From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1794343089; b=4RJae63Wc48lfo9XkmPYiHYH0YzKo8uVWV3AsxkhbIrXnE//tSP6xHQSHQndlTwK5Pxx hK0IvqCwUWtWjKN7fLxfYfRSe/Dnn8XYlvVuaTDqoyOPqxU080OBXUT6YsQcL0l/Co0Jt aQKL4A7N/FpXz5JAXBa89Ww3BYDMomOMdevs/YB+zUByIu9B9s83RAkUK7swDS22Xn+s2 CgWn2N5002eXD0XPoC1IOyPINILoGNbKCBkNmob1BEDBxddAq/KBNrpFk+DipsZH3XQfu KNdZz7A3Xb+XSjOCh3Hx1SMp9f6arYjHPH5Och8YWOZ0Y0h1Nr8HsP6w0jPSj/GnXqw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1794343089; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Message-ID:From:Subject:Reply-To:Cc: In-Reply-To:References:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Date; bh=1nI+oq1qxs876JTOppFdE309Wiuh75q8PbkVxdU7v38=; b=wufgwlzR6nEeDO1gRqqHvfUZCKN5ipx+wMCf1syA4Jd4xf+CbgdmsmThqhe3/1A5OMyk sVqYD6TyvJJTVmarqUT+SX/X82sg0pxXN+QSYIUKh3julbkFq4iZuox/H6ovaVNagG90o bdMbq8y8EL0rzrHYFm0ibOsESYFzLxOQeLsQIoP2fjgFA8o4qhhFfYtzY34755o5NdStA izuv5Je06sPvbXMADdvqCq9FlYSQ+3m1kDYDZLKoNiUJbL/p0uaGUr4VfSP0OCZFs+nso sp6l4lDsjePt9ecM1Oja7rvCwOUtvPbF0rqMbL+xUCy/fs2zAddVh6P8fLWP+b+Wfeg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=Ap3Of0zr; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3BD14606A31C; Tue, 10 Nov 2026 20:38:08 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=Ap3Of0zr Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A25511F008A5; Tue, 10 Nov 2026 20:38:08 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1794343088; bh=1nI+oq1qxs876JTOppFdE309Wiuh75q8PbkVxdU7v38=; h=From:Subject:Reply-To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=Ap3Of0zr42buWsOQBF+1rkFv6H6eJ2NkPBEvwSS03QmkXAVo59/9tS+cXJB3+k345 aEh2tz+HRFY+EKSoH7Qra6OZQP3ZGUbqlCLzqlv4PUu/qFFHkF9mr11rxVIy5yPHbW Pdqsnt7lGr4EAEMuB0OaGPU245f8i+kSZ6joN9ESrzU/UV2rtDbQfUDTF2RIpx1DM4 FVEaK9NGC4CXMoOjjPFF+wcZUs/+yMzYiVsyEw3IvjbcrXeVe5uddd2zTKpj22cy4S CZ8/9fZRplI8xFLhhu4OAIgo9XDZ0MsUwOiOoLkgPdTezRcCnjcBdQm6ex26dKcOTu wqjm6a+BXLHVA== Message-ID: From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/6] landlock: Restrict capabilities guarding other LSMs' policies Reply-To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: <20261110203042.2410140-3-mic@digikod.net> References: <20261110203042.2410140-1-mic@digikod.net> <20261110203042.2410140-3-mic@digikod.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 20:38:08 +0000 X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list > A process in a domain that denies CAP_MAC_ADMIN or CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE > could still use them for AppArmor, Smack or SELinux policy, and > CAP_SYS_PTRACE for Smack's ptrace rule, because these LSMs check them > with cap_capable() instead of capable(). >=20 > Implement the capable_lsm hook with the same check as the capable hook, > so that such capability uses are restricted like any other. The > following commits switch these LSMs to security_capable_lsm(). >=20 > Cc: Christian Brauner > Cc: G=C3=BCnther Noack > Cc: Paul Moore > Cc: Serge Hallyn > Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions") > Signed-off-by: Micka=C3=ABl Sala=C3=BCn Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. --=20 Sashiko AI review =C2=B7 https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261110203042.2410= 140-1-mic@digikod.net?part=3D2