From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795306260; b=gMWS8CRXppem+Ul9IbupwbBEwU9denXRH7YhcoTJCTHNQprRF914W/FNMubcR7O8h+86 VXsAV5jjP8p5esb+eW1IjByTMQamQuOWQVQ+i9wGaBrtVFBCKNfUHnlqJM3C5mNTSypjJ eQ3GDmdCz4/5mVXFeObdVtGvg1pbuVjCR24MD169Eh5x2WPWyAqDErqe5wO1+DhyXco4Y soCa6tTnreVhnVMuFRgEWprnd+fawyDBmpsNkIzVDD1Q/ngJs5ec4R3Pq0+I+qDWwtLA+ EZrHVWXiKMenP6G28eZn0ZKGnV+SicN01fMLP6fxmM3GlQcQHd3EMkazFgFOK1ln6OA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795306260; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Message-ID:From:Subject:Reply-To:To:Cc: In-Reply-To:References:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Date; bh=mJnzJ1/4fleHoLG1FgU2nPuff2XTKEAtpi6kFgEvrTI=; b=S9zgjfD4QjS6LLRYgW1OXPg+qURwOhzWTI2f4v6tEU9v4Bkwwvt8ZNdiOMKyMwetR6QO Bcu1ovgox21sbW6dPvim7if5C0psub2t3ph3hSnc5gfgKFQG0g4YO9Aj4Sh1AVPAvnQFx WKUemmr5e9VsWvk7YIg0ZSOGqFQq6VK03Iu/kMUAwg1iu27XHcw97y9OTKKiqUNcq4a4Z hXkiZOqS5uDYKqUe0WPF9mmpaqIoeLK92A8czlwe9EotKY+MvPpH/a7reZrEyfP1n0M3q H+LSpccNOdBQ4SiXjwVup4KJvupx/92/+Zh4pqXTwb+AjnoX/QdhPwG1ALx4w6AxPPQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=lytczblw; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 71A4B606A320 for ; Sun, 22 Nov 2026 00:11:00 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=lytczblw Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5F4B81F000C4; Sun, 22 Nov 2026 00:10:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795306260; bh=mJnzJ1/4fleHoLG1FgU2nPuff2XTKEAtpi6kFgEvrTI=; h=From:Subject:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=lytczblw7VPLLPzLQ2VWXouheglnC1Jn8pzaJeH2QnyvHLYUvW1QVfVNNFn7cEhgU nFN5K4Odc9zHnq54Tnz0zs7L6Si0eDV0BvmLti3Xz1EoMqwjO4C+oirtMXgmA7TyA3 dOGSDJtKYDhGxuXeKMI++8Lh98qTzlrtLkBksZIFwq7Gl8qQYSkt/tCrX+SJS0lZdL 4G4uUwvYUZTed5aQiW+yLhOa+GZNDQ3jeiKyJRAnjvPf/Man5uefi27rffR7jcLIVo vNJ1tZJASO177H4m/nWZxiKxzgl3EqM9nUJYWDIeoxkigKwginxdyMU6kyp2eiuq7K BC3Uhvy1Qnb8Q== Message-ID: From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v5 17/25] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() Reply-To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, "Alexander Mikhalitsyn" , "Alexander Viro" , "Andy Lutomirski" , "Christian Brauner" , "David Howells" , "Jan Kara" , "Jonathan Corbet" , "Josef Bacik" , "Kees Cook" , "Neal Gompa" , "Paul Moore" , "Serge Hallyn" , "Zygmunt Krynicki" In-Reply-To: <20261121000844.1863324-18-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20261121000844.1863324-1-jarkko@kernel.org> <20261121000844.1863324-18-jarkko@kernel.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 00:10:59 +0000 X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issues to consider: - [High] fs: incomplete namespace binding validation in fsconfig_set_rootns() - [Medium] fs: stale fsopen() credentials retained in fc->cred by fsconfig_set_rootns() -- commit f8ec195808901fb7269d7229635728d247b672b9 Author: Jarkko Sakkinen fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() This commit adds FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS and the ->set_rootns() fs_context operation so callers with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in a target rootns user namespace can bind a newly opened fs_context to that rootns before supplying mount parameters. > diff --git a/fs/fsopen.c b/fs/fsopen.c > index 70024870fefa2..e0d65f6018a7e 100644 > --- a/fs/fsopen.c > +++ b/fs/fsopen.c [ ... ] > +static int fsconfig_set_rootns(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_paramete= r *param) > +{ [ ... ] > + put_net(fc->net_ns); > + fc->net_ns =3D get_net(c->ns->net_ns); > + put_user_ns(fc->user_ns); > + fc->user_ns =3D get_user_ns(user_ns); [Severity: Medium] Should fsconfig_set_rootns() also replace fc->cred with get_current_cred()? alloc_fs_context() sets fc->cred at fsopen() time, when an unprivileged FS_CONTEXT_AWAITING_NS context has not yet been authorized against any target namespace. If the fscontext fd is passed to another task or credentials change before FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS, consumers such as dentry_open(..., fc->cred) in fsmount() and proc_fill_super() (fs_info->mounter_cred) will use the fsopen() caller's credentials rather than the credentials that authorized FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS. > + > + fc->rootns_bound =3D true; > + fc->rootns_mnt_id =3D c->ns->mnt_ns->ns.ns_id; > + > + ret =3D fc->fs_type->init_fs_context(fc); > + if (ret < 0) { > + fc->rootns_bound =3D false; > + fc->phase =3D FS_CONTEXT_FAILED; > + return ret; > + } > + fc->need_free =3D true; > + > + if (fc->ops->set_rootns) { > + ret =3D fc->ops->set_rootns(fc, c); > + if (ret < 0) { > + fc->rootns_bound =3D false; > + fc->phase =3D FS_CONTEXT_FAILED; > + return ret; > + } > + } > + if (fc->user_ns !=3D user_ns) { > + fc->rootns_bound =3D false; > + fc->phase =3D FS_CONTEXT_FAILED; > + return -EOPNOTSUPP; > + } [Severity: High] Is checking fc->user_ns !=3D user_ns enough to verify that the filesystem supports binding to the target rootns? binder_fs_type sets FS_USERNS_MOUNT, and binderfs_init_fs_context() neither changes fc->user_ns nor implements ->set_rootns(), so fsconfig_set_rootns() succeeds with fc->user_ns set to c->user_ns. When FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE then runs binderfs_fill_super(), it captures the caller's current IPC namespace instead of c->ns->ipc_ns: drivers/android/binder/rust_binderfs.c:binderfs_fill_super() { ... info->ipc_ns =3D get_ipc_ns(current->nsproxy->ipc_ns); ... } drivers/android/binder/rust_binderfs.c:binderfs_binder_device_create() { ... bool use_reserve =3D (info->ipc_ns =3D=3D &init_ipc_ns); ... } An unprivileged caller in init_ipc_ns that binds a binderfs context to an unprivileged rootns gets a superblock owned by c->user_ns with info->ipc_ns =3D=3D &init_ipc_ns, allowing it to bypass BINDERFS_MAX_MINOR_CAPPED and allocate from the minor pool reserved for the initial IPC namespace. Similarly, sysfs_init_fs_context() and cgroup_init_fs_context() capture current's net or cgroup namespace and overwrite fc->user_ns with that namespace's owning user_ns without implementing ->set_rootns(); if current's net or cgroup namespace happens to be owned by c->user_ns, fc->user_ns =3D=3D user_ns holds and the context silently binds to current's namespace instead of c->ns. --=20 Sashiko AI review =C2=B7 https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261121000844.1863= 324-1-jarkko@kernel.org?part=3D17