From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795011889; b=HdAHBf7gjgIPKux65dCpa70wu2Yk8R9GkxyexaB+NbphuShcV8qzHNAjWdrCZvlhCcWe sfkJmKDsIkZVcXpUWIfY9u96rXnpQ+PdS8bwmvSY5w+1Vk6QWXFhan1qvQPaeKxVibK7C EoG8+f9FdqVs9aBaEBBUL6XHF/FUIix2c7FereYiE/eydR49A6TCXaluLF6qG0sUV2W94 vW72uXDOlIF7gSQnrLkWVbK6i8faVphG0OQVnw0uXcvcgR7pHrpEZVtb2JVPy8ytjFdqP RE1vYWs/W1tRYPNcmmESoIkd2KFyzro85iD3nydNk7VIsos4mTULqhH3cp4AzeefXAg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795011889; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Message-ID:From:Subject:Reply-To:Cc: In-Reply-To:References:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Date; bh=WkMezfpk5L6Iaw2QI8Eoo9V/JKZp2Qyy3fZqyzjORzc=; b=ZSl4JKRawRPLFv/lwOS8WDgpfaGPTDcgwN1AzcbJxl1edLQE67k9CQb2nWeFUIo7BWJy cwaCiJIOYoxLFjzC4CQwRIQOBzusWd+pZLGqz0myaP1Bxl6ZOsQ/mzq+UHC7rKmtOJK/0 uWM2kM5K0+87ob4MZY/fqHs3Wj+4v2G+gzorBKS0DKYtDKV4+/TUzHIf2eqv4pXnMB+Xc D4+FX1rwtGRrRdCJiJTP5Pcf8jtgoFkhpRi1Hfg/jtgVOPv9s7eBzjKObuc473w27guYc fohPFmqWXOkmNclIh+T4r8/+TOUXX81A3c7UA3lPmVC7PYVUVP5QX/oGbLzkjfBSYuw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=eAohTR7y; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9C6D6606A338 for ; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:24:49 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=eAohTR7y Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 397251F000C9 for ; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:24:49 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795011889; bh=WkMezfpk5L6Iaw2QI8Eoo9V/JKZp2Qyy3fZqyzjORzc=; h=From:Subject:Reply-To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=eAohTR7yiRb2j3NwpTvDGyS8PWLgsvGTle1jKQp9R3JKYevjawJBBx94QZqm0NlsL pCUYMxY2I14AeqlUSwGTXzL+dH5QG4XcP30zV7aw6L0ZS7MNina9LfFlKLlMd9e7Xa ih6CFjfvBfBq/HigfWPS9BFfi4TOsCemqy9igUInImQFQ7sXGQOQdBVyOg952iBgi2 d+2hqm5QeZuoGR38S0EUA7BsH+7etpojnaL5EMbHvAhKwLS1Rt+wkUSXR2QfGiwHqq WRzoWy314QjcaoinxMF6LMs94zu5H4OO7vFcyGQ2MMvI0BrBuD299hiMdcJyD6oL3E lAdf5oweg1D0g== Message-ID: From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] crypto: caam - add an internal cbc(paes) taking the blob's key modifier Reply-To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: <20261118141047.616989-1-giometti@enneenne.com> References: <20261118140421.584086-1-giometti@enneenne.com> <20261118141047.616989-1-giometti@enneenne.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:24:48 +0000 X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list > cbc(paes) decapsulates every blob with the fixed key modifier > "SECURE_KEY", the one trusted keys use for their "pk" keys, and is > reachable from AF_ALG: a blob made for either can be used through the > other by whoever holds CAP_NET_ADMIN or CAP_SYS_ADMIN (with AF_ALG's > default restriction), for whatever operation they choose. A kernel > user that wants its blobs bound to something of its own, such as the > metadata of the key they protect, has no way to say so. >=20 > Add a second cbc(paes), cbc-paes-km-caam, flagged CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL > so that only kernel code asking for that flag can allocate it, as the > DCP's paes is, which trusted keys allocate by driver name with that > flag; its key names the key modifier to decapsulate with. > caam_encap_blob() already takes a caller's key modifier, so a kernel > user can now bind its blobs to a value of its own. >=20 > Its only user is the keycrypt CAAM backend, which is a proposal, and > so is this. >=20 > Signed-off-by: Rodolfo Giometti Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. --=20 Sashiko AI review =C2=B7 https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261118140421.5840= 86-1-giometti@enneenne.com?part=3D7