From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795012246; b=g0c52LqPxfbJ+km4vOvtXbbYX4/pf1wcIBfg10m+kqwuAPkZ5CjBiDHM7gl/tglXVSlL ujk8LvADGykyqlqD9AjJH9roTdpAR7+sFYSqt+cNiO2Z+4ug8i58W9ZLlogZ/FVHyTaCo AykS4/JC61UIjOs0qt4DEE1ei5J5P47HBLNZTsG8kpTP5rLwR/VCd4DvfXUJKcPNLcK2Z l5vOXCxyu2s8TAiVs8IkPvJtSYzBWcxQhTgh2rUG7gEmAYg5/aahifWSzNkmU5GGPjc6Q DLRhy8CQgMxJqEvZuk0c81+XaPPu3WpG9Z/xO8oLRIUcNMxufZWWpZJ15cQqvQGGWtw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795012246; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Message-ID:From:Subject:Reply-To:Cc: In-Reply-To:References:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Date; bh=3wod+sgSe5AO7Y69Ed0onzp5ruRWZ+rQ/N5b0V7FJ8c=; b=Zy3WkuC+N3vscXhe7AttkT59iYCymw0BWfZMF6GswQP9U2W7mASWAdyH6+NJEgdIXDwp yNGdF/lC0M+PWaPNIAosM9TSf/mWpGAHPbHW8YhpvXH9K0cTEPfppKN/yjQIrQnsW2Er5 8qMD+9RBkWgZ7mwZmU1W+vzJ2gJTAAIbkg333Vgnn6+PcdKeRpFUiZ2+RWoYyem0RT7QP uT7wTo0EdNsXMnYTn5Zd5jycDtrvbVJ4vroYTcr1REELAVrEblYDxLD9lN4UwDMhunJ+w +651iOhobOBPXC54hA2kYPqS6MwipDC6LlCjweC9Z2fdqEo5DUbqfhzPnlraqWd8N1Q== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=gaINmaII; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 63F5E606A31C for ; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:30:46 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=gaINmaII Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E2E3F1F000C4 for ; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:30:45 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795012246; bh=3wod+sgSe5AO7Y69Ed0onzp5ruRWZ+rQ/N5b0V7FJ8c=; h=From:Subject:Reply-To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=gaINmaIIz94BACd8MVwX4jax5SbtJkoMB7VCRYGUDBAeOzYyL5EyCJGCRS2VmZr4R 9qG4vPOna4HKKsF8ogFVnb60or92i133pVBtnvKnWt+CvRYvp8vi/c+8wW+Zni74mj iXYaWs0/oLU4oOZOELP+wmpi2kDsi2xDN6OGOE1Ix9ZM97ySRuLIn+MdqXtdWaQfp7 13U2pphoIztkqCZFu9oUGLiCDonEjaKiMBmKQy4QWrGBd8yYcfXPX+cajKGRsz2QAT Tq/ScU8cc8OvuPkB0ohknbQ8gCLg13jYj2Db0ukFPxKFHUxD0038gP0XiaZ+S4NoM6 KjyhQoclv1lnQ== Message-ID: From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 9/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the aes256-gcm-stream algorithm Reply-To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: <20261118141257.627441-1-giometti@enneenne.com> References: <20261118140421.584086-1-giometti@enneenne.com> <20261118141257.627441-1-giometti@enneenne.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:30:45 +0000 X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list > This patch is a proposal on its own: nothing before it needs it, so it > can be discussed, or left out, apart from the rest. >=20 > aes256-cbc does not authenticate what it decrypts, and a file or a > transfer longer than one call cannot be sealed with a single AES-GCM > invocation without buffering all of it, nor decrypted without > releasing plaintext before its tag is checked. >=20 > Add aes256-gcm-stream: the STREAM construction (Hoang, Reyhanitabar, > Rogaway, Vizar) over AES-256-GCM. A message is split into segments > of up to 64 KiB, each sealed with its own tag under a subkey derived > with HKDF-SHA256 from the key and a 16-byte salt drawn at > KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN; the nonce carries the segment's position and a > last-segment flag, and the counter lives in the kernel, so segments > can be neither reordered nor dropped from the end unnoticed. The > segments go through a new ioctl, KEYCRYPT_IOC_SEGMENT, and > KEYCRYPT_IOC_FINAL reports a stream whose last segment never came. > A tee or hsm backend draws the salt and keeps the counter in its > secure side; the sw and optee backends implement it. >=20 > With it comes its section of the documentation, with a file format > built on it. >=20 > No user-space consumer uses it yet. >=20 > Signed-off-by: Rodolfo Giometti Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. --=20 Sashiko AI review =C2=B7 https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261118140421.5840= 86-1-giometti@enneenne.com?part=3D9