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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SETPCAP for inheritable capabilities
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 10:17:45 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-218585@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117101157.2520463-4-mic@digikod.net>

> A process in a domain that denies CAP_SETPCAP could still add
> capabilities outside of its permitted set to its inheritable set with
> capset(2), if it held CAP_SETPCAP.  cap_capset() checks CAP_SETPCAP with
> cap_capable() in cap_inh_is_capped(), so the check never reaches
> hook_capable().  Through file inheritable capabilities, such a set can
> grant new permitted capabilities on execve() when no_new_privs is not
> set, which is possible for a domain enforced by a task holding
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> 
> Add a Landlock capset hook that checks CAP_SETPCAP against the domain
> under the same condition as cap_capset().  As with the mmap_addr hook,
> LSMs implement their own policy in this hook: SELinux checks capset with
> its own permission.
> 
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@kernel.org>
> Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117101157.2520463-1-mic@digikod.net?part=3


  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-17 10:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-17 10:11 [PATCH v2 0/6] Fix Landlock mediation of commoncap's capability checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] landlock: Factor out capability denial checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:14   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_RAWIO for mappings below mmap_min_addr Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:18   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SETPCAP for inheritable capabilities Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:17   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_ADMIN for the admin memory reserve Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:16   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] selftests/landlock: Test capability checks outside the capable hook Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:20   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] landlock: Fix capability restriction documentation Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:17   ` sashiko-bot

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