From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "HARIHARA SUDHAN. R" <harisudhan@armoriq.io>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>, "Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: "Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
"Liam R . Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
"Lorenzo Stoakes" <ljs@kernel.org>,
"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@kernel.org>,
"David Hildenbrand" <david@kernel.org>,
"Mike Rapoport" <rppt@kernel.org>,
"Michal Hocko" <mhocko@suse.com>, "Mel Gorman" <mgorman@suse.de>,
"Suren Baghdasaryan" <surenb@google.com>,
"Ben Segall" <bsegall@google.com>,
"Dietmar Eggemann" <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
"Juri Lelli" <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
"K Prateek Nayak" <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
"Valentin Schneider" <vschneid@redhat.com>,
"Vincent Guittot" <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Ketan Bhardwaj" <ketan@armoriq.io>,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/6] docs: security: Describe the Kernel Assurance Plane design
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 20:33:30 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-207712@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261110202246.274-2-harisudhan@armoriq.io>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential
issue to consider:
- [Low] docs: security: kap: contradictory epoch semantics for bound
tasks
--
commit 77da64268c0c9921ecf4f2c4a0222c86b4687cb2
Author: HARIHARA SUDHAN. R <harisudhan@armoriq.io>
docs: security: Describe the Kernel Assurance Plane design
This commit adds security documentation and securityfs ABI documentation
describing the Kernel Assurance Plane (KAP) design, Intent Lineage Groups,
and control plane files.
> diff --git a/Documentation/security/kap.rst b/Documentation/security/kap.rst
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000000..e002a081c6607
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/security/kap.rst
[ ... ]
> +O1 finishes its first stage. The controller advances O1 to a new authority
> +generation that is narrower: no package cache, no network. It writes the new
> +authority and a higher epoch to O1's igroup. O2's igroup is untouched.
> +
> +From its next check, an already running O1 worker is held to the new authority.
> +It cannot reach the cache or the network even though it could a moment ago, it
> +was not asked to drop anything, it was not restarted, and O2 is unaffected. If
> +instead the controller revokes O1, the next O1 check fails closed.
[ ... ]
> +``epoch``
> + Monotonic authority generation. Installing a higher epoch fails every task
> + still bound to an older one closed from its next check.
[Severity: Low]
Does advancing an igroup's authority_epoch hold already-bound tasks to the
new authority, or does it cause them to fail every check closed?
The motivating example above states that writing a new authority and a
higher epoch to O1's igroup holds an already-running O1 worker to the
narrower authority, whereas the epoch definition here and the
kap.authority_epoch entry in Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-kap say
that installing a higher epoch causes tasks bound to an older epoch to
fail KAP checks closed.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261110202246.274-1-harisudhan@armoriq.io?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-10 20:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-10 20:22 [RFC PATCH v3 0/6] security: introduce Kernel Assurance Plane HARIHARA SUDHAN. R
2026-11-10 20:22 ` [RFC PATCH v3 1/6] docs: security: Describe the Kernel Assurance Plane design HARIHARA SUDHAN. R
2026-11-10 20:33 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-10 20:22 ` [RFC PATCH v3 2/6] security: kap: add the LSM ID and internal headers HARIHARA SUDHAN. R
2026-11-10 20:30 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-10 20:22 ` [RFC PATCH v3 3/6] security: add the Kernel Assurance Plane LSM HARIHARA SUDHAN. R
2026-11-10 20:51 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-10 20:22 ` [RFC PATCH v3 4/6] security: kap: add the securityfs control plane HARIHARA SUDHAN. R
2026-11-10 20:47 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-10 20:22 ` [RFC PATCH v3 5/6] kernel: add KAP checks for unshare and setns HARIHARA SUDHAN. R
2026-11-10 20:36 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-10 20:22 ` [RFC PATCH v3 6/6] MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the Kernel Assurance Plane HARIHARA SUDHAN. R
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