From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Aleksa Sarai" <aleksa@amutable.com>,
"Alexander Mikhalitsyn" <alex@amutable.com>,
"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
"Giuseppe Scrivano" <giuseppe@scrivano.org>,
"Hugh Dickins" <hughd@google.com>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
"Jeff Layton" <jlayton@kernel.org>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Josef Bacik" <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>, "KP Singh" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
"Lennart Poettering" <lennart@poettering.net>,
"Neal Gompa" <neal@gompa.dev>, "Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
"Serge Hallyn" <sergeh@kernel.org>,
"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Zygmunt Krynicki" <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v7 06/26] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount()
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 20:02:32 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-228306@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261122193539.3334213-7-jarkko@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential
issue to consider:
- [High] fs: propagate_mnt() before lock_mnt_tree() in
attach_recursive_mnt()
--
commit 1a941bfde892dcdbb8ea855a00043b140fa232a3
Author: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount()
This commit adds MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS to move_mount() so that detached
anonymous mount trees can be attached directly into a target mount
namespace specified by an nsfs file descriptor.
> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> index 1bb9f90a65239..93dd11da7e734 100644
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -2725,11 +2738,22 @@ static int attach_recursive_mnt(struct mount *source_mnt,
> hlist_add_head(&source_mnt->mnt_hash, &tree_list);
>
> hlist_for_each_entry_safe(child, n, &tree_list, mnt_hash) {
> + struct user_namespace *child_user_ns =
> + child->mnt_parent->mnt_ns->user_ns;
> + bool cross_child_src = cross_src &&
> + !in_userns(child_user_ns, src_user_ns);
> struct mount *q;
> +
> hlist_del_init(&child->mnt_hash);
> - /* Notice when we are propagating across user namespaces */
> - if (child->mnt_parent->mnt_ns->user_ns != user_ns)
> + /*
> + * Notice when we are propagating or attaching a foreign
> + * source tree across user namespaces.
> + */
> + if (child_user_ns != user_ns || cross_child_src) {
> lock_mnt_tree(child);
> + if (cross_child_src && list_empty(&child->mnt_expire))
> + child->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCKED;
> + }
[Severity: High]
Does running lock_mnt_tree() after propagate_mnt() allow copy_tree() to
strip covering nsfs submounts from propagated copies when attaching a
tree across user namespaces with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS?
Earlier in attach_recursive_mnt(), when dest_mnt is shared,
propagate_mnt() clones source_mnt via copy_tree() without
CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE:
fs/namespace.c:copy_tree() {
...
if (!(flag & CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE) &&
is_mnt_ns_file(src_mnt->mnt.mnt_root)) {
if (src_mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED) {
/* Both a mount namespace file and locked. */
dst_mnt = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
goto out;
}
src_mnt = skip_mnt_tree(src_mnt);
continue;
}
...
}
When a manager in an ancestor user namespace (src_user_ns) clones a tree
containing an unlocked nsfs submount via open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE |
AT_RECURSIVE) and attaches it into a less privileged target_mnt_ns onto a
mount that an admin in target_mnt_ns->user_ns has made MS_SHARED,
source_mnt's submounts do not have MNT_LOCKED set yet when
propagate_mnt() runs. Instead of failing with -EPERM, copy_tree() skips
the nsfs submount on the peer or slave copies, revealing whatever was
masked beneath it in target_mnt_ns.
Locking source_mnt before calling propagate_mnt() when cross_src is true
would ensure copy_tree() sees MNT_LOCKED on the submounts.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261122193539.3334213-1-jarkko@kernel.org?part=6
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-22 20:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-22 19:35 [RFC PATCH v7 00/26] userland: Userland containers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 01/26] userns: Factor out idmap validation and commit helpers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 02/26] userns: Add userns_set_idmap() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 03/26] arch: Wire up " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 04/26] mount: Add mnt_ns_get_root() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 05/26] mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 06/26] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:02 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 07/26] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 08/26] userns: Factor out install_user_ns_cred() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 09/26] nsproxy: Expose create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 10/26] userland: Add core infrastructure Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 11/26] userland: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:09 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 12/26] userland: Add userland_open() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 13/26] userland: Add USERLAND_GET_NSFD ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 14/26] userland: Add USERLAND_SHARE_NSFD ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 15/26] exit: Support P_USERLAND in waitid() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 16/26] signal: Support userland fds in pidfd_send_signal() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 17/26] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_USERLAND in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:01 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 18/26] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_USERLAND in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:58 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 19/26] proc: Implement ->set_userland() fs_context operation Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 20/26] ipc/mqueue: " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 21/26] security: Add userland LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 22/26] bpf: Register " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 23/26] arch: Wire up userland_open() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 24/26] docs: Document userland uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:09 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 25/26] selftests/userland: Add userland test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 19:52 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-22 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v7 26/26] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for USERLAND Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-22 20:02 ` [RFC PATCH v7 00/26] userland: Userland containers sashiko-bot
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