From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/5] userns: record how far up CAP_SETFCAP reaches
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2026 20:54:48 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-171912@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261014-b4-setfcap-userns-v2-1-fac4d19281d7@toxicpanda.com>
> create_user_ns() records in ns->parent_could_setfcap whether the creator
> had CAP_SETFCAP in its effective set, and verify_root_map() trusts that
> when a task in the new namespace maps the parent's uid 0. A bool only
> describes the parent, though. File capabilities belong to the kuid of a
> root user, and a namespace that maps the parent's uid 0 shares that kuid
> with the parent and possibly with ancestors further up, so what matters
> is how far up the creator's CAP_SETFCAP counted.
>
> Replace the bool with ns->setfcap_level: CAP_SETFCAP held in the
> namespace counts there and in its ancestors up to the one at that
> ->level. cap_setfcap_level() computes it from the creator's cred. A
> creator that holds CAP_SETFCAP passes on the setfcap_level of its own
> namespace, one that doesn't gets the new namespace's own level, and the
> initial namespace has 0.
>
> verify_root_map() keeps checking the same condition: the bool was false
> exactly when the level is the namespace's own.
>
> No functional change.
>
> Assisted-by: LLM
> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. It looks great!
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261014-b4-setfcap-userns-v2-0-fac4d19281d7@toxicpanda.com?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-14 20:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-14 20:47 [PATCH v2 0/5] capabilities: close the ways around the CAP_SETFCAP rule for uid 0 Josef Bacik
2026-10-14 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] userns: record how far up CAP_SETFCAP reaches Josef Bacik
2026-10-14 20:54 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-10-14 20:55 ` Bradley Morgan
2026-10-14 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] userns: don't let setns() lend CAP_SETFCAP Josef Bacik
2026-10-14 20:54 ` Bradley Morgan
2026-10-14 20:58 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-14 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] userns: check the opener and the writer before mapping uid 0 Josef Bacik
2026-10-14 20:57 ` Bradley Morgan
2026-10-14 20:58 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-14 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] capabilities: limit fscaps to where CAP_SETFCAP reaches Josef Bacik
2026-10-14 20:56 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-14 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] capabilities: don't let ptrace borrow CAP_SETFCAP Josef Bacik
2026-10-14 20:55 ` sashiko-bot
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