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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/5] userns: record how far up CAP_SETFCAP reaches
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 20:44:18 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-180646@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261021-b4-setfcap-userns-v3-1-97c7ed4e43e1@toxicpanda.com>

> create_user_ns() records in ns->parent_could_setfcap whether the creator
> had CAP_SETFCAP in its effective set, and verify_root_map() trusts that
> when a task in the new namespace maps the parent's uid 0.  A bool only
> describes the parent, though.  File capabilities belong to the kuid of a
> root user, and a namespace that maps the parent's uid 0 shares that kuid
> with the parent and possibly with ancestors further up, so what matters
> is how far up the creator's CAP_SETFCAP counted.
> 
> Replace the bool with ns->setfcap_level: CAP_SETFCAP held in the
> namespace counts there and in its ancestors up to the one at that
> ->level.  cap_setfcap_level() computes it from the creator's cred.  A
> creator that holds CAP_SETFCAP passes on the setfcap_level of its own
> namespace, one that doesn't gets the new namespace's own level, and the
> initial namespace has 0.
> 
> verify_root_map() keeps checking the same condition: the bool was false
> exactly when the level is the namespace's own.
> 
> No functional change.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Bradley Morgan <brads@mainlining.org>
> Assisted-by: LLM
> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261021-b4-setfcap-userns-v3-0-97c7ed4e43e1@toxicpanda.com?part=1


  reply	other threads:[~2026-10-21 20:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-21 20:37 [PATCH v3 0/5] capabilities: close the ways around the CAP_SETFCAP rule for uid 0 Josef Bacik
2026-10-21 20:37 ` [PATCH v3 1/5] userns: record how far up CAP_SETFCAP reaches Josef Bacik
2026-10-21 20:44   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-10-21 20:37 ` [PATCH v3 2/5] userns: don't let setns() lend CAP_SETFCAP Josef Bacik
2026-10-21 20:48   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 20:37 ` [PATCH v3 3/5] userns: check the opener and the writer before mapping uid 0 Josef Bacik
2026-10-21 20:57   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 20:37 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] capabilities: limit fscaps to where CAP_SETFCAP reaches Josef Bacik
2026-10-21 21:07   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 20:37 ` [PATCH v3 5/5] capabilities: don't let ptrace borrow CAP_SETFCAP Josef Bacik
2026-10-21 20:55   ` sashiko-bot

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