From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 1/2] security: Expand task_setscheduler LSM hook
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 04:22:23 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-222442@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261119040705.684987-2-atomlin@atomlin.com>
> At present, the task_setscheduler LSM hook only accepts the target
> task_struct pointer. It lacks visibility into the requested scheduling
> attributes (sched_attr) and the CPU affinity or cpuset mask (cpumask).
> Consequently, security modules cannot inspect the target scheduling
> parameters or CPU mask passed through the hook.
>
> For CPU affinity requests via sched_setaffinity(), auditing or
> filtering the raw mask requested by userspace requires inspecting the
> mask before __sched_setaffinity() intersects it with the task's allowed
> cpuset CPUs. Seccomp filters cannot perform this inspection because the
> affinity mask and scheduling attribute structures are passed behind
> user pointers, and scheduler tracepoints only observe the effective
> mask after intersection with the cpuset configuration.
>
> This patch expands the security_task_setscheduler() hook signature to
> [ ... ]
> mediation of explicit scheduling policy and parameter updates,
> sched_setaffinity() requests, and cpuset task migrations.
>
> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> # Smack
> Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@atomlin.com>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261119040705.684987-1-atomlin@atomlin.com?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-19 4:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-19 4:07 [PATCH v6 0/2] security: Expand task_setscheduler LSM hook Aaron Tomlin
2026-11-19 4:07 ` [PATCH v6 1/2] " Aaron Tomlin
2026-11-19 4:22 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-19 4:07 ` [PATCH v6 2/2] selftests/bpf: Verify task_setscheduler LSM hook parameters Aaron Tomlin
2026-11-19 4:13 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19 4:52 ` bot+bpf-ci
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