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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] selinux: Restrict memcg charging to a cgroupfd target
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 08:41:04 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-220473@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117-v2_20230123_tjmercier_google_com-v5-7-1ce975f2a9ad@redhat.com>

> The security_memcg_charge_cgroup() hook allows security modules to
> control which processes may charge memcg memory to an arbitrary cgroup
> named by a cgroupfd passed in charge_fd. Without a policy
> implementation, the hook is a no-op, so a domain that has both
> dma-heap access and CAP_SYS_RESOURCE can charge any cgroup outside
> its own subtree, and SELinux cannot say which targets are acceptable.
> 
> Implement selinux_memcg_charge_cgroup() using avc_has_perm() with a
> new cgroup object class and a charge_to permission. This is the
> counterpart of the process2 charge_to permission used for the pidfd
> path.
> 
> The target SID is the SID of the inode of the cgroup directory the
> cgroupfd refers to, so access control follows the cgroup filesystem
> labeling. Policy authors can then grant cross-cgroup charging selectively,
> for example:
> 
>   allow allocator_app_t cgroup_t:cgroup charge_to;
> 
> Signed-off-by: Albert Esteve <aesteve@redhat.com>

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117-v2_20230123_tjmercier_google_com-v5-0-1ce975f2a9ad@redhat.com?part=7


  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-18  8:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-17  8:39 [PATCH v5 0/8] memcg: dma-buf cgroup accounting and charge transfer Albert Esteve
2026-11-17  8:39 ` [PATCH v5 1/8] memcg: Add MEMCG_DMABUF accounting infrastructure Albert Esteve
2026-11-18  8:40   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  8:39 ` [PATCH v5 2/8] dma-heap: charge dma-buf memory via explicit memcg Albert Esteve
2026-11-18  8:40   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  8:39 ` [PATCH v5 3/8] dma-buf: transfer objcg charges via DMA_BUF_IOCTL_XFER_CHARGE Albert Esteve
2026-11-18  8:41   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  8:39 ` [PATCH v5 4/8] lsm: Add memcg_charge_task LSM hook Albert Esteve
2026-11-17 22:54   ` Paul Moore
2026-11-18  8:41   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  8:39 ` [PATCH v5 5/8] lsm: Add memcg_charge_cgroup " Albert Esteve
2026-11-18  8:41   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  8:39 ` [PATCH v5 6/8] selinux: Restrict cross-cgroup memcg charging Albert Esteve
2026-11-18  8:41   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17  8:39 ` [PATCH v5 7/8] selinux: Restrict memcg charging to a cgroupfd target Albert Esteve
2026-11-18  8:41   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-17  8:39 ` [PATCH v5 8/8] selftests/dmabuf-heaps: Add dma-buf memcg accounting tests Albert Esteve
2026-11-18  8:41   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 22:54 ` [PATCH v5 0/8] memcg: dma-buf cgroup accounting and charge transfer Paul Moore

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