From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/4] landlock: Add capability objects to denial tracing
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 16:39:01 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-221516@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261118163254.2554413-3-mic@digikod.net>
> The capability denial tracepoint identifies the capability number but
> not the credentials or user namespace against which it was checked.
> Typed BPF consumers therefore cannot reconstruct the authoritative hook
> context, especially when a check targets a user namespace other than the
> caller's current namespace.
>
> Carry the exact cred and user_ns used by each commoncap check through
> check_cap() to the tracepoint's BTF prototype. The capable hook
> forwards its arguments. Other callers mirror old->user_ns for
> CAP_SETPCAP, and init_user_ns for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and CAP_SYS_ADMIN. The
> latter checks protect global hardening and the global admin memory
> reserve, so nested user-namespace capabilities must not authorize them.
>
> Keep these pointers out of TP_STRUCT__entry and TP_printk so the raw
> ring-buffer layout and textual format remain unchanged. They provide
> context only and do not participate in Landlock's verdict.
>
> Do not carry the capability options. CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT already suppresses
> the complete denial record, and the remaining option bits do not explain
> the checked security relationship.
>
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261118163254.2554413-1-mic@digikod.net?part=2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-18 16:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-18 16:32 [PATCH v2 0/4] Landlock: Fix namespace and capability denials Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-18 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] landlock: Distinguish namespace creation and entry denials Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-18 16:40 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] landlock: Add capability objects to denial tracing Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-18 16:39 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-18 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] selftests/landlock: Test namespace denial operations Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-18 16:37 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] landlock: Document " Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-18 16:39 ` sashiko-bot
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