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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Cai Xinchen" <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	dsterba@suse.cz, "Chuck Lever" <cel@kernel.org>,
	"Jeff Layton" <jlayton@kernel.org>,
	"Anna Schumaker" <anna@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH -next -v4 09/17] LSM: rename inode_getattr to path_getattr and pass struct file
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 15:30:28 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-219078@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117150542.1169451-10-caixinchen1@huawei.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential
issue to consider:
- [Medium] bpf: missing vfs_getattr_file() in btf_allowlist_d_path
  breaks stat tracing
--

commit 0fd5e45352f3174f9865b405ef695f6fda94ab43
Author: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>

LSM: rename inode_getattr to path_getattr and pass struct file

This commit renames the inode_getattr LSM hook and security_inode_getattr()
to path_getattr and security_path_getattr(), adds a struct file parameter,
and introduces vfs_getattr_file() for callers that hold an open file.

> diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
> index 3107400454982..7006e1830269d 100644
> --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
> +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
> @@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_d_path, const struct path *, path, char *, buf, u32, sz)
>  BTF_SET_START(btf_allowlist_d_path)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>  BTF_ID(func, security_file_permission)
> -BTF_ID(func, security_inode_getattr)
> +BTF_ID(func, security_path_getattr)
>  BTF_ID(func, security_file_open)
>  #endif
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH

[Severity: Medium]
Should vfs_getattr_file also be added to btf_allowlist_d_path alongside
vfs_getattr?

vfs_fstat() and vfs_statx_path() now call vfs_getattr_file() directly
instead of vfs_getattr(), so fentry/vfs_getattr and fexit/vfs_getattr
programs no longer fire on stat-family syscalls.  Without
BTF_ID(func, vfs_getattr_file) in btf_allowlist_d_path,
bpf_d_path_allowed() rejects tracing programs that attach to
vfs_getattr_file() and call bpf_d_path(), and on kernels with
CONFIG_SECURITY disabled no allowlisted function remains on those syscall
paths.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117150542.1169451-1-caixinchen1@huawei.com?part=9

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-17 15:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-17 15:05 [PATCH -next -v4 00/17] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 01/17] fs: pass struct path to notify_change() Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 14:48   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 02/17] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setsecctx hook Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 14:43   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 03/17] fs: pass struct path to xattr helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 14:59   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 04/17] fs: pass struct path to POSIX ACL helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 14:45   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 05/17] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:03   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 06/17] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode posix acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:07   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 07/17] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode fileattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 14:51   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 08/17] LSM: rename inode_setattr to path_setattr and pass struct path and file Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:11   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 09/17] LSM: rename inode_getattr to path_getattr and pass struct file Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:30   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 10/17] LSM: rename the inode xattr hooks to path_xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 14:55   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 11/17] LSM: rename the inode posix acl hooks to path_*_acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 14:55   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 12/17] LSM: rename the inode fileattr hooks to path_file_* hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:02   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 13/17] LSM: rename inode_setsecctx to path_setsecctx Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 14:59   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 14/17] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 15/17] selftests/landlock: Add tests for metadata " Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:12   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 16/17] samples/landlock: Add metadata rights to sandboxer Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:04   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 17/17] Documentation: Update landlock doc for metadata rights Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05   ` sashiko-bot

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