From: David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>
To: Pranav Tyagi <pranav.tyagi03@gmail.com>
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, jirislaby@kernel.org,
kees@kernel.org, skhan@linuxfoundation.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-serial@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel-mentees@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tty: replace capable() with file_ns_capable()
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2025 13:04:31 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250617130431.50f761dc@pumpkin> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250607134114.21899-1-pranav.tyagi03@gmail.com>
On Sat, 7 Jun 2025 19:11:14 +0530
Pranav Tyagi <pranav.tyagi03@gmail.com> wrote:
> The TIOCCONS ioctl currently uses capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to check for
> privileges, which validates the current task's credentials. Since this
> ioctl acts on an open file descriptor, the check should instead use the
> file opener's credentials.
Is that right?
A terminal will have been opened before the login sequence changed the user id.
The 'best practise' might be to check both!
David
>
> Replace capable() with file_ns_capable() to ensure the capability is
> checked against file->f_cred in the correct user namespace. This
> prevents unintended privilege escalation and aligns with best practices
> for secure ioctl implementations.
>
> Signed-off-by: Pranav Tyagi <pranav.tyagi03@gmail.com>
> Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/156
> ---
> drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 5 ++++-
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
> index e2d92cf70eb7..ee0df35d65c3 100644
> --- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
> +++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
> @@ -102,6 +102,9 @@
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> #include <linux/termios_internal.h>
> #include <linux/fs.h>
> +#include <linux/cred.h>
> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
> +#include <linux/capability.h>
>
> #include <linux/kbd_kern.h>
> #include <linux/vt_kern.h>
> @@ -2379,7 +2382,7 @@ static int tiocswinsz(struct tty_struct *tty, struct winsize __user *arg)
> */
> static int tioccons(struct file *file)
> {
> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (!file_ns_capable(file, file->f_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
> if (file->f_op->write_iter == redirected_tty_write) {
> struct file *f;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-17 12:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-07 13:41 [PATCH] tty: replace capable() with file_ns_capable() Pranav Tyagi
2025-06-08 10:25 ` Greg KH
2025-06-13 13:53 ` Pranav Tyagi
2025-06-17 12:04 ` David Laight [this message]
2025-06-18 6:32 ` Pranav Tyagi
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