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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] sched/psi: Check CAP_SYS_RESOURCE in the initial user namespace
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 08:56:17 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-224801@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261120085135.40368-1-dennylin0707@gmail.com>

> Commit d82caa273565 ("sched/psi: Allow unprivileged polling of N*2s
> period") moved the CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check for psi triggers from the
> open() of the /proc/pressure files to psi_trigger_create(), so that the
> credentials of the opener decide whether a trigger is privileged. In
> doing so it replaced capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) with a direct test of the
> opener's effective capability set:
> 
> 	privileged = cap_raised(file->f_cred->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE);
> 
> Unlike capable(), cap_raised() does not check against the initial user
> namespace and does not go through the LSM capable hook. A task that
> creates a user namespace has a full effective set inside it, so an
> unprivileged user gets privileged triggers on /proc/pressure/* and on
> delegated cgroup pressure files: windows that are not a multiple of 2s,
> served by the SCHED_FIFO psimon kthread, which the N*2s rule was meant
> to keep from unprivileged users. LSM policies that deny CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
> are not consulted either.
> 
> Use file_ns_capable(), which checks the opener's credentials against the
> given user namespace through security_capable(). This brings back the
> user namespace and LSM checks of the capable() call it replaced.
> 
> Fixes: d82caa273565 ("sched/psi: Allow unprivileged polling of N*2s period")
> Reported-by: Sieun Yang <didtldms2525@jnu.ac.kr>
> Signed-off-by: Hungyu Lin <dennylin0707@gmail.com>

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261120085135.40368-1-dennylin0707@gmail.com?part=1


      reply	other threads:[~2026-11-20  8:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-20  8:51 [PATCH v2] sched/psi: Check CAP_SYS_RESOURCE in the initial user namespace Hungyu Lin
2026-11-20  8:56 ` sashiko-bot [this message]

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