From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1794911218; b=YbYoziSFqzU9l2+Eu/mtklLJoOB+iDRa0gSFAJRVoCjMjXYbPQJVkl9BvqYDyS0/ks4H uDJgfNZ3L2jo6yLd+45MZYFumEmB5xdcJKsoxfD+vEz7qfc0zuUgVMkrlLDIB2IFbv71J Gy+24J/ljo1phdTbzlKeP8YIcNhk6Zky0KTILr93iWkKGA/RosTj5ZpcMhS7m7BjI8Fu/ B7Gv1hK41vTt1D5hfn0qhCmILxN18foglNjKvtNBaV7mGQmSelpwyuOgQFgDV8s3M5M6K 33Inn9NNhN99K3/j5hRr+FHb4EoAJ4lpQgbf9rTsUcVy4yRZoPHTnTxVMegJIHlflSw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1794911218; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Message-ID:From:Subject:Reply-To:Cc: In-Reply-To:References:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Date; bh=gnj7C7NQo+0MkCW5ZOl5t8cZ58ZCVJKHjIkfNfZfDnE=; b=KRcW7unfF7v2GY56sz+s1RXyvAQf8LRiRrLPxNQzILCnsqBPGDS83M9Sp3shbpujvG4l aqmblfeeMbH5IlYsi7MkhQ85Shq1lyMUwfKFgcA08aJ9qvQ6M8uvhjulLhLVdUhyia2Qi jdW+v+Yn+u8/aVpsJrLL1peIdCiNNdWgdJTjodgMpH8CtzlHXqa/ZOwhiycbiBq8czwXF b+KSio6NrfrPgtafqPVblCIMAI7jLAyb6SJbWHgnleKCJSOx7IQzoYTtXoiD5+N197LKp YaaY6u/xCiHSbRBDhf4Xz/OtDUIOIP9bwY7uyKe9p9XslVpfDNpJZz468xE9sr+vsOQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b="G56/UjTt"; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 54C84606A330; Tue, 17 Nov 2026 10:26:58 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=G56/UjTt Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CA5921F000C4; Tue, 17 Nov 2026 10:26:57 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1794911218; bh=gnj7C7NQo+0MkCW5ZOl5t8cZ58ZCVJKHjIkfNfZfDnE=; h=From:Subject:Reply-To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=G56/UjTtpBtJV5bSYyXmfJsP6ln/pmNF5dqwQ3vZ9Irqa647+J9tOLhRcysxL0rsf Nz0+8mgBBEjOUgsDetiSFThBWSjdbYtnG0Fx2wBJWaQ0JUtKkZb6uayc5VIgIk3yJP As8SOQdgSRm5cbO+1b2aaBxMqGcuMoXuZWV7duWhRot1PtFY6QHZV4BSzeDY5hl5Y1 oQrx9YVFrnoEXZxssU84RHoyQpG7I+M0JgEgFaim418ZTci4MPsLDfsITHa0Lvsf72 xbyvMhjbzXaRmY0mQwGJlNBCr2RMrX0RfplxeILAdT1HQCDzRysQPoQiqttzr6diqu aCMjnwKYDEfKw== Message-ID: From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/6] landlock: Restrict capabilities guarding other LSMs' policies Reply-To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: <20261117101845.2523770-3-mic@digikod.net> References: <20261117101845.2523770-1-mic@digikod.net> <20261117101845.2523770-3-mic@digikod.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 10:26:57 +0000 X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list > A process in a domain that denies CAP_MAC_ADMIN or CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE > could still use them for AppArmor, Smack or SELinux policy, and > CAP_SYS_PTRACE for Smack's ptrace rule, because these LSMs check them > with cap_capable() instead of capable(). >=20 > Implement the capable_lsm hook with the same check as the capable hook, > so that such capability uses are restricted like any other. The > following commits switch these LSMs to security_capable_lsm(). >=20 > Cc: Christian Brauner > Cc: G=C3=BCnther Noack > Cc: Paul Moore > Cc: Serge Hallyn > Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions") > Signed-off-by: Micka=C3=ABl Sala=C3=BCn Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. --=20 Sashiko AI review =C2=B7 https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117101845.2523= 770-1-mic@digikod.net?part=3D2