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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Chris Down" <chris@chrisdown.name>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
	"Lorenzo Stoakes" <ljs@kernel.org>
Cc: "Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@kernel.org>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
	"Pedro Falcato" <pfalcato@suse.de>,
	"David Hildenbrand" <david@kernel.org>,
	"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@chromium.org>,
	"Andrey Vagin" <avagin@gmail.com>,
	"Alexander Mikhalitsyn" <alexander@mihalicyn.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-team@meta.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] selftests/mseal_system_mappings: Test vdso unmap and remap
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 11:43:35 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-187839@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <621847973ba2ec49d0a58e0261da35a9f3a97eda.1793094611.git.chris@chrisdown.name>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] selftests/mseal: SIGSEGV in vdso_munmap() and vdso_mremap() on 32-bit x86
--

commit c39ca555b3d21581707989b9c4e4f219f86ffc25
Author: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>

selftests/mseal_system_mappings: Test vdso unmap and remap

This patch adds vdso_munmap and vdso_mremap tests to
tools/testing/selftests/mseal_system_mappings/sysmap_is_sealed.c to verify
that unmapping or moving [vdso] fails with EPERM when sealed and succeeds
when unsealed.

> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mseal_system_mappings/sysmap_is_sealed.c b/tools/testing/selftests/mseal_system_mappings/sysmap_is_sealed.c
> index ea75ad537620b..83b4fadfbfe79 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/mseal_system_mappings/sysmap_is_sealed.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mseal_system_mappings/sysmap_is_sealed.c

[ ... ]

> @@ -232,4 +233,95 @@ TEST_F(basic, check_sealed)
>  	EXPECT_EQ(expected, sealed);
>  };
>  
> +static bool find_vdso(unsigned long *start, unsigned long *end)
> +{
> +	char line[MAX_LINE_LEN];
> +	bool found = false;
> +	FILE *maps;
> +
> +	maps = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r");
> +	if (!maps)
> +		return false;
> +
> +	while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), maps)) {
> +		if (strstr(line, "[vdso]") &&
> +		    sscanf(line, "%lx-%lx", start, end) == 2) {
> +			found = true;
> +			break;
> +		}
> +	}
> +
> +	fclose(maps);
> +	return found;
> +}
> +
> +static int vdso_is_sealed(void)
> +{
> +	int sealed = -1;
> +	FILE *maps;
> +
> +	maps = fopen("/proc/self/smaps", "r");
> +	if (!maps)
> +		return -1;
> +	if (has_mapping("[vdso]", maps))
> +		sealed = mapping_is_sealed(maps);
> +	fclose(maps);
> +	return sealed;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Unmapping or moving [vdso] must fail with EPERM when it is sealed. When it
> + * is not sealed, it succeeds and leaves glibc with a stale vdso pointer, which
> + * is fine because each test runs in its own forked child.
> + */
> +TEST(vdso_munmap)
> +{
> +	int sealed;
> +	unsigned long start, end;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	if (!find_vdso(&start, &end))
> +		SKIP(return, "could not find the mapping, [vdso]");
> +	sealed = vdso_is_sealed();
> +	if (sealed < 0)
> +		SKIP(return, "could not read the [vdso] sealing state");
> +
> +	ret = munmap((void *)start, end - start);
> +	if (sealed) {
> +		EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
> +		EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
> +	} else {
> +		EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
> +	}
> +	EXPECT_EQ(sealed, find_vdso(&start, &end));
> +}
> +
> +TEST(vdso_mremap)
> +{
> +	int sealed;
> +	unsigned long start, end, size, new_start;
> +	void *dst, *ret;
> +
> +	if (!find_vdso(&start, &end))
> +		SKIP(return, "could not find the mapping, [vdso]");
> +	sealed = vdso_is_sealed();
> +	if (sealed < 0)
> +		SKIP(return, "could not read the [vdso] sealing state");
> +	size = end - start;
> +
> +	dst = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
> +	ASSERT_NE(MAP_FAILED, dst);
> +
> +	ret = mremap((void *)start, size, size, MREMAP_MAYMOVE | MREMAP_FIXED,
> +		     dst);
> +	if (sealed) {
> +		EXPECT_EQ(MAP_FAILED, ret);
> +		EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
> +	} else {
> +		EXPECT_EQ(dst, ret);
> +	}
> +	ASSERT_TRUE(find_vdso(&new_start, &end));
> +	EXPECT_EQ(sealed ? start : (unsigned long)dst, new_start);
> +}

[Severity: Medium]
When sealed == 0 on 32-bit x86 (__i386__), will vdso_munmap and vdso_mremap
in tools/testing/selftests/mseal_system_mappings/sysmap_is_sealed.c crash
with SIGSEGV and cause the test harness to report a failure?

On 32-bit x86, the kernel passes AT_SYSINFO in the ELF auxiliary vector
pointing to __kernel_vsyscall inside [vdso], and glibc caches this pointer
in %gs:0x10 and routes all system calls through it.

Neither vdso_munmap nor vdso_mremap skips on 32-bit builds or when
CONFIG_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS is disabled (which depends on 64BIT, or may be
disabled via CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE=y or mseal_system_mappings=0).

In vdso_munmap, when sealed == 0, calling munmap() via glibc enters the
kernel through __kernel_vsyscall inside [vdso] with the userspace return
address pointing to the landing pad in [vdso]. Once [vdso] is unmapped,
returning to userspace or calling find_vdso() and _exit() in the child jumps
to the unmapped [vdso] range and faults with SIGSEGV.

Similarly, in vdso_mremap, when sealed == 0, arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
updates the return instruction pointer for the mremap() syscall itself via
vdso_fix_landing(), but glibc's cached %gs:0x10 pointer still points to the
old unmapped start address. The subsequent find_vdso() call (which invokes
fopen(), fgets(), and fclose()) and _exit() in the test harness jump through
the stale pointer into the unmapped address and fault with SIGSEGV, as noted
in tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_mremap_vdso.c:main():

#ifdef __i386__
		/* Glibc is likely to explode now - exit with raw syscall */
		asm volatile ("int $0x80" : : "a" (__NR_exit), "b" (!!ret));
#else /* __x86_64__ */
		syscall(SYS_exit, ret);
#endif

Should vdso_munmap and vdso_mremap be skipped on 32-bit x86 or when
[vdso] is unsealed on __i386__?

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/cover.1793094611.git.chris@chrisdown.name?part=3

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-10-28 11:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-27 11:42 [PATCH 0/3] mseal sysmap: Choose system mapping sealing at boot Chris Down
2026-10-27 11:43 ` [PATCH 1/3] mseal sysmap: Add mseal_system_mappings= boot parameter Chris Down
2026-10-27 14:53   ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-27 16:37     ` Chris Down
2026-10-27 16:57       ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-28  4:30         ` Jeff Xu
2026-10-28  5:52           ` Chris Down
2026-10-28  5:55             ` Chris Down
2026-10-28  6:16               ` Jeff Xu
2026-10-28  9:49             ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-28 11:43   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-28 12:18   ` Pedro Falcato
2026-10-27 11:43 ` [PATCH 2/3] mseal sysmap: Allow with CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, default off Chris Down
2026-10-27 14:57   ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-27 16:37     ` Chris Down
2026-10-27 16:59       ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-28 11:43   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 11:43 ` [PATCH 3/3] selftests/mseal_system_mappings: Test vdso unmap and remap Chris Down
2026-10-27 15:03   ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-27 16:40     ` Chris Down
2026-10-27 17:02       ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-28 11:43   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-10-28 15:34 ` [PATCH 0/3] mseal sysmap: Choose system mapping sealing at boot Andrei Vagin

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