From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jan Koester" <jan.koester@tuxist.de>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>, "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, audit@vger.kernel.org,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, "Chuck Lever" <cel@kernel.org>,
"Jeff Layton" <jlayton@kernel.org>,
"Anna Schumaker" <anna@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 34/41] ext4: store ACLs with UUID and GUID entries on uid_r filesystems
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2026 03:18:02 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-180935@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <98758113db07083faeb158948b6b3362c2795231.1792552161.git.jan.koester@tuxist.de>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] ext4: under-reserved journal credits in ext4_set_acl() and new inode ACLs
- [Medium] ext4: missing uid_r check in ext4_get_acl() and ext4_acl_to_disk()
--
commit 9cf145428ff7d92b62a997fd08d61060d4a516a9
Author: Jan Koester <jan.koester@tuxist.de>
ext4: store ACLs with UUID and GUID entries on uid_r filesystems
This commit adds the EXT4_ACL_VERSION_R on-disk format so ext4 can store
POSIX ACLs containing 16-byte UUID or GUID user and group entries on uid_r
filesystems. ACLs without UUID or GUID entries continue to use the legacy
EXT4_ACL_VERSION format.
> diff --git a/fs/ext4/acl.c b/fs/ext4/acl.c
> index 3bffe862f9549..27f8a1b503704 100644
> --- a/fs/ext4/acl.c
> +++ b/fs/ext4/acl.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -14,22 +15,41 @@
> /*
> * Convert from filesystem to in-memory representation.
> */
> +/* The id of an ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP entry of EXT4_ACL_VERSION_R */
> +static int ext4_acl_id_from_disk(const ext4_acl_entry_r *entry, u32 *type,
> + u32 *legacy, uuid_t *id)
> +{
> + *type = le32_to_cpu(entry->e_type);
> + if (*type > EXT4_ID_R_GUID)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + *legacy = get_unaligned_le32(entry->e_id);
> + memcpy(id->b, entry->e_id, sizeof(id->b));
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static struct posix_acl *
> ext4_acl_from_disk(const void *value, size_t size)
> {
> const char *end = (char *)value + size;
> int n, count;
> struct posix_acl *acl;
> + size_t entry_size = sizeof(ext4_acl_entry);
> + bool r = false;
>
> if (!value)
> return NULL;
> if (size < sizeof(ext4_acl_header))
> return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> - if (((ext4_acl_header *)value)->a_version !=
> - cpu_to_le32(EXT4_ACL_VERSION))
> + if (((ext4_acl_header *)value)->a_version ==
> + cpu_to_le32(EXT4_ACL_VERSION_R)) {
> + r = true;
> + entry_size = sizeof(ext4_acl_entry_r);
> + } else if (((ext4_acl_header *)value)->a_version !=
> + cpu_to_le32(EXT4_ACL_VERSION)) {
> return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> + }
[Severity: Medium]
Should ext4_get_acl() -> ext4_acl_from_disk() and ext4_acl_to_disk() verify
that uid_r is enabled on the filesystem before accepting or writing
EXT4_ACL_VERSION_R entries?
In fs/ext4/inode.c, both ext4_inode_get_id_r() and ext4_inode_set_id_r()
check ext4_has_feature_uid_r(inode->i_sb), whereas ext4_get_acl() in
fs/ext4/acl.c calls ext4_acl_from_disk() without checking
ext4_has_feature_uid_r(inode->i_sb) or SB_I_UID_R:
fs/ext4/acl.c:ext4_get_acl() {
...
if (retval > 0)
acl = ext4_acl_from_disk(value, retval);
...
}
In addition, the comment above ext4_acl_to_disk() notes that set_posix_acl()
rejects non-legacy IDs when SB_I_UID_R is not set, but two write paths in
fs/ext4/acl.c bypass set_posix_acl():
1. chmod() calls posix_acl_chmod() -> ext4_set_acl() -> __ext4_set_acl() ->
ext4_acl_to_disk().
2. New inode creation calls __ext4_new_inode() -> ext4_init_acl() ->
posix_acl_create() -> __ext4_set_acl() -> ext4_acl_to_disk():
fs/ext4/acl.c:ext4_init_acl() {
...
if (default_acl) {
error = __ext4_set_acl(handle, inode, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT,
default_acl, XATTR_CREATE);
posix_acl_release(default_acl);
}
...
}
If a filesystem without EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_UID_R (or a uid_r filesystem
mounted with -o nouid32, where __ext4_fill_super() leaves SB_I_UID_R unset)
has an existing EXT4_ACL_VERSION_R xattr on disk, wouldn't ext4_get_acl()
load those non-legacy entries and allow chmod() or file creation to write
new EXT4_ACL_VERSION_R xattrs onto the filesystem?
[ ... ]
> @@ -87,19 +119,38 @@ ext4_acl_from_disk(const void *value, size_t size)
> /*
> * Convert from in-memory to filesystem representation.
> */
> +/* An ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP id into an entry of EXT4_ACL_VERSION_R */
> +static void ext4_acl_id_to_disk(ext4_acl_entry_r *entry, u32 type, u32 legacy,
> + const uuid_t *id)
> +{
> + entry->e_type = cpu_to_le32(type);
> + memset(entry->e_id, 0, sizeof(entry->e_id));
> + if (type == EXT4_ID_R_LEGACY)
> + put_unaligned_le32(legacy, entry->e_id);
> + else
> + memcpy(entry->e_id, id->b, sizeof(entry->e_id));
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * ACLs with UUID or GUID entries (only on uid_r filesystems, see
> + * set_posix_acl()) are written as EXT4_ACL_VERSION_R, others as before.
> + */
> static void *
> ext4_acl_to_disk(const struct posix_acl *acl, size_t *size)
> {
> ext4_acl_header *ext_acl;
> char *e;
> size_t n;
> + bool r = posix_acl_has_id_r(acl);
> + size_t entry_size = r ? sizeof(ext4_acl_entry_r) : sizeof(ext4_acl_entry);
>
> - *size = ext4_acl_size(acl->a_count);
> + *size = ext4_acl_size_e(acl->a_count, entry_size);
[ ... ]
> diff --git a/fs/ext4/acl.h b/fs/ext4/acl.h
> index 0c5a79c3b5d48..48bc352ec77fe 100644
> --- a/fs/ext4/acl.h
> +++ b/fs/ext4/acl.h
[ ... ]
> @@ -46,12 +60,22 @@ static inline int ext4_acl_count(size_t size)
> return -1;
> return size / sizeof(ext4_acl_entry_short);
> } else {
> - if (s % sizeof(ext4_acl_entry))
> + if (s % entry)
> return -1;
> - return s / sizeof(ext4_acl_entry) + 4;
> + return s / entry + 4;
> }
> }
>
> +static inline size_t ext4_acl_size(int count)
> +{
> + return ext4_acl_size_e(count, sizeof(ext4_acl_entry));
> +}
[Severity: High]
Can leaving ext4_acl_size() hardcoded to sizeof(ext4_acl_entry) cause
journal credit under-reservation in ext4_set_acl() and
ext4_xattr_credits_for_new_inode()?
When posix_acl_has_id_r(acl) is true, ext4_acl_to_disk() in fs/ext4/acl.c
serializes ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP entries using sizeof(ext4_acl_entry_r)
(24 bytes) and sets *size to ext4_acl_size_e(acl->a_count,
sizeof(ext4_acl_entry_r)).
However, ext4_set_acl() in fs/ext4/acl.c still computes acl_size using
ext4_acl_size(acl->a_count), which assumes 8-byte ext4_acl_entry elements:
fs/ext4/acl.c:ext4_set_acl() {
...
size_t acl_size = acl ? ext4_acl_size(acl->a_count) : 0;
...
retry:
error = ext4_xattr_set_credits(inode, acl_size, false /* is_create */,
&credits);
}
Similarly, when a new inode inherits a default ACL in __ext4_new_inode() ->
ext4_init_acl(), ext4_xattr_credits_for_new_inode() in fs/ext4/ialloc.c
computes acl_size using sizeof(ext4_acl_entry):
fs/ext4/ialloc.c:ext4_xattr_credits_for_new_inode() {
...
if (p) {
int acl_size = p->a_count * sizeof(ext4_acl_entry);
nblocks += (S_ISDIR(mode) ? 2 : 1) *
__ext4_xattr_set_credits(sb, NULL /* inode */,
NULL /* block_bh */, acl_size,
true /* is_create */);
posix_acl_release(p);
}
}
When the ea_inode feature is enabled on the filesystem,
__ext4_xattr_set_credits() in fs/ext4/xattr.c scales the credit count with
the number of blocks spanned by value_len:
fs/ext4/xattr.c:__ext4_xattr_set_credits() {
...
blocks = (value_len + sb->s_blocksize - 1) >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
blocks += 1;
credits += blocks * 2;
credits += blocks;
...
}
Later, __ext4_set_acl() -> ext4_xattr_set_handle() recomputes the required
credits from the actual serialized value_len and checks that the running
handle has enough buffer credits:
fs/ext4/xattr.c:ext4_xattr_set_handle() {
...
credits = __ext4_xattr_set_credits(inode->i_sb, inode, bh,
value_len,
flags & XATTR_CREATE);
brelse(bh);
if (jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) < credits) {
error = -ENOSPC;
goto cleanup;
}
}
If an EXT4_ACL_VERSION_R ACL is large enough that its 24-byte entries cross
a block boundary not crossed by the 8-byte estimate, won't
ext4_xattr_set_handle() fail this check and return a spurious -ENOSPC (or
leave __ext4_new_inode() short of journal credits for subsequent operations
on the same handle)?
[ ... ]
>
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/cover.1792552161.git.jan.koester@tuxist.de?part=34
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-22 3:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-21 3:15 [RFC PATCH v2 00/41] UUID and GUID user and group ids (*_r system calls) Jan Koester
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/41] uuid: move uuid_t and guid_t into <linux/uuid_types.h> Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/41] uapi: add <linux/uidgid_r.h> for 128 bit capable user and group ids Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/41] uidgid: add uid_is_legacy() and gid_is_legacy() Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/41] net: sock: read sk_uid through a seqcount Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/41] af_unix: keep sender ids in skb->cb only when they are classic ids Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/41] netlink: keep classic sender ids in skb->cb Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/41] Bluetooth: " Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/41] smb: client: use __kuid_val() for the unix SIDs of the caller Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/41] uidgid: let kuid_t and kgid_t hold a UUID or a GUID Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/41] uidgid: convert between kernel ids and the ids of the *_r system calls Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/41] fscrypt: show the whole uid in the description of user key claims Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/41] keys: name per-user keyrings of UUID and GUID users by the whole uid Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/41] ublk: refuse unprivileged devices to UUID and GUID users Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/41] nfsd: don't hand out uid 0 for read layouts of UUID-owned files Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/41] SUNRPC: name UUID and GUID users to gssd as uid_r= Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/41] ecryptfs: hash daemons by kuid_hash() Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/41] quota: don't account UUID and GUID owners Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/41] fs: keep UUID and GUID owners off filesystems that can't store them Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/41] cred: add the *_r variants of the get/set*id() system calls Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/41] groups: add getgroups_r() and setgroups_r() Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 21/41] fs: add chown_r(), lchown_r(), fchown_r() and fchownat_r() Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 22/41] arch: wire up the *_r uid and gid system calls Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 23/41] statx: report UUID and GUID owners Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 24/41] shmem, ramfs: allow " Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 25/41] uidgid: parse and print ids in their text form Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 26/41] proc: show UUID and GUID ids in status, accept them for loginuid Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 27/41] audit: log UUID and GUID ids in full Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 28/41] net: add SO_PEERCRED_R, SO_PEERGROUPS_R and SCM_CREDENTIALS_R Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 29/41] signal: report the sender's UUID or GUID uid in si_uid_r Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 30/41] ipc: add IPC_STAT_R and IPC_SET_R Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 31/41] ext4: add the uid_r feature for UUID and GUID owners Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 32/41] ext4: let uid_r be turned on while the filesystem is mounted Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 33/41] posix_acl: support UUID and GUID entries Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:18 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 34/41] ext4: store ACLs with UUID and GUID entries on uid_r filesystems Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:18 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 35/41] Documentation: describe UUID and GUID user and group ids Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:18 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 36/41] selftests: add tests for UUID and GUID ids Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:18 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 37/41] ovl: allow UUID and GUID owners when the upper layer does Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:18 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 38/41] devpts: allow UUID and GUID owners Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:18 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 39/41] ksmbd: log in UUID and GUID users and map them to SIDs Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:18 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 40/41] nfsd, nfs: carry UUID and GUID owners as their text form Jan Koester
2026-10-21 17:35 ` Chuck Lever
2026-10-22 2:52 ` Takeshi Nishimura
2026-10-22 3:18 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 41/41] Documentation: uid_r: describe SMB and NFSv4 Jan Koester
2026-10-22 3:18 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-21 3:20 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/41] UUID and GUID user and group ids (*_r system calls) jan Koester
2026-10-21 14:26 ` Adding dreaded Windows SID-style, or. Repeating history, the bad chapters. UUID/GUIDRe: " Lionel Cons
2026-10-22 17:00 ` Casey Schaufler
2026-10-22 18:26 ` Theodore Tso
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