From: Markus Probst <markus.probst@posteo.de>
To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev
Cc: linux-serial@vger.kernel.org, ojeda@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] rust: serdev: Fix race condition on driver unbind
Date: Sat, 05 Sep 2026 13:47:20 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e627289dea7ba171f14bdd19e96ba9d8e490c8d5.camel@posteo.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260905134458.85BDE1F00A3D@smtp.kernel.org>
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On Sat, 2026-09-05 at 13:44 +0000, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
> - [High] The function `drvdata_drop` introduces a Use-After-Free window and mutable aliasing vulnerability by dropping the driver data before clearing `dev->driver_data`.
> - [Low] The new helper function `drvdata_drop` is missing the `#[inline]` attribute.
> --
>
> commit 26ab6ef2b4c35bdc9d899d45004d0c1a7f3fca80
> Author: Markus Probst <markus.probst@posteo.de>
>
> rust: serdev: Fix race condition on driver unbind
>
> This commit attempts to fix a race condition where the driver data pointer is
> NULL while the serdev device is still open. It does this by introducing a new
> function drvdata_drop() that leaves the pointer valid until the memory drop
> is complete.
>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-serial/20260905000836.C8FC91F00A3D@smtp.kernel.org/
>
> > diff --git a/rust/kernel/device.rs b/rust/kernel/device.rs
> > index 2291d85b6849e..3886cc713c28b 100644
> > --- a/rust/kernel/device.rs
> > +++ b/rust/kernel/device.rs
>
> [ ... ]
>
> > @@ -236,6 +237,32 @@ pub(crate) unsafe fn drvdata_obtain<T>(&self) -> Option<Pin<KBox<T>>> {
> > // in `into_foreign()`.
> > Some(unsafe { Pin::<KBox<T>>::from_foreign(ptr.cast()) })
> > }
> > +
> > + /// Drop the private data stored in this [`Device`].
> > + ///
> > + /// The pointer to the private data remains valid until the drop is complete.
> > + ///
> > + /// # Safety
> > + ///
> > + /// - The type `T` must match the type of the `ForeignOwnable` previously stored by
> > + /// [`Device::set_drvdata`].
> > + pub(crate) unsafe fn drvdata_drop<T>(&self) {
>
> [Severity: Low]
> This isn't a bug, but should this abstraction function be annotated with
> `#[inline]`?
>
> The Rust subsystem coding guidelines mandate that small functions forwarding
> to C bindings or performing small abstraction tasks should use `#[inline]`.
>
> > + // SAFETY: By the type invariants, `self.as_raw()` is a valid pointer to a `struct device`.
> > + let ptr = unsafe { bindings::dev_get_drvdata(self.as_raw()) };
> > +
> > + if ptr.is_null() {
> > + return;
> > + }
> > +
> > + // SAFETY:
> > + // - If `ptr` is not NULL, it comes from a previous call to `into_foreign()`.
> > + // - `dev_get_drvdata()` guarantees to return the same pointer given to `dev_set_drvdata()`
> > + // in `into_foreign()`.
> > + drop(unsafe { Pin::<KBox<T>>::from_foreign(ptr.cast()) });
> > +
> > + // SAFETY: By the type invariants, `self.as_raw()` is a valid pointer to a `struct device`.
> > + unsafe { bindings::dev_set_drvdata(self.as_raw(), core::ptr::null_mut()) };
drvdata_obtain didn't have it.
>
> [Severity: High]
> Does this create a Use-After-Free window?
>
> By dropping the driver data before clearing `dev->driver_data`, the pointer
> remains valid while and after the memory is freed.
>
> If a concurrent context, such as a hardware interrupt triggering
> receive_buf_callback() in rust/kernel/serdev.rs, runs at this exact
> moment, it will borrow a dangling pointer:
>
> rust/kernel/serdev.rs:receive_buf_callback() {
> ...
> let private_data = unsafe { sdev.as_ref().drvdata_borrow::<PrivateData<'_, T>>() };
> ...
> }
>
> Could this lead to a memory corruption vulnerability during the unbind path?
Under a normal case, no one should access this pointer anymore. For
serdev, this isn't a normal case. Before it becomes a dangling pointer,
PinnedDrop ensures it won't be used afterwards.
>
> > + }
> > }
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-05 13:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-05 13:30 [PATCH v2 0/2] rust: serdev: Mitigate race conditions Markus Probst
2026-09-05 13:30 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] rust: serdev: Fix race condition on driver unbind Markus Probst
2026-09-05 13:44 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-05 13:47 ` Markus Probst [this message]
2026-09-05 14:16 ` Gary Guo
2026-09-05 17:44 ` Markus Probst
2026-09-05 13:30 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] rust: serdev: Fix race condition on driver probe Markus Probst
2026-09-05 13:49 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-05 13:57 ` Markus Probst
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