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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/7] bpf: don't mark namespace_init and namespace_free arguments as trusted
Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2026 16:47:09 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-189675@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261029-work-security-namespace_free-v2-2-65591dbba7b3@kernel.org>

> The bpf LSM marks the arguments of all hooks as trusted unless the hook
> is listed in untrusted_lsm_hooks. That list was added in commit
> c0c852dd1876 ("bpf: Do not mark certain LSM hook arguments as trusted")
> for hooks that are called on objects that are only partially set up or
> that are already on their way out. The namespace_init and namespace_free
> hooks are exactly that but they aren't listed.
> 
> namespace_init is called from __ns_common_init() before the namespace
> has been set up. It isn't in the namespace trees yet and for all types
> but network namespaces even the owning user namespace isn't set yet. If
> any LSM rejects the namespace or if anything after ns_common_init()
> fails the namespace is freed right away without looking at its reference
> count.
> 
> namespace_free is called from __ns_common_free() when the namespace is
> torn down or when its initialization failed.
> 
> Currently there's no kfunc that takes a namespace. But once there is
> one, e.g., for namespace local storage, a program could take a reference
> to or create storage on a namespace that is about to be freed. So don't
> mark the arguments of these hooks as trusted. namespace_install is
> called with a reference to a fully set up namespace and stays trusted.
> 
> Fixes: f675d2e95569 ("lsm: add LSM blob and hooks for namespaces")
> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # mainline only
> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
> Tested-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261029-work-security-namespace_free-v2-0-65591dbba7b3@kernel.org?part=2


  reply	other threads:[~2026-10-29 16:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-29 16:40 [PATCH v2 0/7] ns: fixes for the namespace LSM hooks Christian Brauner
2026-10-29 16:40 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] lsm: always call the namespace_free hook Christian Brauner
2026-10-29 16:48   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-29 16:40 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] bpf: don't mark namespace_init and namespace_free arguments as trusted Christian Brauner
2026-10-29 16:47   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-10-29 16:40 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] selftests/bpf: add verifier tests for the namespace LSM hooks Christian Brauner
2026-10-29 16:46   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-29 16:40 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] ns: allocate the namespace id before the namespace_init hook Christian Brauner
2026-10-29 16:51   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-29 22:13   ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-10-29 16:41 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] nstree: drop ns_tree_add_raw() Christian Brauner
2026-10-29 16:49   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-29 16:41 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] lsm: fix the security_namespace_init() kernel-doc Christian Brauner
2026-10-29 16:50   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-29 16:41 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] selftests/bpf: add a lifecycle test for the namespace LSM hooks Christian Brauner
2026-10-29 16:55   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-29 21:06 ` [PATCH v2 0/7] ns: fixes " Paul Moore

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