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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"Anna-Maria Behnsen" <anna-maria@linutronix.de>,
	"Ben Segall" <bsegall@google.com>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"David Hildenbrand" <david@kernel.org>,
	"Davidlohr Bueso" <dave@stgolabs.net>,
	"Dietmar Eggemann" <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
	"Frederic Weisbecker" <frederic@kernel.org>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
	"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Juri Lelli" <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
	"K Prateek Nayak" <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
	"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
	"Lorenzo Stoakes" <ljs@kernel.org>,
	"Manfred Spraul" <manfred@colorfullife.com>,
	"Mel Gorman" <mgorman@suse.de>, "Michal Hocko" <mhocko@suse.com>,
	"Mike Rapoport" <rppt@kernel.org>, "Neal Gompa" <neal@gompa.dev>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Serge Hallyn" <sergeh@kernel.org>,
	"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	"Suren Baghdasaryan" <surenb@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@kernel.org>,
	"Valentin Schneider" <vschneid@redhat.com>,
	"Vincent Guittot" <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
	"Vincenzo Frascino" <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@kernel.org>,
	"Zygmunt Krynicki" <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 07/13] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS in clone3()
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 19:36:54 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-223949@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261118193539.240065-8-jarkko@kernel.org>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential
issues to consider:
- [High] cred: missing dumpability reset across userns without CLONE_VM
  in copy_creds()
- [Medium] fork: missing CAP_SYS_CHROOT check and umask reset to init_fs
  in copy_fs()
- [Medium] nsproxy: shared mm and timens vvar mismatch in
  copy_namespaces()
- [Low] rootns: wrong errno on external PID 1 race during bootstrap in
  copy_process()
--

commit 9762bc2570e709528c82312b63771aa4f8d6c6d8
Author: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

fork: Support CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS in clone3()

This commit adds CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS and struct clone_args.rootns to spawn a
child process directly into a target root namespace via clone3().

> diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
> index d01df40a9a386..5bc3d455141b5 100644
> --- a/kernel/cred.c
> +++ b/kernel/cred.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -287,6 +294,28 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, u64 clone_flags)
>  	if (!new)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
>  
> +	if (rootns) {
> +		const struct cred *old = current_cred();
> +
> +		if (!ns_capable(rootns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
> +			ret = -EPERM;
> +			goto error_put;
> +		}
> +		if (new->user_ns != rootns->user_ns) {
> +			ret = install_user_ns_cred(new, rootns->user_ns);
> +			if (ret < 0)
> +				goto error_put;
> +		}
> +		if (!cred_cap_issubset(old, new) ||
> +		    ((clone_flags & CLONE_VM) && old->user_ns != new->user_ns)) {
> +			struct task_exec_state *exec_state;
> +
> +			exec_state = rcu_dereference_protected(p->exec_state, true);
> +			if (exec_state != &init_task_exec_state)
> +				WRITE_ONCE(exec_state->dumpable, suid_dumpable);
> +		}
> +	}

[Severity: High]
Should exec_state->dumpable be reset whenever old->user_ns != new->user_ns,
even when CLONE_VM is not set?

When a dumpable daemon (TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER) creates a rootns and spawns a
child into it without CLONE_VM, old->euid owns rootns->user_ns, so
cred_cap_issubset(old, new) returns true:

kernel/cred.c:cred_cap_issubset() {
    ...
	for (;subset_ns != &init_user_ns; subset_ns = subset_ns->parent) {
		if ((set_ns == subset_ns->parent)  &&
		    uid_eq(subset_ns->owner, set->euid))
			return true;
	}
    ...
}

Because CLONE_VM is clear, p->exec_state->dumpable remains
TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER while p->real_cred->user_ns is switched to
rootns->user_ns.  In __ptrace_may_access(), a process in rootns->user_ns
with CAP_SYS_PTRACE passes ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode), and
task_still_dumpable() returns true on TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER without checking
ptrace_has_cap(exec_state->user_ns, mode).  Until the child changes UID or
calls execve(), an unprivileged container root process can attach via
ptrace or read /proc/<pid>/mem and /proc/<pid>/fd/* while the child still
holds the parent daemon's forked memory, O_CLOEXEC descriptors, and host
UID.

> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index 08fc28ad1eedf..f5b98eea9ce92 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1649,7 +1672,7 @@ static int copy_fs(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk,
>  		if (current->nsproxy->mnt_ns != &init_mnt_ns)
>  			return -EINVAL;
>  		fs = userspace_init_fs;
> -	} else if (flags & COPY_FS_IDLE) {
> +	} else if (flags & COPY_FS_IDLE || rootns) {
>  		fs = &init_fs;
>  	} else {
>  		fs = current->fs;
> @@ -1671,6 +1694,20 @@ static int copy_fs(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk,
>  	tsk->real_fs = tsk->fs = copy_fs_struct(fs);
>  	if (!tsk->fs)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
> +	if (rootns) {
> +		struct path root __free(path_put) = {};
> +		int err;
> +
> +		err = mnt_ns_get_root(rootns->ns->mnt_ns, &root);
> +		if (err) {
> +			free_fs_struct(tsk->fs);
> +			tsk->real_fs = NULL;
> +			tsk->fs = NULL;
> +			return err;
> +		}
> +		set_fs_root(tsk->fs, &root);
> +		set_fs_pwd(tsk->fs, &root);
> +	}
>  	return 0;
>  }

[Severity: Medium]
Does copying init_fs when rootns is set discard current->fs->umask, and
should changing tsk->fs->root require CAP_SYS_CHROOT in rootns->user_ns?

Selecting init_fs causes copy_fs_struct() to initialize tsk->fs->umask from
init_fs.umask (0022) instead of inheriting the parent's umask.  In
addition, unlike mntns_install() on setns(CLONE_NEWNS), neither
rootns_prepare_fork() nor copy_creds() checks ns_capable(rootns->user_ns,
CAP_SYS_CHROOT).  A chrooted process already running in rootns->user_ns
that has dropped CAP_SYS_CHROOT while retaining CAP_SYS_ADMIN can call
clone3(CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS) to spawn a child with fs->root reset to the mount
namespace root and escape its chroot.

[ ... ]

> @@ -2510,6 +2548,12 @@ __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
>  		goto bad_fork_core_free;
>  	}
>  
> +	if (unlikely(clone_args_rootns_bootstrapping(args) &&
> +		     !is_child_reaper(pid))) {
> +		retval = -EBUSY;
> +		goto bad_fork_core_free;
> +	}
> +
>  	/* Let kill terminate clone/fork in the middle */
>  	if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
>  		retval = -EINTR;
> diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c
> index 8a3c6d4e94e2a..ec8b6fac7fbf1 100644
> --- a/kernel/nsproxy.c
> +++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c
> @@ -166,12 +167,21 @@ struct nsproxy *create_new_namespaces(u64 flags,
>   * called from clone.  This now handles copy for nsproxy and all
>   * namespaces therein.
>   */
> -int copy_namespaces(u64 flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
> +int copy_namespaces(u64 flags, struct task_struct *tsk,
> +		    struct rootns *rootns)
>  {
>  	struct nsproxy *old_ns = tsk->nsproxy;
>  	struct user_namespace *user_ns = task_cred_xxx(tsk, user_ns);
>  	struct nsproxy *new_ns;
>  
> +	if (rootns) {
> +		if (old_ns->time_ns != rootns->ns->time_ns)
> +			timens_commit_fork(tsk, rootns->ns->time_ns,
> +					   flags & CLONE_VM);
> +		get_nsproxy(rootns->ns);
> +		tsk->nsproxy = rootns->ns;
> +		return 0;
> +	}

[Severity: Medium]
Can switching tsk->nsproxy->time_ns under CLONE_VM | CLONE_VFORK install the
child time namespace's vvar page into the parent's shared mm_struct?

When clone3() is called with CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS | CLONE_VM | CLONE_VFORK and
rootns has a different time namespace, timens_commit_fork() skips
vdso_join_timens() because shared_vm is true, while tsk->nsproxy is switched
immediately to rootns->ns (where time_ns == time_ns_for_children).  The
parent and the vfork child now share current->mm while having different
nsproxy->time_ns pointers.

If VDSO_TIME_PAGE_OFFSET in the shared mm's [vvar] VMA has not been faulted
in yet and the child calls a VDSO time function before execve(),
vvar_fault() calls find_timens_vvar_page(), which sees vma->vm_mm ==
current->mm and maps rootns->ns->time_ns->vvar_page into the shared page
tables.  Because time_ns already equals time_ns_for_children in rootns->ns,
exec_task_namespaces() on the child's later execve() is a no-op, leaving
the parent's mm permanently mapped to the child time namespace's vvar page.
Conversely, if the parent already faulted [vvar] before clone3(), the child
observes the parent's time namespace through VDSO and rootns->ns->time_ns
through syscalls until execve().

Also, calling timens_set_vvar_page() in copy_namespaces() before fallible
steps in copy_process() (such as alloc_pid() and cgroup_can_fork())
permanently sets rootns->ns->time_ns->frozen_offsets = true even when the
fork fails.

> diff --git a/kernel/rootns.c b/kernel/rootns.c
> index 32bb8ef5ed584..cfc33c243dba4 100644
> --- a/kernel/rootns.c
> +++ b/kernel/rootns.c
[ ... ]
> +int rootns_finish_fork(struct kernel_clone_args *args, struct task_struct *p)
> +{
> +	struct file *file __free(fput) = args->rootns_file;
> +	struct rootns *rootns = args->rootns;
> +	struct pid_namespace *pid_ns = rootns->ns->pid_ns_for_children;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	args->rootns_file = NULL;
> +	args->rootns = NULL;
> +	if (!IS_ERR(p))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	ret = PTR_ERR(p);
> +	if (args->rootns_bootstrapping) {
> +		scoped_guard(spinlock, &rootns->lock) {
> +			if (rootns->state == ROOTNS_FORKING)
> +				WRITE_ONCE(rootns->state, ROOTNS_INIT);
> +		}
> +		wake_up_all(&rootns->waitq);
> +	} else if (ret == -ENOMEM &&
> +		   !(READ_ONCE(pid_ns->pid_allocated) & PIDNS_ADDING)) {
> +		return -ESRCH;
> +	}
> +
> +	return ret;
> +}

[Severity: Low]
Can a bootstrap race with an external fork into pid_ns return -EINVAL or
-ENOMEM instead of the documented -EBUSY or -ESRCH?

If an external process enters pid_ns and allocates PID 1 in alloc_pid()
after rootns_prepare_fork() checks READ_ONCE(pid_ns->child_reaper) but
before setting child_reaper under tasklist_lock, the bootstrapping task's
alloc_pid() allocates nr == 2 while child_reaper is still NULL and fails
with -EINVAL, never reaching the !is_child_reaper(pid) check in
copy_process().  Similarly, if that external PID 1 exits and clears
PIDNS_ADDING before the bootstrapping task finishes copy_process(),
copy_process() returns -ENOMEM, and rootns_finish_fork() only translates
-ENOMEM to -ESRCH in the !args->rootns_bootstrapping branch.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261118193539.240065-1-jarkko@kernel.org?part=7

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-19 19:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-18 19:35 [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/13] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 19:36   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/13] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 19:36   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/13] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 19:36   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/13] rootns: Add rootns_create() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 19:36   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/13] rootns: Add rootns_wait() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 19:36   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/13] rootns: Add rootns_kill() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 19:36   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/13] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 19:36   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-18 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/13] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 19:36   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/13] fs: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 19:36   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/13] arch: Wire up rootns system calls Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 19:37   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/13] docs: Document root namespace uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 19:37   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/13] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 19:37   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/13] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 19:54 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 20:42   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 21:22     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19  4:43     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19  6:21       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 22:36 ` Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)
2026-11-18 23:33   ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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