From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/6] docs: security: Describe the Kernel Assurance Plane design
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 13:44:34 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-187940@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261028133335.75899-2-ketan@armoriq.io>
> Describe the Kernel Assurance Plane (KAP) design.
>
> Agents and other long-running tasks act on behalf of an objective that a
> user approved. Linux decides whether a task may perform an operation,
> but not whether the operation still belongs to that objective. Seccomp,
> LSM profiles, namespaces and cgroups cannot hold several objectives apart
> inside one environment, or revoke one objective's authority while its
> task runs.
>
> KAP introduces objective-scoped authority as a kernel subsystem. The
> document covers Intent Lineage Groups, the authority model and the
> control plane under /sys/kernel/security/kap, where igroups are created
> with mkdir as cgroups are. For each design decision it lists the
> alternatives considered, and it ends with the questions on which
> maintainer feedback is wanted.
>
> Assisted-by: Claude
> Co-developed-by: HARIHARA SUDHAN. R <harisudhan@armoriq.io>
> Signed-off-by: HARIHARA SUDHAN. R <harisudhan@armoriq.io>
> Assisted-by: Codex
> Signed-off-by: Ketan Bhardwaj <ketan@armoriq.io>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261028133335.75899-1-ketan@armoriq.io?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-28 13:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-28 13:33 [RFC PATCH v2 0/6] security: introduce Kernel Assurance Plane Ketan Bhardwaj
2026-10-28 13:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/6] docs: security: Describe the Kernel Assurance Plane design Ketan Bhardwaj
2026-10-28 13:44 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-10-28 15:17 ` Günther Noack
[not found] ` <CAKS=Y5WqExXSEu3PPbFY5J0GDaYJyjxqQc8HYUKAnQ6fpEfAsQ@mail.gmail.com>
2026-10-28 16:36 ` Ketan Bhardwaj
2026-10-28 13:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/6] security: kap: add the LSM ID and internal headers Ketan Bhardwaj
2026-10-28 13:42 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-28 13:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/6] security: add the Kernel Assurance Plane LSM Ketan Bhardwaj
2026-10-28 13:57 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-28 13:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 4/6] security: kap: add the securityfs control plane Ketan Bhardwaj
2026-10-28 13:57 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-28 13:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 5/6] kernel: add KAP checks for unshare and setns Ketan Bhardwaj
2026-10-28 13:40 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-28 13:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 6/6] MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the Kernel Assurance Plane Ketan Bhardwaj
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