fsdevel,
linux-integrity, linux-kernel, linux-security-module
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez0p1B9nmG3ZyNRywaSYTtEULSpbxueia912nVpg2Q7WYA@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Sep 01, 2025 at 01:05:16PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 28, 2025 at 11:01 PM Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Aug 27, 2025 at 05:32:02PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > On Wed, Aug 27, 2025 at 5:14 PM Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On 2025-08-26, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
> > > > > On Tue, Aug 26, 2025 at 11:07:03AM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > > > > > Nothing has changed in that regard and I'm not interested in stuffing
> > > > > > the VFS APIs full of special-purpose behavior to work around the fact
> > > > > > that this is work that needs to be done in userspace. Change the apps,
> > > > > > stop pushing more and more cruft into the VFS that has no business
> > > > > > there.
> > > > >
> > > > > It would be interesting to know how to patch user space to get the same
> > > > > guarantees... Do you think I would propose a kernel patch otherwise?
> > > >
> > > > You could mmap the script file with MAP_PRIVATE. This is the *actual*
> > > > protection the kernel uses against overwriting binaries (yes, ETXTBSY is
> > > > nice but IIRC there are ways to get around it anyway).
> > >
> > > Wait, really? MAP_PRIVATE prevents writes to the mapping from
> > > affecting the file, but I don't think that writes to the file will
> > > break the MAP_PRIVATE CoW if it's not already broken.
> > >
> > > IPython says:
> > >
> > > In [1]: import mmap, tempfile
> > >
> > > In [2]: f = tempfile.TemporaryFile()
> > >
> > > In [3]: f.write(b'initial contents')
> > > Out[3]: 16
> > >
> > > In [4]: f.flush()
> > >
> > > In [5]: map = mmap.mmap(f.fileno(), f.tell(), flags=mmap.MAP_PRIVATE,
> > > prot=mmap.PROT_READ)
> > >
> > > In [6]: map[:]
> > > Out[6]: b'initial contents'
> > >
> > > In [7]: f.seek(0)
> > > Out[7]: 0
> > >
> > > In [8]: f.write(b'changed')
> > > Out[8]: 7
> > >
> > > In [9]: f.flush()
> > >
> > > In [10]: map[:]
> > > Out[10]: b'changed contents'
> >
> > That was surprising to me, however, if I split the reader
> > and writer into different processes, so
>
> Testing this in python is a terrible idea because it obfuscates the
> actual syscalls from you.
Hah, I was just trying to fit in :), but of course you're right.
Redoing it in straight c, I'm getting the updates.
-serge
// mmap-w.c (creates an overwrites)
#include <stdio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define FIRST "Initial contents"
#define SECOND "updated contents"
int main() {
int fd, rc;
char c;
fd = open("/tmp/m", O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0644);
if (fd < 0) {
printf("failed to open /tmp/m: %m\n");
_exit(1);
}
rc = write(fd, FIRST, sizeof(FIRST));
if (rc < 0) {
printf("write failed: %m\n");
_exit(1);
}
rc = fsync(fd);
if (rc < 0) {
printf("flush failed: %m\n");
_exit(1);
}
read(STDIN_FILENO, &c, 1);
printf("updating the contents\n");
rc = lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
if (rc < 0) {
printf("seek failed; %m\n");
_exit(1);
}
rc = write(fd, SECOND, sizeof(SECOND));
if (fd < 0) {
printf("write failed: %m\n");
_exit(1);
}
rc = close(fd);
if (rc < 0) {
printf("close failed: %m\n");
_exit(1);
}
printf("done\n");
}
// mmap-r.c (checks and re-checks contents)
#include <stdio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <string.h>
#define FIRST "Initial contents"
#define SECOND "Updated contents"
int main() {
int fd, rc;
char *m;
char c;
fd = open("/tmp/m", O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
printf("failed to open /tmp/m: %m\n");
_exit(1);
}
m = mmap(NULL, 40, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
if (m == MAP_FAILED) {
printf("mmap failed: %m\n");
_exit(1);
}
if (strncmp(m, FIRST, 7) != 0) {
printf("m is %c%c%c%c%c%c%c\n",
m[0], m[1], m[2], m[3], m[4], m[5], m[6]);
_exit(1);
}
read(STDIN_FILENO, &c, 1);
if (strncmp(m, SECOND, 7) != 0) {
printf("m is %c%c%c%c%c%c%c\n",
m[0], m[1], m[2], m[3], m[4], m[5], m[6]);
_exit(1);
}
printf("done\n");
}
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v2 4/4] nios2: implement architecture-specific portion of sys_clone3
From: Simon Schuster via B4 Relay @ 2025-09-01 13:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dinh Nguyen, Christian Brauner, Arnd Bergmann, Andrew Morton,
David Hildenbrand, Lorenzo Stoakes, Liam R. Howlett,
Vlastimil Babka, Mike Rapoport, Suren Baghdasaryan, Michal Hocko,
Ingo Molnar, Peter Zijlstra, Juri Lelli, Vincent Guittot,
Dietmar Eggemann, Steven Rostedt, Ben Segall, Mel Gorman,
Valentin Schneider, Kees Cook, Paul Walmsley, Palmer Dabbelt,
Albert Ou, Alexandre Ghiti, Guo Ren, Oleg Nesterov, Jens Axboe,
Alexander Viro, Jan Kara, Tejun Heo, Johannes Weiner,
Michal Koutný, Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn, James Morris,
Serge E. Hallyn, Anna-Maria Behnsen, Frederic Weisbecker,
Thomas Gleixner, Masami Hiramatsu, David S. Miller, Eric Dumazet,
Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman, Mathieu Desnoyers,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo, Namhyung Kim, Mark Rutland,
Alexander Shishkin, Jiri Olsa, Ian Rogers, Adrian Hunter,
John Johansen, Stephen Smalley, Ondrej Mosnacek, Kentaro Takeda,
Tetsuo Handa, Richard Henderson, Matt Turner, Vineet Gupta,
Russell King, Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Brian Cain,
Huacai Chen, WANG Xuerui, Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, Jonas Bonn, Stefan Kristiansson,
Stafford Horne, James E.J. Bottomley, Helge Deller,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman, Nicholas Piggin,
Christophe Leroy, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
Andreas Larsson, Richard Weinberger, Anton Ivanov, Johannes Berg,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel,
Max Filippov
Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, linux-riscv, linux-csky, linux-block,
linux-fsdevel, cgroups, linux-security-module, linux-trace-kernel,
netdev, linux-perf-users, apparmor, selinux, linux-alpha,
linux-snps-arc, linux-arm-kernel, linux-hexagon, loongarch,
linux-m68k, linux-mips, linux-openrisc, linux-parisc,
linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh, sparclinux, linux-um,
Simon Schuster
In-Reply-To: <20250901-nios2-implement-clone3-v2-0-53fcf5577d57@siemens-energy.com>
From: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
This commit adds the sys_clone3 entry point for nios2. An
architecture-specific wrapper (__sys_clone3) is required to save and
restore additional registers to the kernel stack via SAVE_SWITCH_STACK
and RESTORE_SWITCH_STACK.
Signed-off-by: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
---
arch/nios2/include/asm/syscalls.h | 1 +
arch/nios2/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 --
arch/nios2/kernel/entry.S | 6 ++++++
arch/nios2/kernel/syscall_table.c | 1 +
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/nios2/include/asm/syscalls.h b/arch/nios2/include/asm/syscalls.h
index b4d4ed3bf9c8..0e214b0a0ac8 100644
--- a/arch/nios2/include/asm/syscalls.h
+++ b/arch/nios2/include/asm/syscalls.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
int sys_cacheflush(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
unsigned int op);
+asmlinkage long __sys_clone3(struct clone_args __user *uargs, size_t size);
#include <asm-generic/syscalls.h>
diff --git a/arch/nios2/include/asm/unistd.h b/arch/nios2/include/asm/unistd.h
index 1146e56473c5..213f6de3cf7b 100644
--- a/arch/nios2/include/asm/unistd.h
+++ b/arch/nios2/include/asm/unistd.h
@@ -7,6 +7,4 @@
#define __ARCH_WANT_STAT64
#define __ARCH_WANT_SET_GET_RLIMIT
-#define __ARCH_BROKEN_SYS_CLONE3
-
#endif
diff --git a/arch/nios2/kernel/entry.S b/arch/nios2/kernel/entry.S
index 99f0a65e6234..dd40dfd908e5 100644
--- a/arch/nios2/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/nios2/kernel/entry.S
@@ -403,6 +403,12 @@ ENTRY(sys_clone)
addi sp, sp, 4
RESTORE_SWITCH_STACK
ret
+/* long syscall(SYS_clone3, struct clone_args *cl_args, size_t size); */
+ENTRY(__sys_clone3)
+ SAVE_SWITCH_STACK
+ call sys_clone3
+ RESTORE_SWITCH_STACK
+ ret
ENTRY(sys_rt_sigreturn)
SAVE_SWITCH_STACK
diff --git a/arch/nios2/kernel/syscall_table.c b/arch/nios2/kernel/syscall_table.c
index 434694067d8f..c99818aac9e1 100644
--- a/arch/nios2/kernel/syscall_table.c
+++ b/arch/nios2/kernel/syscall_table.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#define __SYSCALL_WITH_COMPAT(nr, native, compat) __SYSCALL(nr, native)
#define sys_mmap2 sys_mmap_pgoff
+#define sys_clone3 __sys_clone3
void *sys_call_table[__NR_syscalls] = {
[0 ... __NR_syscalls-1] = sys_ni_syscall,
--
2.39.5
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 3/4] arch: copy_thread: pass clone_flags as u64
From: Simon Schuster via B4 Relay @ 2025-09-01 13:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dinh Nguyen, Christian Brauner, Arnd Bergmann, Andrew Morton,
David Hildenbrand, Lorenzo Stoakes, Liam R. Howlett,
Vlastimil Babka, Mike Rapoport, Suren Baghdasaryan, Michal Hocko,
Ingo Molnar, Peter Zijlstra, Juri Lelli, Vincent Guittot,
Dietmar Eggemann, Steven Rostedt, Ben Segall, Mel Gorman,
Valentin Schneider, Kees Cook, Paul Walmsley, Palmer Dabbelt,
Albert Ou, Alexandre Ghiti, Guo Ren, Oleg Nesterov, Jens Axboe,
Alexander Viro, Jan Kara, Tejun Heo, Johannes Weiner,
Michal Koutný, Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn, James Morris,
Serge E. Hallyn, Anna-Maria Behnsen, Frederic Weisbecker,
Thomas Gleixner, Masami Hiramatsu, David S. Miller, Eric Dumazet,
Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman, Mathieu Desnoyers,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo, Namhyung Kim, Mark Rutland,
Alexander Shishkin, Jiri Olsa, Ian Rogers, Adrian Hunter,
John Johansen, Stephen Smalley, Ondrej Mosnacek, Kentaro Takeda,
Tetsuo Handa, Richard Henderson, Matt Turner, Vineet Gupta,
Russell King, Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Brian Cain,
Huacai Chen, WANG Xuerui, Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, Jonas Bonn, Stefan Kristiansson,
Stafford Horne, James E.J. Bottomley, Helge Deller,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman, Nicholas Piggin,
Christophe Leroy, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
Andreas Larsson, Richard Weinberger, Anton Ivanov, Johannes Berg,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel,
Max Filippov
Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, linux-riscv, linux-csky, linux-block,
linux-fsdevel, cgroups, linux-security-module, linux-trace-kernel,
netdev, linux-perf-users, apparmor, selinux, linux-alpha,
linux-snps-arc, linux-arm-kernel, linux-hexagon, loongarch,
linux-m68k, linux-mips, linux-openrisc, linux-parisc,
linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh, sparclinux, linux-um,
Simon Schuster
In-Reply-To: <20250901-nios2-implement-clone3-v2-0-53fcf5577d57@siemens-energy.com>
From: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
With the introduction of clone3 in commit 7f192e3cd316 ("fork: add
clone3") the effective bit width of clone_flags on all architectures was
increased from 32-bit to 64-bit, with a new type of u64 for the flags.
However, for most consumers of clone_flags the interface was not
changed from the previous type of unsigned long.
While this works fine as long as none of the new 64-bit flag bits
(CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND and CLONE_INTO_CGROUP) are evaluated, this is still
undesirable in terms of the principle of least surprise.
Thus, this commit fixes all relevant interfaces of the copy_thread
function that is called from copy_process to consistently pass
clone_flags as u64, so that no truncation to 32-bit integers occurs on
32-bit architectures.
Signed-off-by: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
---
arch/alpha/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/arc/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/arm/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/csky/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/hexagon/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/loongarch/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/m68k/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/microblaze/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/mips/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/nios2/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/openrisc/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/parisc/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/riscv/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/s390/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/sh/kernel/process_32.c | 2 +-
arch/sparc/kernel/process_32.c | 2 +-
arch/sparc/kernel/process_64.c | 2 +-
arch/um/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/sched.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 2 +-
arch/xtensa/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
26 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/process.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/process.c
index 582d96548385..06522451f018 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/process.c
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ flush_thread(void)
*/
int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long usp = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
extern void ret_from_fork(void);
diff --git a/arch/arc/kernel/process.c b/arch/arc/kernel/process.c
index 186ceab661eb..8166d0908713 100644
--- a/arch/arc/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/arc/kernel/process.c
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ asmlinkage void ret_from_fork(void);
*/
int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long usp = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
struct pt_regs *c_regs; /* child's pt_regs */
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm/kernel/process.c
index e16ed102960c..d7aa95225c70 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/process.c
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ asmlinkage void ret_from_fork(void) __asm__("ret_from_fork");
int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long stack_start = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
struct thread_info *thread = task_thread_info(p);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
index 96482a1412c6..fba7ca102a8c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ asmlinkage void ret_from_fork(void) asm("ret_from_fork");
int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long stack_start = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
struct pt_regs *childregs = task_pt_regs(p);
diff --git a/arch/csky/kernel/process.c b/arch/csky/kernel/process.c
index 0c6e4b17fe00..a7a90340042a 100644
--- a/arch/csky/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/csky/kernel/process.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ void flush_thread(void){}
int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long usp = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
struct switch_stack *childstack;
diff --git a/arch/hexagon/kernel/process.c b/arch/hexagon/kernel/process.c
index 2a77bfd75694..15b4992bfa29 100644
--- a/arch/hexagon/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/hexagon/kernel/process.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ void arch_cpu_idle(void)
*/
int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long usp = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
struct thread_info *ti = task_thread_info(p);
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/process.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/process.c
index 3582f591bab2..efd9edf65603 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/process.c
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
unsigned long childksp;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
unsigned long usp = args->stack;
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
struct pt_regs *childregs, *regs = current_pt_regs();
childksp = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p) + THREAD_SIZE;
diff --git a/arch/m68k/kernel/process.c b/arch/m68k/kernel/process.c
index fda7eac23f87..f5a07a70e938 100644
--- a/arch/m68k/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/m68k/kernel/process.c
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ asmlinkage int m68k_clone3(struct pt_regs *regs)
int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long usp = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
struct fork_frame {
diff --git a/arch/microblaze/kernel/process.c b/arch/microblaze/kernel/process.c
index 56342e11442d..6cbf642d7b80 100644
--- a/arch/microblaze/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/microblaze/kernel/process.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ void flush_thread(void)
int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long usp = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
struct pt_regs *childregs = task_pt_regs(p);
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/process.c b/arch/mips/kernel/process.c
index 02aa6a04a21d..29191fa1801e 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/process.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ int arch_dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src)
*/
int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long usp = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
struct thread_info *ti = task_thread_info(p);
diff --git a/arch/nios2/kernel/process.c b/arch/nios2/kernel/process.c
index f84021303f6a..151404139085 100644
--- a/arch/nios2/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/nios2/kernel/process.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ void flush_thread(void)
int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long usp = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
struct pt_regs *childregs = task_pt_regs(p);
diff --git a/arch/openrisc/kernel/process.c b/arch/openrisc/kernel/process.c
index eef99fee2110..73ffb9fa3118 100644
--- a/arch/openrisc/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/openrisc/kernel/process.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ extern asmlinkage void ret_from_fork(void);
int
copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long usp = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
struct pt_regs *userregs;
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/process.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/process.c
index ed93bd8c1545..e64ab5d2a40d 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/process.c
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ arch_initcall(parisc_idle_init);
int
copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long usp = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
struct pt_regs *cregs = &(p->thread.regs);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
index 855e09886503..eb23966ac0a9 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
@@ -1805,7 +1805,7 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
f = ret_from_kernel_user_thread;
} else {
struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long usp = args->stack;
/* Copy registers */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c
index a0a40889d79a..31a392993cb4 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ asmlinkage void ret_from_fork_user(struct pt_regs *regs)
int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long usp = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
struct pt_regs *childregs = task_pt_regs(p);
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/process.c b/arch/s390/kernel/process.c
index f55f09cda6f8..b107dbca4ed7 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/process.c
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ int arch_dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src)
int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long new_stackp = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
struct fake_frame
diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/process_32.c b/arch/sh/kernel/process_32.c
index 92b6649d4929..62f753a85b89 100644
--- a/arch/sh/kernel/process_32.c
+++ b/arch/sh/kernel/process_32.c
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ asmlinkage void ret_from_kernel_thread(void);
int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long usp = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
struct thread_info *ti = task_thread_info(p);
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/process_32.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/process_32.c
index 9c7c662cb565..5a28c0e91bf1 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/process_32.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/process_32.c
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ extern void ret_from_kernel_thread(void);
int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long sp = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
struct thread_info *ti = task_thread_info(p);
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/process_64.c
index 529adfecd58c..25781923788a 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ void fault_in_user_windows(struct pt_regs *regs)
*/
int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long sp = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
struct thread_info *t = task_thread_info(p);
diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/process.c b/arch/um/kernel/process.c
index 1be644de9e41..9c9c66dc45f0 100644
--- a/arch/um/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/um/kernel/process.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static void fork_handler(void)
int copy_thread(struct task_struct * p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long sp = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
void (*handler)(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/sched.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/sched.h
index c060549c6c94..89004f4ca208 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/sched.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/sched.h
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
extern void save_fpregs_to_fpstate(struct fpu *fpu);
extern void fpu__drop(struct task_struct *tsk);
-extern int fpu_clone(struct task_struct *dst, unsigned long clone_flags, bool minimal,
+extern int fpu_clone(struct task_struct *dst, u64 clone_flags, bool minimal,
unsigned long shstk_addr);
extern void fpu_flush_thread(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
index ba6f2fe43848..0f50e0125943 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ struct thread_shstk {
long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2);
void reset_thread_features(void);
-unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags,
+unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p, u64 clone_flags,
unsigned long stack_size);
void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig);
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static inline long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option,
unsigned long arg2) { return -EINVAL; }
static inline void reset_thread_features(void) {}
static inline unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p,
- unsigned long clone_flags,
+ u64 clone_flags,
unsigned long stack_size) { return 0; }
static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
static inline int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig) { return 0; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
index aefd412a23dc..1f71cc135e9a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ static int update_fpu_shstk(struct task_struct *dst, unsigned long ssp)
}
/* Clone current's FPU state on fork */
-int fpu_clone(struct task_struct *dst, unsigned long clone_flags, bool minimal,
+int fpu_clone(struct task_struct *dst, u64 clone_flags, bool minimal,
unsigned long ssp)
{
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 1b7960cf6eb0..e3a3987b0c4f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ __visible void ret_from_fork(struct task_struct *prev, struct pt_regs *regs,
int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long sp = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
struct inactive_task_frame *frame;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
index 2ddf23387c7e..5eba6c5a6775 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ void reset_thread_features(void)
current->thread.features_locked = 0;
}
-unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long clone_flags,
+unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, u64 clone_flags,
unsigned long stack_size)
{
struct thread_shstk *shstk = &tsk->thread.shstk;
diff --git a/arch/xtensa/kernel/process.c b/arch/xtensa/kernel/process.c
index 7bd66677f7b6..94d43f44be13 100644
--- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/process.c
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ int arch_dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src)
int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
- unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
+ u64 clone_flags = args->flags;
unsigned long usp_thread_fn = args->stack;
unsigned long tls = args->tls;
struct pt_regs *childregs = task_pt_regs(p);
--
2.39.5
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 2/4] copy_process: pass clone_flags as u64 across calltree
From: Simon Schuster via B4 Relay @ 2025-09-01 13:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dinh Nguyen, Christian Brauner, Arnd Bergmann, Andrew Morton,
David Hildenbrand, Lorenzo Stoakes, Liam R. Howlett,
Vlastimil Babka, Mike Rapoport, Suren Baghdasaryan, Michal Hocko,
Ingo Molnar, Peter Zijlstra, Juri Lelli, Vincent Guittot,
Dietmar Eggemann, Steven Rostedt, Ben Segall, Mel Gorman,
Valentin Schneider, Kees Cook, Paul Walmsley, Palmer Dabbelt,
Albert Ou, Alexandre Ghiti, Guo Ren, Oleg Nesterov, Jens Axboe,
Alexander Viro, Jan Kara, Tejun Heo, Johannes Weiner,
Michal Koutný, Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn, James Morris,
Serge E. Hallyn, Anna-Maria Behnsen, Frederic Weisbecker,
Thomas Gleixner, Masami Hiramatsu, David S. Miller, Eric Dumazet,
Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman, Mathieu Desnoyers,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo, Namhyung Kim, Mark Rutland,
Alexander Shishkin, Jiri Olsa, Ian Rogers, Adrian Hunter,
John Johansen, Stephen Smalley, Ondrej Mosnacek, Kentaro Takeda,
Tetsuo Handa, Richard Henderson, Matt Turner, Vineet Gupta,
Russell King, Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Brian Cain,
Huacai Chen, WANG Xuerui, Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, Jonas Bonn, Stefan Kristiansson,
Stafford Horne, James E.J. Bottomley, Helge Deller,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman, Nicholas Piggin,
Christophe Leroy, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
Andreas Larsson, Richard Weinberger, Anton Ivanov, Johannes Berg,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel,
Max Filippov
Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, linux-riscv, linux-csky, linux-block,
linux-fsdevel, cgroups, linux-security-module, linux-trace-kernel,
netdev, linux-perf-users, apparmor, selinux, linux-alpha,
linux-snps-arc, linux-arm-kernel, linux-hexagon, loongarch,
linux-m68k, linux-mips, linux-openrisc, linux-parisc,
linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh, sparclinux, linux-um,
Simon Schuster
In-Reply-To: <20250901-nios2-implement-clone3-v2-0-53fcf5577d57@siemens-energy.com>
From: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
With the introduction of clone3 in commit 7f192e3cd316 ("fork: add
clone3") the effective bit width of clone_flags on all architectures was
increased from 32-bit to 64-bit, with a new type of u64 for the flags.
However, for most consumers of clone_flags the interface was not
changed from the previous type of unsigned long.
While this works fine as long as none of the new 64-bit flag bits
(CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND and CLONE_INTO_CGROUP) are evaluated, this is still
undesirable in terms of the principle of least surprise.
Thus, this commit fixes all relevant interfaces of callees to
sys_clone3/copy_process (excluding the architecture-specific
copy_thread) to consistently pass clone_flags as u64, so that
no truncation to 32-bit integers occurs on 32-bit architectures.
Signed-off-by: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
---
block/blk-ioc.c | 2 +-
fs/namespace.c | 2 +-
include/linux/cgroup.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/cred.h | 2 +-
include/linux/iocontext.h | 6 +++---
include/linux/ipc_namespace.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +-
include/linux/mnt_namespace.h | 2 +-
include/linux/nsproxy.h | 2 +-
include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/rseq.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/sched/task.h | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/sem.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/time_namespace.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/uprobes.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/user_events.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/utsname.h | 4 ++--
include/net/net_namespace.h | 4 ++--
include/trace/events/task.h | 6 +++---
ipc/namespace.c | 2 +-
ipc/sem.c | 2 +-
kernel/cgroup/namespace.c | 2 +-
kernel/cred.c | 2 +-
kernel/events/uprobes.c | 2 +-
kernel/fork.c | 8 ++++----
kernel/nsproxy.c | 4 ++--
kernel/pid_namespace.c | 2 +-
kernel/sched/core.c | 4 ++--
kernel/sched/fair.c | 2 +-
kernel/sched/sched.h | 4 ++--
kernel/time/namespace.c | 2 +-
kernel/utsname.c | 2 +-
net/core/net_namespace.c | 2 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 +-
38 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
diff --git a/block/blk-ioc.c b/block/blk-ioc.c
index 9fda3906e5f5..d15918d7fabb 100644
--- a/block/blk-ioc.c
+++ b/block/blk-ioc.c
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ int set_task_ioprio(struct task_struct *task, int ioprio)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_task_ioprio);
-int __copy_io(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
+int __copy_io(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct io_context *ioc = current->io_context;
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 4b352a44cb80..0cd875b38552 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -4202,7 +4202,7 @@ static struct mnt_namespace *alloc_mnt_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns, bool a
}
__latent_entropy
-struct mnt_namespace *copy_mnt_ns(unsigned long flags, struct mnt_namespace *ns,
+struct mnt_namespace *copy_mnt_ns(u64 flags, struct mnt_namespace *ns,
struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct fs_struct *new_fs)
{
struct mnt_namespace *new_ns;
diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup.h b/include/linux/cgroup.h
index ae73dbb19165..15ed7a8f0abb 100644
--- a/include/linux/cgroup.h
+++ b/include/linux/cgroup.h
@@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ extern struct cgroup_namespace init_cgroup_ns;
void free_cgroup_ns(struct cgroup_namespace *ns);
-struct cgroup_namespace *copy_cgroup_ns(unsigned long flags,
+struct cgroup_namespace *copy_cgroup_ns(u64 flags,
struct user_namespace *user_ns,
struct cgroup_namespace *old_ns);
@@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ static inline void put_cgroup_ns(struct cgroup_namespace *ns)
static inline void free_cgroup_ns(struct cgroup_namespace *ns) { }
static inline struct cgroup_namespace *
-copy_cgroup_ns(unsigned long flags, struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+copy_cgroup_ns(u64 flags, struct user_namespace *user_ns,
struct cgroup_namespace *old_ns)
{
return old_ns;
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index a102a10f833f..89ae50ad2ace 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ struct cred {
extern void __put_cred(struct cred *);
extern void exit_creds(struct task_struct *);
-extern int copy_creds(struct task_struct *, unsigned long);
+extern int copy_creds(struct task_struct *, u64);
extern const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *);
extern struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void);
extern struct cred *prepare_creds(void);
diff --git a/include/linux/iocontext.h b/include/linux/iocontext.h
index 14f7eaf1b443..079d8773790c 100644
--- a/include/linux/iocontext.h
+++ b/include/linux/iocontext.h
@@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ struct task_struct;
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
void put_io_context(struct io_context *ioc);
void exit_io_context(struct task_struct *task);
-int __copy_io(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk);
-static inline int copy_io(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
+int __copy_io(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk);
+static inline int copy_io(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
if (!current->io_context)
return 0;
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static inline int copy_io(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
struct io_context;
static inline void put_io_context(struct io_context *ioc) { }
static inline void exit_io_context(struct task_struct *task) { }
-static inline int copy_io(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
+static inline int copy_io(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/ipc_namespace.h b/include/linux/ipc_namespace.h
index e8240cf2611a..4b399893e2b3 100644
--- a/include/linux/ipc_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/ipc_namespace.h
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static inline int mq_init_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { return 0; }
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_IPC_NS)
-extern struct ipc_namespace *copy_ipcs(unsigned long flags,
+extern struct ipc_namespace *copy_ipcs(u64 flags,
struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct ipc_namespace *ns);
static inline struct ipc_namespace *get_ipc_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns)
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static inline struct ipc_namespace *get_ipc_ns_not_zero(struct ipc_namespace *ns
extern void put_ipc_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns);
#else
-static inline struct ipc_namespace *copy_ipcs(unsigned long flags,
+static inline struct ipc_namespace *copy_ipcs(u64 flags,
struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct ipc_namespace *ns)
{
if (flags & CLONE_NEWIPC)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index fd11fffdd3c3..adbe234a6f6c 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_open, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_post_open, struct file *file, int mask)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_truncate, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_alloc, struct task_struct *task,
- unsigned long clone_flags)
+ u64 clone_flags)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_free, struct task_struct *task)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, cred_alloc_blank, struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, cred_free, struct cred *cred)
diff --git a/include/linux/mnt_namespace.h b/include/linux/mnt_namespace.h
index 70b366b64816..ff290c87b2e7 100644
--- a/include/linux/mnt_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/mnt_namespace.h
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ struct fs_struct;
struct user_namespace;
struct ns_common;
-extern struct mnt_namespace *copy_mnt_ns(unsigned long, struct mnt_namespace *,
+extern struct mnt_namespace *copy_mnt_ns(u64, struct mnt_namespace *,
struct user_namespace *, struct fs_struct *);
extern void put_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *ns);
DEFINE_FREE(put_mnt_ns, struct mnt_namespace *, if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(_T)) put_mnt_ns(_T))
diff --git a/include/linux/nsproxy.h b/include/linux/nsproxy.h
index dab6a1734a22..82533e899ff4 100644
--- a/include/linux/nsproxy.h
+++ b/include/linux/nsproxy.h
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static inline struct cred *nsset_cred(struct nsset *set)
*
*/
-int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk);
+int copy_namespaces(u64 flags, struct task_struct *tsk);
void exit_task_namespaces(struct task_struct *tsk);
void switch_task_namespaces(struct task_struct *tsk, struct nsproxy *new);
int exec_task_namespaces(void);
diff --git a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h
index 7c67a5811199..0620a3e08e83 100644
--- a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static inline int pidns_memfd_noexec_scope(struct pid_namespace *ns)
}
#endif
-extern struct pid_namespace *copy_pid_ns(unsigned long flags,
+extern struct pid_namespace *copy_pid_ns(u64 flags,
struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct pid_namespace *ns);
extern void zap_pid_ns_processes(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns);
extern int reboot_pid_ns(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns, int cmd);
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static inline int pidns_memfd_noexec_scope(struct pid_namespace *ns)
return 0;
}
-static inline struct pid_namespace *copy_pid_ns(unsigned long flags,
+static inline struct pid_namespace *copy_pid_ns(u64 flags,
struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct pid_namespace *ns)
{
if (flags & CLONE_NEWPID)
diff --git a/include/linux/rseq.h b/include/linux/rseq.h
index bc8af3eb5598..a96fd345aa38 100644
--- a/include/linux/rseq.h
+++ b/include/linux/rseq.h
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static inline void rseq_migrate(struct task_struct *t)
* If parent process has a registered restartable sequences area, the
* child inherits. Unregister rseq for a clone with CLONE_VM set.
*/
-static inline void rseq_fork(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long clone_flags)
+static inline void rseq_fork(struct task_struct *t, u64 clone_flags)
{
if (clone_flags & CLONE_VM) {
t->rseq = NULL;
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static inline void rseq_preempt(struct task_struct *t)
static inline void rseq_migrate(struct task_struct *t)
{
}
-static inline void rseq_fork(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long clone_flags)
+static inline void rseq_fork(struct task_struct *t, u64 clone_flags)
{
}
static inline void rseq_execve(struct task_struct *t)
diff --git a/include/linux/sched/task.h b/include/linux/sched/task.h
index ea41795a352b..34d6a0e108c3 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched/task.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched/task.h
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ extern int lockdep_tasklist_lock_is_held(void);
extern asmlinkage void schedule_tail(struct task_struct *prev);
extern void init_idle(struct task_struct *idle, int cpu);
-extern int sched_fork(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *p);
+extern int sched_fork(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *p);
extern int sched_cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_clone_args *kargs);
extern void sched_cancel_fork(struct task_struct *p);
extern void sched_post_fork(struct task_struct *p);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 521bcb5b9717..9a1d4a6c8673 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
int security_file_open(struct file *file);
int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask);
int security_file_truncate(struct file *file);
-int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags);
+int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags);
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task);
int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
@@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ static inline int security_file_truncate(struct file *file)
}
static inline int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
- unsigned long clone_flags)
+ u64 clone_flags)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/sem.h b/include/linux/sem.h
index c4deefe42aeb..275269ce2ec8 100644
--- a/include/linux/sem.h
+++ b/include/linux/sem.h
@@ -9,12 +9,12 @@ struct task_struct;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
-extern int copy_semundo(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk);
+extern int copy_semundo(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk);
extern void exit_sem(struct task_struct *tsk);
#else
-static inline int copy_semundo(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
+static inline int copy_semundo(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/time_namespace.h b/include/linux/time_namespace.h
index bb2c52f4fc94..b6e36525e0be 100644
--- a/include/linux/time_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/time_namespace.h
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static inline struct time_namespace *get_time_ns(struct time_namespace *ns)
return ns;
}
-struct time_namespace *copy_time_ns(unsigned long flags,
+struct time_namespace *copy_time_ns(u64 flags,
struct user_namespace *user_ns,
struct time_namespace *old_ns);
void free_time_ns(struct time_namespace *ns);
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static inline void put_time_ns(struct time_namespace *ns)
}
static inline
-struct time_namespace *copy_time_ns(unsigned long flags,
+struct time_namespace *copy_time_ns(u64 flags,
struct user_namespace *user_ns,
struct time_namespace *old_ns)
{
diff --git a/include/linux/uprobes.h b/include/linux/uprobes.h
index 516217c39094..915303a82d84 100644
--- a/include/linux/uprobes.h
+++ b/include/linux/uprobes.h
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ extern void uprobe_start_dup_mmap(void);
extern void uprobe_end_dup_mmap(void);
extern void uprobe_dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *newmm);
extern void uprobe_free_utask(struct task_struct *t);
-extern void uprobe_copy_process(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long flags);
+extern void uprobe_copy_process(struct task_struct *t, u64 flags);
extern int uprobe_post_sstep_notifier(struct pt_regs *regs);
extern int uprobe_pre_sstep_notifier(struct pt_regs *regs);
extern void uprobe_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs);
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static inline bool uprobe_deny_signal(void)
static inline void uprobe_free_utask(struct task_struct *t)
{
}
-static inline void uprobe_copy_process(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long flags)
+static inline void uprobe_copy_process(struct task_struct *t, u64 flags)
{
}
static inline void uprobe_clear_state(struct mm_struct *mm)
diff --git a/include/linux/user_events.h b/include/linux/user_events.h
index 8afa8c3a0973..57d1ff006090 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_events.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_events.h
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ extern void user_event_mm_dup(struct task_struct *t,
extern void user_event_mm_remove(struct task_struct *t);
static inline void user_events_fork(struct task_struct *t,
- unsigned long clone_flags)
+ u64 clone_flags)
{
struct user_event_mm *old_mm;
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static inline void user_events_exit(struct task_struct *t)
}
#else
static inline void user_events_fork(struct task_struct *t,
- unsigned long clone_flags)
+ u64 clone_flags)
{
}
diff --git a/include/linux/utsname.h b/include/linux/utsname.h
index bf7613ba412b..ba34ec0e2f95 100644
--- a/include/linux/utsname.h
+++ b/include/linux/utsname.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline void get_uts_ns(struct uts_namespace *ns)
refcount_inc(&ns->ns.count);
}
-extern struct uts_namespace *copy_utsname(unsigned long flags,
+extern struct uts_namespace *copy_utsname(u64 flags,
struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct uts_namespace *old_ns);
extern void free_uts_ns(struct uts_namespace *ns);
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static inline void put_uts_ns(struct uts_namespace *ns)
{
}
-static inline struct uts_namespace *copy_utsname(unsigned long flags,
+static inline struct uts_namespace *copy_utsname(u64 flags,
struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct uts_namespace *old_ns)
{
if (flags & CLONE_NEWUTS)
diff --git a/include/net/net_namespace.h b/include/net/net_namespace.h
index 025a7574b275..0e008cfe159d 100644
--- a/include/net/net_namespace.h
+++ b/include/net/net_namespace.h
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ struct net {
extern struct net init_net;
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS
-struct net *copy_net_ns(unsigned long flags, struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+struct net *copy_net_ns(u64 flags, struct user_namespace *user_ns,
struct net *old_net);
void net_ns_get_ownership(const struct net *net, kuid_t *uid, kgid_t *gid);
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ extern struct task_struct *cleanup_net_task;
#else /* CONFIG_NET_NS */
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
-static inline struct net *copy_net_ns(unsigned long flags,
+static inline struct net *copy_net_ns(u64 flags,
struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct net *old_net)
{
if (flags & CLONE_NEWNET)
diff --git a/include/trace/events/task.h b/include/trace/events/task.h
index af535b053033..4f0759634306 100644
--- a/include/trace/events/task.h
+++ b/include/trace/events/task.h
@@ -8,14 +8,14 @@
TRACE_EVENT(task_newtask,
- TP_PROTO(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags),
+ TP_PROTO(struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags),
TP_ARGS(task, clone_flags),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( pid_t, pid)
__array( char, comm, TASK_COMM_LEN)
- __field( unsigned long, clone_flags)
+ __field( u64, clone_flags)
__field( short, oom_score_adj)
),
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(task_newtask,
__entry->oom_score_adj = task->signal->oom_score_adj;
),
- TP_printk("pid=%d comm=%s clone_flags=%lx oom_score_adj=%hd",
+ TP_printk("pid=%d comm=%s clone_flags=%llx oom_score_adj=%hd",
__entry->pid, __entry->comm,
__entry->clone_flags, __entry->oom_score_adj)
);
diff --git a/ipc/namespace.c b/ipc/namespace.c
index 4df91ceeeafe..a712ec27209c 100644
--- a/ipc/namespace.c
+++ b/ipc/namespace.c
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static struct ipc_namespace *create_ipc_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
-struct ipc_namespace *copy_ipcs(unsigned long flags,
+struct ipc_namespace *copy_ipcs(u64 flags,
struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct ipc_namespace *ns)
{
if (!(flags & CLONE_NEWIPC))
diff --git a/ipc/sem.c b/ipc/sem.c
index a39cdc7bf88f..0f06e4bd4673 100644
--- a/ipc/sem.c
+++ b/ipc/sem.c
@@ -2303,7 +2303,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(semop, int, semid, struct sembuf __user *, tsops,
* parent and child tasks.
*/
-int copy_semundo(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
+int copy_semundo(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct sem_undo_list *undo_list;
int error;
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/namespace.c b/kernel/cgroup/namespace.c
index 144a464e45c6..dedadb525880 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup/namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup/namespace.c
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ void free_cgroup_ns(struct cgroup_namespace *ns)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(free_cgroup_ns);
-struct cgroup_namespace *copy_cgroup_ns(unsigned long flags,
+struct cgroup_namespace *copy_cgroup_ns(u64 flags,
struct user_namespace *user_ns,
struct cgroup_namespace *old_ns)
{
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 9676965c0981..dbf6b687dc5c 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
* The new process gets the current process's subjective credentials as its
* objective and subjective credentials
*/
-int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
+int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, u64 clone_flags)
{
struct cred *new;
int ret;
diff --git a/kernel/events/uprobes.c b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
index 31a12b60055f..aa479d24ccaf 100644
--- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c
+++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
@@ -2160,7 +2160,7 @@ static void dup_xol_work(struct callback_head *work)
/*
* Called in context of a new clone/fork from copy_process.
*/
-void uprobe_copy_process(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long flags)
+void uprobe_copy_process(struct task_struct *t, u64 flags)
{
struct uprobe_task *utask = current->utask;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 82f5d52fecf1..0e9b2dd6c365 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1510,7 +1510,7 @@ static struct mm_struct *dup_mm(struct task_struct *tsk,
return NULL;
}
-static int copy_mm(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
+static int copy_mm(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct mm_struct *mm, *oldmm;
@@ -1548,7 +1548,7 @@ static int copy_mm(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
return 0;
}
-static int copy_fs(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
+static int copy_fs(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_FS) {
@@ -1569,7 +1569,7 @@ static int copy_fs(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
return 0;
}
-static int copy_files(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk,
+static int copy_files(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk,
int no_files)
{
struct files_struct *oldf, *newf;
@@ -1648,7 +1648,7 @@ static void posix_cpu_timers_init_group(struct signal_struct *sig)
posix_cputimers_group_init(pct, cpu_limit);
}
-static int copy_signal(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
+static int copy_signal(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct signal_struct *sig;
diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c
index 5f31fdff8a38..8af3b9ec3aa8 100644
--- a/kernel/nsproxy.c
+++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static inline struct nsproxy *create_nsproxy(void)
* Return the newly created nsproxy. Do not attach this to the task,
* leave it to the caller to do proper locking and attach it to task.
*/
-static struct nsproxy *create_new_namespaces(unsigned long flags,
+static struct nsproxy *create_new_namespaces(u64 flags,
struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *user_ns,
struct fs_struct *new_fs)
{
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ static struct nsproxy *create_new_namespaces(unsigned long flags,
* called from clone. This now handles copy for nsproxy and all
* namespaces therein.
*/
-int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
+int copy_namespaces(u64 flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct nsproxy *old_ns = tsk->nsproxy;
struct user_namespace *user_ns = task_cred_xxx(tsk, user_ns);
diff --git a/kernel/pid_namespace.c b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
index 7098ed44e717..06bc7c7f78e0 100644
--- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static void destroy_pid_namespace_work(struct work_struct *work)
} while (ns != &init_pid_ns && refcount_dec_and_test(&ns->ns.count));
}
-struct pid_namespace *copy_pid_ns(unsigned long flags,
+struct pid_namespace *copy_pid_ns(u64 flags,
struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct pid_namespace *old_ns)
{
if (!(flags & CLONE_NEWPID))
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index be00629f0ba4..6fa85d30d965 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -4472,7 +4472,7 @@ int wake_up_state(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int state)
* __sched_fork() is basic setup which is also used by sched_init() to
* initialize the boot CPU's idle task.
*/
-static void __sched_fork(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *p)
+static void __sched_fork(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *p)
{
p->on_rq = 0;
@@ -4707,7 +4707,7 @@ late_initcall(sched_core_sysctl_init);
/*
* fork()/clone()-time setup:
*/
-int sched_fork(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *p)
+int sched_fork(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *p)
{
__sched_fork(clone_flags, p);
/*
diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c
index e256793b9a08..06bcba61ca75 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/fair.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c
@@ -3542,7 +3542,7 @@ static void task_numa_work(struct callback_head *work)
}
}
-void init_numa_balancing(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *p)
+void init_numa_balancing(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *p)
{
int mm_users = 0;
struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
diff --git a/kernel/sched/sched.h b/kernel/sched/sched.h
index be9745d104f7..f9adfc912ddc 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/sched.h
+++ b/kernel/sched/sched.h
@@ -1935,12 +1935,12 @@ extern void sched_setnuma(struct task_struct *p, int node);
extern int migrate_task_to(struct task_struct *p, int cpu);
extern int migrate_swap(struct task_struct *p, struct task_struct *t,
int cpu, int scpu);
-extern void init_numa_balancing(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *p);
+extern void init_numa_balancing(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *p);
#else /* !CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING: */
static inline void
-init_numa_balancing(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *p)
+init_numa_balancing(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *p)
{
}
diff --git a/kernel/time/namespace.c b/kernel/time/namespace.c
index 667452768ed3..888872bcc5bb 100644
--- a/kernel/time/namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/time/namespace.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static struct time_namespace *clone_time_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
*
* Return: timens_for_children namespace or ERR_PTR.
*/
-struct time_namespace *copy_time_ns(unsigned long flags,
+struct time_namespace *copy_time_ns(u64 flags,
struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct time_namespace *old_ns)
{
if (!(flags & CLONE_NEWTIME))
diff --git a/kernel/utsname.c b/kernel/utsname.c
index b1ac3ca870f2..00d8d7922f86 100644
--- a/kernel/utsname.c
+++ b/kernel/utsname.c
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static struct uts_namespace *clone_uts_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
* utsname of this process won't be seen by parent, and vice
* versa.
*/
-struct uts_namespace *copy_utsname(unsigned long flags,
+struct uts_namespace *copy_utsname(u64 flags,
struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct uts_namespace *old_ns)
{
struct uts_namespace *new_ns;
diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c
index 1b6f3826dd0e..8ec9d83475bf 100644
--- a/net/core/net_namespace.c
+++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c
@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ void net_drop_ns(void *p)
net_passive_dec(net);
}
-struct net *copy_net_ns(unsigned long flags,
+struct net *copy_net_ns(u64 flags,
struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct net *old_net)
{
struct ucounts *ucounts;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 8e1cc229b41b..ba39cfe0cd08 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
}
static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
- unsigned long clone_flags)
+ u64 clone_flags)
{
struct aa_task_ctx *new = task_ctx(task);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ca126b02d2fe..d5fea03a741a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -3224,7 +3224,7 @@ int security_file_truncate(struct file *file)
*
* Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure.
*/
-int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
+int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
{
int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f94642ca34f2..9d3b5ebd7657 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4144,7 +4144,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
/* task security operations */
static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
- unsigned long clone_flags)
+ u64 clone_flags)
{
u32 sid = current_sid();
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index d6ebcd9db80a..48fc59d38ab2 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes tomoyo_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
* Returns 0.
*/
static int tomoyo_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
- unsigned long clone_flags)
+ u64 clone_flags)
{
struct tomoyo_task *old = tomoyo_task(current);
struct tomoyo_task *new = tomoyo_task(task);
--
2.39.5
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 1/4] copy_sighand: Handle architectures where sizeof(unsigned long) < sizeof(u64)
From: Simon Schuster via B4 Relay @ 2025-09-01 13:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dinh Nguyen, Christian Brauner, Arnd Bergmann, Andrew Morton,
David Hildenbrand, Lorenzo Stoakes, Liam R. Howlett,
Vlastimil Babka, Mike Rapoport, Suren Baghdasaryan, Michal Hocko,
Ingo Molnar, Peter Zijlstra, Juri Lelli, Vincent Guittot,
Dietmar Eggemann, Steven Rostedt, Ben Segall, Mel Gorman,
Valentin Schneider, Kees Cook, Paul Walmsley, Palmer Dabbelt,
Albert Ou, Alexandre Ghiti, Guo Ren, Oleg Nesterov, Jens Axboe,
Alexander Viro, Jan Kara, Tejun Heo, Johannes Weiner,
Michal Koutný, Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn, James Morris,
Serge E. Hallyn, Anna-Maria Behnsen, Frederic Weisbecker,
Thomas Gleixner, Masami Hiramatsu, David S. Miller, Eric Dumazet,
Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman, Mathieu Desnoyers,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo, Namhyung Kim, Mark Rutland,
Alexander Shishkin, Jiri Olsa, Ian Rogers, Adrian Hunter,
John Johansen, Stephen Smalley, Ondrej Mosnacek, Kentaro Takeda,
Tetsuo Handa, Richard Henderson, Matt Turner, Vineet Gupta,
Russell King, Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Brian Cain,
Huacai Chen, WANG Xuerui, Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, Jonas Bonn, Stefan Kristiansson,
Stafford Horne, James E.J. Bottomley, Helge Deller,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman, Nicholas Piggin,
Christophe Leroy, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
Andreas Larsson, Richard Weinberger, Anton Ivanov, Johannes Berg,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel,
Max Filippov
Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, linux-riscv, linux-csky, linux-block,
linux-fsdevel, cgroups, linux-security-module, linux-trace-kernel,
netdev, linux-perf-users, apparmor, selinux, linux-alpha,
linux-snps-arc, linux-arm-kernel, linux-hexagon, loongarch,
linux-m68k, linux-mips, linux-openrisc, linux-parisc,
linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh, sparclinux, linux-um,
Simon Schuster, stable
In-Reply-To: <20250901-nios2-implement-clone3-v2-0-53fcf5577d57@siemens-energy.com>
From: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
With the introduction of clone3 in commit 7f192e3cd316 ("fork: add
clone3") the effective bit width of clone_flags on all architectures was
increased from 32-bit to 64-bit. However, the signature of the copy_*
helper functions (e.g., copy_sighand) used by copy_process was not
adapted.
As such, they truncate the flags on any 32-bit architectures that
supports clone3 (arc, arm, csky, m68k, microblaze, mips32, openrisc,
parisc32, powerpc32, riscv32, x86-32 and xtensa).
For copy_sighand with CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND being an actual u64
constant, this triggers an observable bug in kernel selftest
clone3_clear_sighand:
if (clone_flags & CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND)
in function copy_sighand within fork.c will always fail given:
unsigned long /* == uint32_t */ clone_flags
#define CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND 0x100000000ULL
This commit fixes the bug by always passing clone_flags to copy_sighand
via their declared u64 type, invariant of architecture-dependent integer
sizes.
Fixes: b612e5df4587 ("clone3: add CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # linux-5.5+
Signed-off-by: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
---
kernel/fork.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 5115be549234..82f5d52fecf1 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1599,7 +1599,7 @@ static int copy_files(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk,
return 0;
}
-static int copy_sighand(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
+static int copy_sighand(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct sighand_struct *sig;
--
2.39.5
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 0/4] nios2: Add architecture support for clone3
From: Simon Schuster via B4 Relay @ 2025-09-01 13:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dinh Nguyen, Christian Brauner, Arnd Bergmann, Andrew Morton,
David Hildenbrand, Lorenzo Stoakes, Liam R. Howlett,
Vlastimil Babka, Mike Rapoport, Suren Baghdasaryan, Michal Hocko,
Ingo Molnar, Peter Zijlstra, Juri Lelli, Vincent Guittot,
Dietmar Eggemann, Steven Rostedt, Ben Segall, Mel Gorman,
Valentin Schneider, Kees Cook, Paul Walmsley, Palmer Dabbelt,
Albert Ou, Alexandre Ghiti, Guo Ren, Oleg Nesterov, Jens Axboe,
Alexander Viro, Jan Kara, Tejun Heo, Johannes Weiner,
Michal Koutný, Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn, James Morris,
Serge E. Hallyn, Anna-Maria Behnsen, Frederic Weisbecker,
Thomas Gleixner, Masami Hiramatsu, David S. Miller, Eric Dumazet,
Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman, Mathieu Desnoyers,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo, Namhyung Kim, Mark Rutland,
Alexander Shishkin, Jiri Olsa, Ian Rogers, Adrian Hunter,
John Johansen, Stephen Smalley, Ondrej Mosnacek, Kentaro Takeda,
Tetsuo Handa, Richard Henderson, Matt Turner, Vineet Gupta,
Russell King, Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Brian Cain,
Huacai Chen, WANG Xuerui, Geert Uytterhoeven, Michal Simek,
Thomas Bogendoerfer, Jonas Bonn, Stefan Kristiansson,
Stafford Horne, James E.J. Bottomley, Helge Deller,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Ellerman, Nicholas Piggin,
Christophe Leroy, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik,
Alexander Gordeev, Christian Borntraeger, Sven Schnelle,
Yoshinori Sato, Rich Felker, John Paul Adrian Glaubitz,
Andreas Larsson, Richard Weinberger, Anton Ivanov, Johannes Berg,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Chris Zankel,
Max Filippov
Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, linux-riscv, linux-csky, linux-block,
linux-fsdevel, cgroups, linux-security-module, linux-trace-kernel,
netdev, linux-perf-users, apparmor, selinux, linux-alpha,
linux-snps-arc, linux-arm-kernel, linux-hexagon, loongarch,
linux-m68k, linux-mips, linux-openrisc, linux-parisc,
linuxppc-dev, linux-s390, linux-sh, sparclinux, linux-um,
Simon Schuster, stable
This series adds support for the clone3 system call to the nios2
architecture. This addresses the build-time warning "warning: clone3()
entry point is missing, please fix" introduced in 505d66d1abfb9
("clone3: drop __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3 macro"). The implementation passes
the relevant clone3 tests of kselftest when applied on top of
next-20250815:
./run_kselftest.sh
TAP version 13
1..4
# selftests: clone3: clone3
ok 1 selftests: clone3: clone3
# selftests: clone3: clone3_clear_sighand
ok 2 selftests: clone3: clone3_clear_sighand
# selftests: clone3: clone3_set_tid
ok 3 selftests: clone3: clone3_set_tid
# selftests: clone3: clone3_cap_checkpoint_restore
ok 4 selftests: clone3: clone3_cap_checkpoint_restore
The series also includes a small patch to kernel/fork.c that ensures
that clone_flags are passed correctly on architectures where unsigned
long is insufficient to store the u64 clone_flags. It is marked as a fix
for stable backporting.
As requested, in v2, this series now further tries to correct this type
error throughout the whole code base. Thus, it now touches a larger
number of subsystems and all architectures.
Therefore, another test was performed for ARCH=x86_64 (as a
representative for 64-bit architectures). Here, the series builds cleanly
without warnings on defconfig with CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y and
CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO=y (to compile-check the LSM-related changes).
The build further successfully passes testing/selftests/clone3 (with the
patch from 20241105062948.1037011-1-zhouyuhang1010@163.com to prepare
clone3_cap_checkpoint_restore for compatibility with the newer libcap
version on my system).
Is there any option to further preflight check this patch series via
lkp/KernelCI/etc. for a broader test across architectures, or is this
degree of testing sufficient to eventually get the series merged?
N.B.: The series is not checkpatch clean right now:
- include/linux/cred.h, include/linux/mnt_namespace.h:
function definition arguments without identifier name
- include/trace/events/task.h:
space prohibited after that open parenthesis
I did not fix these warnings to keep my changes minimal and reviewable,
as the issues persist throughout the files and they were not introduced
by me; I only followed the existing code style and just replaced the
types. If desired, I'd be happy to make the changes in a potential v3,
though.
Signed-off-by: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Introduce "Fixes:" and "Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org" where necessary
- Factor out "Fixes:" when adapting the datatype of clone_flags for
easier backports
- Fix additional instances where `unsigned long` clone_flags is used
- Reword commit message to make it clearer that any 32-bit arch is
affected by this bug
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250821-nios2-implement-clone3-v1-0-1bb24017376a@siemens-energy.com
---
Simon Schuster (4):
copy_sighand: Handle architectures where sizeof(unsigned long) < sizeof(u64)
copy_process: pass clone_flags as u64 across calltree
arch: copy_thread: pass clone_flags as u64
nios2: implement architecture-specific portion of sys_clone3
arch/alpha/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/arc/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/arm/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/csky/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/hexagon/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/loongarch/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/m68k/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/microblaze/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/mips/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/nios2/include/asm/syscalls.h | 1 +
arch/nios2/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 --
arch/nios2/kernel/entry.S | 6 ++++++
arch/nios2/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/nios2/kernel/syscall_table.c | 1 +
arch/openrisc/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/parisc/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/riscv/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/s390/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/sh/kernel/process_32.c | 2 +-
arch/sparc/kernel/process_32.c | 2 +-
arch/sparc/kernel/process_64.c | 2 +-
arch/um/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/sched.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 2 +-
arch/xtensa/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
block/blk-ioc.c | 2 +-
fs/namespace.c | 2 +-
include/linux/cgroup.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/cred.h | 2 +-
include/linux/iocontext.h | 6 +++---
include/linux/ipc_namespace.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +-
include/linux/mnt_namespace.h | 2 +-
include/linux/nsproxy.h | 2 +-
include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/rseq.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/sched/task.h | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/sem.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/time_namespace.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/uprobes.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/user_events.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/utsname.h | 4 ++--
include/net/net_namespace.h | 4 ++--
include/trace/events/task.h | 6 +++---
ipc/namespace.c | 2 +-
ipc/sem.c | 2 +-
kernel/cgroup/namespace.c | 2 +-
kernel/cred.c | 2 +-
kernel/events/uprobes.c | 2 +-
kernel/fork.c | 10 +++++-----
kernel/nsproxy.c | 4 ++--
kernel/pid_namespace.c | 2 +-
kernel/sched/core.c | 4 ++--
kernel/sched/fair.c | 2 +-
kernel/sched/sched.h | 4 ++--
kernel/time/namespace.c | 2 +-
kernel/utsname.c | 2 +-
net/core/net_namespace.c | 2 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 +-
68 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 1357b2649c026b51353c84ddd32bc963e8999603
change-id: 20250818-nios2-implement-clone3-7f252c20860b
Best regards,
--
Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/2] Add O_DENY_WRITE (complement AT_EXECVE_CHECK)
From: Jann Horn @ 2025-09-01 11:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Serge E. Hallyn
Cc: Andy Lutomirski, Aleksa Sarai, Mickaël Salaün,
Christian Brauner, Al Viro, Kees Cook, Paul Moore, Arnd Bergmann,
Christian Heimes, Dmitry Vyukov, Elliott Hughes, Fan Wu,
Florian Weimer, Jeff Xu, Jonathan Corbet, Jordan R Abrahams,
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian, Luca Boccassi, Matt Bobrowski,
Miklos Szeredi, Mimi Zohar, Nicolas Bouchinet, Robert Waite,
Roberto Sassu, Scott Shell, Steve Dower, Steve Grubb,
kernel-hardening, linux-api, linux-fsdevel, linux-integrity,
linux-kernel, linux-security-module
In-Reply-To: <aLDDk4x7QBKxLmoi@mail.hallyn.com>
On Thu, Aug 28, 2025 at 11:01 PM Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 27, 2025 at 05:32:02PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Wed, Aug 27, 2025 at 5:14 PM Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On 2025-08-26, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
> > > > On Tue, Aug 26, 2025 at 11:07:03AM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > > > > Nothing has changed in that regard and I'm not interested in stuffing
> > > > > the VFS APIs full of special-purpose behavior to work around the fact
> > > > > that this is work that needs to be done in userspace. Change the apps,
> > > > > stop pushing more and more cruft into the VFS that has no business
> > > > > there.
> > > >
> > > > It would be interesting to know how to patch user space to get the same
> > > > guarantees... Do you think I would propose a kernel patch otherwise?
> > >
> > > You could mmap the script file with MAP_PRIVATE. This is the *actual*
> > > protection the kernel uses against overwriting binaries (yes, ETXTBSY is
> > > nice but IIRC there are ways to get around it anyway).
> >
> > Wait, really? MAP_PRIVATE prevents writes to the mapping from
> > affecting the file, but I don't think that writes to the file will
> > break the MAP_PRIVATE CoW if it's not already broken.
> >
> > IPython says:
> >
> > In [1]: import mmap, tempfile
> >
> > In [2]: f = tempfile.TemporaryFile()
> >
> > In [3]: f.write(b'initial contents')
> > Out[3]: 16
> >
> > In [4]: f.flush()
> >
> > In [5]: map = mmap.mmap(f.fileno(), f.tell(), flags=mmap.MAP_PRIVATE,
> > prot=mmap.PROT_READ)
> >
> > In [6]: map[:]
> > Out[6]: b'initial contents'
> >
> > In [7]: f.seek(0)
> > Out[7]: 0
> >
> > In [8]: f.write(b'changed')
> > Out[8]: 7
> >
> > In [9]: f.flush()
> >
> > In [10]: map[:]
> > Out[10]: b'changed contents'
>
> That was surprising to me, however, if I split the reader
> and writer into different processes, so
Testing this in python is a terrible idea because it obfuscates the
actual syscalls from you.
> P1:
> f = open("/tmp/3", "w")
> f.write('initial contents')
> f.flush()
>
> P2:
> import mmap
> f = open("/tmp/3", "r")
> map = mmap.mmap(f.fileno(), f.tell(), flags=mmap.MAP_PRIVATE, prot=mmap.PROT_READ)
>
> Back to P1:
> f.seek(0)
> f.write('changed')
>
> Back to P2:
> map[:]
>
> Then P2 gives me:
>
> b'initial contents'
Because when you executed `f.write('changed')`, Python internally
buffered the write. "changed" is never actually written into the file
in your example. If you add a `f.flush()` in P1 after this, running
`map[:]` in P2 again will show you the new data.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/2] Add O_DENY_WRITE (complement AT_EXECVE_CHECK)
From: Roberto Sassu @ 2025-09-01 9:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Aleksa Sarai, Mickaël Salaün
Cc: Christian Brauner, Al Viro, Kees Cook, Paul Moore, Serge Hallyn,
Andy Lutomirski, Arnd Bergmann, Christian Heimes, Dmitry Vyukov,
Elliott Hughes, Fan Wu, Florian Weimer, Jann Horn, Jeff Xu,
Jonathan Corbet, Jordan R Abrahams, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian,
Luca Boccassi, Matt Bobrowski, Miklos Szeredi, Mimi Zohar,
Nicolas Bouchinet, Robert Waite, Roberto Sassu, Scott Shell,
Steve Dower, Steve Grubb, kernel-hardening, linux-api,
linux-fsdevel, linux-integrity, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module
In-Reply-To: <2025-08-27-obscene-great-toy-diary-X1gVRV@cyphar.com>
On Thu, 2025-08-28 at 10:14 +1000, Aleksa Sarai wrote:
> On 2025-08-26, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
> > On Tue, Aug 26, 2025 at 11:07:03AM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > > Nothing has changed in that regard and I'm not interested in stuffing
> > > the VFS APIs full of special-purpose behavior to work around the fact
> > > that this is work that needs to be done in userspace. Change the apps,
> > > stop pushing more and more cruft into the VFS that has no business
> > > there.
> >
> > It would be interesting to know how to patch user space to get the same
> > guarantees... Do you think I would propose a kernel patch otherwise?
>
> You could mmap the script file with MAP_PRIVATE. This is the *actual*
> protection the kernel uses against overwriting binaries (yes, ETXTBSY is
> nice but IIRC there are ways to get around it anyway). Of course, most
> interpreters don't mmap their scripts, but this is a potential solution.
> If the security policy is based on validating the script text in some
> way, this avoids the TOCTOU.
>
> Now, in cases where you have IMA or something and you only permit signed
> binaries to execute, you could argue there is a different race here (an
> attacker creates a malicious script, runs it, and then replaces it with
> a valid script's contents and metadata after the fact to get
> AT_EXECVE_CHECK to permit the execution). However, I'm not sure that
Uhm, let's consider measurement, I'm more familiar with.
I think the race you wanted to express was that the attacker replaces
the good script, verified with AT_EXECVE_CHECK, with the bad script
after the IMA verification but before the interpreter reads it.
Fortunately, IMA is able to cope with this situation, since this race
can happen for any file open, where of course a file can be not read-
locked.
If the attacker tries to concurrently open the script for write in this
race window, IMA will report this event (called violation) in the
measurement list, and during remote attestation it will be clear that
the interpreter did not read what was measured.
We just need to run the violation check for the BPRM_CHECK hook too
(then, probably for us the O_DENY_WRITE flag or alternative solution
would not be needed, for measurement).
Please, let us know when you apply patches like 2a010c412853 ("fs:
don't block i_writecount during exec"). We had a discussion [1], but
probably I missed when it was decided to be applied (I saw now it was
in the same thread, but didn't get that at the time). We would have
needed to update our code accordingly. In the future, we will try to
clarify better our expectations from the VFS.
Thanks
Roberto
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/88d5a92379755413e1ec3c981d9a04e6796da110.camel@huaweicloud.com/#t
> this is even possible with IMA (can an unprivileged user even set
> security.ima?). But even then, I would expect users that really need
> this would also probably use fs-verity or dm-verity that would block
> this kind of attack since it would render the files read-only anyway.
>
> This is why a more detailed threat model of what kinds of attacks are
> relevant is useful. I was there for the talk you gave and subsequent
> discussion at last year's LPC, but I felt that your threat model was
> not really fleshed out at all. I am still not sure what capabilities you
> expect the attacker to have nor what is being used to authenticate
> binaries (other than AT_EXECVE_CHECK). Maybe I'm wrong with my above
> assumptions, but I can't know without knowing what threat model you have
> in mind, *in detail*.
>
> For example, if you are dealing with an attacker that has CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
> there are plenty of ways for an attacker to execute their own code
> without using interpreters (create a new tmpfs with fsopen(2) for
> instance). Executable memfds are even easier and don't require
> privileges on most systems (yes, you can block them with vm.memfd_noexec
> but CAP_SYS_ADMIN can disable that -- and there's always fsopen(2) or
> mount(2)).
>
> (As an aside, it's a shame that AT_EXECVE_CHECK burned one of the
> top-level AT_* bits for a per-syscall flag -- the block comment I added
> in b4fef22c2fb9 ("uapi: explain how per-syscall AT_* flags should be
> allocated") was meant to avoid this happening but it seems you and the
> reviewers missed that...)
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net-next 0/8] ipv4: icmp: Fix source IP derivation in presence of VRFs
From: Ido Schimmel @ 2025-09-01 8:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, kuba, pabeni
Cc: davem, edumazet, horms, paul, dsahern, petrm,
linux-security-module
In-Reply-To: <20250901083027.183468-1-idosch@nvidia.com>
On Mon, Sep 01, 2025 at 11:30:19AM +0300, Ido Schimmel wrote:
> Align IPv4 with IPv6 and in the presence of VRFs generate ICMP error
> messages with a source IP that is derived from the receiving interface
> and not from its VRF master. This is especially important when the error
> messages are "Time Exceeded" messages as it means that utilities like
> traceroute will show an incorrect packet path.
>
> Patches #1-#2 are preparations.
>
> Patch #3 is the actual change.
>
> Patches #4-#7 make small improvements in the existing traceroute test.
>
> Patch #8 extends the traceroute test with VRF test cases for both IPv4
> and IPv6.
Jakub / Paolo, patch #2 is going to conflict with the following net
patch:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250828091435.161962-1-fabian@blaese.de/
Resolution is below. Please let me know if you prefer that I repost next
week in order to avoid the conflict.
@@ -799,15 +800,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__icmp_send);
void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)
{
struct sk_buff *cloned_skb = NULL;
- struct ip_options opts = { 0 };
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;
enum ip_conntrack_dir dir;
+ struct inet_skb_parm parm;
struct nf_conn *ct;
__be32 orig_ip;
+ memset(&parm, 0, sizeof(parm));
ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo);
if (!ct || !(READ_ONCE(ct->status) & IPS_NAT_MASK)) {
- __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &opts);
+ __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &parm);
return;
}
@@ -823,7 +825,7 @@ void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)
orig_ip = ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr;
dir = CTINFO2DIR(ctinfo);
ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.u3.ip;
- __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &opts);
+ __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &parm);
ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip;
out:
consume_skb(cloned_skb);
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH net-next 8/8] selftests: traceroute: Add VRF tests
From: Ido Schimmel @ 2025-09-01 8:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: davem, kuba, pabeni, edumazet, horms, paul, dsahern, petrm,
linux-security-module, Ido Schimmel
In-Reply-To: <20250901083027.183468-1-idosch@nvidia.com>
Create versions of the existing test cases where the routers generating
the ICMP error messages are using VRFs. Check that the source IPs of
these messages do not change in the presence of VRFs.
IPv6 always behaved correctly, but IPv4 fails when reverting "ipv4:
icmp: Fix source IP derivation in presence of VRFs".
Without IPv4 change:
# ./traceroute.sh
TEST: IPv6 traceroute [ OK ]
TEST: IPv6 traceroute with VRF [ OK ]
TEST: IPv4 traceroute [ OK ]
TEST: IPv4 traceroute with VRF [FAIL]
traceroute did not return 1.0.3.1
$ echo $?
1
The test fails because the ICMP error message is sent with the VRF
device's IP (1.0.4.1):
# traceroute -n -s 1.0.1.3 1.0.2.4
traceroute to 1.0.2.4 (1.0.2.4), 30 hops max, 60 byte packets
1 1.0.4.1 0.165 ms 0.110 ms 0.103 ms
2 1.0.2.4 0.098 ms 0.085 ms 0.078 ms
# traceroute -n -s 1.0.3.3 1.0.2.4
traceroute to 1.0.2.4 (1.0.2.4), 30 hops max, 60 byte packets
1 1.0.4.1 0.201 ms 0.138 ms 0.129 ms
2 1.0.2.4 0.123 ms 0.105 ms 0.098 ms
With IPv4 change:
# ./traceroute.sh
TEST: IPv6 traceroute [ OK ]
TEST: IPv6 traceroute with VRF [ OK ]
TEST: IPv4 traceroute [ OK ]
TEST: IPv4 traceroute with VRF [ OK ]
$ echo $?
0
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh | 178 ++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 178 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh
index 0ab9eccf1499..dbb34c7e09ce 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh
@@ -193,6 +193,110 @@ run_traceroute6()
cleanup_traceroute6
}
+################################################################################
+# traceroute6 with VRF test
+#
+# Verify that in this scenario
+#
+# ------------------------ N2
+# | |
+# ------ ------ N3 ----
+# | R1 | | R2 |------|H2|
+# ------ ------ ----
+# | |
+# ------------------------ N1
+# |
+# ----
+# |H1|
+# ----
+#
+# Where H1's default route goes through R1 and R1's default route goes through
+# R2 over N2, traceroute6 from H1 to H2 reports R2's address on N2 and not N1.
+# The interfaces connecting R2 to the different subnets are membmer in a VRF
+# and the intention is to check that traceroute6 does not report the VRF's
+# address.
+#
+# Addresses are assigned as follows:
+#
+# N1: 2000:101::/64
+# N2: 2000:102::/64
+# N3: 2000:103::/64
+#
+# R1's host part of address: 1
+# R2's host part of address: 2
+# H1's host part of address: 3
+# H2's host part of address: 4
+#
+# For example:
+# the IPv6 address of R1's interface on N2 is 2000:102::1/64
+
+cleanup_traceroute6_vrf()
+{
+ cleanup_all_ns
+}
+
+setup_traceroute6_vrf()
+{
+ # Start clean
+ cleanup_traceroute6_vrf
+
+ setup_ns h1 h2 r1 r2
+ create_ns "$h1"
+ create_ns "$h2"
+ create_ns "$r1"
+ create_ns "$r2"
+
+ ip -n "$r2" link add name vrf100 up type vrf table 100
+ ip -n "$r2" addr add 2001:db8:100::1/64 dev vrf100
+
+ # Setup N3
+ connect_ns "$r2" eth3 - 2000:103::2/64 "$h2" eth3 - 2000:103::4/64
+
+ ip -n "$r2" link set dev eth3 master vrf100
+
+ ip -n "$h2" route add default via 2000:103::2
+
+ # Setup N2
+ connect_ns "$r1" eth2 - 2000:102::1/64 "$r2" eth2 - 2000:102::2/64
+
+ ip -n "$r1" route add default via 2000:102::2
+
+ ip -n "$r2" link set dev eth2 master vrf100
+
+ # Setup N1. host-1 and router-2 connect to a bridge in router-1.
+ ip -n "$r1" link add name br100 up type bridge
+ ip -n "$r1" addr add 2000:101::1/64 dev br100
+
+ connect_ns "$h1" eth0 - 2000:101::3/64 "$r1" eth0 - -
+
+ ip -n "$h1" route add default via 2000:101::1
+
+ ip -n "$r1" link set dev eth0 master br100
+
+ connect_ns "$r2" eth1 - 2000:101::2/64 "$r1" eth1 - -
+
+ ip -n "$r2" link set dev eth1 master vrf100
+
+ ip -n "$r1" link set dev eth1 master br100
+
+ # Prime the network
+ ip netns exec "$h1" ping6 -c5 2000:103::4 >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+run_traceroute6_vrf()
+{
+ setup_traceroute6_vrf
+
+ RET=0
+
+ # traceroute6 host-2 from host-1 (expects 2000:102::2)
+ run_cmd "$h1" "traceroute6 2000:103::4 | grep 2000:102::2"
+ check_err $? "traceroute6 did not return 2000:102::2"
+ log_test "IPv6 traceroute with VRF"
+
+ cleanup_traceroute6_vrf
+}
+
################################################################################
# traceroute test
#
@@ -261,13 +365,87 @@ run_traceroute()
cleanup_traceroute
}
+################################################################################
+# traceroute with VRF test
+#
+# Verify that traceroute from H1 to H2 shows 1.0.3.1 and 1.0.1.1 when
+# traceroute uses 1.0.3.3 and 1.0.1.3 as the source IP, respectively. The
+# intention is to check that the kernel does not choose an IP assigned to the
+# VRF device, but rather an address from the VRF port (eth1) that received the
+# packet that generates the ICMP error message.
+#
+# 1.0.4.1/24 (vrf100)
+# 1.0.3.3/24 1.0.3.1/24
+# ---- 1.0.1.3/24 1.0.1.1/24 ---- 1.0.2.1/24 1.0.2.4/24 ----
+# |H1|--------------------------|R1|--------------------------|H2|
+# ---- N1 ---- N2 ----
+
+cleanup_traceroute_vrf()
+{
+ cleanup_all_ns
+}
+
+setup_traceroute_vrf()
+{
+ # Start clean
+ cleanup_traceroute_vrf
+
+ setup_ns h1 h2 router
+ create_ns "$h1"
+ create_ns "$h2"
+ create_ns "$router"
+
+ ip -n "$router" link add name vrf100 up type vrf table 100
+ ip -n "$router" addr add 1.0.4.1/24 dev vrf100
+
+ connect_ns "$h1" eth0 1.0.1.3/24 - \
+ "$router" eth1 1.0.1.1/24 -
+
+ ip -n "$h1" addr add 1.0.3.3/24 dev eth0
+ ip -n "$h1" route add default via 1.0.1.1
+
+ ip -n "$router" link set dev eth1 master vrf100
+ ip -n "$router" addr add 1.0.3.1/24 dev eth1
+ ip netns exec "$router" sysctl -qw \
+ net.ipv4.icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr=1
+
+ connect_ns "$h2" eth0 1.0.2.4/24 - \
+ "$router" eth2 1.0.2.1/24 -
+
+ ip -n "$h2" route add default via 1.0.2.1
+
+ ip -n "$router" link set dev eth2 master vrf100
+
+ # Prime the network
+ ip netns exec "$h1" ping -c5 1.0.2.4 >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+run_traceroute_vrf()
+{
+ setup_traceroute_vrf
+
+ RET=0
+
+ # traceroute host-2 from host-1. Expect a source IP that is on the same
+ # subnet as destination IP of the ICMP error message.
+ run_cmd "$h1" "traceroute -s 1.0.1.3 1.0.2.4 | grep 1.0.1.1"
+ check_err $? "traceroute did not return 1.0.1.1"
+ run_cmd "$h1" "traceroute -s 1.0.3.3 1.0.2.4 | grep 1.0.3.1"
+ check_err $? "traceroute did not return 1.0.3.1"
+ log_test "IPv4 traceroute with VRF"
+
+ cleanup_traceroute_vrf
+}
+
################################################################################
# Run tests
run_tests()
{
run_traceroute6
+ run_traceroute6_vrf
run_traceroute
+ run_traceroute_vrf
}
################################################################################
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next 6/8] selftests: traceroute: Reword comment
From: Ido Schimmel @ 2025-09-01 8:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: davem, kuba, pabeni, edumazet, horms, paul, dsahern, petrm,
linux-security-module, Ido Schimmel
In-Reply-To: <20250901083027.183468-1-idosch@nvidia.com>
Both of the addresses are configured as primary addresses, but the
kernel is expected to choose 10.0.1.1/24 as the source IP of the ICMP
error message since it is on the same subnet as the destination IP of
the message (10.0.1.3/24). Reword the comment to reflect that.
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh
index 1ac91eebd16f..8dc4e5d03e43 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh
@@ -203,10 +203,10 @@ run_traceroute6()
# |H1|--------------------------|R1|--------------------------|H2|
# ---- N1 ---- N2 ----
#
-# where net.ipv4.icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr is set on R1 and
-# 1.0.3.1/24 and 1.0.1.1/24 are respectively R1's primary and secondary
-# address on N1.
-#
+# where net.ipv4.icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr is set on R1 and 1.0.3.1/24 and
+# 1.0.1.1/24 are R1's primary addresses on N1. The kernel is expected to prefer
+# a source address that is on the same subnet as the destination IP of the ICMP
+# error message.
cleanup_traceroute()
{
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next 7/8] selftests: traceroute: Test traceroute with different source IPs
From: Ido Schimmel @ 2025-09-01 8:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: davem, kuba, pabeni, edumazet, horms, paul, dsahern, petrm,
linux-security-module, Ido Schimmel
In-Reply-To: <20250901083027.183468-1-idosch@nvidia.com>
When generating ICMP error messages, the kernel will prefer a source IP
that is on the same subnet as the destination IP (see
inet_select_addr()). Test this behavior by invoking traceroute with
different source IPs and checking that the ICMP error message is
generated with a source IP in the same subnet.
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh | 13 +++++++++----
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh
index 8dc4e5d03e43..0ab9eccf1499 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh
@@ -196,9 +196,10 @@ run_traceroute6()
################################################################################
# traceroute test
#
-# Verify that traceroute from H1 to H2 shows 1.0.1.1 in this scenario
+# Verify that traceroute from H1 to H2 shows 1.0.3.1 and 1.0.1.1 when
+# traceroute uses 1.0.3.3 and 1.0.1.3 as the source IP, respectively.
#
-# 1.0.3.1/24
+# 1.0.3.3/24 1.0.3.1/24
# ---- 1.0.1.3/24 1.0.1.1/24 ---- 1.0.2.1/24 1.0.2.4/24 ----
# |H1|--------------------------|R1|--------------------------|H2|
# ---- N1 ---- N2 ----
@@ -226,6 +227,7 @@ setup_traceroute()
connect_ns $h1 eth0 1.0.1.3/24 - \
$router eth1 1.0.3.1/24 -
+ ip -n "$h1" addr add 1.0.3.3/24 dev eth0
ip netns exec $h1 ip route add default via 1.0.1.1
ip netns exec $router ip addr add 1.0.1.1/24 dev eth1
@@ -248,9 +250,12 @@ run_traceroute()
RET=0
- # traceroute host-2 from host-1 (expects 1.0.1.1). Takes a while.
- run_cmd $h1 "traceroute 1.0.2.4 | grep -q 1.0.1.1"
+ # traceroute host-2 from host-1. Expect a source IP that is on the same
+ # subnet as destination IP of the ICMP error message.
+ run_cmd "$h1" "traceroute -s 1.0.1.3 1.0.2.4 | grep -q 1.0.1.1"
check_err $? "traceroute did not return 1.0.1.1"
+ run_cmd "$h1" "traceroute -s 1.0.3.3 1.0.2.4 | grep -q 1.0.3.1"
+ check_err $? "traceroute did not return 1.0.3.1"
log_test "IPv4 traceroute"
cleanup_traceroute
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next 5/8] selftests: traceroute: Use require_command()
From: Ido Schimmel @ 2025-09-01 8:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: davem, kuba, pabeni, edumazet, horms, paul, dsahern, petrm,
linux-security-module, Ido Schimmel
In-Reply-To: <20250901083027.183468-1-idosch@nvidia.com>
Use require_command() so that the test will return SKIP (4) when a
required command is not present.
Before:
# ./traceroute.sh
SKIP: Could not run IPV6 test without traceroute6
SKIP: Could not run IPV4 test without traceroute
$ echo $?
0
After:
# ./traceroute.sh
TEST: traceroute6 not installed [SKIP]
$ echo $?
4
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh | 13 +++----------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh
index 46cb37e124ce..1ac91eebd16f 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh
@@ -181,11 +181,6 @@ setup_traceroute6()
run_traceroute6()
{
- if [ ! -x "$(command -v traceroute6)" ]; then
- echo "SKIP: Could not run IPV6 test without traceroute6"
- return
- fi
-
setup_traceroute6
RET=0
@@ -249,11 +244,6 @@ setup_traceroute()
run_traceroute()
{
- if [ ! -x "$(command -v traceroute)" ]; then
- echo "SKIP: Could not run IPV4 test without traceroute"
- return
- fi
-
setup_traceroute
RET=0
@@ -287,6 +277,9 @@ do
esac
done
+require_command traceroute6
+require_command traceroute
+
run_tests
exit "${EXIT_STATUS}"
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next 4/8] selftests: traceroute: Return correct value on failure
From: Ido Schimmel @ 2025-09-01 8:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: davem, kuba, pabeni, edumazet, horms, paul, dsahern, petrm,
linux-security-module, Ido Schimmel
In-Reply-To: <20250901083027.183468-1-idosch@nvidia.com>
The test always returns success even if some tests were modified to
fail. Fix by converting the test to use the appropriate library
functions instead of using its own functions.
Before:
# ./traceroute.sh
TEST: IPV6 traceroute [FAIL]
TEST: IPV4 traceroute [ OK ]
Tests passed: 1
Tests failed: 1
$ echo $?
0
After:
# ./traceroute.sh
TEST: IPv6 traceroute [FAIL]
traceroute6 did not return 2000:102::2
TEST: IPv4 traceroute [ OK ]
$ echo $?
1
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh | 38 ++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh
index 282f14760940..46cb37e124ce 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh
@@ -10,28 +10,6 @@ PAUSE_ON_FAIL=no
################################################################################
#
-log_test()
-{
- local rc=$1
- local expected=$2
- local msg="$3"
-
- if [ ${rc} -eq ${expected} ]; then
- printf "TEST: %-60s [ OK ]\n" "${msg}"
- nsuccess=$((nsuccess+1))
- else
- ret=1
- nfail=$((nfail+1))
- printf "TEST: %-60s [FAIL]\n" "${msg}"
- if [ "${PAUSE_ON_FAIL}" = "yes" ]; then
- echo
- echo "hit enter to continue, 'q' to quit"
- read a
- [ "$a" = "q" ] && exit 1
- fi
- fi
-}
-
run_cmd()
{
local ns
@@ -210,9 +188,12 @@ run_traceroute6()
setup_traceroute6
+ RET=0
+
# traceroute6 host-2 from host-1 (expects 2000:102::2)
run_cmd $h1 "traceroute6 2000:103::4 | grep -q 2000:102::2"
- log_test $? 0 "IPV6 traceroute"
+ check_err $? "traceroute6 did not return 2000:102::2"
+ log_test "IPv6 traceroute"
cleanup_traceroute6
}
@@ -275,9 +256,12 @@ run_traceroute()
setup_traceroute
+ RET=0
+
# traceroute host-2 from host-1 (expects 1.0.1.1). Takes a while.
run_cmd $h1 "traceroute 1.0.2.4 | grep -q 1.0.1.1"
- log_test $? 0 "IPV4 traceroute"
+ check_err $? "traceroute did not return 1.0.1.1"
+ log_test "IPv4 traceroute"
cleanup_traceroute
}
@@ -294,9 +278,6 @@ run_tests()
################################################################################
# main
-declare -i nfail=0
-declare -i nsuccess=0
-
while getopts :pv o
do
case $o in
@@ -308,5 +289,4 @@ done
run_tests
-printf "\nTests passed: %3d\n" ${nsuccess}
-printf "Tests failed: %3d\n" ${nfail}
+exit "${EXIT_STATUS}"
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next 2/8] ipv4: icmp: Pass IPv4 control block structure as an argument to __icmp_send()
From: Ido Schimmel @ 2025-09-01 8:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: davem, kuba, pabeni, edumazet, horms, paul, dsahern, petrm,
linux-security-module, Ido Schimmel
In-Reply-To: <20250901083027.183468-1-idosch@nvidia.com>
__icmp_send() is used to generate ICMP error messages in response to
various situations such as MTU errors (i.e., "Fragmentation Required")
and too many hops (i.e., "Time Exceeded").
The skb that generated the error does not necessarily come from the IPv4
layer and does not always have a valid IPv4 control block in skb->cb.
Therefore, commit 9ef6b42ad6fd ("net: Add __icmp_send helper.") changed
the function to take the IP options structure as argument instead of
deriving it from the skb's control block. Some callers of this function
such as icmp_send() pass the IP options structure from the skb's control
block as in these call paths the control block is known to be valid, but
other callers simply pass a zeroed structure.
A subsequent patch will need __icmp_send() to access more information
from the IPv4 control block (specifically, the ifindex of the input
interface). As a preparation for this change, change the function to
take the IPv4 control block structure as an argument instead of the IP
options structure. This makes the function similar to its IPv6
counterpart that already takes the IPv6 control block structure as an
argument.
No functional changes intended.
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
---
include/net/icmp.h | 10 ++++++----
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 12 ++++++------
net/ipv4/icmp.c | 12 +++++++-----
net/ipv4/route.c | 10 +++++-----
4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/icmp.h b/include/net/icmp.h
index caddf4a59ad1..935ee13d9ae9 100644
--- a/include/net/icmp.h
+++ b/include/net/icmp.h
@@ -37,10 +37,10 @@ struct sk_buff;
struct net;
void __icmp_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info,
- const struct ip_options *opt);
+ const struct inet_skb_parm *parm);
static inline void icmp_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)
{
- __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &IPCB(skb_in)->opt);
+ __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, IPCB(skb_in));
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
@@ -48,8 +48,10 @@ void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info);
#else
static inline void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)
{
- struct ip_options opts = { 0 };
- __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &opts);
+ struct inet_skb_parm parm;
+
+ memset(&parm, 0, sizeof(parm));
+ __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &parm);
}
#endif
diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index c7c949c37e2d..709021197e1c 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -1715,7 +1715,7 @@ int cipso_v4_validate(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned char **option)
*/
void cipso_v4_error(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, u32 gateway)
{
- struct ip_options opt;
+ struct inet_skb_parm parm;
int res;
if (ip_hdr(skb)->protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP || error != -EACCES)
@@ -1726,19 +1726,19 @@ void cipso_v4_error(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, u32 gateway)
* so we can not use icmp_send and IPCB here.
*/
- memset(&opt, 0, sizeof(opt));
- opt.optlen = ip_hdr(skb)->ihl * 4 - sizeof(struct iphdr);
+ memset(&parm, 0, sizeof(parm));
+ parm.opt.optlen = ip_hdr(skb)->ihl * 4 - sizeof(struct iphdr);
rcu_read_lock();
- res = __ip_options_compile(dev_net(skb->dev), &opt, skb, NULL);
+ res = __ip_options_compile(dev_net(skb->dev), &parm.opt, skb, NULL);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (res)
return;
if (gateway)
- __icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_NET_ANO, 0, &opt);
+ __icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_NET_ANO, 0, &parm);
else
- __icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_ANO, 0, &opt);
+ __icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_ANO, 0, &parm);
}
/**
diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c
index 823c70e34de8..92fb7aef4abf 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c
@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ static struct rtable *icmp_route_lookup(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *fl4,
*/
void __icmp_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info,
- const struct ip_options *opt)
+ const struct inet_skb_parm *parm)
{
struct iphdr *iph;
int room;
@@ -725,7 +725,8 @@ void __icmp_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info,
iph->tos;
mark = IP4_REPLY_MARK(net, skb_in->mark);
- if (__ip_options_echo(net, &icmp_param.replyopts.opt.opt, skb_in, opt))
+ if (__ip_options_echo(net, &icmp_param.replyopts.opt.opt, skb_in,
+ &parm->opt))
goto out_unlock;
@@ -799,14 +800,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__icmp_send);
void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)
{
struct sk_buff *cloned_skb = NULL;
- struct ip_options opts = { 0 };
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;
+ struct inet_skb_parm parm;
struct nf_conn *ct;
__be32 orig_ip;
+ memset(&parm, 0, sizeof(parm));
ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo);
if (!ct || !(ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT)) {
- __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &opts);
+ __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &parm);
return;
}
@@ -821,7 +823,7 @@ void icmp_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info)
orig_ip = ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr;
ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[0].tuple.src.u3.ip;
- __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &opts);
+ __icmp_send(skb_in, type, code, info, &parm);
ip_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip;
out:
consume_skb(cloned_skb);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c
index 50309f2ab132..6d27d3610c1c 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
@@ -1222,8 +1222,8 @@ EXPORT_INDIRECT_CALLABLE(ipv4_dst_check);
static void ipv4_send_dest_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct inet_skb_parm parm;
struct net_device *dev;
- struct ip_options opt;
int res;
/* Recompile ip options since IPCB may not be valid anymore.
@@ -1233,21 +1233,21 @@ static void ipv4_send_dest_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb)
ip_hdr(skb)->version != 4 || ip_hdr(skb)->ihl < 5)
return;
- memset(&opt, 0, sizeof(opt));
+ memset(&parm, 0, sizeof(parm));
if (ip_hdr(skb)->ihl > 5) {
if (!pskb_network_may_pull(skb, ip_hdr(skb)->ihl * 4))
return;
- opt.optlen = ip_hdr(skb)->ihl * 4 - sizeof(struct iphdr);
+ parm.opt.optlen = ip_hdr(skb)->ihl * 4 - sizeof(struct iphdr);
rcu_read_lock();
dev = skb->dev ? skb->dev : skb_rtable(skb)->dst.dev;
- res = __ip_options_compile(dev_net(dev), &opt, skb, NULL);
+ res = __ip_options_compile(dev_net(dev), &parm.opt, skb, NULL);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (res)
return;
}
- __icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_UNREACH, 0, &opt);
+ __icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_UNREACH, 0, &parm);
}
static void ipv4_link_failure(struct sk_buff *skb)
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next 1/8] ipv4: cipso: Simplify IP options handling in cipso_v4_error()
From: Ido Schimmel @ 2025-09-01 8:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: davem, kuba, pabeni, edumazet, horms, paul, dsahern, petrm,
linux-security-module, Ido Schimmel
In-Reply-To: <20250901083027.183468-1-idosch@nvidia.com>
When __ip_options_compile() is called with an skb, the IP options are
parsed from the skb data into the provided IP option argument. This is
in contrast to the case where the skb argument is NULL and the options
are parsed from opt->__data.
Given that cipso_v4_error() always passes an skb to
__ip_options_compile(), there is no need to allocate an extra 40 bytes
(maximum IP options size).
Therefore, simplify the function by removing these extra bytes and make
the function similar to ipv4_send_dest_unreach() which also calls both
__ip_options_compile() and __icmp_send().
This is a preparation for changing the arguments being passed to
__icmp_send().
No functional changes intended.
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
---
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 ++++++-------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index 740af8541d2f..c7c949c37e2d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -1715,8 +1715,7 @@ int cipso_v4_validate(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned char **option)
*/
void cipso_v4_error(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, u32 gateway)
{
- unsigned char optbuf[sizeof(struct ip_options) + 40];
- struct ip_options *opt = (struct ip_options *)optbuf;
+ struct ip_options opt;
int res;
if (ip_hdr(skb)->protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP || error != -EACCES)
@@ -1727,19 +1726,19 @@ void cipso_v4_error(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, u32 gateway)
* so we can not use icmp_send and IPCB here.
*/
- memset(opt, 0, sizeof(struct ip_options));
- opt->optlen = ip_hdr(skb)->ihl*4 - sizeof(struct iphdr);
+ memset(&opt, 0, sizeof(opt));
+ opt.optlen = ip_hdr(skb)->ihl * 4 - sizeof(struct iphdr);
rcu_read_lock();
- res = __ip_options_compile(dev_net(skb->dev), opt, skb, NULL);
+ res = __ip_options_compile(dev_net(skb->dev), &opt, skb, NULL);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (res)
return;
if (gateway)
- __icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_NET_ANO, 0, opt);
+ __icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_NET_ANO, 0, &opt);
else
- __icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_ANO, 0, opt);
+ __icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_ANO, 0, &opt);
}
/**
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next 3/8] ipv4: icmp: Fix source IP derivation in presence of VRFs
From: Ido Schimmel @ 2025-09-01 8:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: davem, kuba, pabeni, edumazet, horms, paul, dsahern, petrm,
linux-security-module, Ido Schimmel
In-Reply-To: <20250901083027.183468-1-idosch@nvidia.com>
When the "icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr" sysctl is enabled, the source
IP of ICMP error messages should be the "primary address of the
interface that received the packet that caused the icmp error".
The IPv4 ICMP code determines this interface using inet_iif() which in
the input path translates to skb->skb_iif. If the interface that
received the packet is a VRF port, skb->skb_iif will contain the ifindex
of the VRF device and not that of the receiving interface. This is
because in the input path the VRF driver overrides skb->skb_iif with the
ifindex of the VRF device itself (see vrf_ip_rcv()).
As such, the source IP that will be chosen for the ICMP error message is
either an address assigned to the VRF device itself (if present) or an
address assigned to some VRF port, not necessarily the input or output
interface.
This behavior is especially problematic when the error messages are
"Time Exceeded" messages as it means that utilities like traceroute will
show an incorrect packet path.
Solve this by determining the input interface based on the iif field in
the control block, if present. This field is set in the input path to
skb->skb_iif and is not later overridden by the VRF driver, unlike
skb->skb_iif.
This behavior is consistent with the IPv6 counterpart that already uses
the iif from the control block.
Reported-by: Andy Roulin <aroulin@nvidia.com>
Reported-by: Rajkumar Srinivasan <rajsrinivasa@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
---
net/ipv4/icmp.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c
index 92fb7aef4abf..7547db362ec7 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c
@@ -710,7 +710,8 @@ void __icmp_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int type, int code, __be32 info,
rcu_read_lock();
if (rt_is_input_route(rt) &&
READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr))
- dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, inet_iif(skb_in));
+ dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, parm->iif ? parm->iif :
+ inet_iif(skb_in));
if (dev)
saddr = inet_select_addr(dev, iph->saddr,
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH net-next 0/8] ipv4: icmp: Fix source IP derivation in presence of VRFs
From: Ido Schimmel @ 2025-09-01 8:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: davem, kuba, pabeni, edumazet, horms, paul, dsahern, petrm,
linux-security-module, Ido Schimmel
Align IPv4 with IPv6 and in the presence of VRFs generate ICMP error
messages with a source IP that is derived from the receiving interface
and not from its VRF master. This is especially important when the error
messages are "Time Exceeded" messages as it means that utilities like
traceroute will show an incorrect packet path.
Patches #1-#2 are preparations.
Patch #3 is the actual change.
Patches #4-#7 make small improvements in the existing traceroute test.
Patch #8 extends the traceroute test with VRF test cases for both IPv4
and IPv6.
Ido Schimmel (8):
ipv4: cipso: Simplify IP options handling in cipso_v4_error()
ipv4: icmp: Pass IPv4 control block structure as an argument to
__icmp_send()
ipv4: icmp: Fix source IP derivation in presence of VRFs
selftests: traceroute: Return correct value on failure
selftests: traceroute: Use require_command()
selftests: traceroute: Reword comment
selftests: traceroute: Test traceroute with different source IPs
selftests: traceroute: Add VRF tests
include/net/icmp.h | 10 +-
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 +-
net/ipv4/icmp.c | 15 +-
net/ipv4/route.c | 10 +-
tools/testing/selftests/net/traceroute.sh | 250 ++++++++++++++++++----
5 files changed, 229 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] selftests: Replace relative includes with non-relative for kselftest.h and kselftest_harness.h
From: Bala-Vignesh-Reddy @ 2025-09-01 2:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm
Cc: Liam.Howlett, davem, david, edumazet, gnoack, horms, kuba,
linux-kernel, linux-kselftest, linux-mm, linux-security-module,
lorenzo.stoakes, mhocko, mic, ming.lei, pabeni,
reddybalavignesh9979, richard.weiyang, rppt, shuah, skhan, surenb,
vbabka
In-Reply-To: <20250831130340.c096ab001dd38bcdb11146b8@linux-foundation.org>
Hi Andrew,
Sorry for the trouble caused by this patch. No problem on
dropping the conflicting hunks.
I'll send a follow up patch after 6.17 to cover the missed
conversion sites.
Thanks for your review.
Bala Vignesh
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] selftests: Replace relative includes with non-relative for kselftest.h and kselftest_harness.h
From: Andrew Morton @ 2025-08-31 20:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Bala-Vignesh-Reddy
Cc: richard.weiyang, Liam.Howlett, davem, david, edumazet, gnoack,
horms, kuba, linux-kernel, linux-kselftest, linux-mm,
linux-security-module, lorenzo.stoakes, mhocko, mic, ming.lei,
pabeni, rppt, shuah, skhan, surenb, vbabka
In-Reply-To: <20250830163949.20952-3-reddybalavignesh9979@gmail.com>
On Sat, 30 Aug 2025 22:09:49 +0530 Bala-Vignesh-Reddy <reddybalavignesh9979@gmail.com> wrote:
> Replaced relative path of kselftest.h and kselftest_harness.h
> to a non-relative path
This patch causes me some trouble. It alters things which are also
altered in both mm.git's `mm' and `non-mm' branches. I try to keep
those branches independent and this patch won't apply to either branch.
And I'd rather not mess around doing git tricks to address this just
for one patch.
So what I plan to do is to simply drop the problematic hunks from this
patch. So what will be queued in mm.git's mm-nonmm will have a few
missed conversion sites. Everything should still work OK and I'll ask
that after 6.17 is released, you send along a followup patch which fixes
those missed sites, OK?
^ permalink raw reply
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