* [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-03-24 11:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: keyrings, Jarkko Sakkinen, Srish Srinivasan, Nayna Jain,
James Bottomley, Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Moore,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Ahmad Fatoum,
Pengutronix Kernel Team, open list, open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM
TPM_DEBUG, and other similar flags, are a non-standard way to specify a
feature in Linux kernel. Introduce CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG for
trusted keys, and use it to replace these ad-hoc feature flags.
Given that trusted keys debug dumps can contain sensitive data, harden
the feature as follows:
1. In the Kconfig description postulate that pr_debug() statements must be
used.
2. Use pr_debug() statements in TPM 1.x driver to print the protocol dump.
Traces, when actually needed, can be easily enabled by providing
trusted.dyndbg='+p' in the kernel command-line.
Cc: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/7f8b8478-5cd8-4d97-bfd0-341fd5cf10f9@linux.ibm.com/
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
v2:
- Implement for all trusted keys backends.
- Add HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG as it is a good practice despite full
coverage.
---
include/keys/trusted-type.h | 18 +++++-------
security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 19 ++++++++++++
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c | 4 +--
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 36 +++++++++++------------
4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
index 03527162613f..620a1f890b6b 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
@@ -83,18 +83,16 @@ struct trusted_key_source {
extern struct key_type key_type_trusted;
-#define TRUSTED_DEBUG 0
-
-#if TRUSTED_DEBUG
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
{
- pr_info("key_len %d\n", p->key_len);
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0);
- pr_info("bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len);
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0);
- pr_info("migratable %d\n", p->migratable);
+ pr_debug("key_len %d\n", p->key_len);
+ print_hex_dump_debug("key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0);
+ pr_debug("bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len);
+ print_hex_dump_debug("blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0);
+ pr_debug("migratable %d\n", p->migratable);
}
#else
static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
index 9e00482d886a..2ad9ba0e03f1 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
@@ -1,10 +1,25 @@
config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
bool
+config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+ bool
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+ bool "Debug trusted keys"
+ depends on HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+ default n
+ help
+ Trusted keys backends and core code that support debug dumps
+ can opt-in that feature here. Dumps must only use DEBUG
+ level output, as sensitive data may pass by. In the
+ kernel-command line traces can be enabled via
+ trusted.dyndbg='+p'.
+
config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM
bool "TPM-based trusted keys"
depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS
default y
+ select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1
select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS
@@ -23,6 +38,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE
bool "TEE-based trusted keys"
depends on TEE >= TRUSTED_KEYS
default y
+ select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
help
Enable use of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as trusted
@@ -33,6 +49,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM
depends on CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR >= TRUSTED_KEYS
select CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN
default y
+ select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
help
Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module
@@ -42,6 +59,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP
bool "DCP-based trusted keys"
depends on CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP >= TRUSTED_KEYS
default y
+ select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
help
Enable use of NXP's DCP (Data Co-Processor) as trusted key backend.
@@ -50,6 +68,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_PKWM
bool "PKWM-based trusted keys"
depends on PSERIES_PLPKS >= TRUSTED_KEYS
default y
+ select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
help
Enable use of IBM PowerVM Key Wrapping Module (PKWM) as a trusted key backend.
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
index 601943ce0d60..015cddc6b53c 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
{opt_err, NULL}
};
-#ifdef CAAM_DEBUG
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
static inline void dump_options(const struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info)
{
- pr_info("key encryption algo %d\n", pkey_info->key_enc_algo);
+ pr_debug("key encryption algo %d\n", pkey_info->key_enc_algo);
}
#else
static inline void dump_options(const struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index c865c97aa1b4..8fe889c7cdd1 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -46,38 +46,36 @@ enum {
SRK_keytype = 4
};
-#define TPM_DEBUG 0
-
-#if TPM_DEBUG
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
{
- pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
- pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
- pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
- pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
+ pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
+ pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
+ pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
+ pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
+ print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
}
static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
{
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
- pr_info("secret:\n");
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
- pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
+ print_hex_dump_debug("trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
+ pr_debug("secret:\n");
+ print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
+ pr_debug("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
+ print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
}
static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
{
int len;
- pr_info("\ntpm buffer\n");
+ pr_debug("\ntpm buffer\n");
len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
+ print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
}
#else
static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-03-24 11:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: keyrings, Jarkko Sakkinen, Srish Srinivasan, Nayna Jain,
James Bottomley, Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Moore,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Ahmad Fatoum,
Pengutronix Kernel Team, open list, open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM
TPM_DEBUG, and other similar flags, are a non-standard way to specify a
feature in Linux kernel. Introduce CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG for
trusted keys, and use it to replace these ad-hoc feature flags.
Given that trusted keys debug dumps can contain sensitive data, harden
the feature as follows:
1. In the Kconfig description postulate that pr_debug() statements must be
used.
2. Use pr_debug() statements in TPM 1.x driver to print the protocol dump.
Traces, when actually needed, can be easily enabled by providing
trusted.dyndbg='+p' in the kernel command-line.
Cc: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/7f8b8478-5cd8-4d97-bfd0-341fd5cf10f9@linux.ibm.com/
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
v2:
- Implement for all trusted keys backends.
- Add HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG as it is a good practice despite full
coverage.
---
include/keys/trusted-type.h | 18 +++++-------
security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 19 ++++++++++++
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c | 4 +--
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 36 +++++++++++------------
4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
index 03527162613f..620a1f890b6b 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
@@ -83,18 +83,16 @@ struct trusted_key_source {
extern struct key_type key_type_trusted;
-#define TRUSTED_DEBUG 0
-
-#if TRUSTED_DEBUG
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
{
- pr_info("key_len %d\n", p->key_len);
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0);
- pr_info("bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len);
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0);
- pr_info("migratable %d\n", p->migratable);
+ pr_debug("key_len %d\n", p->key_len);
+ print_hex_dump_debug("key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0);
+ pr_debug("bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len);
+ print_hex_dump_debug("blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0);
+ pr_debug("migratable %d\n", p->migratable);
}
#else
static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
index 9e00482d886a..2ad9ba0e03f1 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
@@ -1,10 +1,25 @@
config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
bool
+config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+ bool
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+ bool "Debug trusted keys"
+ depends on HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
+ default n
+ help
+ Trusted keys backends and core code that support debug dumps
+ can opt-in that feature here. Dumps must only use DEBUG
+ level output, as sensitive data may pass by. In the
+ kernel-command line traces can be enabled via
+ trusted.dyndbg='+p'.
+
config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM
bool "TPM-based trusted keys"
depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS
default y
+ select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1
select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS
@@ -23,6 +38,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE
bool "TEE-based trusted keys"
depends on TEE >= TRUSTED_KEYS
default y
+ select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
help
Enable use of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as trusted
@@ -33,6 +49,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM
depends on CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR >= TRUSTED_KEYS
select CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN
default y
+ select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
help
Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module
@@ -42,6 +59,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP
bool "DCP-based trusted keys"
depends on CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP >= TRUSTED_KEYS
default y
+ select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
help
Enable use of NXP's DCP (Data Co-Processor) as trusted key backend.
@@ -50,6 +68,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_PKWM
bool "PKWM-based trusted keys"
depends on PSERIES_PLPKS >= TRUSTED_KEYS
default y
+ select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
help
Enable use of IBM PowerVM Key Wrapping Module (PKWM) as a trusted key backend.
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
index 601943ce0d60..015cddc6b53c 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c
@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
{opt_err, NULL}
};
-#ifdef CAAM_DEBUG
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
static inline void dump_options(const struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info)
{
- pr_info("key encryption algo %d\n", pkey_info->key_enc_algo);
+ pr_debug("key encryption algo %d\n", pkey_info->key_enc_algo);
}
#else
static inline void dump_options(const struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index c865c97aa1b4..8fe889c7cdd1 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -46,38 +46,36 @@ enum {
SRK_keytype = 4
};
-#define TPM_DEBUG 0
-
-#if TPM_DEBUG
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
{
- pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
- pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
- pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
- pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
+ pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
+ pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
+ pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
+ pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
+ print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
}
static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
{
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
- pr_info("secret:\n");
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
- pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
+ print_hex_dump_debug("trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
+ pr_debug("secret:\n");
+ print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
+ pr_debug("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
+ print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+ 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
}
static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
{
int len;
- pr_info("\ntpm buffer\n");
+ pr_debug("\ntpm buffer\n");
len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
+ print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
}
#else
static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: Protocol debugging as a feature
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-03-24 10:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: keyrings, Srish Srinivasan, Nayna Jain, James Bottomley,
Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Moore, James Morris,
Serge E. Hallyn, open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM, open list
In-Reply-To: <20260323090047.632499-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
On Mon, Mar 23, 2026 at 11:00:46AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> TPM_DEBUG is a non-standard way to specify a feature in Linux kernel.
> Introduce CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG, and use it to replace TPM_DEBUG in
> TPM 1.x trusted keys.
>
> Given that protocol bus could contain sensitive data, harden the feature as
> follows:
>
> 1. In the Kconfig description postulate that pr_debug() statements must be
> used.
> 2. Use pr_debug() statements in TPM 1.x driver to print the protocol dump.
>
> Traces can be enabled e.g., by providing trusted.dyndbg='+p' for the kernel
> command-line.
>
> Cc: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
> Reported-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/7f8b8478-5cd8-4d97-bfd0-341fd5cf10f9@linux.ibm.com/
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> ---
I'm posting a v2 update with HAVE_* flag and a bit wider scope.
BR, Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 6/7] tomoyo: Convert from sb_mount to granular mount hooks
From: Tetsuo Handa @ 2026-03-24 9:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Song Liu
Cc: Song Liu, Christian Brauner, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
jack@suse.cz, john.johansen@canonical.com,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com,
mic@digikod.net, gnoack@google.com, takedakn@nttdata.co.jp,
herton@canonical.com, Kernel Team, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <CAPhsuW4G7vo-JZqenZ-sFHw9z02wZUJa1-+9U81U--vQhnfG_Q@mail.gmail.com>
On 2026/03/24 16:46, Song Liu wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 23, 2026 at 11:12 PM Tetsuo Handa
> <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> wrote:
>>
>> On 2026/03/24 4:31, Song Liu wrote:
>>>> Then, how can LSM modules know that how the requested filesystem resolves
>>>> the dev_name argument, without embedding filesystem specific resolution
>>>> logic into individual LSM module?
>>>
>>> IIUC, if an LSM cares about the dev_name of a new mount, it will have to look
>>> into each individual filesystem. We can add a LSM hook for the filesystems to
>>> call. But this will require changes to individual filesystem code. OTOH,
>>> dev_name can probably bridge the gap as we change filesystems.
>>>
>>> Would this work?
>>
>> I guess something like untested diff shown below would work.
>
> I think this doesn't work with erofs on file (requires
> CONFIG_EROFS_FS_BACKED_BY_FILE). erofs may not be the
> only one that has this problem.
This is incomplete but I think this is better than now because currently
mount() operation likely fails with -ENOENT if the requested filesystem
does not interpret fc->source as a pathname despite tomoyo_mount_acl()
always interprets fc->source as a pathname when FS_REQUIRES_DEV is set.
Also, mount() operation might by error succeed because tomoyo_mount_acl()
checks permission against unintended file when e.g. "mtd0" by chance exists
in the current directory.
We could add filesystem-specific logic to e.g. CONFIG_EROFS_FS_BACKED_BY_FILE
case that copies the resolved "struct path" to fc->source_path. But even without
adding filesystem-specific logic, mount() operation will succeed because
tomoyo_mount_acl() can handle fc->source as a string rather than a canonicalized
pathname.
Being able to know whether tomoyo_mount_acl() should interpret dev_name as a
pathname (which is subjected to canonicalization, and also subjected to more
complicated permission checks based on e.g. inode's uid/gid) is appreciated.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v4] landlock: Expand restrict flags example for ABI version 8
From: Günther Noack @ 2026-03-24 9:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün
Cc: Panagiotis "Ivory" Vasilopoulos, Jonathan Corbet,
Shuah Khan, linux-security-module, linux-doc, linux-kernel,
Dan Cojocaru
In-Reply-To: <20260323.sheiHaR5uRoo@digikod.net>
Hello!
On Mon, Mar 23, 2026 at 07:56:21PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Thanks! I pushed your patch in next with a minor fix.
>
> Günther, does it look good to you?
>
> On Wed, Mar 04, 2026 at 07:13:04PM +0100, Panagiotis "Ivory" Vasilopoulos wrote:
> > Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC to the backwards compatibility example
> > for restrict flags. This introduces completeness, similar to that of
> > the ruleset attributes example. However, as the new example can impact
> > enforcement in certain cases, an appropriate warning is also included.
> >
> > Additionally, I modified the two comments of the example to make them
> > more consistent with the ruleset attributes example's.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Panagiotis 'Ivory' Vasilopoulos <git@n0toose.net>
> > Co-developed-by: Dan Cojocaru <dan@dcdev.ro>
> > Signed-off-by: Dan Cojocaru <dan@dcdev.ro>
> > ---
> > Changes in v4:
> > - Make warning somewhat more terse, merge comments.
> > - Remove some sensationalization. ("Don't copy-paste this just yet!")
> > - Apply Günther's suggestion (v3 "recycled" some phrases, was long)
> > - ... but also retain some of the wording on ABI differences
> > - Provide a brief overview that contextualizes the example further:
> > - Clarify the difference behind ABI < 8 & ABI v8, to avoid
> > misunderstandings on which option is the default.
> > - Make "linear reading" easier.
> > - Based on Mickaël's feedback: Avoid cans of worms w.r.t. use cases
> > - Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260228-landlock-docs-add-tsync-example-v3-1-140ab50f0524@n0toose.net
> >
> > Changes in v3:
> > - Add __attribute__((fallthrough)) like in earlier example.
> > - Improve comment for LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC (ABI < 8) example.
> > - Add relevant warning for ABI < 8 example based on Günther's feedback.
> > - Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260221-landlock-docs-add-tsync-example-v2-1-60990986bba5@n0toose.net
> >
> > Changes in v2:
> > - Fix formatting error.
> > - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260221-landlock-docs-add-tsync-example-v1-1-f89383809eb4@n0toose.net
> > ---
> > Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
> > 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> > index 13134bccdd39d78ddce3daf454f32dda162ce91b..64c7138a788d74f99da0a71428da392b3d873bf8 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> > +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> > @@ -196,13 +196,27 @@ similar backwards compatibility check is needed for the restrict flags
> > (see sys_landlock_restrict_self() documentation for available flags):
> >
> > .. code-block:: c
> > -
> > - __u32 restrict_flags = LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON;
> > - if (abi < 7) {
> > - /* Clear logging flags unsupported before ABI 7. */
> > + __u32 restrict_flags =
> > + LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON |
> > + LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC;
> > + switch (abi) {
> > + case 1 ... 6:
> > + /* Clear logging flags unsupported for ABI < 7 */
> > restrict_flags &= ~(LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF |
> > LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON |
> > LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF);
> > + __attribute__((fallthrough));
> > + case 7:
> > + /*
> > + * Removes multithreaded enforcement flag unsupported for ABI < 8
> > + *
> > + * WARNING: Without this flag, calling landlock_restrict_self(2) is
> > + * only equivalent if the calling process is single-threaded. Below
> > + * ABI v8 (and as of ABI v8, when not using this flag), a Landlock
> > + * policy would only be enforced for the calling thread and its
> > + * children (and not for all threads, including parents and siblings).
> > + */
> > + restrict_flags &= ~LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC;
> > }
> >
> > The next step is to restrict the current thread from gaining more privileges
> >
> > ---
> > base-commit: ceb977bfe9e8715e6cd3a4785c7aab8ea5cd2b77
> > change-id: 20260221-landlock-docs-add-tsync-example-e8fd5c64a366
> >
> > Best regards,
> > --
> > Panagiotis "Ivory" Vasilopoulos <git@n0toose.net>
> >
> >
Apologies for the delay, this must have slipped through the cracks.
Thanks for bringing it up again. Yes, this looks good.
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
—Günther
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 6/7] tomoyo: Convert from sb_mount to granular mount hooks
From: Song Liu @ 2026-03-24 7:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tetsuo Handa
Cc: Song Liu, Christian Brauner, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
jack@suse.cz, john.johansen@canonical.com,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com,
mic@digikod.net, gnoack@google.com, takedakn@nttdata.co.jp,
herton@canonical.com, Kernel Team, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <6609e11e-90aa-4021-974e-e9937688dd49@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
On Mon, Mar 23, 2026 at 11:12 PM Tetsuo Handa
<penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> wrote:
>
> On 2026/03/24 4:31, Song Liu wrote:
> >> Then, how can LSM modules know that how the requested filesystem resolves
> >> the dev_name argument, without embedding filesystem specific resolution
> >> logic into individual LSM module?
> >
> > IIUC, if an LSM cares about the dev_name of a new mount, it will have to look
> > into each individual filesystem. We can add a LSM hook for the filesystems to
> > call. But this will require changes to individual filesystem code. OTOH,
> > dev_name can probably bridge the gap as we change filesystems.
> >
> > Would this work?
>
> I guess something like untested diff shown below would work.
I think this doesn't work with erofs on file (requires
CONFIG_EROFS_FS_BACKED_BY_FILE). erofs may not be the
only one that has this problem.
Thanks,
Song
>
> block/bdev.c | 26 ++++++++++++++------------
> fs/fs_context.c | 4 ++++
> fs/namespace.c | 10 ++++++----
> fs/super.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/blkdev.h | 12 +++++++++++-
> include/linux/fs_context.h | 1 +
> security/tomoyo/mount.c | 26 ++------------------------
> security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 +-
> 8 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 6/7] tomoyo: Convert from sb_mount to granular mount hooks
From: Tetsuo Handa @ 2026-03-24 6:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Song Liu
Cc: Christian Brauner, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, Song Liu,
paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
jack@suse.cz, john.johansen@canonical.com,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com,
mic@digikod.net, gnoack@google.com, takedakn@nttdata.co.jp,
herton@canonical.com, Kernel Team, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <CAAeYb7k+TWArOKyOomkLZ8fwqUPjha9iORpJaj4nMyN=o4ZRQg@mail.gmail.com>
On 2026/03/24 4:31, Song Liu wrote:
>> Then, how can LSM modules know that how the requested filesystem resolves
>> the dev_name argument, without embedding filesystem specific resolution
>> logic into individual LSM module?
>
> IIUC, if an LSM cares about the dev_name of a new mount, it will have to look
> into each individual filesystem. We can add a LSM hook for the filesystems to
> call. But this will require changes to individual filesystem code. OTOH,
> dev_name can probably bridge the gap as we change filesystems.
>
> Would this work?
I guess something like untested diff shown below would work.
block/bdev.c | 26 ++++++++++++++------------
fs/fs_context.c | 4 ++++
fs/namespace.c | 10 ++++++----
fs/super.c | 2 +-
include/linux/blkdev.h | 12 +++++++++++-
include/linux/fs_context.h | 1 +
security/tomoyo/mount.c | 26 ++------------------------
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 +-
8 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
diff --git a/block/bdev.c b/block/bdev.c
index ed022f8c48c7..35707a6144fa 100644
--- a/block/bdev.c
+++ b/block/bdev.c
@@ -1199,44 +1199,46 @@ void bdev_fput(struct file *bdev_file)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(bdev_fput);
/**
- * lookup_bdev() - Look up a struct block_device by name.
+ * lookup_bdev_path() - Look up a struct block_device by name.
* @pathname: Name of the block device in the filesystem.
* @dev: Pointer to the block device's dev_t, if found.
+ * @path: Pointer to the block device's path, if found.
*
- * Lookup the block device's dev_t at @pathname in the current
- * namespace if possible and return it in @dev.
+ * Lookup the block device's dev_t and path at @pathname in the current
+ * namespace if possible and return these in @dev and @path
*
* Context: May sleep.
* Return: 0 if succeeded, negative errno otherwise.
+ * Caller must call path_put(@path) if this function returned 0.
*/
-int lookup_bdev(const char *pathname, dev_t *dev)
+int lookup_bdev_path(const char *pathname, dev_t *dev, struct path *path)
{
struct inode *inode;
- struct path path;
int error;
if (!pathname || !*pathname)
return -EINVAL;
- error = kern_path(pathname, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
+ error = kern_path(pathname, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, path);
if (error)
return error;
- inode = d_backing_inode(path.dentry);
+ inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
error = -ENOTBLK;
if (!S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode))
goto out_path_put;
error = -EACCES;
- if (!may_open_dev(&path))
+ if (!may_open_dev(path))
goto out_path_put;
-
*dev = inode->i_rdev;
- error = 0;
+ return 0;
out_path_put:
- path_put(&path);
+ path_put(path);
+ path->dentry = NULL;
+ path->mnt = NULL;
return error;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(lookup_bdev);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(lookup_bdev_path);
/**
* bdev_mark_dead - mark a block device as dead
diff --git a/fs/fs_context.c b/fs/fs_context.c
index a37b0a093505..e5294f48eb32 100644
--- a/fs/fs_context.c
+++ b/fs/fs_context.c
@@ -377,6 +377,8 @@ struct fs_context *vfs_dup_fs_context(struct fs_context *src_fc)
fc->fs_private = NULL;
fc->s_fs_info = NULL;
fc->source = NULL;
+ fc->source_path.dentry = NULL;
+ fc->source_path.mnt = NULL;
fc->security = NULL;
get_filesystem(fc->fs_type);
get_net(fc->net_ns);
@@ -504,6 +506,8 @@ void put_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
put_cred(fc->cred);
put_fc_log(fc);
put_filesystem(fc->fs_type);
+ if (fc->source_path.dentry)
+ path_put(&fc->source_path);
kfree(fc->source);
kfree(fc);
}
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index ba5baccdde67..621b8205a0af 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -3777,7 +3777,7 @@ static bool mount_too_revealing(const struct super_block *sb, int *new_mnt_flags
* be added to the namespace tree.
*/
static int do_new_mount_fc(struct fs_context *fc, const struct path *mountpoint,
- unsigned int mnt_flags)
+ unsigned int mnt_flags, void *data, unsigned long flags)
{
struct super_block *sb;
struct vfsmount *mnt __free(mntput) = fc_mount(fc);
@@ -3786,6 +3786,10 @@ static int do_new_mount_fc(struct fs_context *fc, const struct path *mountpoint,
if (IS_ERR(mnt))
return PTR_ERR(mnt);
+ error = security_mount_new(fc, mountpoint, mnt_flags, flags, data);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
sb = fc->root->d_sb;
error = security_sb_kern_mount(sb);
if (unlikely(error))
@@ -3857,9 +3861,7 @@ static int do_new_mount(const struct path *path, const char *fstype,
err = -EPERM;
if (!err)
- err = security_mount_new(fc, path, mnt_flags, flags, data);
- if (!err)
- err = do_new_mount_fc(fc, path, mnt_flags);
+ err = do_new_mount_fc(fc, path, mnt_flags, data, flags);
put_fs_context(fc);
return err;
diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
index 378e81efe643..588f207f26ae 100644
--- a/fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/super.c
@@ -1670,7 +1670,7 @@ int get_tree_bdev_flags(struct fs_context *fc,
if (!fc->source)
return invalf(fc, "No source specified");
- error = lookup_bdev(fc->source, &dev);
+ error = lookup_bdev_path(fc->source, &dev, &fc->source_path);
if (error) {
if (!(flags & GET_TREE_BDEV_QUIET_LOOKUP))
errorf(fc, "%s: Can't lookup blockdev", fc->source);
diff --git a/include/linux/blkdev.h b/include/linux/blkdev.h
index d463b9b5a0a5..c38d538f2a07 100644
--- a/include/linux/blkdev.h
+++ b/include/linux/blkdev.h
@@ -1723,7 +1723,17 @@ static inline void bio_end_io_acct(struct bio *bio, unsigned long start_time)
int bdev_validate_blocksize(struct block_device *bdev, int block_size);
int set_blocksize(struct file *file, int size);
-int lookup_bdev(const char *pathname, dev_t *dev);
+int lookup_bdev_path(const char *pathname, dev_t *dev, struct path *path);
+static inline int lookup_bdev(const char *pathname, dev_t *dev)
+{
+ struct path path = {};
+ int ret = lookup_bdev_path(pathname, dev, &path);
+
+ if (!ret)
+ path_put(&path);
+ return ret;
+}
+
void blkdev_show(struct seq_file *seqf, off_t offset);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs_context.h b/include/linux/fs_context.h
index 0d6c8a6d7be2..0dfa6b6fc256 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs_context.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs_context.h
@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ struct fs_context {
const struct cred *cred; /* The mounter's credentials */
struct p_log log; /* Logging buffer */
const char *source; /* The source name (eg. dev path) */
+ struct path source_path; /* Fields are NULL unless resolved from the source name. */
void *security; /* LSM options */
void *s_fs_info; /* Proposed s_fs_info */
unsigned int sb_flags; /* Proposed superblock flags (SB_*) */
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/mount.c b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
index 82ffe7d02814..3a384b698557 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/mount.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
@@ -84,7 +84,6 @@ static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
__must_hold_shared(&tomoyo_ss)
{
struct tomoyo_obj_info obj = { };
- struct file_system_type *fstype = NULL;
const char *requested_type = NULL;
const char *requested_dir_name = NULL;
const char *requested_dev_name = NULL;
@@ -124,32 +123,16 @@ static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
} else if (type == tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_BIND] ||
type == tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE]) {
need_dev = -1; /* dev_name is a directory */
- } else {
- fstype = get_fs_type(type);
- if (!fstype) {
- error = -ENODEV;
- goto out;
- }
- if (fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV)
- /* dev_name is a block device file. */
- need_dev = 1;
+ } else if (dev_path) {
+ need_dev = 1; /* dev_name is a block device file. */
}
if (need_dev) {
if (dev_path) {
/* Use pre-resolved path to avoid TOCTOU issues. */
obj.path1 = *dev_path;
- path_get(&obj.path1);
} else if (!dev_name) {
error = -ENOENT;
goto out;
- } else {
- struct path path;
-
- if (kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path)) {
- error = -ENOENT;
- goto out;
- }
- obj.path1 = path;
}
requested_dev_name = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&obj.path1);
if (!requested_dev_name) {
@@ -181,12 +164,7 @@ static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
out:
kfree(requested_dev_name);
kfree(requested_dir_name);
- if (fstype)
- put_filesystem(fstype);
kfree(requested_type);
- /* Drop refcount obtained by kern_path() or path_get(). */
- if (obj.path1.dentry)
- path_put(&obj.path1);
return error;
}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index ac84e1f03d5e..6235e527cc20 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static int tomoyo_mount_new(struct fs_context *fc, const struct path *mp,
{
/* Use original MS_* flags for policy matching */
return tomoyo_mount_permission(fc->source, mp, fc->fs_type->name,
- flags, NULL);
+ flags, &fc->source_path);
}
static int tomoyo_mount_remount(struct fs_context *fc, const struct path *mp,
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/2] selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks
From: Paul Moore @ 2026-03-23 21:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module, selinux, linux-fsdevel, linux-unionfs,
linux-erofs
Cc: Amir Goldstein, Gao Xiang
In-Reply-To: <20260323042510.3331778-6-paul@paul-moore.com>
On Mon, Mar 23, 2026 at 12:25 AM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
>
> The existing SELinux security model for overlayfs is to allow access if
> the current task is able to access the top level file (the "user" file)
> and the mounter's credentials are sufficient to access the lower
> level file (the "backing" file). Unfortunately, the current code does
> not properly enforce these access controls for both mmap() and mprotect()
> operations on overlayfs filesystems.
>
> This patch makes use of the newly created security_mmap_backing_file()
> LSM hook to provide the missing backing file enforcement for mmap()
> operations, and leverages the backing file API and new LSM blob to
> provide the necessary information to properly enforce the mprotect()
> access controls.
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> ---
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 252 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 17 ++
> 2 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index d8224ea113d1..2a3d524dce24 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -1745,6 +1745,60 @@ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
> static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid);
> #endif
>
> +static int __file_has_perm(bool bf_user_file, const struct cred *cred,
> + const struct file *file, u32 av)
> +
> +{
> + struct common_audit_data ad;
> + struct inode *inode;
> + u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
> + u32 tsid_fd;
> + int rc;
> +
> + if (bf_user_file) {
> + struct backing_file_security_struct *bfsec;
> + const struct path *path;
> +
> + if (WARN_ON(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING)))
> + return -EPERM;
Based on other code paths, we should return -EIO here. I've updated
the patch, but I'm holding off on posting another version for a day or
so in case anyone else is able to take a look.
> + bfsec = selinux_backing_file(file);
> + path = backing_file_user_path(file);
> + tsid_fd = bfsec->uf_sid;
> + inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
> +
> + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
> + ad.u.path = *path;
> + } else {
> + struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
> +
> + tsid_fd = fsec->sid;
> + inode = file_inode(file);
> +
> + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
> + ad.u.file = file;
> + }
> +
> + if (ssid != tsid_fd) {
> + rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, tsid_fd, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> + /* regardless of backing vs user file, use the underlying file here */
> + rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, ssid);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +#endif
> +
> + /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
> + if (av)
> + return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v7 01/11] lsm: Add LSM hook security_unix_find
From: Paul Moore @ 2026-03-23 20:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Günther Noack
Cc: Mickaël Salaün, John Johansen, James Morris,
Serge E . Hallyn, Tingmao Wang, Justin Suess,
linux-security-module, Samasth Norway Ananda, Matthieu Buffet,
Mikhail Ivanov, konstantin.meskhidze, Demi Marie Obenour,
Alyssa Ross, Jann Horn, Tahera Fahimi, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior,
Kuniyuki Iwashima, Simon Horman, netdev, Alexander Viro,
Christian Brauner
In-Reply-To: <20260323165654.193957-2-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
On Mon, Mar 23, 2026 at 12:58 PM Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
>
> Add an LSM hook security_unix_find.
>
> This hook is called to check the path of a named UNIX socket before a
> connection is initiated. The peer socket may be inspected as well.
>
> Why existing hooks are unsuitable:
>
> Existing socket hooks, security_unix_stream_connect(),
> security_unix_may_send(), and security_socket_connect() don't provide
> TOCTOU-free / namespace independent access to the paths of sockets.
>
> (1) We cannot resolve the path from the struct sockaddr in existing hooks.
> This requires another path lookup. A change in the path between the
> two lookups will cause a TOCTOU bug.
>
> (2) We cannot use the struct path from the listening socket, because it
> may be bound to a path in a different namespace than the caller,
> resulting in a path that cannot be referenced at policy creation time.
>
> Consumers of the hook wishing to reference @other are responsible
> for acquiring the unix_state_lock and checking for the SOCK_DEAD flag
> therein, ensuring the socket hasn't died since lookup.
>
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
> Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
> Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 5 +++++
> include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++
> net/unix/af_unix.c | 10 +++++++---
> security/security.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v6 1/9] lsm: Add LSM hook security_unix_find
From: Paul Moore @ 2026-03-23 20:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Georgia Garcia
Cc: Mickaël Salaün, John Johansen, Günther Noack,
James Morris, Serge E . Hallyn, Tingmao Wang, Justin Suess,
linux-security-module, Samasth Norway Ananda, Matthieu Buffet,
Mikhail Ivanov, konstantin.meskhidze, Demi Marie Obenour,
Alyssa Ross, Jann Horn, Tahera Fahimi, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior,
Kuniyuki Iwashima, Simon Horman, netdev, Alexander Viro,
Christian Brauner
In-Reply-To: <c3fccd822db5fc76b7fab00a9515eb276a71b421.camel@canonical.com>
On Mon, Mar 23, 2026 at 10:37 AM Georgia Garcia
<georgia.garcia@canonical.com> wrote:
> On Wed, 2026-03-18 at 09:48 +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> > On Tue, Mar 17, 2026 at 05:34:57PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > On Mar 15, 2026 =?UTF-8?q?G=C3=BCnther=20Noack?= <gnoack3000@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Add a LSM hook security_unix_find.
> > > >
> > > > This hook is called to check the path of a named unix socket before a
> > > > connection is initiated. The peer socket may be inspected as well.
> > > >
> > > > Why existing hooks are unsuitable:
> > > >
> > > > Existing socket hooks, security_unix_stream_connect(),
> > > > security_unix_may_send(), and security_socket_connect() don't provide
> > > > TOCTOU-free / namespace independent access to the paths of sockets.
> > > >
> > > > (1) We cannot resolve the path from the struct sockaddr in existing hooks.
> > > > This requires another path lookup. A change in the path between the
> > > > two lookups will cause a TOCTOU bug.
> > > >
> > > > (2) We cannot use the struct path from the listening socket, because it
> > > > may be bound to a path in a different namespace than the caller,
> > > > resulting in a path that cannot be referenced at policy creation time.
> > > >
> > > > Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
> > > > Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
> > > > Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
> > > > ---
> > > > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 5 +++++
> > > > include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++
> > > > net/unix/af_unix.c | 13 ++++++++++---
> > > > security/security.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
> > > > 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > Some really minor nitpicky things (below), but nothing critical.
> > > However, as we discussed, I would like to see the AppArmor folks comment
> > > on the new hook before we merge anything as I know they have an interest
> > > here.
> >
> > John, Georgia, we've been discussing this new hook for a few months now
> > but didn't hear from you yet. We plan to merge this patch series with
> > the 7.1 merge window (in a few weeks), so before that I'd like to merge
> > it in -next in a few days to get a broader coverage. I'm pretty sure
> > this hook will work well with AppArmor too, but could you please take
> > look to confirm?
>
> Apologies for the long delay replying. I have looked it over and I have
> no objections on the hook, it looks good to me. I would prefer if we
> got a reply from John as well since I'm not 100% confident but he
> should be out this week. In any case,
>
> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Thanks! I can understand wanting to wait for John, and if I'm
understanding the other aspects of the discussion (unrelated to this)
I think there still might be some additional discussions or revisions
before this goes anywhere.
--
paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 6/7] tomoyo: Convert from sb_mount to granular mount hooks
From: Song Liu @ 2026-03-23 19:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tetsuo Handa
Cc: Christian Brauner, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, Song Liu,
paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
jack@suse.cz, john.johansen@canonical.com,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com,
mic@digikod.net, gnoack@google.com, takedakn@nttdata.co.jp,
herton@canonical.com, Kernel Team, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <714a614b-cfb4-4b20-af8c-df3cc56dfb92@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
On Mon, Mar 23, 2026 at 3:33 AM Tetsuo Handa
<penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> wrote:
>
> On 2026/03/23 19:16, Christian Brauner wrote:
> >>> Since not all filesystems need to resolve dev_name argument, conversion from dev_name
> >>> to "struct path" is up to individual filesystem. If we can use a flag like FS_REQUIRES_DEV
> >>> that tells whether that filesystem will resolve dev_name argument, I think we can resolve
> >>> the dev_name argument before security_mount_new() is called (and can avoid TOCTOU).
> >>
>
> I was expecting that "struct file_system_type"->fs_flags containing FS_REQUIRES_DEV
> is a sign that the dev_name argument is a pathname. But it seems that such assumption
> no longer holds true. For example, cramfs started treating dev_name like "mtd$num"
> as if /dev/mtdblock$num since 4.15. So, current TOMOYO logic causes mount request of
> cramfs with dev_name like "mtd0" to fail.
>
> >> I guess we can add dev_path to fs_context?
> >
> > No, when and how the path is resolved is entirely up to the individual
> > filesystem and we're not hoisting the block-based specific path lookup
> > up into the VFS while leaving the other stuff per-filesystem. And it's
> > not as trivial as you want it to be either.
>
> Then, how can LSM modules know that how the requested filesystem resolves
> the dev_name argument, without embedding filesystem specific resolution
> logic into individual LSM module?
IIUC, if an LSM cares about the dev_name of a new mount, it will have to look
into each individual filesystem. We can add a LSM hook for the filesystems to
call. But this will require changes to individual filesystem code. OTOH,
dev_name can probably bridge the gap as we change filesystems.
Would this work?
Thanks,
Song
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v7 01/11] lsm: Add LSM hook security_unix_find
From: Günther Noack @ 2026-03-23 19:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün, John Johansen, Paul Moore, James Morris,
Serge E . Hallyn, Georgia Garcia
Cc: Tingmao Wang, Justin Suess, linux-security-module,
Samasth Norway Ananda, Matthieu Buffet, Mikhail Ivanov,
konstantin.meskhidze, Demi Marie Obenour, Alyssa Ross, Jann Horn,
Tahera Fahimi, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior, Kuniyuki Iwashima,
Simon Horman, netdev, Alexander Viro, Christian Brauner
In-Reply-To: <20260323165654.193957-2-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
On Mon, Mar 23, 2026 at 05:56:43PM +0100, Günther Noack wrote:
> From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
>
> Add an LSM hook security_unix_find.
>
> This hook is called to check the path of a named UNIX socket before a
> connection is initiated. The peer socket may be inspected as well.
>
> Why existing hooks are unsuitable:
>
> Existing socket hooks, security_unix_stream_connect(),
> security_unix_may_send(), and security_socket_connect() don't provide
> TOCTOU-free / namespace independent access to the paths of sockets.
>
> (1) We cannot resolve the path from the struct sockaddr in existing hooks.
> This requires another path lookup. A change in the path between the
> two lookups will cause a TOCTOU bug.
>
> (2) We cannot use the struct path from the listening socket, because it
> may be bound to a path in a different namespace than the caller,
> resulting in a path that cannot be referenced at policy creation time.
>
> Consumers of the hook wishing to reference @other are responsible
> for acquiring the unix_state_lock and checking for the SOCK_DEAD flag
> therein, ensuring the socket hasn't died since lookup.
>
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
> Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
> Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 5 +++++
> include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++
> net/unix/af_unix.c | 10 +++++++---
> security/security.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index 8c42b4bde09c..7a0fd3dbfa29 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -317,6 +317,11 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, post_notification, const struct cred *w_cred,
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, watch_key, struct key *key)
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY && CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
>
> +#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_find, const struct path *path, struct sock *other,
> + int flags)
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_stream_connect, struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
> struct sock *newsk)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 83a646d72f6f..99a33d8eb28d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1931,6 +1931,17 @@ static inline int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
>
> +#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
> +
> +int security_unix_find(const struct path *path, struct sock *other, int flags);
> +
> +#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
> +static inline int security_unix_find(const struct path *path, struct sock *other, int flags)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
> int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey);
> int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, const char *name, u8 port_num);
> diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> index 3756a93dc63a..5ef3c2e31757 100644
> --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
> +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> @@ -1231,11 +1231,15 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, int addr_len,
> goto path_put;
>
> err = -EPROTOTYPE;
> - if (sk->sk_type == type)
> - touch_atime(&path);
> - else
> + if (sk->sk_type != type)
> goto sock_put;
>
> + err = security_unix_find(&path, sk, flags);
> + if (err)
> + goto sock_put;
> +
> + touch_atime(&path);
> +
> path_put(&path);
>
> return sk;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 67af9228c4e9..28ccea205874 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -4731,6 +4731,26 @@ int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
>
> +#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
> +/**
> + * security_unix_find() - Check if a named AF_UNIX socket can connect
> + * @path: path of the socket being connected to
> + * @other: peer sock
> + * @flags: flags associated with the socket
> + *
> + * This hook is called to check permissions before connecting to a named
> + * AF_UNIX socket. The caller does not hold any locks on @other.
> + *
> + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
> + */
> +int security_unix_find(const struct path *path, struct sock *other, int flags)
> +{
> + return call_int_hook(unix_find, path, other, flags);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_find);
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
> /**
> * security_ib_pkey_access() - Check if access to an IB pkey is allowed
> --
> 2.53.0
>
P.S. I noticed it too late today, so it's not on the commit message,
but we also got a Reviewed-by from Georgia Garcia in
https://lore.kernel.org/all/c3fccd822db5fc76b7fab00a9515eb276a71b421.camel@canonical.com/
(in response to V6 of the patch).
Thanks, Georgia!
–Günther
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v4] landlock: Expand restrict flags example for ABI version 8
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2026-03-23 18:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Panagiotis "Ivory" Vasilopoulos
Cc: Günther Noack, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan,
linux-security-module, linux-doc, linux-kernel, Dan Cojocaru
In-Reply-To: <20260304-landlock-docs-add-tsync-example-v4-1-819a276f05c5@n0toose.net>
Thanks! I pushed your patch in next with a minor fix.
Günther, does it look good to you?
On Wed, Mar 04, 2026 at 07:13:04PM +0100, Panagiotis "Ivory" Vasilopoulos wrote:
> Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC to the backwards compatibility example
> for restrict flags. This introduces completeness, similar to that of
> the ruleset attributes example. However, as the new example can impact
> enforcement in certain cases, an appropriate warning is also included.
>
> Additionally, I modified the two comments of the example to make them
> more consistent with the ruleset attributes example's.
>
> Signed-off-by: Panagiotis 'Ivory' Vasilopoulos <git@n0toose.net>
> Co-developed-by: Dan Cojocaru <dan@dcdev.ro>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Cojocaru <dan@dcdev.ro>
> ---
> Changes in v4:
> - Make warning somewhat more terse, merge comments.
> - Remove some sensationalization. ("Don't copy-paste this just yet!")
> - Apply Günther's suggestion (v3 "recycled" some phrases, was long)
> - ... but also retain some of the wording on ABI differences
> - Provide a brief overview that contextualizes the example further:
> - Clarify the difference behind ABI < 8 & ABI v8, to avoid
> misunderstandings on which option is the default.
> - Make "linear reading" easier.
> - Based on Mickaël's feedback: Avoid cans of worms w.r.t. use cases
> - Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260228-landlock-docs-add-tsync-example-v3-1-140ab50f0524@n0toose.net
>
> Changes in v3:
> - Add __attribute__((fallthrough)) like in earlier example.
> - Improve comment for LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC (ABI < 8) example.
> - Add relevant warning for ABI < 8 example based on Günther's feedback.
> - Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260221-landlock-docs-add-tsync-example-v2-1-60990986bba5@n0toose.net
>
> Changes in v2:
> - Fix formatting error.
> - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260221-landlock-docs-add-tsync-example-v1-1-f89383809eb4@n0toose.net
> ---
> Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> index 13134bccdd39d78ddce3daf454f32dda162ce91b..64c7138a788d74f99da0a71428da392b3d873bf8 100644
> --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> @@ -196,13 +196,27 @@ similar backwards compatibility check is needed for the restrict flags
> (see sys_landlock_restrict_self() documentation for available flags):
>
> .. code-block:: c
> -
> - __u32 restrict_flags = LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON;
> - if (abi < 7) {
> - /* Clear logging flags unsupported before ABI 7. */
> + __u32 restrict_flags =
> + LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON |
> + LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC;
> + switch (abi) {
> + case 1 ... 6:
> + /* Clear logging flags unsupported for ABI < 7 */
> restrict_flags &= ~(LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF |
> LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON |
> LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF);
> + __attribute__((fallthrough));
> + case 7:
> + /*
> + * Removes multithreaded enforcement flag unsupported for ABI < 8
> + *
> + * WARNING: Without this flag, calling landlock_restrict_self(2) is
> + * only equivalent if the calling process is single-threaded. Below
> + * ABI v8 (and as of ABI v8, when not using this flag), a Landlock
> + * policy would only be enforced for the calling thread and its
> + * children (and not for all threads, including parents and siblings).
> + */
> + restrict_flags &= ~LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC;
> }
>
> The next step is to restrict the current thread from gaining more privileges
>
> ---
> base-commit: ceb977bfe9e8715e6cd3a4785c7aab8ea5cd2b77
> change-id: 20260221-landlock-docs-add-tsync-example-e8fd5c64a366
>
> Best regards,
> --
> Panagiotis "Ivory" Vasilopoulos <git@n0toose.net>
>
>
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v7 11/11] landlock: Document FS access right for pathname UNIX sockets
From: Günther Noack @ 2026-03-23 16:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün, John Johansen
Cc: Günther Noack, Justin Suess, linux-security-module,
Tingmao Wang, Samasth Norway Ananda, Matthieu Buffet,
Mikhail Ivanov, konstantin.meskhidze, Demi Marie Obenour,
Alyssa Ross, Jann Horn, Tahera Fahimi, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior,
Kuniyuki Iwashima
In-Reply-To: <20260323165654.193957-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Add LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX to the example code, and explain
it in the section about previous limitations. The bulk of the
interesting flag documentation lives in the kernel header and is
included in the Sphinx rendering.
Cc: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 14 +++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
index 13134bccdd39..318d0d8a16da 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
.handled_access_net =
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
@@ -127,6 +128,10 @@ version, and only use the available subset of access rights:
/* Removes LANDLOCK_SCOPE_* for ABI < 6 */
ruleset_attr.scoped &= ~(LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET |
LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL);
+ __attribute__((fallthrough));
+ case 6 ... 8:
+ /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX for ABI < 9 */
+ ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX;
}
This enables the creation of an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules.
@@ -685,6 +690,13 @@ enforce Landlock rulesets across all threads of the calling process
using the ``LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC`` flag passed to
sys_landlock_restrict_self().
+Pathname UNIX sockets (ABI < 9)
+-------------------------------
+
+Starting with the Landlock ABI version 9, it is possible to restrict
+connections to pathname UNIX domain sockets (:manpage:`unix(7)`) using
+the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX`` right.
+
.. _kernel_support:
Kernel support
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v7 10/11] selftests/landlock: fs_test: Simplify ruleset creation and enforcement
From: Günther Noack @ 2026-03-23 16:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün, John Johansen
Cc: Günther Noack, linux-security-module, Tingmao Wang,
Justin Suess, Samasth Norway Ananda, Matthieu Buffet,
Mikhail Ivanov, konstantin.meskhidze, Demi Marie Obenour,
Alyssa Ross, Jann Horn, Tahera Fahimi, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior,
Kuniyuki Iwashima
In-Reply-To: <20260323165654.193957-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
* Add enforce_fs() for defining and enforcing a ruleset in one step
* In some places, dropped "ASSERT_LE(0, fd)" checks after
create_ruleset() call -- create_ruleset() already checks that.
* In some places, rename "file_fd" to "fd" if it is not needed to
disambiguate any more.
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 821 ++++++---------------
1 file changed, 210 insertions(+), 611 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index af0f0b16129a..cdb47fc1fc0a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -767,15 +767,6 @@ static int create_ruleset(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
.handled_access_fs = handled_access_fs,
};
- ASSERT_NE(NULL, rules)
- {
- TH_LOG("No rule list");
- }
- ASSERT_NE(NULL, rules[0].path)
- {
- TH_LOG("Empty rule list");
- }
-
ruleset_fd =
landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd)
@@ -783,16 +774,26 @@ static int create_ruleset(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
TH_LOG("Failed to create a ruleset: %s", strerror(errno));
}
- for (i = 0; rules[i].path; i++) {
- if (!rules[i].access)
- continue;
+ if (rules)
+ for (i = 0; rules[i].path; i++) {
+ if (!rules[i].access)
+ continue;
- add_path_beneath(_metadata, ruleset_fd, rules[i].access,
- rules[i].path);
- }
+ add_path_beneath(_metadata, ruleset_fd, rules[i].access,
+ rules[i].path);
+ }
return ruleset_fd;
}
+static void enforce_fs(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+ const __u64 access_fs, const struct rule rules[])
+{
+ const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, access_fs, rules);
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+}
+
TEST_F_FORK(layout0, proc_nsfs)
{
const struct rule rules[] = {
@@ -879,13 +880,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, effective_access)
},
{},
};
- const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
char buf;
int reg_fd;
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
/* Tests on a directory (with or without O_PATH). */
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open("/", O_RDONLY));
@@ -932,12 +930,9 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, unhandled_access)
},
{},
};
- /* Here, we only handle read accesses, not write accesses. */
- const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RO, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ /* Here, we only handle read accesses, not write accesses. */
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RO, rules);
/*
* Because the policy does not handle LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
@@ -966,11 +961,8 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, ruleset_overlap)
},
{},
};
- const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
/* Checks s1d1 hierarchy. */
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
@@ -1022,11 +1014,8 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, layer_rule_unions)
},
{},
};
- int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer1);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer1);
/* Checks s1d1 hierarchy with layer1. */
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
@@ -1048,10 +1037,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, layer_rule_unions)
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY));
/* Doesn't change anything from layer1. */
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer2);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer2);
/* Checks s1d1 hierarchy with layer2. */
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
@@ -1073,10 +1059,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, layer_rule_unions)
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY));
/* Only allows write (but not read) to dir_s1d3. */
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer3);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer3);
/* Checks s1d1 hierarchy with layer3. */
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
@@ -1114,27 +1097,18 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, non_overlapping_accesses)
},
{},
};
- int ruleset_fd;
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d1));
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2));
- ruleset_fd =
- create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG, layer1);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG, layer1);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d1, S_IFREG | 0700, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
ASSERT_EQ(0, mknod(file1_s1d2, S_IFREG | 0700, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2));
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE,
- layer2);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE, layer2);
/* Unchanged accesses for file creation. */
ASSERT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d1, S_IFREG | 0700, 0));
@@ -1238,37 +1212,24 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, interleaved_masked_accesses)
},
{},
};
- int ruleset_fd;
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
- layer1_read);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, layer1_read);
/* Checks that read access is granted for file1_s1d3 with layer 1. */
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDWR));
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_WRONLY));
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata,
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
- layer2_read_write);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ layer2_read_write);
/* Checks that previous access rights are unchanged with layer 2. */
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDWR));
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_WRONLY));
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
- layer3_read);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, layer3_read);
/* Checks that previous access rights are unchanged with layer 3. */
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDWR));
@@ -1276,13 +1237,9 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, interleaved_masked_accesses)
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_WRONLY));
/* This time, denies write access for the file hierarchy. */
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata,
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
- layer4_read_write);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ layer4_read_write);
/*
* Checks that the only change with layer 4 is that write access is
@@ -1293,11 +1250,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, interleaved_masked_accesses)
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_WRONLY));
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
- layer5_read);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, layer5_read);
/* Checks that previous access rights are unchanged with layer 5. */
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY));
@@ -1305,11 +1258,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, interleaved_masked_accesses)
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_WRONLY));
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_RDONLY));
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
- layer6_execute);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, layer6_execute);
/* Checks that previous access rights are unchanged with layer 6. */
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY));
@@ -1317,13 +1266,9 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, interleaved_masked_accesses)
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_WRONLY));
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_RDONLY));
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata,
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
- layer7_read_write);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ layer7_read_write);
/* Checks read access is now denied with layer 7. */
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY));
@@ -1344,7 +1289,6 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inherit_subset)
};
const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_WRONLY));
@@ -1460,7 +1404,6 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inherit_superset)
};
const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
/* Readdir access is denied for dir_s1d2. */
@@ -1476,7 +1419,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inherit_superset)
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR,
dir_s1d2);
enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
/* Readdir access is still denied for dir_s1d2. */
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY));
@@ -1498,7 +1441,6 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout0, max_layers)
};
const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
@@ -1507,7 +1449,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout0, max_layers)
ASSERT_EQ(-1, err);
ASSERT_EQ(E2BIG, errno);
}
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
}
TEST_F_FORK(layout1, empty_or_same_ruleset)
@@ -1521,20 +1463,15 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, empty_or_same_ruleset)
ASSERT_LE(-1, ruleset_fd);
ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno);
- /* Enforces policy which deny read access to all files. */
- ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE;
- ruleset_fd =
- landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ /* Enforces policy which denies read access to all files. */
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, NULL);
+
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
- /* Nests a policy which deny read access to all directories. */
- ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR;
+ /* Nests a policy which denies read access to all directories. */
ruleset_fd =
- landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR, NULL);
enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
@@ -1558,11 +1495,8 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, rule_on_mountpoint)
},
{},
};
- const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
@@ -1587,11 +1521,8 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, rule_over_mountpoint)
},
{},
};
- const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
@@ -1615,21 +1546,15 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, rule_over_root_allow_then_deny)
},
{},
};
- int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
/* Checks allowed access. */
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open("/", O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
rules[0].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE;
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
/* Checks denied access (on a directory). */
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open("/", O_RDONLY));
@@ -1645,11 +1570,8 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, rule_over_root_deny)
},
{},
};
- const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
/* Checks denied access (on a directory). */
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open("/", O_RDONLY));
@@ -1665,7 +1587,6 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, rule_inside_mount_ns)
},
{},
};
- int ruleset_fd;
set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
ASSERT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_pivot_root, dir_s3d2, dir_s3d3))
@@ -1675,10 +1596,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, rule_inside_mount_ns)
ASSERT_EQ(0, chdir("/"));
clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open("s3d3", O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open("/", O_RDONLY));
@@ -1693,11 +1611,8 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, mount_and_pivot)
},
{},
};
- const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, mount(NULL, dir_s3d2, NULL, MS_RDONLY, NULL));
@@ -1716,9 +1631,6 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, move_mount)
},
{},
};
- const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
-
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
ASSERT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_move_mount, AT_FDCWD, dir_s3d2, AT_FDCWD,
@@ -1731,8 +1643,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, move_mount)
dir_s3d2, 0));
clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, syscall(__NR_move_mount, AT_FDCWD, dir_s3d2, AT_FDCWD,
@@ -1747,14 +1658,9 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, topology_changes_with_net_only)
.handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
};
- int ruleset_fd;
/* Add network restrictions. */
- ruleset_fd =
- landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_net, sizeof(ruleset_net), 0);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &ruleset_net);
/* Mount, remount, move_mount, umount, and pivot_root checks. */
set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
@@ -1775,14 +1681,9 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, topology_changes_with_net_and_fs)
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
};
- int ruleset_fd;
/* Add network and filesystem restrictions. */
- ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_net_fs,
- sizeof(ruleset_net_fs), 0);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &ruleset_net_fs);
/* Mount, remount, move_mount, umount, and pivot_root checks. */
set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
@@ -1819,14 +1720,13 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, release_inodes)
};
const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
/* Unmount a file hierarchy while it is being used by a ruleset. */
set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
ASSERT_EQ(0, umount(dir_s3d2));
clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s3d2, O_RDONLY));
@@ -1858,7 +1758,6 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, covered_rule)
/* Creates a ruleset with the future hidden directory. */
ruleset_fd =
create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR, layer1);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
/* Covers with a new mount point. */
set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
@@ -1908,10 +1807,7 @@ static void test_relative_path(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
};
int dirfd, ruleset_fd;
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer1_base);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer1_base);
ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer2_subs);
@@ -2092,10 +1988,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, execute)
},
{},
};
- const int ruleset_fd =
- create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
copy_file(_metadata, bin_true, file1_s1d1);
copy_file(_metadata, bin_true, file1_s1d2);
copy_file(_metadata, bin_true, file1_s1d3);
@@ -2104,8 +1997,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, execute)
test_execute(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
test_check_exec(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, rules[0].access, rules);
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
@@ -2216,16 +2108,12 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, link)
},
{},
};
- int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, layer1[0].access, layer1);
-
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d1));
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2));
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, layer1[0].access, layer1);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, link(file2_s1d1, file1_s1d1));
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ -2245,10 +2133,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, link)
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d2));
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d3));
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, layer2[0].access, layer2);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, layer2[0].access, layer2);
/* Checks that linkind doesn't require the ability to delete a file. */
ASSERT_EQ(0, link(file1_s1d2, file2_s1d2));
@@ -2298,15 +2183,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, rename_file)
},
{},
};
- const int ruleset_fd =
- create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access, rules);
-
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2));
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, rules[0].access, rules);
/*
* Tries to replace a file, from a directory that allows file removal,
@@ -2380,17 +2260,12 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, rename_dir)
},
{},
};
- const int ruleset_fd =
- create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access, rules);
-
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
/* Empties dir_s1d3 to allow renaming. */
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d3));
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, rules[0].access, rules);
/* Exchanges and renames directory to a different parent. */
ASSERT_EQ(-1, renameat2(AT_FDCWD, dir_s2d3, AT_FDCWD, dir_s1d3,
@@ -2444,12 +2319,8 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, reparent_refer)
},
{},
};
- int ruleset_fd =
- create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER, layer1);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER, layer1);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, rename(dir_s1d2, dir_s2d1));
ASSERT_EQ(EXDEV, errno);
@@ -2479,14 +2350,9 @@ static void refer_denied_by_default(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
const int layer1_err,
const struct rule layer2[])
{
- int ruleset_fd;
-
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2));
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, layer1[0].access, layer1);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, layer1[0].access, layer1);
/*
* If the first layer handles LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER (according to
@@ -2498,10 +2364,7 @@ static void refer_denied_by_default(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
ASSERT_EQ(layer1_err, test_exchange(file2_s1d1, file2_s1d2));
ASSERT_EQ(layer1_err, test_exchange(file2_s1d2, file2_s1d1));
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, layer2[0].access, layer2);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, layer2[0].access, layer2);
/*
* Now, either the first or the second layer does not handle
@@ -2587,10 +2450,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, refer_denied_by_default4)
*/
TEST_F_FORK(layout1, refer_mount_root_deny)
{
- const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
- .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR,
- };
- int root_fd, ruleset_fd;
+ int root_fd;
/* Creates a mount object from a non-mount point. */
set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
@@ -2600,13 +2460,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, refer_mount_root_deny)
clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
ASSERT_LE(0, root_fd);
- ruleset_fd =
- landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
-
- ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
- ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0));
- EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR, NULL);
/* Link denied by Landlock: EACCES. */
EXPECT_EQ(-1, linkat(root_fd, ".", root_fd, "does_not_exist", 0));
@@ -2641,18 +2495,12 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, refer_part_mount_tree_is_allowed)
},
{},
};
- int ruleset_fd;
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s3d3));
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata,
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE,
- layer1);
-
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE,
+ layer1);
ASSERT_EQ(0, rename(file1_s3d4, file1_s3d3));
}
@@ -2678,13 +2526,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, reparent_link)
},
{},
};
- const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(
- _metadata,
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER, layer1);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER,
+ layer1);
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d1));
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2));
@@ -2756,13 +2601,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, reparent_rename)
},
{},
};
- const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(
- _metadata,
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER, layer1);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER,
+ layer1);
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2));
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
@@ -2902,13 +2744,9 @@ reparent_exdev_layers_enforce1(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)
},
{},
};
- const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(
- _metadata,
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER, layer1);
-
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER,
+ layer1);
}
static void
@@ -2925,12 +2763,7 @@ reparent_exdev_layers_enforce2(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)
* Same checks as before but with a second layer and a new MAKE_DIR
* rule (and no explicit handling of REFER).
*/
- const int ruleset_fd =
- create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR, layer2);
-
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR, layer2);
}
TEST_F_FORK(layout1, reparent_exdev_layers_rename1)
@@ -3199,15 +3032,11 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, reparent_remove)
},
{},
};
- const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(
- _metadata,
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE,
- layer1);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE,
+ layer1);
/* Access denied because of wrong/swapped remove file/dir. */
ASSERT_EQ(-1, rename(file1_s1d1, dir_s2d2));
@@ -3271,17 +3100,13 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, reparent_dom_superset)
},
{},
};
- int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata,
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO,
- layer1);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO,
+ layer1);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, rename(file1_s1d2, file1_s2d1));
ASSERT_EQ(EXDEV, errno);
@@ -3344,18 +3169,13 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, remove_dir)
},
{},
};
- const int ruleset_fd =
- create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access, rules);
-
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d1));
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2));
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d3));
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, rules[0].access, rules);
ASSERT_EQ(0, rmdir(dir_s1d3));
ASSERT_EQ(0, mkdir(dir_s1d3, 0700));
@@ -3381,12 +3201,8 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, remove_file)
},
{},
};
- const int ruleset_fd =
- create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, rules[0].access, rules);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, unlink(file1_s1d1));
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ -3407,9 +3223,6 @@ static void test_make_file(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
},
{},
};
- const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, access, rules);
-
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d1));
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d1));
@@ -3425,8 +3238,7 @@ static void test_make_file(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d3));
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, access, rules);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d1, mode | 0400, dev));
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ -3495,10 +3307,6 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, make_sym)
},
{},
};
- const int ruleset_fd =
- create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access, rules);
-
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d1));
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d1));
@@ -3510,8 +3318,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, make_sym)
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d3));
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, rules[0].access, rules);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, symlink("none", file1_s1d1));
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ -3540,17 +3347,12 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, make_dir)
},
{},
};
- const int ruleset_fd =
- create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access, rules);
-
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d1));
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2));
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, rules[0].access, rules);
/* Uses file_* as directory names. */
ASSERT_EQ(-1, mkdir(file1_s1d1, 0700));
@@ -3581,14 +3383,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_unlinked_file)
{},
};
int reg_fd, proc_fd;
- const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(
- _metadata,
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
- rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ rules);
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDWR));
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
@@ -3624,13 +3422,9 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe)
},
{},
};
- /* Limits read and write access to files tied to the filesystem. */
- const int ruleset_fd =
- create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ /* Limits read and write access to files tied to the filesystem. */
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, rules[0].access, rules);
/* Checks enforcement for normal files. */
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDWR));
@@ -3720,16 +3514,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, truncate_unhandled)
{},
};
- const __u64 handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE;
- int ruleset_fd;
-
/* Enables Landlock. */
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, handled, rules);
-
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ rules);
/*
* Checks read right: truncate and open with O_TRUNC work, unless the
@@ -3802,17 +3590,13 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, truncate)
},
{},
};
- const __u64 handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
- int ruleset_fd;
/* Enables Landlock. */
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, handled, rules);
-
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+ rules);
/* Checks read, write and truncate rights: truncation works. */
EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_rwt));
@@ -3912,34 +3696,25 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, ftruncate)
},
{},
};
- int fd_layer0, fd_layer1, fd_layer2, fd_layer3, ruleset_fd;
+ int fd_layer0, fd_layer1, fd_layer2, fd_layer3;
fd_layer0 = open(path, O_WRONLY);
EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(fd_layer0));
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, handled1, layer1);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, handled1, layer1);
fd_layer1 = open(path, O_WRONLY);
EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(fd_layer0));
EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(fd_layer1));
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, handled2, layer2);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, handled2, layer2);
fd_layer2 = open(path, O_WRONLY);
EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(fd_layer0));
EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(fd_layer1));
EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(fd_layer2));
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, handled3, layer3);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, handled3, layer3);
fd_layer3 = open(path, O_WRONLY);
EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(fd_layer0));
@@ -4031,13 +3806,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(ftruncate, open_and_ftruncate)
},
{},
};
- int fd, ruleset_fd;
+ int fd;
/* Enables Landlock. */
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, variant->handled, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, variant->handled, rules);
fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
EXPECT_EQ(variant->expected_open_result, (fd < 0 ? errno : 0));
@@ -4072,12 +3844,9 @@ TEST_F_FORK(ftruncate, open_and_ftruncate_in_different_processes)
},
{},
};
- int fd, ruleset_fd;
+ int fd;
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, variant->handled, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, variant->handled, rules);
fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
ASSERT_EQ(variant->expected_open_result, (fd < 0 ? errno : 0));
@@ -4122,10 +3891,7 @@ static int test_fs_ioc_getflags_ioctl(int fd)
TEST(memfd_ftruncate_and_ioctl)
{
- const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- };
- int ruleset_fd, fd, i;
+ int fd, i;
/*
* We exercise the same test both with and without Landlock enabled, to
@@ -4147,10 +3913,7 @@ TEST(memfd_ftruncate_and_ioctl)
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd));
/* Enables Landlock. */
- ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&attr, sizeof(attr), 0);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
}
}
@@ -4165,10 +3928,7 @@ static int test_fionread_ioctl(int fd)
TEST_F_FORK(layout1, o_path_ftruncate_and_ioctl)
{
- const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- };
- int ruleset_fd, fd;
+ int fd;
/*
* Checks that for files opened with O_PATH, both ioctl(2) and
@@ -4184,10 +3944,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, o_path_ftruncate_and_ioctl)
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd));
/* Enables Landlock. */
- ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&attr, sizeof(attr), 0);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
/*
* Checks that after enabling Landlock,
@@ -4261,16 +4018,10 @@ struct space_resv {
*/
TEST_F_FORK(layout1, blanket_permitted_ioctls)
{
- const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
- .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
- };
- int ruleset_fd, fd;
+ int fd;
/* Enables Landlock. */
- ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&attr, sizeof(attr), 0);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV, NULL);
fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
@@ -4323,20 +4074,14 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, blanket_permitted_ioctls)
TEST_F_FORK(layout1, named_pipe_ioctl)
{
pid_t child_pid;
- int fd, ruleset_fd;
+ int fd;
const char *const path = file1_s1d1;
- const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
- .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
- };
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(path));
ASSERT_EQ(0, mkfifo(path, 0600));
/* Enables Landlock. */
- ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&attr, sizeof(attr), 0);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV, NULL);
/* The child process opens the pipe for writing. */
child_pid = fork();
@@ -4411,20 +4156,14 @@ static int test_connect_named_unix(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
TEST_F_FORK(layout1, named_unix_domain_socket_ioctl)
{
const char *const path = file1_s1d1;
- int srv_fd, cli_fd, ruleset_fd;
- const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
- .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
- };
+ int srv_fd, cli_fd;
/* Sets up a server */
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(path));
srv_fd = set_up_named_unix_server(_metadata, SOCK_STREAM, path);
/* Enables Landlock. */
- ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&attr, sizeof(attr), 0);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV, NULL);
/* Sets up a client connection to it */
cli_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
@@ -4497,29 +4236,25 @@ TEST_F_FORK(ioctl, handle_dir_access_file)
},
{},
};
- int file_fd, ruleset_fd;
+ int fd;
/* Enables Landlock. */
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, variant->handled, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, variant->handled, rules);
- file_fd = open("/dev/zero", variant->open_mode);
- ASSERT_LE(0, file_fd);
+ fd = open("/dev/zero", variant->open_mode);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
/* Checks that IOCTL commands return the expected errors. */
- EXPECT_EQ(variant->expected_fionread_result,
- test_fionread_ioctl(file_fd));
+ EXPECT_EQ(variant->expected_fionread_result, test_fionread_ioctl(fd));
/* Checks that unrestrictable commands are unrestricted. */
- EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIOCLEX));
- EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIONCLEX));
- EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIONBIO, &flag));
- EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIOASYNC, &flag));
- EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIGETBSZ, &flag));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(fd, FIOCLEX));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(fd, FIONCLEX));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(fd, FIONBIO, &flag));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(fd, FIOASYNC, &flag));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(fd, FIGETBSZ, &flag));
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(file_fd));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd));
}
TEST_F_FORK(ioctl, handle_dir_access_dir)
@@ -4532,13 +4267,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(ioctl, handle_dir_access_dir)
},
{},
};
- int dir_fd, ruleset_fd;
+ int dir_fd;
/* Enables Landlock. */
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, variant->handled, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, variant->handled, rules);
/*
* Ignore variant->open_mode for this test, as we intend to open a
@@ -4577,32 +4309,28 @@ TEST_F_FORK(ioctl, handle_file_access_file)
},
{},
};
- int file_fd, ruleset_fd;
+ int fd;
/* Enables Landlock. */
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, variant->handled, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, variant->handled, rules);
- file_fd = open("/dev/zero", variant->open_mode);
- ASSERT_LE(0, file_fd)
+ fd = open("/dev/zero", variant->open_mode);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd)
{
TH_LOG("Failed to open /dev/zero: %s", strerror(errno));
}
/* Checks that IOCTL commands return the expected errors. */
- EXPECT_EQ(variant->expected_fionread_result,
- test_fionread_ioctl(file_fd));
+ EXPECT_EQ(variant->expected_fionread_result, test_fionread_ioctl(fd));
/* Checks that unrestrictable commands are unrestricted. */
- EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIOCLEX));
- EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIONCLEX));
- EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIONBIO, &flag));
- EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIOASYNC, &flag));
- EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIGETBSZ, &flag));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(fd, FIOCLEX));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(fd, FIONCLEX));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(fd, FIONBIO, &flag));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(fd, FIOASYNC, &flag));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(fd, FIGETBSZ, &flag));
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(file_fd));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd));
}
/*
@@ -4644,22 +4372,6 @@ FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(scoped_domains)
{
}
-static void enforce_fs_resolve_unix(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
- const struct rule rules[])
-{
- if (rules) {
- int fd = create_ruleset(_metadata,
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, rules);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, fd);
- EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
- } else {
- struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
- .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
- };
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &attr);
- }
-}
-
/*
* Flags for test_connect_to_parent and test_connect_to_child:
*
@@ -4690,9 +4402,9 @@ static void test_connect_to_parent(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
char buf[1];
if (variant->domain_both)
- enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, NULL);
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, NULL);
else if (flags & ENFORCE_ALL)
- enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, rules);
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, rules);
unlink(path);
ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(readiness_pipe, O_CLOEXEC));
@@ -4702,9 +4414,11 @@ static void test_connect_to_parent(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
if (child_pid == 0) {
if (variant->domain_child)
- enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, NULL);
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+ NULL);
else if (flags & ENFORCE_ALL)
- enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, rules);
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+ rules);
/* Wait for server to be available. */
EXPECT_EQ(0, close(readiness_pipe[1]));
@@ -4730,9 +4444,9 @@ static void test_connect_to_parent(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
}
if (variant->domain_parent)
- enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, NULL);
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, NULL);
else if (flags & ENFORCE_ALL)
- enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, rules);
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, rules);
srv_fd = set_up_named_unix_server(_metadata, sock_type, path);
@@ -4771,9 +4485,9 @@ static void test_connect_to_child(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
char buf[1];
if (variant->domain_both)
- enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, NULL);
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, NULL);
else if (flags & ENFORCE_ALL)
- enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, rules);
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, rules);
unlink(path);
ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(readiness_pipe, O_CLOEXEC));
@@ -4784,9 +4498,11 @@ static void test_connect_to_child(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
if (child_pid == 0) {
if (variant->domain_child)
- enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, NULL);
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+ NULL);
else if (flags & ENFORCE_ALL)
- enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, rules);
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+ rules);
srv_fd = set_up_named_unix_server(_metadata, sock_type, path);
@@ -4810,9 +4526,9 @@ static void test_connect_to_child(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
}
if (variant->domain_parent)
- enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, NULL);
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, NULL);
else if (flags & ENFORCE_ALL)
- enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, rules);
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, rules);
/* Wait for server to be available. */
EXPECT_EQ(0, close(readiness_pipe[1]));
@@ -5021,11 +4737,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(coredump, socket_not_restricted)
set_core_pattern(_metadata, core_pattern);
/* Restrict LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX. */
- drop_access_rights(_metadata,
- &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs =
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, NULL);
/* Fork a child that crashes. */
child_pid = fork();
@@ -5212,13 +4924,9 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1_bind, same_content_same_file)
},
{},
};
- int ruleset_fd;
/* Sets rules for the parent directories. */
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer1_parent);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer1_parent);
/* Checks source hierarchy. */
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
@@ -5237,10 +4945,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1_bind, same_content_same_file)
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s2d2, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY));
/* Sets rules for the mount points. */
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer2_mount_point);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer2_mount_point);
/* Checks source hierarchy. */
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
@@ -5261,10 +4966,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1_bind, same_content_same_file)
ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(bind_dir_s1d3, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY));
/* Sets a (shared) rule only on the source. */
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer3_source);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer3_source);
/* Checks source hierarchy. */
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
@@ -5285,10 +4987,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1_bind, same_content_same_file)
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(bind_dir_s1d3, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY));
/* Sets a (shared) rule only on the destination. */
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer4_destination);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer4_destination);
/* Checks source hierarchy. */
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY));
@@ -5313,13 +5012,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1_bind, reparent_cross_mount)
},
{},
};
- int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(
- _metadata,
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, layer1);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
+ layer1);
/* Checks basic denied move. */
ASSERT_EQ(-1, rename(file1_s1d1, file1_s1d2));
@@ -5376,10 +5072,6 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1_bind, path_disconnected)
create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer3_only_s1d2);
int bind_s1d3_fd;
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_l1);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_l2);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_l3);
-
enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_l1);
EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_l1));
@@ -5483,8 +5175,6 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1_bind, path_disconnected_rename)
ruleset_fd_l1 = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, layer1);
ruleset_fd_l2 = create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
layer2_only_s1d2);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_l1);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_l2);
enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_l1);
EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_l1));
@@ -5630,7 +5320,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1_bind, path_disconnected_link)
},
{}
};
- int ruleset_fd, bind_s1d3_fd;
+ int bind_s1d3_fd;
/* Removes unneeded files created by layout1, otherwise it will EEXIST. */
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2));
@@ -5653,10 +5343,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1_bind, path_disconnected_link)
TH_LOG("Failed to create %s: %s", dir_s4d2, strerror(errno));
}
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, layer1);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, layer1);
/* From disconnected to connected. */
ASSERT_EQ(0, linkat(bind_s1d3_fd, file1_name, AT_FDCWD, file1_s2d2, 0))
@@ -6194,7 +5881,6 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout4_disconnected_leafs, read_rename_exchange)
int ruleset_fd, s1d41_bind_fd, s1d42_bind_fd;
ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, handled_access, rules);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
/* Adds rule for the covered directory. */
if (variant->allowed_s2d2) {
@@ -7127,7 +6813,6 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout2_overlay, same_content_different_file)
},
{},
};
- int ruleset_fd;
size_t i;
const char *path_entry;
@@ -7135,10 +6820,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout2_overlay, same_content_different_file)
SKIP(return, "overlayfs is not supported (test)");
/* Sets rules on base directories (i.e. outside overlay scope). */
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer1_base);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer1_base);
/* Checks lower layer. */
for_each_path(lower_base_files, path_entry, i) {
@@ -7183,10 +6865,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout2_overlay, same_content_different_file)
}
/* Sets rules on data directories (i.e. inside overlay scope). */
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer2_data);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer2_data);
/* Checks merge. */
for_each_path(merge_base_files, path_entry, i) {
@@ -7200,10 +6879,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout2_overlay, same_content_different_file)
}
/* Same checks with tighter rules. */
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer3_subdirs);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer3_subdirs);
/* Checks changes for lower layer. */
for_each_path(lower_base_files, path_entry, i) {
@@ -7225,10 +6901,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout2_overlay, same_content_different_file)
}
/* Sets rules directly on overlayed files. */
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer4_files);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer4_files);
/* Checks unchanged accesses on lower layer. */
for_each_path(lower_sub_files, path_entry, i) {
@@ -7253,10 +6926,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout2_overlay, same_content_different_file)
}
/* Only allowes access to the merge hierarchy. */
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer5_merge_only);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer5_merge_only);
/* Checks new accesses on lower layer. */
for_each_path(lower_sub_files, path_entry, i) {
@@ -7442,11 +7112,7 @@ static void layer3_fs_tag_inode(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
},
{},
};
- const struct landlock_ruleset_attr layer2_deny_everything_attr = {
- .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
- };
const char *const dev_null_path = "/dev/null";
- int ruleset_fd;
if (self->skip_test)
SKIP(return, "this filesystem is not supported (test)");
@@ -7455,22 +7121,14 @@ static void layer3_fs_tag_inode(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(dev_null_path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC));
EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(variant->file_path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC));
- ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
- layer1_allow_read_file);
- EXPECT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
+ layer1_allow_read_file);
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dev_null_path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC));
EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(variant->file_path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC));
/* Forbids directory reading. */
- ruleset_fd =
- landlock_create_ruleset(&layer2_deny_everything_attr,
- sizeof(layer2_deny_everything_attr), 0);
- EXPECT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, NULL);
/* Checks with Landlock and forbidden access. */
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dev_null_path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC));
@@ -7532,7 +7190,6 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout3_fs, release_inodes)
ruleset_fd =
create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR, layer1);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
/* Unmount the filesystem while it is being used by a ruleset. */
set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
@@ -7639,11 +7296,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, execute_make)
test_execute(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
test_check_exec(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
- drop_access_rights(_metadata,
- &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs =
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, NULL);
test_execute(_metadata, EACCES, file1_s1d1);
EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.execute",
@@ -7670,9 +7323,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, execute_read)
test_execute(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
test_check_exec(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
/*
* The only difference with the previous audit_layout1.execute_read test is
@@ -7694,9 +7345,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, write_file)
{
struct audit_records records;
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_WRONLY));
EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
@@ -7711,9 +7360,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, read_file)
{
struct audit_records records;
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.read_file",
@@ -7728,9 +7375,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, read_dir)
{
struct audit_records records;
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_DIRECTORY));
EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.read_dir",
@@ -7748,9 +7393,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, remove_dir)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, rmdir(dir_s1d3));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ -7771,9 +7414,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, remove_file)
{
struct audit_records records;
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, unlink(file1_s1d3));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ -7791,9 +7432,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_char)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFCHR | 0644, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ -7811,9 +7450,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_dir)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, mkdir(file1_s1d3, 0755));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ -7831,9 +7468,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_reg)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFREG | 0644, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ -7851,9 +7486,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_sock)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFSOCK | 0644, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ -7871,9 +7504,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_fifo)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFIFO | 0644, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ -7891,9 +7522,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_block)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFBLK | 0644, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ -7911,9 +7540,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_sym)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, symlink("target", file1_s1d3));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ -7931,10 +7558,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_handled)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs =
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, link(file1_s1d1, file1_s1d3));
EXPECT_EQ(EXDEV, errno);
@@ -7956,12 +7580,9 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_make)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata,
- &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs =
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER,
+ NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, link(file1_s1d1, file1_s1d3));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ -7981,9 +7602,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_rename)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_rename(file1_s1d2, file1_s2d3));
EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
@@ -8003,9 +7622,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_exchange)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
/*
* The only difference with the previous audit_layout1.refer_rename test is
@@ -8043,12 +7660,8 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_rename_half)
},
{},
};
- int ruleset_fd =
- create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER, layer1);
- ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
- ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER, layer1);
ASSERT_EQ(-1, rename(dir_s1d2, dir_s2d3));
ASSERT_EQ(EXDEV, errno);
@@ -8066,9 +7679,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, truncate)
{
struct audit_records records;
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, truncate(file1_s1d3, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ -8085,12 +7696,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, ioctl_dev)
struct audit_records records;
int fd;
- drop_access_rights(_metadata,
- &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs =
- ACCESS_ALL &
- ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL & ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, NULL);
fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
@@ -8116,10 +7722,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, resolve_unix)
child_pid = fork();
ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid);
if (!child_pid) {
- drop_access_rights(_metadata,
- &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
cli_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
ASSERT_LE(0, cli_fd);
@@ -8148,11 +7751,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, mount)
{
struct audit_records records;
- drop_access_rights(_metadata,
- &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs =
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, NULL);
set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, mount(NULL, dir_s3d2, NULL, MS_RDONLY, NULL));
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v7 09/11] selftests/landlock: Check that coredump sockets stay unrestricted
From: Günther Noack @ 2026-03-23 16:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün, John Johansen
Cc: Günther Noack, linux-security-module, Tingmao Wang,
Justin Suess, Samasth Norway Ananda, Matthieu Buffet,
Mikhail Ivanov, konstantin.meskhidze, Demi Marie Obenour,
Alyssa Ross, Jann Horn, Tahera Fahimi, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior,
Kuniyuki Iwashima
In-Reply-To: <20260323165654.193957-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Even when a process is restricted with the new
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX right, the kernel can continue writing
its coredump to the configured coredump socket.
In the test, we create a local server and rewire the system to write
coredumps into it. We then create a child process within a Landlock
domain where LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX is restricted and make
the process crash. The test uses SO_PEERCRED to check that the
connecting client process is the expected one.
Includes a fix by Mickaël Salaün for setting the EUID to 0 (see [1]).
Link[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260218.ohth8theu8Yi@digikod.net/
Suggested-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 143 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 143 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index 3dad643741f7..af0f0b16129a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/sendfile.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
@@ -4928,6 +4929,148 @@ TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_seqpacket_connect_to_child_full)
#undef USE_SENDTO
#undef ENFORCE_ALL
+static void read_core_pattern(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+ char *buf, size_t buf_size)
+{
+ int fd;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+
+ ret = read(fd, buf, buf_size - 1);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+
+ buf[ret] = '\0';
+}
+
+static void set_core_pattern(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+ const char *pattern)
+{
+ int fd;
+ size_t len = strlen(pattern);
+
+ /*
+ * Writing to /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern requires EUID 0 because
+ * sysctl_perm() checks that, ignoring capabilities like
+ * CAP_SYS_ADMIN or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE.
+ *
+ * Switching EUID clears the dumpable flag, which must be restored
+ * afterwards to allow coredumps.
+ */
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, seteuid(0));
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID);
+
+ fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern", O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd)
+ {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to open core_pattern for writing: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(len, write(fd, pattern, len));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, seteuid(getuid()));
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID);
+
+ /* Restore dumpable flag cleared by seteuid(). */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 1, 0, 0, 0));
+}
+
+FIXTURE(coredump)
+{
+ char original_core_pattern[256];
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(coredump)
+{
+ disable_caps(_metadata);
+ read_core_pattern(_metadata, self->original_core_pattern,
+ sizeof(self->original_core_pattern));
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN_PARENT(coredump)
+{
+ set_core_pattern(_metadata, self->original_core_pattern);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test that even when a process is restricted with
+ * LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, the kernel can still initiate a connection
+ * to the coredump socket on the processes' behalf.
+ */
+TEST_F_FORK(coredump, socket_not_restricted)
+{
+ static const char core_pattern[] = "@/tmp/landlock_coredump_test.sock";
+ const char *const sock_path = core_pattern + 1;
+ int srv_fd, conn_fd, status;
+ pid_t child_pid;
+ struct ucred cred;
+ socklen_t cred_len = sizeof(cred);
+ char buf[4096];
+
+ /* Set up the coredump server socket. */
+ unlink(sock_path);
+ srv_fd = set_up_named_unix_server(_metadata, SOCK_STREAM, sock_path);
+
+ /* Point coredumps at our socket. */
+ set_core_pattern(_metadata, core_pattern);
+
+ /* Restrict LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX. */
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata,
+ &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs =
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+ });
+
+ /* Fork a child that crashes. */
+ child_pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid);
+ if (child_pid == 0) {
+ struct rlimit rl = {
+ .rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY,
+ .rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY,
+ };
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rl));
+
+ /* Crash on purpose. */
+ kill(getpid(), SIGSEGV);
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Accept the coredump connection. If Landlock incorrectly denies the
+ * kernel's coredump connect, accept() will block forever, so the test
+ * would time out.
+ */
+ conn_fd = accept(srv_fd, NULL, NULL);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, conn_fd);
+
+ /* Check that the connection came from the crashing child. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, getsockopt(conn_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cred,
+ &cred_len));
+ EXPECT_EQ(child_pid, cred.pid);
+
+ /* Drain the coredump data so the kernel can finish. */
+ while (read(conn_fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) > 0)
+ ;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(conn_fd));
+
+ /* Wait for the child and verify it coredumped. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(WIFSIGNALED(status));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(WCOREDUMP(status));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(srv_fd));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(sock_path));
+}
+
/* clang-format off */
FIXTURE(layout1_bind) {};
/* clang-format on */
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v7 08/11] selftests/landlock: Audit test for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX
From: Günther Noack @ 2026-03-23 16:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün, John Johansen
Cc: Günther Noack, linux-security-module, Tingmao Wang,
Justin Suess, Samasth Norway Ananda, Matthieu Buffet,
Mikhail Ivanov, konstantin.meskhidze, Demi Marie Obenour,
Alyssa Ross, Jann Horn, Tahera Fahimi, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior,
Kuniyuki Iwashima
In-Reply-To: <20260323165654.193957-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Add an audit test to check that Landlock denials from
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX result in audit logs in the expected
format. (There is one audit test for each filesystem access right, so
we should add one for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX as well.)
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 40 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index f8cfd31335e1..3dad643741f7 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -7961,6 +7961,46 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, ioctl_dev)
EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
}
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, resolve_unix)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+ const char *const path = "sock";
+ int srv_fd, cli_fd, status;
+ pid_t child_pid;
+
+ srv_fd = set_up_named_unix_server(_metadata, SOCK_STREAM, path);
+
+ child_pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid);
+ if (!child_pid) {
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata,
+ &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+ });
+
+ cli_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, cli_fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES,
+ test_connect_named_unix(_metadata, cli_fd, path));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(cli_fd));
+ _exit(_metadata->exit_code);
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs_extra(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.resolve_unix", path, NULL));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(srv_fd));
+}
+
TEST_F(audit_layout1, mount)
{
struct audit_records records;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v7 07/11] selftests/landlock: Test LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX
From: Günther Noack @ 2026-03-23 16:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün, John Johansen
Cc: Günther Noack, Justin Suess, Tingmao Wang,
linux-security-module, Samasth Norway Ananda, Matthieu Buffet,
Mikhail Ivanov, konstantin.meskhidze, Demi Marie Obenour,
Alyssa Ross, Jann Horn, Tahera Fahimi, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior,
Kuniyuki Iwashima
In-Reply-To: <20260323165654.193957-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
* Extract common helpers from an existing IOCTL test that
also uses pathname unix(7) sockets.
* These tests use the common scoped domains fixture which is also used
in other Landlock scoping tests and which was used in Tingmao Wang's
earlier patch set in [1].
These tests exercise the cross product of the following scenarios:
* Stream connect(), Datagram connect(), Datagram sendmsg() and
Seqpacket connect().
* Child-to-parent and parent-to-child communication
* The Landlock policy configuration as listed in the scoped_domains
fixture.
* In the default variant, Landlock domains are only placed where
prescribed in the fixture.
* In the "ALL_DOMAINS" variant, Landlock domains are also placed in
the places where the fixture says to omit them, but with a
LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH that allows connection.
Cc: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/53b9883648225d5a08e82d2636ab0b4fda003bc9.1767115163.git.m@maowtm.org/
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 390 ++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 374 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index 9fdd3b8f7b11..f8cfd31335e1 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -4358,30 +4358,66 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, named_pipe_ioctl)
ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, NULL, 0));
}
+/*
+ * set_up_named_unix_server - Create a pathname unix socket
+ *
+ * If the socket type is not SOCK_DGRAM, also invoke listen(2).
+ *
+ * Return: The listening FD - it is the caller responsibility to close it.
+ */
+static int set_up_named_unix_server(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+ int type, const char *const path)
+{
+ int fd;
+ struct sockaddr_un addr = {
+ .sun_family = AF_UNIX,
+ };
+
+ fd = socket(AF_UNIX, type, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+
+ ASSERT_LT(strlen(path), sizeof(addr.sun_path));
+ strncpy(addr.sun_path, path, sizeof(addr.sun_path) - 1);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)));
+
+ if (type != SOCK_DGRAM)
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, listen(fd, 10 /* qlen */));
+ return fd;
+}
+
+/*
+ * test_connect_named_unix - connect to the given named UNIX socket
+ *
+ * Return: The errno from connect(), or 0
+ */
+static int test_connect_named_unix(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+ int fd, const char *const path)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_un addr = {
+ .sun_family = AF_UNIX,
+ };
+
+ ASSERT_LT(strlen(path), sizeof(addr.sun_path));
+ strncpy(addr.sun_path, path, sizeof(addr.sun_path) - 1);
+
+ if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* For named UNIX domain sockets, no IOCTL restrictions apply. */
TEST_F_FORK(layout1, named_unix_domain_socket_ioctl)
{
const char *const path = file1_s1d1;
int srv_fd, cli_fd, ruleset_fd;
- struct sockaddr_un srv_un = {
- .sun_family = AF_UNIX,
- };
- struct sockaddr_un cli_un = {
- .sun_family = AF_UNIX,
- };
const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
};
/* Sets up a server */
ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(path));
- srv_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- ASSERT_LE(0, srv_fd);
-
- strncpy(srv_un.sun_path, path, sizeof(srv_un.sun_path));
- ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(srv_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&srv_un, sizeof(srv_un)));
-
- ASSERT_EQ(0, listen(srv_fd, 10 /* qlen */));
+ srv_fd = set_up_named_unix_server(_metadata, SOCK_STREAM, path);
/* Enables Landlock. */
ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&attr, sizeof(attr), 0);
@@ -4393,9 +4429,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, named_unix_domain_socket_ioctl)
cli_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
ASSERT_LE(0, cli_fd);
- strncpy(cli_un.sun_path, path, sizeof(cli_un.sun_path));
- ASSERT_EQ(0,
- connect(cli_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&cli_un, sizeof(cli_un)));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, test_connect_named_unix(_metadata, cli_fd, path));
/* FIONREAD and other IOCTLs should not be forbidden. */
EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fionread_ioctl(cli_fd));
@@ -4570,6 +4604,330 @@ TEST_F_FORK(ioctl, handle_file_access_file)
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(file_fd));
}
+/*
+ * test_sendto_named_unix - sendto to the given named UNIX socket
+ *
+ * sendto() is equivalent to sendmsg() in this respect.
+ *
+ * Return: The errno from sendto(), or 0
+ */
+static int test_sendto_named_unix(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+ int fd, const char *const path)
+{
+ static const char buf[] = "dummy";
+ struct sockaddr_un addr = {
+ .sun_family = AF_UNIX,
+ };
+
+ ASSERT_LT(strlen(path), sizeof(addr.sun_path));
+ strncpy(addr.sun_path, path, sizeof(addr.sun_path) - 1);
+
+ if (sendto(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
+ sizeof(addr)) == -1)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE(scoped_domains) {};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+#include "scoped_base_variants.h"
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(scoped_domains)
+{
+ drop_caps(_metadata);
+};
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(scoped_domains)
+{
+}
+
+static void enforce_fs_resolve_unix(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+ const struct rule rules[])
+{
+ if (rules) {
+ int fd = create_ruleset(_metadata,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, rules);
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+ } else {
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
+ .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+ };
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &attr);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Flags for test_connect_to_parent and test_connect_to_child:
+ *
+ * USE_SENDTO: Use sendto() instead of connect() (for SOCK_DGRAM only)
+ * ENFORCE_ALL: Enforce a Landlock domain even when the variant says
+ * we shouldn't. We enforce a domain where the path is allow-listed,
+ * and expect the behavior to be the same as if none was used.
+ */
+#define USE_SENDTO (1 << 0)
+#define ENFORCE_ALL (1 << 1)
+
+static void test_connect_to_parent(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+ const FIXTURE_VARIANT(scoped_domains) *
+ variant,
+ int sock_type, int flags)
+{
+ const char *const path = "sock";
+ const struct rule rules[] = {
+ {
+ .path = ".",
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+ int cli_fd, srv_fd, res, status;
+ pid_t child_pid;
+ int readiness_pipe[2];
+ char buf[1];
+
+ if (variant->domain_both)
+ enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, NULL);
+ else if (flags & ENFORCE_ALL)
+ enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, rules);
+
+ unlink(path);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(readiness_pipe, O_CLOEXEC));
+
+ child_pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid);
+
+ if (child_pid == 0) {
+ if (variant->domain_child)
+ enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, NULL);
+ else if (flags & ENFORCE_ALL)
+ enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, rules);
+
+ /* Wait for server to be available. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(readiness_pipe[1]));
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, read(readiness_pipe[0], &buf, 1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(readiness_pipe[0]));
+
+ /* Talk to server. */
+ cli_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, sock_type, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, cli_fd);
+
+ if (flags & USE_SENDTO)
+ res = test_sendto_named_unix(_metadata, cli_fd, path);
+ else
+ res = test_connect_named_unix(_metadata, cli_fd, path);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(variant->domain_child ? EACCES : 0, res);
+
+ /* Clean up. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(cli_fd));
+
+ _exit(_metadata->exit_code);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (variant->domain_parent)
+ enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, NULL);
+ else if (flags & ENFORCE_ALL)
+ enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, rules);
+
+ srv_fd = set_up_named_unix_server(_metadata, sock_type, path);
+
+ /* Tell the child that it can connect. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(readiness_pipe[0]));
+ EXPECT_EQ(sizeof(buf), write(readiness_pipe[1], buf, sizeof(buf)));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(readiness_pipe[1]));
+
+ /* Wait for child. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+ /* Clean up. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(srv_fd));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(path));
+}
+
+static void test_connect_to_child(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+ const FIXTURE_VARIANT(scoped_domains) *
+ variant,
+ int sock_type, int flags)
+{
+ const char *const path = "sock";
+ const struct rule rules[] = {
+ {
+ .path = ".",
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+ int readiness_pipe[2];
+ int shutdown_pipe[2];
+ int cli_fd, srv_fd, res, status;
+ pid_t child_pid;
+ char buf[1];
+
+ if (variant->domain_both)
+ enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, NULL);
+ else if (flags & ENFORCE_ALL)
+ enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, rules);
+
+ unlink(path);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(readiness_pipe, O_CLOEXEC));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(shutdown_pipe, O_CLOEXEC));
+
+ child_pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid);
+
+ if (child_pid == 0) {
+ if (variant->domain_child)
+ enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, NULL);
+ else if (flags & ENFORCE_ALL)
+ enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, rules);
+
+ srv_fd = set_up_named_unix_server(_metadata, sock_type, path);
+
+ /* Tell the parent that it can connect. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(readiness_pipe[0]));
+ EXPECT_EQ(sizeof(buf),
+ write(readiness_pipe[1], buf, sizeof(buf)));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(readiness_pipe[1]));
+
+ /* Wait until it is time to shut down. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(shutdown_pipe[1]));
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, read(shutdown_pipe[0], &buf, 1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(shutdown_pipe[0]));
+
+ /* Cleanup */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(srv_fd));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(path));
+
+ _exit(_metadata->exit_code);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (variant->domain_parent)
+ enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, NULL);
+ else if (flags & ENFORCE_ALL)
+ enforce_fs_resolve_unix(_metadata, rules);
+
+ /* Wait for server to be available. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(readiness_pipe[1]));
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, read(readiness_pipe[0], &buf, 1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(readiness_pipe[0]));
+
+ /* Talk to server. */
+ cli_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, sock_type, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, cli_fd);
+
+ if (flags & USE_SENDTO)
+ res = test_sendto_named_unix(_metadata, cli_fd, path);
+ else
+ res = test_connect_named_unix(_metadata, cli_fd, path);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(variant->domain_parent ? EACCES : 0, res);
+
+ /* Clean up. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(cli_fd));
+
+ /* Tell the server to shut down. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(shutdown_pipe[0]));
+ EXPECT_EQ(sizeof(buf), write(shutdown_pipe[1], buf, sizeof(buf)));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(shutdown_pipe[1]));
+
+ /* Wait for child. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_stream_connect_to_parent)
+{
+ test_connect_to_parent(_metadata, variant, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_dgram_connect_to_parent)
+{
+ test_connect_to_parent(_metadata, variant, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_dgram_sendmsg_to_parent)
+{
+ test_connect_to_parent(_metadata, variant, SOCK_DGRAM, USE_SENDTO);
+}
+
+TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_seqpacket_connect_to_parent)
+{
+ test_connect_to_parent(_metadata, variant, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_stream_connect_to_parent_full)
+{
+ test_connect_to_parent(_metadata, variant, SOCK_STREAM, ENFORCE_ALL);
+}
+
+TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_dgram_connect_to_parent_full)
+{
+ test_connect_to_parent(_metadata, variant, SOCK_DGRAM, ENFORCE_ALL);
+}
+
+TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_dgram_sendmsg_to_parent_full)
+{
+ test_connect_to_parent(_metadata, variant, SOCK_DGRAM,
+ USE_SENDTO | ENFORCE_ALL);
+}
+
+TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_seqpacket_connect_to_parent_full)
+{
+ test_connect_to_parent(_metadata, variant, SOCK_SEQPACKET, ENFORCE_ALL);
+}
+
+TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_stream_connect_to_child)
+{
+ test_connect_to_child(_metadata, variant, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_dgram_connect_to_child)
+{
+ test_connect_to_child(_metadata, variant, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_dgram_sendmsg_to_child)
+{
+ test_connect_to_child(_metadata, variant, SOCK_DGRAM, USE_SENDTO);
+}
+
+TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_seqpacket_connect_to_child)
+{
+ test_connect_to_child(_metadata, variant, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_stream_connect_to_child_full)
+{
+ test_connect_to_child(_metadata, variant, SOCK_STREAM, ENFORCE_ALL);
+}
+
+TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_dgram_connect_to_child_full)
+{
+ test_connect_to_child(_metadata, variant, SOCK_DGRAM, ENFORCE_ALL);
+}
+
+TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_dgram_sendmsg_to_child_full)
+{
+ test_connect_to_child(_metadata, variant, SOCK_DGRAM,
+ USE_SENDTO | ENFORCE_ALL);
+}
+
+TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_seqpacket_connect_to_child_full)
+{
+ test_connect_to_child(_metadata, variant, SOCK_SEQPACKET, ENFORCE_ALL);
+}
+
+#undef USE_SENDTO
+#undef ENFORCE_ALL
+
/* clang-format off */
FIXTURE(layout1_bind) {};
/* clang-format on */
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v7 06/11] selftests/landlock: Replace access_fs_16 with ACCESS_ALL in fs_test
From: Günther Noack @ 2026-03-23 16:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün, John Johansen
Cc: Günther Noack, linux-security-module, Tingmao Wang,
Justin Suess, Samasth Norway Ananda, Matthieu Buffet,
Mikhail Ivanov, konstantin.meskhidze, Demi Marie Obenour,
Alyssa Ross, Jann Horn, Tahera Fahimi, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior,
Kuniyuki Iwashima
In-Reply-To: <20260323165654.193957-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
The access_fs_16 variable was originally intended to stay frozen at 16
access rights so that audit tests would not need updating when new
access rights are added. Now that we have 17 access rights, the name
is confusing.
Replace all uses of access_fs_16 with ACCESS_ALL and delete the
variable.
Suggested-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 54 +++++++---------------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index b318627e7561..9fdd3b8f7b11 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -7161,26 +7161,6 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, execute_make)
* only the blocked ones are logged.
*/
-/* clang-format off */
-static const __u64 access_fs_16 =
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
-/* clang-format on */
-
TEST_F(audit_layout1, execute_read)
{
struct audit_records records;
@@ -7190,7 +7170,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, execute_read)
test_check_exec(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
});
/*
@@ -7214,7 +7194,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, write_file)
struct audit_records records;
drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
});
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_WRONLY));
@@ -7231,7 +7211,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, read_file)
struct audit_records records;
drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
});
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
@@ -7248,7 +7228,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, read_dir)
struct audit_records records;
drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
});
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_DIRECTORY));
@@ -7268,7 +7248,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, remove_dir)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d3));
drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
});
EXPECT_EQ(-1, rmdir(dir_s1d3));
@@ -7291,7 +7271,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, remove_file)
struct audit_records records;
drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
});
EXPECT_EQ(-1, unlink(file1_s1d3));
@@ -7311,7 +7291,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_char)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
});
EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFCHR | 0644, 0));
@@ -7331,7 +7311,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_dir)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
});
EXPECT_EQ(-1, mkdir(file1_s1d3, 0755));
@@ -7351,7 +7331,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_reg)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
});
EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFREG | 0644, 0));
@@ -7371,7 +7351,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_sock)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
});
EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFSOCK | 0644, 0));
@@ -7391,7 +7371,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_fifo)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
});
EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFIFO | 0644, 0));
@@ -7411,7 +7391,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_block)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
});
EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFBLK | 0644, 0));
@@ -7431,7 +7411,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_sym)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
});
EXPECT_EQ(-1, symlink("target", file1_s1d3));
@@ -7501,7 +7481,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_rename)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
});
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_rename(file1_s1d2, file1_s2d3));
@@ -7523,7 +7503,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_exchange)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
});
/*
@@ -7586,7 +7566,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, truncate)
struct audit_records records;
drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
});
EXPECT_EQ(-1, truncate(file1_s1d3, 0));
@@ -7607,7 +7587,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_layout1, ioctl_dev)
drop_access_rights(_metadata,
&(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
.handled_access_fs =
- access_fs_16 &
+ ACCESS_ALL &
~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
});
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v7 05/11] landlock: Clarify BUILD_BUG_ON check in scoping logic
From: Günther Noack @ 2026-03-23 16:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün, John Johansen
Cc: Günther Noack, linux-security-module, Tingmao Wang,
Justin Suess, Samasth Norway Ananda, Matthieu Buffet,
Mikhail Ivanov, konstantin.meskhidze, Demi Marie Obenour,
Alyssa Ross, Jann Horn, Tahera Fahimi, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior,
Kuniyuki Iwashima
In-Reply-To: <20260323165654.193957-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
The BUILD_BUG_ON check in domain_is_scoped() and
unmask_scoped_access() should check that the loop that counts down
client_layer finishes. We therefore check that the numbers
LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS-1 and -1 are both representable by that
integer. If they are representable, the numbers in between are
representable too, and the loop finishes.
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
security/landlock/fs.c | 9 ++++++---
security/landlock/task.c | 9 ++++++---
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index fcf69b3d734d..c1ecfe239032 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -1595,10 +1595,13 @@ static void unmask_scoped_access(const struct landlock_ruleset *const client,
return;
/*
- * client_layer must be a signed integer with greater capacity
- * than client->num_layers to ensure the following loop stops.
+ * client_layer must be able to represent all numbers from
+ * LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1 to -1 for the loop below to terminate.
+ * (It must be large enough, and it must be signed.)
*/
- BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(client_layer) > sizeof(client->num_layers));
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(!is_signed_type(typeof(client_layer)));
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1 >
+ type_max(typeof(client_layer)));
client_layer = client->num_layers - 1;
client_walker = client->hierarchy;
diff --git a/security/landlock/task.c b/security/landlock/task.c
index f2dbdebf2770..6d46042132ce 100644
--- a/security/landlock/task.c
+++ b/security/landlock/task.c
@@ -191,10 +191,13 @@ static bool domain_is_scoped(const struct landlock_ruleset *const client,
client_layer = client->num_layers - 1;
client_walker = client->hierarchy;
/*
- * client_layer must be a signed integer with greater capacity
- * than client->num_layers to ensure the following loop stops.
+ * client_layer must be able to represent all numbers from
+ * LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1 to -1 for the loop below to terminate.
+ * (It must be large enough, and it must be signed.)
*/
- BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(client_layer) > sizeof(client->num_layers));
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(!is_signed_type(typeof(client_layer)));
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1 >
+ type_max(typeof(client_layer)));
server_layer = server ? (server->num_layers - 1) : -1;
server_walker = server ? server->hierarchy : NULL;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v7 04/11] samples/landlock: Add support for named UNIX domain socket restrictions
From: Günther Noack @ 2026-03-23 16:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün, John Johansen
Cc: Günther Noack, Justin Suess, linux-security-module,
Tingmao Wang, Samasth Norway Ananda, Matthieu Buffet,
Mikhail Ivanov, konstantin.meskhidze, Demi Marie Obenour,
Alyssa Ross, Jann Horn, Tahera Fahimi, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior,
Kuniyuki Iwashima
In-Reply-To: <20260323165654.193957-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
The access right for UNIX domain socket lookups is grouped with the
read-write rights in the sample tool. Rationale: In the general case,
any operations are possible through a UNIX domain socket, including
data-mutating operations.
Cc: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 12 +++++++++---
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
index 9f21088c0855..66e56ae275c6 100644
--- a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
+++ b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list)
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX)
/* clang-format on */
@@ -295,11 +296,12 @@ static bool check_ruleset_scope(const char *const env_var,
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX)
/* clang-format on */
-#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 8
+#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 9
#define XSTR(s) #s
#define STR(s) XSTR(s)
@@ -438,6 +440,10 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
~LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON;
__attribute__((fallthrough));
case 7:
+ case 8:
+ /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX for ABI < 9 */
+ ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &=
+ ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX;
/* Must be printed for any ABI < LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST. */
fprintf(stderr,
"Hint: You should update the running kernel "
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v7 03/11] landlock: Control pathname UNIX domain socket resolution by path
From: Günther Noack @ 2026-03-23 16:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün, John Johansen
Cc: Günther Noack, Tingmao Wang, Justin Suess,
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior, Kuniyuki Iwashima, Jann Horn,
linux-security-module, Samasth Norway Ananda, Matthieu Buffet,
Mikhail Ivanov, konstantin.meskhidze, Demi Marie Obenour,
Alyssa Ross, Tahera Fahimi
In-Reply-To: <20260323165654.193957-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
* Add a new access right LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, which
controls the lookup operations for named UNIX domain sockets. The
resolution happens during connect() and sendmsg() (depending on
socket type).
* Change access_mask_t from u16 to u32 (see below)
* Hook into the path lookup in unix_find_bsd() in af_unix.c, using a
LSM hook. Make policy decisions based on the new access rights
* Increment the Landlock ABI version.
* Minor test adaptations to keep the tests working.
* Document the design rationale for scoped access rights,
and cross-reference it from the header documentation.
With this access right, access is granted if either of the following
conditions is met:
* The target socket's filesystem path was allow-listed using a
LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH rule, *or*:
* The target socket was created in the same Landlock domain in which
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX was restricted.
In case of a denial, connect() and sendmsg() return EACCES, which is
the same error as it is returned if the user does not have the write
bit in the traditional UNIX file system permissions of that file.
The access_mask_t type grows from u16 to u32 to make space for the new
access right. This also doubles the size of struct layer_access_masks
from 32 byte to 64 byte.
Document the (possible future) interaction between scoped flags and
other access rights in struct landlock_ruleset_attr, and summarize the
rationale, as discussed in code review leading up to [2].
This feature was created with substantial discussion and input from
Justin Suess, Tingmao Wang and Mickaël Salaün.
Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Cc: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link[1]: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/36
Link[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260205.8531e4005118@gnoack.org/
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
Documentation/security/landlock.rst | 40 ++++++
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 21 +++
security/landlock/access.h | 2 +-
security/landlock/audit.c | 1 +
security/landlock/fs.c | 130 ++++++++++++++++++-
security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +-
security/landlock/syscalls.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 5 +-
9 files changed, 198 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
index 3e4d4d04cfae..4bbe250a6829 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
@@ -89,6 +89,46 @@ this is required to keep access controls consistent over the whole system, and
this avoids unattended bypasses through file descriptor passing (i.e. confused
deputy attack).
+.. _scoped-flags-interaction:
+
+Interaction between scoped flags and other access rights
+--------------------------------------------------------
+
+The ``scoped`` flags in ``struct landlock_ruleset_attr`` restrict the
+use of *outgoing* IPC from the created Landlock domain, while they
+permit reaching out to IPC endpoints *within* the created Landlock
+domain.
+
+In the future, scoped flags *may* interact with other access rights,
+e.g. so that abstract UNIX sockets can be allow-listed by name, or so
+that signals can be allow-listed by signal number or target process.
+
+When introducing ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX``, we defined it to
+implicitly have the same scoping semantics as a
+``LANDLOCK_SCOPE_PATHNAME_UNIX_SOCKET`` flag would have: connecting to
+UNIX sockets within the same domain (where
+``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX`` is used) is unconditionally
+allowed.
+
+The reasoning is:
+
+* Like other IPC mechanisms, connecting to named UNIX sockets in the
+ same domain should be expected and harmless. (If needed, users can
+ further refine their Landlock policies with nested domains or by
+ restricting ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK``.)
+* We reserve the option to still introduce
+ ``LANDLOCK_SCOPE_PATHNAME_UNIX_SOCKET`` in the future. (This would
+ be useful if we wanted to have a Landlock rule to permit IPC access
+ to other Landlock domains.)
+* But we can postpone the point in time when users have to deal with
+ two interacting flags visible in the userspace API. (In particular,
+ it is possible that it won't be needed in practice, in which case we
+ can avoid the second flag altogether.)
+* If we *do* introduce ``LANDLOCK_SCOPE_PATHNAME_UNIX_SOCKET`` in the
+ future, setting this scoped flag in a ruleset does *not reduce* the
+ restrictions, because access within the same scope is already
+ allowed based on ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX``.
+
Tests
=====
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
index f88fa1f68b77..3157d257555b 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -248,6 +248,26 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
*
* This access right is available since the fifth version of the Landlock
* ABI.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX: Look up pathname UNIX domain sockets
+ * (:manpage:`unix(7)`). On UNIX domain sockets, this restricts both calls to
+ * :manpage:`connect(2)` as well as calls to :manpage:`sendmsg(2)` with an
+ * explicit recipient address.
+ *
+ * This access right only applies to connections to UNIX server sockets which
+ * were created outside of the newly created Landlock domain (e.g. from within
+ * a parent domain or from an unrestricted process). Newly created UNIX
+ * servers within the same Landlock domain continue to be accessible. In this
+ * regard, %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX has the same semantics as the
+ * ``LANDLOCK_SCOPE_*`` flags.
+ *
+ * If a resolve attempt is denied, the operation returns an ``EACCES`` error,
+ * in line with other filesystem access rights (but different to denials for
+ * abstract UNIX domain sockets).
+ *
+ * This access right is available since the ninth version of the Landlock ABI.
+ *
+ * The rationale for this design is described in
+ * :ref:`Documentation/security/landlock.rst <scoped-flags-interaction>`.
*
* Whether an opened file can be truncated with :manpage:`ftruncate(2)` or used
* with `ioctl(2)` is determined during :manpage:`open(2)`, in the same way as
@@ -333,6 +353,7 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER (1ULL << 13)
#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE (1ULL << 14)
#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV (1ULL << 15)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX (1ULL << 16)
/* clang-format on */
/**
diff --git a/security/landlock/access.h b/security/landlock/access.h
index 42c95747d7bd..89dc8e7b93da 100644
--- a/security/landlock/access.h
+++ b/security/landlock/access.h
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
/* clang-format on */
-typedef u16 access_mask_t;
+typedef u32 access_mask_t;
/* Makes sure all filesystem access rights can be stored. */
static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
diff --git a/security/landlock/audit.c b/security/landlock/audit.c
index 60ff217ab95b..8d0edf94037d 100644
--- a/security/landlock/audit.c
+++ b/security/landlock/audit.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ static const char *const fs_access_strings[] = {
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)] = "fs.refer",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)] = "fs.truncate",
[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)] = "fs.ioctl_dev",
+ [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX)] = "fs.resolve_unix",
};
static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(fs_access_strings) == LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 97065d51685a..fcf69b3d734d 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/path.h>
#include <linux/pid.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
@@ -36,6 +37,7 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/wait_bit.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <net/af_unix.h>
#include <uapi/linux/fiemap.h>
#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
@@ -314,7 +316,8 @@ static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX)
/* clang-format on */
/*
@@ -1557,6 +1560,130 @@ static int hook_path_truncate(const struct path *const path)
return current_check_access_path(path, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
}
+/**
+ * unmask_scoped_access - Remove access right bits in @masks in all layers
+ * where @client and @server have the same domain
+ *
+ * This does the same as domain_is_scoped(), but unmasks bits in @masks.
+ * It can not return early as domain_is_scoped() does.
+ *
+ * A scoped access for a given access right bit is allowed iff, for all layer
+ * depths where the access bit is set, the client and server domain are the
+ * same. This function clears the access rights @access in @masks at all layer
+ * depths where the client and server domain are the same, so that, when they
+ * are all cleared, the access is allowed.
+ *
+ * @client: Client domain
+ * @server: Server domain
+ * @masks: Layer access masks to unmask
+ * @access: Access bits that control scoping
+ */
+static void unmask_scoped_access(const struct landlock_ruleset *const client,
+ const struct landlock_ruleset *const server,
+ struct layer_access_masks *const masks,
+ const access_mask_t access)
+{
+ int client_layer, server_layer;
+ const struct landlock_hierarchy *client_walker, *server_walker;
+
+ /* This should not happen. */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!client))
+ return;
+
+ /* Server has no Landlock domain; nothing to clear. */
+ if (!server)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * client_layer must be a signed integer with greater capacity
+ * than client->num_layers to ensure the following loop stops.
+ */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(client_layer) > sizeof(client->num_layers));
+
+ client_layer = client->num_layers - 1;
+ client_walker = client->hierarchy;
+ server_layer = server->num_layers - 1;
+ server_walker = server->hierarchy;
+
+ /*
+ * Clears the access bits at all layers where the client domain is the
+ * same as the server domain. We start the walk at min(client_layer,
+ * server_layer). The layer bits until there can not be cleared because
+ * either the client or the server domain is missing.
+ */
+ for (; client_layer > server_layer; client_layer--)
+ client_walker = client_walker->parent;
+
+ for (; server_layer > client_layer; server_layer--)
+ server_walker = server_walker->parent;
+
+ for (; client_layer >= 0; client_layer--) {
+ if (masks->access[client_layer] & access &&
+ client_walker == server_walker)
+ masks->access[client_layer] &= ~access;
+
+ client_walker = client_walker->parent;
+ server_walker = server_walker->parent;
+ }
+}
+
+static int hook_unix_find(const struct path *const path, struct sock *other,
+ int flags)
+{
+ const struct landlock_ruleset *dom_other;
+ const struct landlock_cred_security *subject;
+ struct layer_access_masks layer_masks;
+ struct landlock_request request = {};
+ static const struct access_masks fs_resolve_unix = {
+ .fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+ };
+
+ /* Lookup for the purpose of saving coredumps is OK. */
+ if (unlikely(flags & SOCK_COREDUMP))
+ return 0;
+
+ subject = landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(),
+ fs_resolve_unix, NULL);
+
+ if (!subject)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Ignoring return value: that the domains apply was already checked in
+ * landlock_get_applicable_subject() above.
+ */
+ landlock_init_layer_masks(subject->domain, fs_resolve_unix.fs,
+ &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
+
+ /* Checks the layers in which we are connecting within the same domain. */
+ unix_state_lock(other);
+ if (unlikely(sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD) || !other->sk_socket ||
+ !other->sk_socket->file)) {
+ unix_state_unlock(other);
+ /*
+ * We rely on the caller to catch the (non-reversible) SOCK_DEAD
+ * condition and retry the lookup. If we returned an error
+ * here, the lookup would not get retried.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ dom_other = landlock_cred(other->sk_socket->file->f_cred)->domain;
+
+ /* Access to the same (or a lower) domain is always allowed. */
+ unmask_scoped_access(subject->domain, dom_other, &layer_masks,
+ fs_resolve_unix.fs);
+ unix_state_unlock(other);
+
+ /* Checks the connections to allow-listed paths. */
+ if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(subject->domain, path,
+ fs_resolve_unix.fs, &layer_masks,
+ &request, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ landlock_log_denial(subject, &request);
+ return -EACCES;
+}
+
/* File hooks */
/**
@@ -1834,6 +1961,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, hook_path_unlink),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, hook_path_truncate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_find, hook_unix_find),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, hook_file_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open),
diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
index eb584f47288d..b454ad73b15e 100644
--- a/security/landlock/limits.h
+++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS 16
#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES U32_MAX
-#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV
+#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX
#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1)
#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 3b33839b80c7..a6e23657f3ce 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = {
* If the change involves a fix that requires userspace awareness, also update
* the errata documentation in Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst .
*/
-const int landlock_abi_version = 8;
+const int landlock_abi_version = 9;
/**
* sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
index 0fea236ef4bd..30d37234086c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ TEST(abi_version)
const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
};
- ASSERT_EQ(8, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
+ ASSERT_EQ(9, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0,
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index 968a91c927a4..b318627e7561 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -575,9 +575,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval)
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX)
-#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV
+#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX
#define ACCESS_ALL ( \
ACCESS_FILE | \
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v7 02/11] landlock: Use mem_is_zero() in is_layer_masks_allowed()
From: Günther Noack @ 2026-03-23 16:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün, John Johansen
Cc: Günther Noack, linux-security-module, Tingmao Wang,
Justin Suess, Samasth Norway Ananda, Matthieu Buffet,
Mikhail Ivanov, konstantin.meskhidze, Demi Marie Obenour,
Alyssa Ross, Jann Horn, Tahera Fahimi, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior,
Kuniyuki Iwashima
In-Reply-To: <20260323165654.193957-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
This is equivalent, but expresses the intent a bit clearer.
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
security/landlock/fs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index a03ec664c78e..97065d51685a 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ static void test_no_more_access(struct kunit *const test)
static bool is_layer_masks_allowed(const struct layer_access_masks *masks)
{
- return !memchr_inv(&masks->access, 0, sizeof(masks->access));
+ return mem_is_zero(&masks->access, sizeof(masks->access));
}
/*
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v7 01/11] lsm: Add LSM hook security_unix_find
From: Günther Noack @ 2026-03-23 16:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün, John Johansen, Paul Moore, James Morris,
Serge E . Hallyn
Cc: Günther Noack, Tingmao Wang, Justin Suess,
linux-security-module, Samasth Norway Ananda, Matthieu Buffet,
Mikhail Ivanov, konstantin.meskhidze, Demi Marie Obenour,
Alyssa Ross, Jann Horn, Tahera Fahimi, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior,
Kuniyuki Iwashima, Simon Horman, netdev, Alexander Viro,
Christian Brauner
In-Reply-To: <20260323165654.193957-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Add an LSM hook security_unix_find.
This hook is called to check the path of a named UNIX socket before a
connection is initiated. The peer socket may be inspected as well.
Why existing hooks are unsuitable:
Existing socket hooks, security_unix_stream_connect(),
security_unix_may_send(), and security_socket_connect() don't provide
TOCTOU-free / namespace independent access to the paths of sockets.
(1) We cannot resolve the path from the struct sockaddr in existing hooks.
This requires another path lookup. A change in the path between the
two lookups will cause a TOCTOU bug.
(2) We cannot use the struct path from the listening socket, because it
may be bound to a path in a different namespace than the caller,
resulting in a path that cannot be referenced at policy creation time.
Consumers of the hook wishing to reference @other are responsible
for acquiring the unix_state_lock and checking for the SOCK_DEAD flag
therein, ensuring the socket hasn't died since lookup.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 5 +++++
include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++
net/unix/af_unix.c | 10 +++++++---
security/security.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 8c42b4bde09c..7a0fd3dbfa29 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -317,6 +317,11 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, post_notification, const struct cred *w_cred,
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, watch_key, struct key *key)
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY && CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_find, const struct path *path, struct sock *other,
+ int flags)
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_stream_connect, struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
struct sock *newsk)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 83a646d72f6f..99a33d8eb28d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1931,6 +1931,17 @@ static inline int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
+
+int security_unix_find(const struct path *path, struct sock *other, int flags);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+static inline int security_unix_find(const struct path *path, struct sock *other, int flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey);
int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, const char *name, u8 port_num);
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 3756a93dc63a..5ef3c2e31757 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1231,11 +1231,15 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, int addr_len,
goto path_put;
err = -EPROTOTYPE;
- if (sk->sk_type == type)
- touch_atime(&path);
- else
+ if (sk->sk_type != type)
goto sock_put;
+ err = security_unix_find(&path, sk, flags);
+ if (err)
+ goto sock_put;
+
+ touch_atime(&path);
+
path_put(&path);
return sk;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 67af9228c4e9..28ccea205874 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -4731,6 +4731,26 @@ int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
+/**
+ * security_unix_find() - Check if a named AF_UNIX socket can connect
+ * @path: path of the socket being connected to
+ * @other: peer sock
+ * @flags: flags associated with the socket
+ *
+ * This hook is called to check permissions before connecting to a named
+ * AF_UNIX socket. The caller does not hold any locks on @other.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_unix_find(const struct path *path, struct sock *other, int flags)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(unix_find, path, other, flags);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_find);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
/**
* security_ib_pkey_access() - Check if access to an IB pkey is allowed
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v7 00/11] landlock: UNIX connect() control by pathname and scope
From: Günther Noack @ 2026-03-23 16:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün, John Johansen, Paul Moore, James Morris,
Serge E . Hallyn
Cc: Günther Noack, linux-security-module, Tingmao Wang,
Justin Suess, Samasth Norway Ananda, Matthieu Buffet,
Mikhail Ivanov, konstantin.meskhidze, Demi Marie Obenour,
Alyssa Ross, Jann Horn, Tahera Fahimi, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior,
Kuniyuki Iwashima, Simon Horman, netdev, Alexander Viro,
Christian Brauner
Hello!
This patch set introduces a filesystem-based Landlock restriction
mechanism for connecting to UNIX domain sockets (or addressing them
with sendmsg(2)). It introduces the filesystem access right
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX.
For the connection-oriented SOCK_STREAM and SOCK_SEQPACKET type
sockets, the access right makes the connect(2) operation fail with
EACCES, if denied.
SOCK_DGRAM-type UNIX sockets can be used both with connect(2), or by
passing an explicit recipient address with every sendmsg(2)
invocation. In the latter case, the Landlock check is done when an
explicit recipient address is passed to sendmsg(2) and can make
sendmsg(2) return EACCES. When UNIX datagram sockets are connected
with connect(2), a fixed recipient address is associated with the
socket and the check happens during connect(2) and may return EACCES.
When LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX is handled within a Landlock
domain, this domain will only allow connect(2) and sendmsg(2) to
server sockets that were created within the same domain. Or, to
phrase it the other way around: Unless it is allow-listed with a
LANDLOCK_PATH_BENEATH rule, the newly created domain denies connect(2)
and sendmsg(2) actions that are directed *outwards* of that domain.
In that regard, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX has the same semantics
as one of the "scoped" access rights.
== Motivation
Currently, landlocked processes can connect to named UNIX sockets
through the BSD socket API described in unix(7), by invoking socket(2)
followed by connect(2) with a suitable struct sockname_un holding the
socket's filename. This is a surprising gap in Landlock's sandboxing
capabilities for users (e.g. in [1]) and it can be used to escape a
sandbox when a Unix service offers command execution (various such
scenarios were listed by Tingmao Wang in [2]).
The original feature request is at [4].
== Alternatives and Related Work
=== Alternative: Use existing LSM hooks
We have carefully and seriously considered the use of existing LSM
hooks, but still came to the conclusion that a new LSM hook is better
suited in this case:
The existing hooks security_unix_stream_connect(),
security_unix_may_send() and security_socket_connect() do not give
access to the resolved filesystem path.
* Resolving the filesystem path in the struct sockaddr_un again within
a Landlock would produce a TOCTOU race, so this is not an option.
* We would therefore need to wire through the resolved struct path
from unix_find_bsd() to one of the existing LSM hooks which get
called later. This would be a more substantial change to af_unix.c.
The struct path that is available in the listening-side struct sock is
can be read through the existing hooks, but it is not an option to use
this information: As the listening socket may have been bound from
within a different namespace, the path that was used for that can is
in the general case not meaningful for a sandboxed process. In
particular, it is not possible to use this path (or prefixes thereof)
when constructing a sandbox policy in the client-side process.
Paul Moore also chimed in in support of adding a new hook, with the
rationale that the simplest change to the LSM hook interface has
traditionally proven to be the most robust. [11]
More details are on the Github issue at [6] and on the LKML at [9].
In a the discussion of the V2 review, started by Christian Brauner
[10], we have further explored the approach of reusing the existing
LSM hooks but still ended up leaning on the side of introducing a new
hook, with Paul Moore and me (gnoack) arguing for that option.
Further insights about the LSM hook were shared in the V3 review by
Tingmao Wang [12], who spotted additional requirements due to the two
approaches being merged into one patch set. The summary of that
discussion is in [13].
=== Related work: Scope Control for Pathname Unix Sockets
The motivation for this patch is the same as in Tingmao Wang's patch
set for "scoped" control for pathname Unix sockets [2], originally
proposed in the Github feature request [5].
In [14], we have settled on the decision to merge the two patch sets
into this one, whose primary way of controlling connect(2) is
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, but where this flag additionally has
the semantics of only restricting this unix(7) IPC *outwards* of the
created Landlock domain, in line with the logic that exists for the
existing "scoped" flags already.
By having LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX implement "scoping"
semantics, we can avoid introducing two separate interacting flags for
now, but we retain the option of introducing
LANDLOCK_SCOPE_PATHNAME_UNIX_SOCKET at a later point in time, should
such a flag be needed to express additional rules.
== Credits
The feature was originally suggested by Jann Horn in [7].
Tingmao Wang and Demi Marie Obenour have taken the initiative to
revive this discussion again in [1], [4] and [5].
Tingmao Wang has sent the patch set for the scoped access control for
pathname Unix sockets [2] and has contributed substantial insights
during the code review, shaping the form of the LSM hook and agreeing
to merge the pathname and scoped-flag patch sets.
Justin Suess has sent the patch for the LSM hook in [8] and
subsequently through this patch set.
Christian Brauner and Paul Moore have contributed to the design of the
new LSM hook, discussing the tradeoffs in [10].
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior and Kuniyuki Iwashima have helped with
locking questions in the networking subsystem. [15] [16]
Ryan Sullivan has started on an initial implementation and has brought
up relevant discussion points on the Github issue at [4].
As maintainer of Landlock, Mickaël Salaün has done the main review so
far and particularly pointed out ways in which the UNIX connect()
patch sets interact with each other and what we need to look for with
regards to UAPI consistency as Landlock evolves.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/landlock/515ff0f4-2ab3-46de-8d1e-5c66a93c6ede@gmail.com/
[2] Tingmao Wang's "Implement scope control for pathname Unix sockets"
https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1767115163.git.m@maowtm.org/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251230.bcae69888454@gnoack.org/
[4] Github issue for FS-based control for named Unix sockets:
https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/36
[5] Github issue for scope-based restriction of named Unix sockets:
https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/51
[6] https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/36#issuecomment-2950632277
[7] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/CAG48ez3NvVnonOqKH4oRwRqbSOLO0p9djBqgvxVwn6gtGQBPcw@mail.gmail.com/
[8] Patch for the LSM hook:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251231213314.2979118-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com/
[9] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260108.64bd7391e1ae@gnoack.org/
[10] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260113-kerngesund-etage-86de4a21da24@brauner/
[11] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHC9VhQHZCe0LMx4xzSo-h1SWY489U4frKYnxu4YVrcJN3x7nA@mail.gmail.com/
[12] https://lore.kernel.org/all/e6b6b069-384c-4c45-a56b-fa54b26bc72a@maowtm.org/
[13] https://lore.kernel.org/all/aYMenaSmBkAsFowd@google.com/
[14] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260205.Kiech3gupee1@digikod.net/
[15] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260310151907.VYySCtJp@linutronix.de/
[16] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAAVpQUC95mSjX1vRK===pubHofcYqbkNE7goYKiu6vha5GYAFw@mail.gmail.com/
---
== Patch set history
V1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260101134102.25938-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com/
V2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260110143300.71048-2-gnoack3000@gmail.com/
V3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260119203457.97676-2-gnoack3000@gmail.com/
V4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260208231017.114343-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com/
V5: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260215105158.28132-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com/
V6: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260315222150.121952-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com/
Changes in V7:
* Implementation:
* LSM hook: Small header file layout restructurings, typos (Justin)
* Hold unix_state_lock across the usage of the other Landlock domain
This prevents a UAF; spotted by Mickaël and Sebastian in code review 🏆
* Ignore the return value from landlock_init_layer_masks() -
it is not needed in this specific case
* Add a BUILD_BUG_ON to unmask_scoped_access() like in
domain_is_scoped(). Revise the BUILD_BUG_ON logic and bring both
implementations in line.
* Documentation and commentary:
* Mention access_mask_t change from u16 to u32 in commit message
* Improve documentation for unmask_scoped_access()
* Various typos and smaller documentation fixes, caught in code review
* Add ABI version remark to landlock.h
* Add comment to explain why returning 0 on SOCK_DEAD is correct -
This is not obvious in the code and requires understanding the callers
* In kernel docs, use "case 6 ... 8" in a place
Changes in V6:
* Implementation:
* Move the LSM hook call after the check that checks for the other
end's matching socket type. (Justin Suess)
* Lock with unix_state_lock() and check SOCK_DEAD.
* Remove unnecessary layer_access_masks_empty() call (and its
implementation).
* Documentation:
* Squash docs with design rationale into main implementation commit,
and cross-referece it from the header docs.
* Clarify that denials result in EACCES and that this is consistent
with other filesystem access rights.
* Minor:
* Use mem_is_zero() in is_layer_masks_allowed() (minor cleanup)
* Omit unnecessary __attribute__((fallthrough)) usages
* Remove comment at the end of a line in a place.
* Selftests:
* sun_path population fixes
* coredump test: Set EUID to 0 (needed for UML-based selftests)
Link[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260218.ohth8theu8Yi@digikod.net/
Changes in V5:
This change primarily adds tests, changing the testing approach for
the main test to use the scoped_domains fixture as in Tingmao's patch
set [2], and adding tests for the audit and coredump cases.
* Selftests:
* Replaced the main selftest with one based on scoped_domains
* Added audit test
* Added test for the coredump case
* Added a follow-up commit that simplifies ruleset enforcement
* Kernel code:
* Mark coredump check as unlikely (per Justin's review)
* Drop check for socket type (per Mickaël's review)
Changes in V4:
Since this version, this patch set subsumes the scoping semantics from
Tingmao Wang's "Scope Control" patch set [2], per discussion with
Tingmao Wang and Mickaël Salaün in [14] and in the thread leading up
to it.
Now, LANDLOCK_SCOPE_PATHNAME_UNIX_SOCKET only restricts connect(2) and
sendmsg(2) *outwards* of the domain where it is restricted, *with the
same semantics as a "scoped" flag*.
* Implement a layer-mask based version of domain_is_scoped():
unmask_scoped_access(). Rationale: domain_is_scoped() returns
early, which we can't do in the layer masks based variant. The two
variants are similar enough.
* LSM hook: Replace 'type' argument with 'sk' argument,
per discussion in [12] and [13].
* Bump ABI version to 9 (pessimistically assuming that we won't make
it for 7.0)
* Documentation fixes in header file and in Documentation/
* selftests: more test variants, now also parameterizing whether the
server socket gets created within the Landlock domain or before that
* selftests: use EXPECT_EQ() for test cleanup
Changes in V3:
* LSM hook: rename it to security_unix_find() (Justin Suess)
(resolving the previously open question about the LSM hook name)
Related discussions:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260112.Wufar9coosoo@digikod.net/
https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHC9VhSRiHwLEWfFkQdPEwgB4AXKbXzw_+3u=9hPpvUTnu02Bg@mail.gmail.com/
* Reunite the three UNIX resolving access rights back into one
(resolving the previously open question about the access right
structuring) Related discussion:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260112.Wufar9coosoo@digikod.net/)
* Sample tool: Add new UNIX lookup access rights to ACCESS_FILE
Changes in V2:
* Send Justin Suess's LSM hook patch together with the Landlock
implementation
* LSM hook: Pass type and flags parameters to the hook, to make the
access right more generally usable across LSMs, per suggestion from
Paul Moore (Implemented by Justin)
* Split the access right into the three types of UNIX domain sockets:
SOCK_STREAM, SOCK_DGRAM and SOCK_SEQPACKET.
* selftests: More exhaustive tests.
* Removed a minor commit from V1 which adds a missing close(fd) to a
test (it is already in the mic-next branch)
Günther Noack (10):
landlock: Use mem_is_zero() in is_layer_masks_allowed()
landlock: Control pathname UNIX domain socket resolution by path
samples/landlock: Add support for named UNIX domain socket
restrictions
landlock: Clarify BUILD_BUG_ON check in scoping logic
selftests/landlock: Replace access_fs_16 with ACCESS_ALL in fs_test
selftests/landlock: Test LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX
selftests/landlock: Audit test for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX
selftests/landlock: Check that coredump sockets stay unrestricted
selftests/landlock: fs_test: Simplify ruleset creation and enforcement
landlock: Document FS access right for pathname UNIX sockets
Justin Suess (1):
lsm: Add LSM hook security_unix_find
Documentation/security/landlock.rst | 40 +
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 14 +-
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 5 +
include/linux/security.h | 11 +
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 21 +
net/unix/af_unix.c | 10 +-
samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 12 +-
security/landlock/access.h | 2 +-
security/landlock/audit.c | 1 +
security/landlock/fs.c | 135 +-
security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +-
security/landlock/syscalls.c | 2 +-
security/landlock/task.c | 9 +-
security/security.c | 20 +
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 1345 ++++++++++--------
16 files changed, 1003 insertions(+), 628 deletions(-)
Range-diff against v6:
1: b2235eddb099 ! 1: dec515e7d7bf lsm: Add LSM hook security_unix_find
@@ Metadata
## Commit message ##
lsm: Add LSM hook security_unix_find
- Add a LSM hook security_unix_find.
+ Add an LSM hook security_unix_find.
- This hook is called to check the path of a named unix socket before a
+ This hook is called to check the path of a named UNIX socket before a
connection is initiated. The peer socket may be inspected as well.
Why existing hooks are unsuitable:
@@ Commit message
may be bound to a path in a different namespace than the caller,
resulting in a path that cannot be referenced at policy creation time.
+ Consumers of the hook wishing to reference @other are responsible
+ for acquiring the unix_state_lock and checking for the SOCK_DEAD flag
+ therein, ensuring the socket hasn't died since lookup.
+
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
+ Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
+ Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
## include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h ##
@@ include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h: LSM_HOOK(int, 0, post_notification, const struct cred *w_cred,
@@ net/unix/af_unix.c: static struct sock *unix_find_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunadd
+ if (sk->sk_type != type)
goto sock_put;
-+ /*
-+ * We call the hook because we know that the inode is a socket and we
-+ * hold a valid reference to it via the path.
-+ */
+ err = security_unix_find(&path, sk, flags);
+ if (err)
+ goto sock_put;
++
+ touch_atime(&path);
+
path_put(&path);
@@ security/security.c: int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock
+ * @flags: flags associated with the socket
+ *
+ * This hook is called to check permissions before connecting to a named
-+ * AF_UNIX socket.
++ * AF_UNIX socket. The caller does not hold any locks on @other.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
2: 0e25c15eea62 ! 2: aaa334660a52 landlock: use mem_is_zero() in is_layer_masks_allowed()
@@ Metadata
Author: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
## Commit message ##
- landlock: use mem_is_zero() in is_layer_masks_allowed()
+ landlock: Use mem_is_zero() in is_layer_masks_allowed()
This is equivalent, but expresses the intent a bit clearer.
3: e50515788eba ! 3: 4d455134c5d9 landlock: Control pathname UNIX domain socket resolution by path
@@ Commit message
landlock: Control pathname UNIX domain socket resolution by path
* Add a new access right LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, which
- controls the look up operations for named UNIX domain sockets. The
+ controls the lookup operations for named UNIX domain sockets. The
resolution happens during connect() and sendmsg() (depending on
socket type).
+ * Change access_mask_t from u16 to u32 (see below)
* Hook into the path lookup in unix_find_bsd() in af_unix.c, using a
LSM hook. Make policy decisions based on the new access rights
* Increment the Landlock ABI version.
- * Minor test adaptions to keep the tests working.
+ * Minor test adaptations to keep the tests working.
* Document the design rationale for scoped access rights,
and cross-reference it from the header documentation.
@@ Commit message
In case of a denial, connect() and sendmsg() return EACCES, which is
the same error as it is returned if the user does not have the write
- bit in the traditional Unix file system permissions of that file.
+ bit in the traditional UNIX file system permissions of that file.
+
+ The access_mask_t type grows from u16 to u32 to make space for the new
+ access right. This also doubles the size of struct layer_access_masks
+ from 32 byte to 64 byte.
Document the (possible future) interaction between scoped flags and
other access rights in struct landlock_ruleset_attr, and summarize the
@@ include/uapi/linux/landlock.h: struct landlock_net_port_attr {
+ * were created outside of the newly created Landlock domain (e.g. from within
+ * a parent domain or from an unrestricted process). Newly created UNIX
+ * servers within the same Landlock domain continue to be accessible. In this
-+ * regard, %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_RESOLVE_UNIX has the same semantics as the
++ * regard, %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX has the same semantics as the
+ * ``LANDLOCK_SCOPE_*`` flags.
+ *
+ * If a resolve attempt is denied, the operation returns an ``EACCES`` error,
+ * in line with other filesystem access rights (but different to denials for
+ * abstract UNIX domain sockets).
+ *
++ * This access right is available since the ninth version of the Landlock ABI.
++ *
+ * The rationale for this design is described in
+ * :ref:`Documentation/security/landlock.rst <scoped-flags-interaction>`.
*
@@ security/landlock/fs.c: static int hook_path_truncate(const struct path *const p
+ * This does the same as domain_is_scoped(), but unmasks bits in @masks.
+ * It can not return early as domain_is_scoped() does.
+ *
++ * A scoped access for a given access right bit is allowed iff, for all layer
++ * depths where the access bit is set, the client and server domain are the
++ * same. This function clears the access rights @access in @masks at all layer
++ * depths where the client and server domain are the same, so that, when they
++ * are all cleared, the access is allowed.
++ *
+ * @client: Client domain
+ * @server: Server domain
+ * @masks: Layer access masks to unmask
-+ * @access: Access bit that controls scoping
++ * @access: Access bits that control scoping
+ */
+static void unmask_scoped_access(const struct landlock_ruleset *const client,
+ const struct landlock_ruleset *const server,
@@ security/landlock/fs.c: static int hook_path_truncate(const struct path *const p
+ if (!server)
+ return;
+
++ /*
++ * client_layer must be a signed integer with greater capacity
++ * than client->num_layers to ensure the following loop stops.
++ */
++ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(client_layer) > sizeof(client->num_layers));
++
+ client_layer = client->num_layers - 1;
+ client_walker = client->hierarchy;
+ server_layer = server->num_layers - 1;
@@ security/landlock/fs.c: static int hook_path_truncate(const struct path *const p
+ if (unlikely(flags & SOCK_COREDUMP))
+ return 0;
+
-+ /* Access to the same (or a lower) domain is always allowed. */
+ subject = landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(),
+ fs_resolve_unix, NULL);
+
+ if (!subject)
+ return 0;
+
-+ if (!landlock_init_layer_masks(subject->domain, fs_resolve_unix.fs,
-+ &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE))
-+ return 0;
++ /*
++ * Ignoring return value: that the domains apply was already checked in
++ * landlock_get_applicable_subject() above.
++ */
++ landlock_init_layer_masks(subject->domain, fs_resolve_unix.fs,
++ &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
+
+ /* Checks the layers in which we are connecting within the same domain. */
+ unix_state_lock(other);
+ if (unlikely(sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD) || !other->sk_socket ||
+ !other->sk_socket->file)) {
+ unix_state_unlock(other);
++ /*
++ * We rely on the caller to catch the (non-reversible) SOCK_DEAD
++ * condition and retry the lookup. If we returned an error
++ * here, the lookup would not get retried.
++ */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ dom_other = landlock_cred(other->sk_socket->file->f_cred)->domain;
-+ unix_state_unlock(other);
+
++ /* Access to the same (or a lower) domain is always allowed. */
+ unmask_scoped_access(subject->domain, dom_other, &layer_masks,
+ fs_resolve_unix.fs);
++ unix_state_unlock(other);
+
+ /* Checks the connections to allow-listed paths. */
+ if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(subject->domain, path,
4: 8c1a813b9831 = 4: 70354dfcefcb samples/landlock: Add support for named UNIX domain socket restrictions
-: ------------ > 5: 00c90045f470 landlock: Clarify BUILD_BUG_ON check in scoping logic
9: 43c93c9af805 ! 6: b8e6477b2f9a landlock: Document FS access right for pathname UNIX sockets
@@ Metadata
Author: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
## Commit message ##
- landlock: Document FS access right for pathname UNIX sockets
+ selftests/landlock: Replace access_fs_16 with ACCESS_ALL in fs_test
- Cc: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
- Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ The access_fs_16 variable was originally intended to stay frozen at 16
+ access rights so that audit tests would not need updating when new
+ access rights are added. Now that we have 17 access rights, the name
+ is confusing.
+
+ Replace all uses of access_fs_16 with ACCESS_ALL and delete the
+ variable.
+
+ Suggested-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
- ## Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst ##
-@@ Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst: to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE |
-- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
-+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV |
-+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
- .handled_access_net =
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
-@@ Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst: version, and only use the available subset of access rights:
- /* Removes LANDLOCK_SCOPE_* for ABI < 6 */
- ruleset_attr.scoped &= ~(LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET |
- LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL);
-+ __attribute__((fallthrough));
-+ case 7:
-+ case 8:
-+ /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX for ABI < 9 */
-+ ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX;
- }
+ ## tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c ##
+@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, execute_make)
+ * only the blocked ones are logged.
+ */
- This enables the creation of an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules.
-@@ Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst: enforce Landlock rulesets across all threads of the calling process
- using the ``LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC`` flag passed to
- sys_landlock_restrict_self().
+-/* clang-format off */
+-static const __u64 access_fs_16 =
+- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE |
+- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE |
+- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR |
+- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR |
+- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE |
+- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR |
+- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR |
+- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG |
+- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK |
+- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO |
+- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK |
+- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM |
+- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER |
+- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE |
+- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+-/* clang-format on */
+-
+ TEST_F(audit_layout1, execute_read)
+ {
+ struct audit_records records;
+@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, execute_read)
+ test_check_exec(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
-+Pathname UNIX sockets (ABI < 9)
-+-------------------------------
-+
-+Starting with the Landlock ABI version 9, it is possible to restrict
-+connections to pathname UNIX domain sockets (:manpage:`unix(7)`) using
-+the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX`` right.
-+
- .. _kernel_support:
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
++ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+ });
+
+ /*
+@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, write_file)
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
++ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_WRONLY));
+@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, read_file)
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
++ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
+@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, read_dir)
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
++ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_DIRECTORY));
+@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, remove_dir)
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
++ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, rmdir(dir_s1d3));
+@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, remove_file)
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
++ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_char)
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
++ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFCHR | 0644, 0));
+@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_dir)
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
++ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mkdir(file1_s1d3, 0755));
+@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_reg)
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
++ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFREG | 0644, 0));
+@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_sock)
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
++ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFSOCK | 0644, 0));
+@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_fifo)
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
++ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFIFO | 0644, 0));
+@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_block)
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
++ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFBLK | 0644, 0));
+@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_sym)
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
++ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, symlink("target", file1_s1d3));
+@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_rename)
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
++ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_rename(file1_s1d2, file1_s2d3));
+@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_exchange)
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
++ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+ });
+
+ /*
+@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, truncate)
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
++ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, truncate(file1_s1d3, 0));
+@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, ioctl_dev)
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata,
+ &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs =
+- access_fs_16 &
++ ACCESS_ALL &
+ ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
+ });
- Kernel support
5: 7c360d3c293f ! 7: 66554c5b5b9c landlock/selftests: Test LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX
@@ Metadata
Author: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
## Commit message ##
- landlock/selftests: Test LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX
+ selftests/landlock: Test LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX
* Extract common helpers from an existing IOCTL test that
also uses pathname unix(7) sockets.
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F_FORK(ioctl, handle_file_acces
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+ } else {
-+ drop_access_rights(
-+ _metadata,
-+ &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-+ .handled_access_fs =
-+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
-+ });
++ struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
++ .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
++ };
++ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &attr);
+ }
+}
+
6: 6ea15ea91990 ! 8: fab3d3d71215 landlock/selftests: Audit test for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX
@@ Metadata
Author: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
## Commit message ##
- landlock/selftests: Audit test for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX
+ selftests/landlock: Audit test for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX
Add an audit test to check that Landlock denials from
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX result in audit logs in the expected
@@ Commit message
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
## tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c ##
-@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: static const __u64 access_fs_16 =
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER |
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE |
-- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
-+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV |
-+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX;
- /* clang-format on */
-
- TEST_F(audit_layout1, execute_read)
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, ioctl_dev)
EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
}
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, ioctl_dev)
+ if (!child_pid) {
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata,
+ &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
++ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+ });
+
+ cli_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
7: 0ada3dd8e1a1 ! 9: 4e8a07344278 landlock/selftests: Check that coredump sockets stay unrestricted
@@ Metadata
Author: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
## Commit message ##
- landlock/selftests: Check that coredump sockets stay unrestricted
+ selftests/landlock: Check that coredump sockets stay unrestricted
Even when a process is restricted with the new
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_SOCKET right, the kernel can continue
- writing its coredump to the configured coredump socket.
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX right, the kernel can continue writing
+ its coredump to the configured coredump socket.
In the test, we create a local server and rewire the system to write
coredumps into it. We then create a child process within a Landlock
- domain where LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_SOCKET is restricted and make
+ domain where LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX is restricted and make
the process crash. The test uses SO_PEERCRED to check that the
connecting client process is the expected one.
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_seqpacke
+ set_core_pattern(_metadata, core_pattern);
+
+ /* Restrict LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX. */
-+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-+ .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
-+ });
++ drop_access_rights(_metadata,
++ &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
++ .handled_access_fs =
++ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
++ });
+
+ /* Fork a child that crashes. */
+ child_pid = fork();
8: e9f591ec527f ! 10: fcaef2882dbd landlock/selftests: fs_test: Simplify ruleset creation and enforcement
@@ Metadata
Author: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
## Commit message ##
- landlock/selftests: fs_test: Simplify ruleset creation and enforcement
+ selftests/landlock: fs_test: Simplify ruleset creation and enforcement
* Add enforce_fs() for defining and enforcing a ruleset in one step
* In some places, dropped "ASSERT_LE(0, fd)" checks after
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(scoped_domains)
- enforce_ruleset(_metadata, fd);
- EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
- } else {
-- drop_access_rights(
-- _metadata,
-- &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-- .handled_access_fs =
-- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
-- });
+- struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
+- .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+- };
+- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &attr);
- }
-}
-
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F_FORK(coredump, socket_not_res
set_core_pattern(_metadata, core_pattern);
/* Restrict LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX. */
-- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-- .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
-- });
+- drop_access_rights(_metadata,
+- &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+- .handled_access_fs =
+- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+- });
+ enforce_fs(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, NULL);
/* Fork a child that crashes. */
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, execute_read)
test_check_exec(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
-+ enforce_fs(_metadata, access_fs_16, NULL);
++ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
/*
* The only difference with the previous audit_layout1.execute_read test is
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, write_file)
struct audit_records records;
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
-+ enforce_fs(_metadata, access_fs_16, NULL);
++ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_WRONLY));
EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, read_file)
struct audit_records records;
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
-+ enforce_fs(_metadata, access_fs_16, NULL);
++ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.read_file",
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, read_dir)
struct audit_records records;
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
-+ enforce_fs(_metadata, access_fs_16, NULL);
++ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_DIRECTORY));
EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.read_dir",
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, remove_dir)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
-+ enforce_fs(_metadata, access_fs_16, NULL);
++ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, rmdir(dir_s1d3));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, remove_file)
struct audit_records records;
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
-+ enforce_fs(_metadata, access_fs_16, NULL);
++ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, unlink(file1_s1d3));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_char)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
-+ enforce_fs(_metadata, access_fs_16, NULL);
++ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFCHR | 0644, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_dir)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
-+ enforce_fs(_metadata, access_fs_16, NULL);
++ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, mkdir(file1_s1d3, 0755));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_reg)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
-+ enforce_fs(_metadata, access_fs_16, NULL);
++ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFREG | 0644, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_sock)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
-+ enforce_fs(_metadata, access_fs_16, NULL);
++ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFSOCK | 0644, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_fifo)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
-+ enforce_fs(_metadata, access_fs_16, NULL);
++ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFIFO | 0644, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_block)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
-+ enforce_fs(_metadata, access_fs_16, NULL);
++ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFBLK | 0644, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_sym)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
-+ enforce_fs(_metadata, access_fs_16, NULL);
++ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, symlink("target", file1_s1d3));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_rename)
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
-+ enforce_fs(_metadata, access_fs_16, NULL);
++ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_rename(file1_s1d2, file1_s2d3));
EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_exchange
EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
-+ enforce_fs(_metadata, access_fs_16, NULL);
++ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
/*
* The only difference with the previous audit_layout1.refer_rename test is
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, truncate)
struct audit_records records;
- drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
-+ enforce_fs(_metadata, access_fs_16, NULL);
++ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(-1, truncate(file1_s1d3, 0));
EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, ioctl_dev)
- drop_access_rights(_metadata,
- &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
- .handled_access_fs =
-- access_fs_16 &
+- ACCESS_ALL &
- ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
- });
-+ enforce_fs(_metadata, access_fs_16 & ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
-+ NULL);
++ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL & ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, NULL);
fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
@@ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c: TEST_F(audit_layout1, resolve_unix)
if (!child_pid) {
- drop_access_rights(_metadata,
- &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
-- .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+- .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
- });
-+ enforce_fs(_metadata, access_fs_16, NULL);
++ enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL);
cli_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
ASSERT_LE(0, cli_fd);
-: ------------ > 11: 362a0e8f84a0 landlock: Document FS access right for pathname UNIX sockets
--
2.53.0
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